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Introduction
In light of the fact that for a long time I never dreamt of writing a 
phenomenology of redemption, a word of explanation about the 
title and the range of content of this book is in order. In explaining 
how an ethnography of Scottish nationalism ended up also 
becoming a sociological phenomenology of Christian redemption, 
I can only say that if it is the final end-point of a journey that 
reveals the final meaning to the road travelled, then this goes some 
way to explaining the unexpected trajectory that is described here. 
The book emerges from two periods of research in my natal Fife 
village of Cardenden in the east of Scotland. Firstly, from doctoral 
fieldwork conducted between 1998 until 2003 and, secondly, from 
fieldwork conducted throughout 2013 into locals’ views on the 
upcoming Independence Referendum on 18 September 2014. At 
the time of my initial doctoral studies I felt fortunate to be 
researching working-class politics at a time of unprecedented 
questioning and contestation of Scottish identity, and I was certain 
that my informants who were living through the restoration of the 
Scots parliament in 1999 would be likely to voice their sense of 
‘the nation’ and its politicisation. However, if my doctoral 
research was fortuitous in terms of timing, the preparation of this 
book for publication was done living through an even more 
significant turning point in Scotland’s history i.e. the run-up to 
Scotland’s ‘date with destiny’ in the Independence Referendum of 
2014 as a result of the Scottish National Party’s victory in 2011.
For a long time I imagined the book that I might write from my 
doctoral fieldwork would be a straightforward ethnography of 
nationalism that fortuitously captured the moment of its historic 
triumph, and at no stage did I imagine I would end up writing on 
the range of experiences covered here or the question of 
transcendence as my original aim was to present a ‘fundamental 
ontology’ of the Scottish working class and proceed to an 
understanding of the working-class nationalism that is emergent 
in Scotland today. However, in trying to understand contemporary 
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Scotland’s “present as history” (Jameson 1984; Hobsbawm 1997) 
the historic events of 1999 which saw the triumph of the desire to 
re-organise political life in Scotland upon exclusively national 
grounds and which turned several generations of yesterday’s 
wisdom into today’s foolishness, meant that it was not only 
appropriate but fundamentally necessary to ask at this precise 
point in Scotland’s history the question: if the elite who defended 
a depoliticised relation between nation and state for so long are 
destined to be remembered as having defended an obsolete 
imagining of Scotland, what other false wisdoms must be 
suspected and dismantled at this time? What other false wisdoms 
are we still labouring under and what other relationships require 
liberating from their current form? If Scottish nationalists, 
who throughout the modern industrial period were confidently 
dismissed insofar as they were held to advocate an impossible 
return to a hopelessly out-of-date ‘medieval’ programme of 
resurrecting the Scottish State in fact articulated a superior 
wisdom in their de-differentiated conception of the relation 
between nation and state, what other tasks of de-differentiation 
are necessary today?
Insofar as these questions emerged onto my horizon I began 
to lose control of what I needed to address and more or less lost 
sight of the end point to which I might arrive. Where I have 
arrived to is arguing for the need to rethink (Scottish) human 
being outwith the established mirrors of modernism, industrialism 
and secularism and that such is one of the tasks awaiting post-
industrial generations recently liberated by literacy and affluence 
(Galbraith 1969). It is my view that beneath the rise of nationalism 
and the imminent prospect of the restoration of Scotland’s historic 
independence, something more fundamental is happening and 
identifying what this ‘something’ is has taken me some years to 
see with any kind of clarity. I argue that nationalism is only a 
fraction of what is emerging and that the retrieval of the repressed 
‘medieval’ nation is only a fraction of what must be retrieved if 
we are to become equal to the task of understanding “the present 
as history” (Jameson 1984, p. 65) or “comprehending our era in 
thought” (Hegel 1991, p. 21).
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i n t r o d u c t i o n
I argue in what follows that in taking up the task of representing 
a social class recently empowered by literacy and affluence and 
provoked by political events from 1979 onwards, the task that 
devolves to the social researcher is the challenge of re-thinking 
human being within the ‘mirror of production’ (Baudrillard 1975) 
but outwith a debilitating modernist consciousness1 and taking up 
this task has led to the range of concerns tackled here. A focus 
upon contemporary nationalism has meant a process of coming 
to understand that to properly contextualise my data I had to 
situate it within a broader European context and within the 
question of modernity. In what follows I locate the beginning of 
the modern era in the gradual shift to living in ‘society’ begun in 
the twelfth century, which saw the shift from an agrarian-based 
organic community to the cash nexus and the urbanisation of 
human living (Haskins 1927; Pirenne 1936; Hollister 1969; 
Trinkaus and Oberman 1974; Gimpel 1977; Constable 1996; 
Chenu 1997; Bisson 2008) and the growth in individual freedom 
(Morris 1987) and the gradual disappearance of serfdom from 
this time onwards (Lyon, cited in Warren-Holister 1969, 
pp. 59-67). In locating the advent of modernity in the twelfth-
century I have simply learned from a range of scholars better 
informed than myself, such as Castoriadis (1987, p. 48):
What we see in the twelfth–to nineteenth–century Europe is 
not a great number of different types of society appearing, 
and then all dying away except for one because they are 
incapable of surviving. We see one phenomenon, the birth…
of the bourgeoisie.
1 The terms modernist and modernism are used interchangeably with the latter 
term not being used in the sense of the ‘literary modernism’ of, for example, Hugh 
McDiarmid or James Joyce where it denotes the literary depiction of the mundane 
at the expense of the heroic and the Greco-Roman classical tradition. The aesthetic 
modernism which turned to the mundane and everyday in a conscious rejection of 
classical aesthetics is not my understanding of modernism. Rather, I use the term 
to denote the myth that modern societies either have or must effect a break or 
caesura with their past in order to either become or remain modern.
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I define the condition of ‘being modern’ as the advent of living a 
particular and defining tension: the tension involved in living a 
‘perennial’ or pre-modern set of beliefs in a modern stratified 
market society characterised by a complex division of labour. 
In giving an account of ‘the present as history,’ recognising the 
importance of the twelfth century has become a feature of my 
thinking which is at odds with modernists within the sociological 
tradition such as Kilminster (1998). I use the term modernist 
to describe, as a first approximation, those who share the “belief 
in the once-for-all distinction between the present age (called 
‘Modern’) and the past” (Ardener, cited in Overing 1985, p. 47) 
and who generally imagine the advent of the modern and the 
advent of ‘society’ to be a far later development in European 
history than historical scholarship advocates. My emphasis upon 
the twelfth century as the beginning of the modern era, then, 
comes from reading historians such as Bisson (2009) who has 
argued that the crisis of the twelfth century saw the shift, after 
1150, from the experience of power as the exercise of ‘personal 
lordship’ to the experience of power as impersonal Government, 
so that it is from the twelfth century there emerged from the 
experience of locality and lordship the beginning of the European 
experience of Government, Society and the State. In contrast 
to this periodisation of modernity, the modernist sociologist 
Kilminster (1998, p. 11) writes:
Of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries one could say 
that people did not experience their social interconnectedness 
as ‘society,’ but rather the experience of society resulted from 
the actions of leading people such as kings and ministers.
If the project or tension of ‘being modern’ was originally specific 
to European Christians (Morris 1949, pp. 9-24), subsequent to 
this original twelfth-century advent of modernity saw the 
emergence of non-Christian or purely naturalistic forms of living 
this tension. The tension of ‘being modern’ then is no longer 
exclusive to Christians (nor Europeans) insofar as it includes non-
religious beliefs such as Marxism, for example, so that the struggle 
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to reconcile the current market order with beliefs and values 
surrounding conceptions of ‘the good society’ establishes a tension 
and dialectic of ‘being modern’ within non-religious biographies, 
so that the tension lived by the contemporary Christian fated to 
struggle with Royce’s (2001, p. 62) question, “Can the modern 
man be a Christian?” has become a universal tension. 
What unites the varied range of concerns I will address in due 
course is the basic proposition that today’s post-industrial working-
class generations face the question of ‘being modern’ in a unique 
and fresh manner as they are living through the death of various 
wisdoms that imagined they had solved the question of ‘being 
modern.’ If some tried and tested imaginings of Scotland have been 
revealed as ‘foolish’ and are on the brink of obsolescence, the 
challenge to those producing representations of Scotland today is 
to articulate fully contextual imaginings of ‘being modern’ and 
fully contextual accounts of individuation based upon empirical 
research in particular localities and communities. I argue that 
successfully prosecuting this task means nothing less than effecting 
a re-orientation of the Scottish imagination and psyche and in this 
task it is necessary to return to the original twelfth-century source 
of the modern era to take our bearings. On the eve of the 
Independence Referendum, taking this long durée perspective is 
appropriate and must be integrated into our understanding of 
Scotland’s “present as history” (Jameson 1984, p. 65) as it allows 
onto our horizon an emergent working-class project of systematic 
integralism that has been prepared for by literacy and affluence 
and political events and the retrieval of the nation by a younger 
working-class generation liberated by these same forces.
If, so far, the response of a younger working-class generation to 
the question of being modern has come in the still-emerging shape 
of constituting a politics without England, this is only a fraction 
of an emergent integralist vision insofar as what is ‘at hand’ is a 
new imagining of cultural and psychological and social and 
spiritual and intellectual development beyond the established 
sources and imaginings of modernism. My answer to the challenge 
of thinking the present as history is a vision of modern class-
informed individuation and sociation beyond the twin errors of 
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supernaturalism and secularism as a direct result of “the free 
appropriation of one’s whole Dasein” (Heidegger 1998, p. 53) 
which only now is a real possibility thanks to the advent of 
affluence and literacy in the nineteen-eighties. In light of the recent 
reversal of modernist understandings at a political level, my view 
is that working-class producers of culture will proceed to widen 
their horizon to the whole modernist mythology as they construct 
their own social imaginary and produce a post-supernaturalist 
and post-secular literature, music and theatre, for example, free of 
industrialism and modernism.
The phrase being modern then is used in two ways. Firstly, 
drawing upon the work of historians, ‘being modern’ denotes 
a series of macro or large-scale social, economic, demographic, 
political and intellectual changes that occurred from the twelfth 
century. Secondly, the term is used to denote an existential 
condition that I propose only arrives to the Scottish central-belt 
working class after the end of the “dictatorship of scarcity” (Beck 
1992, p. 20) in the nineteen-seventies. I distinguish ‘being modern’ 
in two senses then: in the sense of the first arrival of ‘society’ as 
opposed to ‘community’ and the advent of government as opposed 
to ‘personal lordship’ (Bisson 2009), the advent of new technology 
and urbanisation and a range of macro processes resulting in 
society being volatilised to the extent that we can say the twelfth 
century saw the end of a non-dynamic or static view of human 
society, and that from this time onwards social change disrupting 
settled convention became normal. This macro view of modernity, 
then, is related to but also should be distinguished from the use of 
the phrase ‘being modern’ to describe a condition of the lifeworld 
of the individual. In this latter sense ‘being modern’ describes the 
condition of exercising real freedom concerning one’s social fate. 
A person can be modern, then, in the sense of living in a modern 
society characterised by change and innovation in knowledge and 
technology while in their own life and consciousness they may 
remain largely immune to the second sense of ‘being modern.’ 
Societies and periods of time then may be modern while many 
living through those times may not be modern in their consciousness 
or behaviour.
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From the evidence of historians, twelfth-century European 
Christians were alive to the new tension of being modern in the 
sense of living the predicament of reconciling their new social 
conditions free of agrarian conventions and fixed political and 
social arrangements laid down by custom since ‘time immemo-
rial.’ The advent of the volatilisation of social and economic and 
political conditions in the twelfth century has remained, as has 
specifically intellectual problematics and an existential condition 
mediated by a shared Christian consciousness that was never the 
preoccupation of an elite but of much of the general population, 
and that may be expressed as having to bear the weight of the 
historicisation of Christian redemption in changing social con- 
ditions. Today, this condition in its non-religious guise is known 
as the ‘crisis of the West’ which as a result of affluence and deep 
literacy is becoming a democratic existential predicament insofar 
as it is increasingly difficult not to have one’s lifeworld impacted 
by the drama of reflexive modernisation and the drama of being 
post-conventional.
Being modern then volatilises the realm of culture and belief 
because of the objective pressures to exercise reflexivity in order 
to practice a predicament, and one of those predicaments par 
excellence is the burden of exercising sovereignty. Only a clear 
sighting of the ‘present as history’ frees one to assume the 
responsibilities of being modern and make one’s way as an 
individual or a locality or a class or a nation under one’s own 
steam or upon the basis of one’s specific ‘secondary nature’ – 
whether the ‘condition of reduction’ for the worker-inquirer (see 
Chapter 2) or the geographical or territorial ‘second nature’ of the 
nation (Chapter 5). I will argue that the contemporary significance 
of the twelfth century is its being a historical period when the 
‘present as history’ was imagined in a way that was free of 
modernist despoliation, so that this era models how we today 
might retain a holistic or integral vision of ourselves and correctly 
depart towards our future upon the basis of the deepest historical 
continuity with the past that our fully-contextualised dasein in 
conscious and free possession of itself is capable of. Because new 
generations are living through the demise of old answers to the 
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tension and conundrum of being modern, the original twelfth-
century advent of modernity provides useful ballast as it knew 
nothing of the ‘separation of powers’ but thanks to the great 
Investiture Controversy knows the defining tension between 
the sacred and the secular, and is a significant resource for a 
contemporary working-class integralism which will form the basis 
for a genuine pluralism within the public realm, instead of the 
current toxic cleansing of political and public life which is too 
rarefied to support working-class life. To the question whether 
a working-class generation has been liberated by literacy and 
affluence simply to reproduce the same materialist and modernist 
‘evacuation of Scottish being’ practiced by their modernist masters 
throughout the “dictatorship of scarcity” (Beck 1992, p. 20) 
period there can be only one answer, and an important part of that 
answer is likely to come in the 2014 Independence Referendum.
While there is a consensus of opinion that there has been a 
shift to a nationality-based politics of identity in Scotland away 
from traditional all-British materialist conceptions of class politics 
among the working class (Brown et al. 1996; Paterson 1996), this 
‘new’ class politics remains a politics of identity, and if a central 
thesis in what follows is that the politics of nationality in Scotland 
today is being driven by class realities, within the term ‘class 
realities’ is an entire social ontology that is in-formed by national 
identity which I propose to think through. Part of the significance 
of the 2014 Independence Referendum lies in this retrieval of the 
original European non-modernist advent of the modern era to 
overcome nihilism and meet the epidemic of post-foundationalist 
scepticism which characterises much of European intellectual 
culture. In what follows I will outline the contours of a post-
affluent and post-liberal working-class generation’s systematic 
integralism based upon their own ‘integral contingency,’ and give 
an account of integral liberation upon the rock of socio-historic 
contingency, a decentred and class-specific ontology opposed to 
any pretence of being a universal ontology.
As what follows is a phenomenology of working-class being, 
the influence of Husserl and Heidegger is never far away and 
along with Heidegger (1962, p. 155) I conceive dasein as mitsein 
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because “Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one I share 
with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. 
Being-in is Being-with Others.”2 My use of the Heideggerian 
terms dasein (‘being there’) and mitsein (‘being with’) then is 
largely interchangeable given that “for Heidegger Dasein is 
Mitsein; what it means to be a person is indistinguishable from my 
being with others” (Critchley 2007, p. 59). My view is that the 
project of understanding Scottish nationalism via thinking 
working-class dasein is necessary because I categorically reject the 
idea that one can rise to the challenge of grasping the ‘present as 
history’ without a fundamental ontology of the class that 
constitutes much of the social reality of the force that is dominating 
political life i.e. nationalism. Also, working-class nationalism 
rather usefully frames its desire to have the Nation and State 
congruent without recourse to prefabricated metaphors of ‘blood 
and soil’ or stranded appeals to ‘civic nationalism’ or ‘civil society’ 
(Yack 1996; Hearn 2000).
Why there are Scots while ‘North Britons’ are long extinct is 
a problem for modernist theorists of nationalism who maintain 
the nation can be imagined ex nihilo or ‘out of nothing’ (Gellner 
1997, pp. 90-101). Chapters 4 and 5 attempt to understand why 
a ‘medieval patrimony’ has not only survived but is driving current 
events in Scotland, and I explain this state of affairs by arguing 
an important consequence of maintaining the local mediates 
the national is to abandon the illusion of ‘civil society’ as either 
constituting the nation or having been responsible for nursing 
the nation through its exile from statehood. Hence, “re-framing 
Scottish nationalism” via the prism of “social contract theory” 
2 The term phenomenology is used in the widely accepted sense of an approach 
that is concerned with the way things appear to the human person as opposed to 
how they may appear to a detached observer or a God-like point of view. As a 
description of methodology, I use the word phenomenology in the Heideggerian 
sense of that process of conducting research that highlights “the process of 
letting things manifest themselves” (Heidegger, cited in Relph 1989, p. 15) 
thanks to an iterative process whereby the researcher’s perception is increasingly 
freed from the clichéd and hackneyed understandings of human affairs that are 
conveniently ‘at hand.’ 
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(Hearn 1998, 2000) or “liberal nationalism” (Tamir 1993; 
MacCormick 1996) not only offers little purchase upon working-
class reality but are examples of the cleansing of nationalism of 
its social density and class reality. The general argument I will 
pursue is also a direct challenge to those nationalists who, having 
abandoned political modernism in the shape of the failed geo-
political experiment of the United Kingdom, wish to cling onto 
cultural and philosophical forms of modernism. These more 
fundamental forms of modernism which will remain intact after 
independence is achieved, means many nationalists fail to catch 
sight of what is at stake and what is possible in Scotland today at 
this historic turning of the tide. Among the SNP membership and 
leadership are those who prefer their ‘medieval particularism’ 
(Lenin) to be lite, their territorialisation of identity and freedom to 
be ‘civic’ and their return to a ‘medieval’ patrimony to be as brief 
as possible. While these civic nationalists celebrated the return of a 
Scottish parliament in 1999 and hope for the return of a Scottish 
state after 2014, they propose a highly selective and short-lived 
‘return of the repressed’ insofar as what horrifies the modernist 
imagination in a globalising twenty-first century Scotland is the 
prospect of an ‘integral particularism’ which enthusiastically takes 
to the reconstruction of the many tasks that three centuries of 
modernism among social and cultural elites, as well as ‘scarcity 
thinking’ among the dominated, have left unsuspected, untouched 
and unimaginable.
If the official State-opening of the Holyrood parliament that 
took place on 1 July 1999 represents the partial ‘putting right’ of 
the failure of modernity and the long trek ‘back to the future,’ the 
restoration of Scotland’s political structures to its ‘ancient’ 
standards signals the failure of modernism as a politics but is only 
the beginning of a longer struggle against metaphysical forms 
of modernism such as modernism as an anthropology and 
a philosophy of history. Chapters 4 and 5 argue the modernist 
legacy in Scotland must be replaced by the intellectual and cultural 
triumph of a species of particularism and the return of a repressed 
twelfth-century integralism that may be described as a perennial 
template in view of the fact that the historico-symbolic complex 
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that first imagined and achieved national sovereignty has been 
resurrected and mobilised at the ballot box to return a genuine 
political dialectic to Scotland and rescue affluent and literate 
Scotland from the modernist no man’s land of the past three 
centuries. I argue that what we are witnessing in Scotland today 
is the retrieval of a more fundamental medieval-come-modern 
project that, long abandoned, has been mobilised in response to 
the ‘long event’ of 1979-1997; a politicisation of national identity 
and a disposition to de-differentiate what liberal modernity sought 
to differentiate, so that what is ‘at hand’ is a disposition to reject 
traditional accommodations to modernist understandings of 
history and the bourgeois anthropology which views modern man 
as a variant of homo economicus and, thanks to the deployment 
of a long inert historico-symbolic complex, seeks to put in its 
place not an era that comes after modernity but a more balanced 
project of modernity and in the process break from inherited geo-
political, intergenerational, political and cultural relations and 
self-understandings.
I will develop the argument that Scotland has once again begun 
to address the question of what it means to be modern upon 
the basis of freedom from political union with England, and 
fundamental to the sociology of Scottish nationalism is the fact 
that by destroying all-British strongholds among the Scottish 
working class such as all-British industries and all-British trade 
unions, the ‘post-national’ neoliberal globalisation of the economy 
pursued in the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties was integral 
to deconstructing the geo-political relationships which have 
characterised Scotland’s modernity insofar as it destroyed the 
mundane bases for the symbolic reproduction of Britain among 
the post-industrial working class. If an older generation of 
Scots who traditionally did not question union with England are 
becoming rare, opting for political unionism at the ballot box 
among a younger working-class generation is becoming ever-rarer 
in light of modern forces such as affluence and higher literacy 
(Seawright and Curtice 1995) as well as political and historic 
events coming into alignment with the nationalist project and 
releasing long suppressed cultural and historical exigencies to such 
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an extent that, sociologically speaking, young people voting for 
union with England makes as much sociological sense as voting 
for communism or marginal socialist parties. I argue, then, that 
the signature weakness of unionism as it fights for its very life in 
Scotland today is that it is not alive to the task of ‘being modern’ 
or the task of thinking the present as history and for many signifies 
the tired turning to a prefabricated solution that has been tried for 
three centuries and has been found wanting.
If there has emerged a re-articulation of the political field among 
younger generations in the shape of a politics without England, 
a deeper question is what uses will a post-affluent working-class 
generation put its recently-acquired access to higher education to? 
In answering this question I recognise counter-evidence to my thesis 
concerning an emergent re-imagining of working-class dasein free 
from modernist mythology as even in the ‘renaissance’ of working-
class writing that occurred in Scotland during the nineteen-eighties 
and nineteen-nineties, those authors who now enjoy iconic status as 
working-class writers still struggle to shed the modernist or ‘mono-
chromatic’ anthropology they have internalised and struggle to 
model how to re-think working-class human being free from the 
corruptions of modernism, materialism and secularism. In the likes 
of Irvine Welsh and James Kelman, then, we still see depictions of 
working-class dasein with some of the primary colours of human 
being removed as a matter of realist principle, which I take as 
evidence of how recent and fragile is an emergent working-class 
literature free from “the yoke of scarcity” (Sartre 1963, p. 34) and 
the truncated materialist vision of working-class dasein which 
inspires this use of literacy. In this regard the words of Dolan (1999, 
p. 49) are apposite: “It’s hard to write purely in the abstract 
when you’re surrounded by poverty and blighted lives. But it’s 
also a grave misunderstanding to think that realism itself hasn’t 
moved on.”
Against Nairn’s characterisation of nationalism as the 
bourgeoisie inviting “the masses into history” (1981, p. 340) I take 
the mainstream sociological position that Scottish nationalism 
is more accurately described as the working class inviting a 
traditionally unionist middle class into playing its part in the 
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creation of Scottish history and an independent State in light of 
sociologists’ findings (Brown et al. 1996, p. 153) that “support for 
a Scottish parliament has been higher in working-class than in 
middle-class groups in every survey that has ever asked the 
question.” The working-class integralism that has already (partially) 
achieved a nation-state of its own thanks to the re-convening of 
the Scottish parliament is just one element of a much larger and 
more fundamental ‘politics of being’ that is at hand, so that in 
contrast to characterisations of the present era as an incredulity 
towards foundationalist projects (Lyotard 1984), the late-modern 
condition of Scotland offers an empirical opportunity to research a 
systematic integralism that is emerging (Kravitz 1997, pp. xi-xxxvi).
Having spent the last fifteen years taking advantage of this 
historic opportunity, what follows is essentially an ethnographic 
account that is based upon a prolonged period of “being there” 
(Geertz 1988) and the longitudinal data that this long-term 
project has brought into view. For example, in August 1998 
when beginning doctoral fieldwork my tenancy agreement with 
Fife Council stipulated a monthly rent of £137.28 and still in 
Cardenden some fifteen years later in 2013 my monthly mortgage 
is £789.66. In 1998 the Jamphlars garage in Cardenden advertised 
MOTs at £17.50 and in 2013 an MOT now costs £45; in 1998 a 
litre of unleaded petrol at the Robertson’s garage in Cardenden 
(which has since closed) cost 74.9 pence and in 2013 a litre 
of unleaded petrol costs 136.9 pence at the nearest garage in 
Kirkcaldy. In 1998 a pint of lager at the Railway Tavern cost 
£1.60 while in September 2013 the same pint costs £2.90. In 1998 
my weekly wage when working with East of Scotland Water 
authority was £186.06 and in 2013 my weekly wage was £929.31. 
Longitudinal ethnography, then, allows such data to emerge and 
conducting fieldwork meant I was able to appropriate the benefits 
of participant observation:
As a technique of research, participant observation 
distinguishes itself by breaking down the barriers between 
observer and participant, between those who study and 
those who are studied. It shatters the glass box from which 
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sociologists observe the world and puts them temporarily at 
the mercy of their subjects…the ethnographer confronts 
participants in their corporeal reality, in their concrete 
existence, in their time and space. 
(Burawoy et al. 1991, p. 291).
However, I am sure that I would never have dared to cover the 
range of topics that follow were it not for the additional confidence 
that comes from conducting “anthropology at home” (Jackson 
1987) and drawing upon my insider status as a result of having 
been brought up in the village I studied. This study also emerges 
from conducting anthropology at home as an undergraduate in 
1987, as well as Master’s degree research in 1997 on the miners’ 
strike of 1984-1985 and then doctoral level study. Because in 
what follows I am ‘writing’ my natal village I am engaged with the 
“writing culture” debate (Marcus & Fischer 1986) and the general 
post-positivist emphasis upon reflexivity which accepts that an 
ethnographer’s embeddedness in his or her home culture plays an 
integral part in the production of anthropological knowledge. I 
share the same class and national identity of my informants and 
in this respect hope to emulate anthropologists such as Obeyesekere 
(1979, 1981) and Tambiah (1986) who have exploited their 
shared background with the nationalists they write about. As a 
local among other locals, then, I apply Emmett’s comment to 
myself: “The fact that I have been living in rather than studying 
Blaenau, have been my own informant as much as an ethnographer, 
I count as an advantage (cited in Cohen 1982, p. 165).
Conducting ethnography at home was an advantage as it 
enabled me to comply with the specifically ethnographic approach 
to nationalism whereby in the words of my doctoral supervisor: 
“Local experience mediates national identity and, therefore, an 
anthropological understanding of the latter cannot proceed 
without knowledge of the former” (Cohen 1982, p. 13). This 
requirement to understand the local social and cultural context 
out of which nationalism emerges has enabled me to evidence 
the consubstantial link that exists between different ‘realms of 
belonging:’ from the intimate and domestic everyday realm to the 
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national political realm. Likewise, in light of Eriksen’s contention 
that: “[National identity’s] great emotional power, and its 
unabashed linking up with the intimate sphere” (in Olwig & 
Hastrup 1997, p. 109) is of a piece with Herzfeld’s (1997) urging 
anthropologists of nationalism to attend to how ordinary people 
experience ‘being national’ and aligns with current thinking 
among anthropologists (Handler 1984 & 1985; Smith 1986; 
Segal & Handler 1992; Brubaker 1996) which stresses that it 
is necessary to understand traditional forms of community 
and belonging in order to achieve ethnographic accounts of 
nationalism. In a small Fife village such as Cardenden, then, 
belonging is experienced and expressed largely through the idiom 
of kinship so that a person belongs because, like his or her mother 
and father before, he or she was “born and brought up” in 
Cardenden. Kinship and residence, then, are the traditional means 
through which belonging is articulated in everyday life so that 
longevity of residence and kinship-based metaphors of belonging 
are an integral aspect of the larger construction of national 
identity and belonging and confirm Herzfeld’s argument in 
Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation State (1997) 
regarding the special relevance of anthropology’s ability to achieve 
theoretical purchase upon the popular appeal of nationalist 
discourse insofar as it is able to explain why “marginal 
communities…are often the source of the national-character 
models” (1997, p. 7). In what follows, then, I argue that 
Cardenden affords an ethnographic site for investigating the 
iconicity between local and national identity, an idiom of 
‘sameness’ to mark boundaries of identity and belonging.
In terms of the geographic location of my research I make 
my own Macdonald’s (1997, p. 9) description of her study of 
the Hebridean island of Skye: “The geographically defined 
‘community’…constitutes not the boundaries and limits of my 
investigation but the position from which to begin, and through 
which to focus, the discussion.” While the clear geographic focus 
of what follows is the post-industrial village of Cardenden, I view 
this study as directly relevant not only to the former coalfield 
areas and former pit villages of Fife but to the many post-industrial 
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lives and localities throughout central Scotland. If the local 
mediates the national there is the need to articulate working-class 
culture before focusing upon national identity and its politicisation. 
However, in terms of the available scholarly representations of 
‘working-class Scotland,’ it seems working-class Scotland doesn’t 
much exist in the minds of working-class Scots in light of the fact 
that from the outset of fieldwork I was struck by informants’ 
matter-of-fact insistence that “there’s nothing here,’’ so that my 
informants set me the challenge of constructing ‘something from 
nothing’ insofar as they refused to claim the presence of a local 
substantive culture, and so a research question became: if not 
from substantive cultural traditions, then from what ‘stuff’ is 
Scottish working-class nationalism being drawn from?
If conducting anthropology at home has several advantages, 
one obvious difference between this and traditional anthropological 
fieldwork carried out in far-flung fields is that instead of being 
faced with a surplus of data in the shape of a strange language or 
unfamiliar practices and beliefs that stand out for the ethnographer’s 
attention, researching at home meant the question of what to 
research was far from straightforward due to the absence of any 
strange language, beliefs, customs or practices. From the outset 
I was faced with Foley’s (1989) question whether the working 
class has a culture in the anthropological sense and in this regard 
Nade-Klein (1997) has argued that ethnographers of Scotland 
have reproduced the Highland/Lowland distinction because they 
have failed to engage in anthropology at home due to their 
persistent preference to conduct research in remote rural areas 
which are unrepresentative of the lives of the vast majority of 
Scots. This study, then, is very much an ethnography of the 
Scottish working class and is offered in the belief that it speaks to 
the post-industrial central belt of Scotland where the majority of 
Scots live.
Constituting the what to represent, then, has been a defining 
and ongoing issue for me and has been a question posed within 
the context of many theorists having struggled with the realisation 
that working-class dasein and mitsein are defined by their 
separation from any form of substantive culture or ‘tradition.’ 
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As opposed to the production and inheritance of a literature, a 
language, an architecture or some other defining quality to rescue 
the researcher from the problem of constituting ‘the what’ to 
represent, I argue that what there is to study are defining relations 
and it is these relations that in large measure constitute the reality 
of being working class. In what follows I begin my answer to the 
question of what there is to represent by an immersion into the 
world of manual labour and gradually rise to a viewpoint which 
stresses a subjectivity and an intersubjectivity and a range of 
communicative practices and a politics specific to the working 
class, before finally arguing this ‘something’ is a class-specific 
departure point for an insertion into and appropriation of the 
wider European cultural tradition. Grappling with the problem 
of how to produce ‘something from nothing’ was how I began my 
journey to a structuralist perspective and to understanding that 
the real is structural or relational. The move to a relational 
definition of reality and a structuralist theory of meaning echoes 
Caws’s (1997, p. 249) conclusion that the “most general insight of 
structuralism...is that the elements of the human world are 
constituted out of the relations into which they enter,” and is 
something I have found particularly relevant for capturing the 
decentred nature of working-class experience.
I argue that relations generate ‘stuff’ or reality; not only the 
what of that which is present to the subject in his experience 
but the means to experience his experience so that working-class 
nationalism, for example, is the politicisation of a highly structured 
social ontology characterised by a radical openness to incarnating 
time, history, locality, society and work etcetera. Fully-contextual 
Man, then, is more or less fated to make himself through 
the relations he is made to enter or through the relations he is 
not able to enter so that, as a rule, ontology is at the mercy of 
relations which are at the mercy of social and historical forces. A 
structuralist theory of human being, then, points to the conclusion 
that the working class is the social group most incapable of 
escaping their relations to being, time, society, history etcetera 
due to their lacking the means to resource any thought, far less 
practice, of removing themselves from their material conditions or 
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instantiating a ‘forgetfulness’ of their objective being and time 
and their structuring consequences. Insofar as human reality is 
fundamentally structural/relational, I systematically develop the 
conclusion that the working class are the social group most 
conformed to their relations and the world in their being and that 
to grasp this is to grasp all there is to grasp about working-class 
dasein. Because the working class are the social class who more 
than any other have been reduced to the exigencies of the wage-
capital relation, they are the social group most incapable of 
substantivist illusions regarding themselves and their localities, 
so that if we turn our attention to nationalism, for example, it is 
rare to hear nationalism articulated as discourse, and this lack 
of nationalist discourse was the clue that set me on the road to 
understanding the ‘ontological work’ which relations must 
perform and the ‘ontological density’ which relations are capable 
of constituting and carrying. This structuralist understanding 
when turned to the realm of meaning was the key to realising 
locals’ nationalism borrows its ‘substance’ from the various 
relations they inhabit as opposed to being sourced in a discourse 
of values such as civic society or civic nationalism.
The ethnographer who wishes to think about working-class 
experience but is wary of hackneyed and clichéd language has 
an obvious affinity with Husserl’s phenomenological project of 
a “return to the things themselves” (Husserl 1975, p. 252). I also 
believe this concern to avoid cliché is shared by locals themselves 
insofar as they refuse to claim the existence of a living working-class 
tradition in contemporary conditions of deindustrialization. For my 
informants, the existence and reality of a ‘working-class culture’ is 
easier to discern when looking back to the era of coal and the years 
of economic and political struggle and the heyday of locality, and as 
an ethnographer of this post-industrialised locality I often felt faced 
with an obvious yet intangible ‘nothingness,’ with fieldwork often 
feeling like being on a treadmill chasing a passed ‘something.’ It 
seems to me that the ethnographer of any working class is faced 
with the problem characterised by Marcus when discussing Willis’s 
ethnography of the English working class and the ethnographer 
“having to invest richness of meaning in “thin” cultural forms 
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purely generated by responses to capitalism” (Marcus and Fischer 
1986, p. 178), and as someone who “strains to invest positive 
meaning and richness in a cultural form that seems entirely 
oppositional” (Marcus and Fischer 1986, pp. 178-9). This concern 
directly relates to Hoggart’s question in The Uses of Literacy: 
Aspects of Working Class Life (1957) as to the uses made of literacy 
by the first Scottish working-class generation socialised in conditions 
of post-scarcity, and I argue that to answer this question is to 
fashion not only a new relationship to language in light of 
the relationship to empirical material conditions having been 
considerably ‘loosened,’ but to fashion a new sociology that is 
capable of reflecting an image of contemporary Scotland and 
working-class dasein free from materialism, secularism and 
modernism. If affluence fundamentally sets working-class dasein 
free in unpredictable ways, it also frees a new kind of sociology 
to come into being which presupposes the successful dismantling 
of the mirrors in which working-class dasein has misrecognised 
itself, and an accompanying consciousness that belongs to the 
“dictatorship of scarcity” era which has come to an end.
In everything that follows the reality of ‘social class’ is 
fundamental and my departure point is that: “In the industrial 
West, class culture is the only culture that defines the form of life 
of many people” (Marcus, cited in Clifford & Marcus 1986, 
p. 178), along with Willis’s (1977, p. 147) insistence that labour 
“is the main mode of active connection with the world: the way 
par excellence of articulating the innermost self with external 
reality.” However, I am mindful of the ‘ontological difference’ 
between reality and its representation and that the ‘work 
experience’ cannot be represented directly, and theorising the 
effects of work are highly problematic for sociology and 
ethnography as they are among the least ‘showable’ aspects of 
dasein’s structuration in light of the fact that there is a physical 
aspect to disappearing the effects of labour from the consciousness 
of the worker as noted by Connerton (1989, p. 102):
[I]ncorporating practices…provide a particularly effective 
system of mnemonics. However, sui generis, this suggestion 
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is very difficult to back up with direct evidence since 
incorporating practices…are largely traceless and that, as 
such, they are incapable of providing a means by which any 
evidence of a will to be remembered can be left behind.
This absence of literary traces has meant a sensitivity to the 
embodied nature of much of working-class experience was 
fundamental to my fieldwork, and meant participating in practices 
such as production-line work to enable me to observe locals and 
share their daily practices. Taking jobs as an agricultural labourer 
at Kettle Produce and as a manual operative with East of Scotland 
Water was integral to ‘fleshing-out’ the fundamental interpretive 
idea of embodied discourse and as methods to position me to gain 
the necessary data to write an ethnography that would deliver the 
level of understanding I sought, as well as being able to comply 
with my supervisor’s view that, “if one’s ambition is for the 
intimate knowledge which is afforded by genuinely participant 
observation…One has to acquire the idiom of the locality, and 
then learn within it. The acquisition of the idiom is the starting 
point for investigation” (Cohen 1978, p. 6). My view is that so 
long as accounts of manual labour, for example, are couched in 
hackneyed terms such as exploitation and oppression there is little 
prospect of the lived reality of manual work ‘appearing,’ and 
having read my fair share of texts purporting to deal with 
working-class experience only to conclude that misplaced goodwill 
effectively colonises an aspect of working-class being for the 
observing gaze so that working-class dasein remains a terra 
incognita insofar as much of the issues involved stand pre-judged, 
I was of the view that an original effort was required to 
conceptualise working-class ontology and so I have pursued the 
task of naming and bringing the world of workers’ embodiment 
and intentionality to the level of the concept, thereby producing 
an appropriate vocabulary of this particular dasein.
Based upon working as a day-labourer for local farmers and 
a production line agricultural worker at Kettle Produce (Fife) as 
part of fieldwork, I introduce the notion of a physical reduction 
as a result of manual labour and in Chapter 6 introduce the 
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terms reductio ad sensum and reductio ad humanum as a 
conceptualisation of the ‘worked self’ in order to establish the 
autonomy of working class being at a conceptual level. In this 
effort my guiding departure point has been Castoriadis (1987, 
p. 168) who has noted the culprit of the piece is the absence of an 
ontology of doing: “There has not been the slightest concern with 
knowing what doing means, what the being of doing is and what 
it is that doing brings into being.” In my treatment of this area of 
working-class experience I begin from my own practice and 
recognise that in terms of achieving an embodied point of view 
immanence changes everything (Tanner et al. 1992), and the issue 
of realistic representation is further complicated by the fact that 
articulating the ‘worked self’ requires a sensitivity to a way of 
being-in-the-world which cannot be caught by the metaphysics of 
‘thinghood,’ so that another ‘culprit’ in the long misrepresentation 
of work has been the Marxist tradition in which subjectivity and 
immanence have been marginalised by the traditional representation 
of the worker as ‘alienated’ from himself and his fellow workers 
and the products he or she produces, so that what has been lost 
sight of is that one ‘product’ the worker is never alienated from is 
his or her worked self.
My focus upon the body as a source of data follows upon many 
qualitative researchers who similarly recognise embodiment as an 
important source of non-discursive data and who draw upon their 
own body as a source of field data (Ellingson 2006). However, if 
going beyond the philosophy of consciousness tradition in favour 
of developing an embodied standpoint as a means of accessing 
the necessary data and producing knowledge through this 
sensitivity to embodiment is increasingly commonplace, how to 
properly conceive this drawing upon embodiment has also led me 
to include in what follows my own cognitional acts which were 
sourced in conceptualising an embodied condition. Significantly, 
this inclusion of natives’ reflexive acts (Myerhoff & Ruby, in 
Ruby 1982, p. 17) as a source of data meant I felt more or less 
obliged to include not only an account of my own intellectual self-
appropriation but my supernatural experience so that, beginning 
from an unremarkable inclusion of embodiment, I found myself 
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on a slippery slope that more or less directly led from the inclusion 
of cognitional acts to the inclusion of the acts of my soul as 
a source of field data.
Trying to find a way to avoid this and then finally surrendering 
to this methodological slippery slope or ‘turn to the subject’ 
has meant I have had to learn to embrace an integral sociology 
and learn the view expressed many years ago by Marcel Mauss 
who appealed for social scientists to study the ‘total man.’ “In 
reality, in our science, in sociology, rarely or even hardly ever...do 
we find man divided into faculties. We are always dealing with his 
body and his mentality as wholes, given simultaneously and all at 
once. Fundamentally body, soul and society are all mixed 
together” (Mauss 1979, pp. 24-5). Mauss described the working 
class as particularly good examples of this fusion of ‘body, soul 
and society’ due to its peculiar structuration or the particular 
relatedness to environment that makes the lived reality of 
structuration intensely personal, embodied, emotionally charged 
and determining. As Mauss wrote (1979, p. 28):
[T]he more we regress toward the less evolved forms of 
social life… the more we are dealing with instinctive men, 
or, if you will permit the expression, let me rather say total 
men. Similarly, it is these ‘total’ men that we meet in the 
broadest strata of our own populations and above all in the 
most backward strata. Hence it is they who form the 
majority of the statistical data available to us…
The average man of our days – and this is true above all 
of women -…is a ‘total’ man…The study of this ‘totality’ is 
crucial.
The ground covered in the proceeding chapters reflects my journey 
from a residual positivism to interpretivism and the shift to auto-
ethnography until the final position which I describe as integral 
sociology, in light of the initial starting point that both the range 
and the meaning of experience “is not susceptible to objective 
description, but only to interpretation” (Cohen 1985, p. 98). 
In exploiting my native status I have had to deal with a residual 
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suspicion that the entire project was tainted as a result of my 
own personal experiences directly impacting “the conditions of 
production of ethnographic knowledge” (Bell et al. 1993, p. 19). 
As Chapter 3 will detail, a confrontation with my residual positi- 
vism was more or less forced upon me as a result of living with 
antisocial neighbours and my wish to ignore much of the field 
because of my fears that writing an ethnography that emerged 
from my experience of the field meant producing an unrepresenta-
tive account of Cardenden. It was grappling with the unsustainable 
position of ignoring the field and its data to produce an ethnogra-
phy that in classic positivist fashion could be reproduced and 
verified by another researcher which forced the issue and made me 
reject the scientistic ‘ideal of knowledge’ in favour of a reflexive 
sociology. This more or less coerced choosing between positivism 
and interpretivism set me on the path towards auto-ethnography 
and delving not only into the ‘lived experience’ (Dilthey) of locals 
but my own inner experience as a source of knowledge.
If initially I was happy to set myself the task of piecing together 
the phenomenology of how locals experienced particular housing 
conditions because I was still writing about realities within the 
range of ordinary experience, this sense of security was short-lived 
because, having made the initial break into interpretivism and 
drawing upon my own lived experience of the field, it was only 
a matter of time before moving from auto-ethnography as a 
legitimate methodology to including my own cognitional acts as 
legitimate sources of data and, upon this basis, making a second 
break from ordinary experience and a second break from locals 
themselves insofar as I wished to theorise their experience beyond 
their own representations of it and beyond what they themselves 
were familiar with. At this point, if my fieldwork experience 
became the basis for a sociologically-informed project of self–
appropriation (Lonergan 1957; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), 
the successful achievement of this project and the acts of 
knowledge and love and the experience of the supernatural that 
arose from prosecuting this ethnographically-informed project of 
self appropriation compelled my break with a purely naturalistic 
understanding of working-class dasein as incomplete and unable 
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to contain or recognise or represent the full range of working- 
class experience. This, then, is the basis for the section on Special 
Ontology.
The decision to include an account of ‘higher experiences’ 
or the reflexive acts that working-class dasein is capable of funda-
mentally changed the scope of the book I have written and per-
haps even the kind of reader it will attract. In making this 
decision I draw a parallel between the fact that just as authors of 
fiction have depicted working-class dasein using an impoverished 
epistemological basis that was more or less adequate to represent-
ing the “dictatorship of scarcity” (Beck 1992, p. 20) era these 
authors were writing within, so among the representations 
produced by social theorists there has been a similar ‘scarcity’ 
epistemology that was felt adequate to describing the ‘realm of 
meaning’ as lived by most people in pre-affluent societies. We are 
the heirs to generations of social theorists and literary authors 
who have resisted using the full range of colours to depict human 
reality because to do so was not felt to be empirically justified and 
so it would have been unrepresentative to do so. I argue, however, 
that painting with this ‘scarcity palette’ is at an end and must 
be replaced by integralism as a more up-to-date and adequate 
epistemology for accessing the ‘world of meaning’ not simply 
as it currently empirically exists but in order to anticipate the 
dynamism and potentialities being liberated within working-class 
dasein today thanks to affluence and higher education.
The methodological debates that occurred in the nineteen-
seventies within the social sciences concerning a post-positivist 
sociology have been swept away by a comprehensive victory of 
qualitative and interpretive approaches, and what has also been 
swept aside is any prospect of a unified standpoint for doing 
sociology in the wake of the proliferation of different standpoints 
for doing sociology such as gender, class, sexuality, ethnic identity 
and geo-political location. However, one standpoint yet to 
be legitimated is that of religious belief, so that in 2000 when 
the European Association of Social Anthropologists addressed 
the question of “how those anthropologists who embrace religion 
in their personal lives situate themselves within the secular ethos 
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of professional anthropology (Stewart 2001, p. 323), Kapferer 
identified a ‘blinding prejudice’ and ‘secularist zeal’ in much 
professional anthropology as it struggles to leave behind its 
methodological atheism in favour of genuine openness to the 
field, an openness which “offends most of all that secular 
rationalism, that virtually religious secularism…[so that]… the 
commitment to secularism in the form of belief (rational secularism 
as such) militates against openness” (Kapferer 2001, p. 344).
If openness to transcendence horrifies members of an older 
generation it also signals the coming to an end of a long-held 
understanding of sociology, and in this regard Kilminster’s The 
Sociological Revolution (1998) reminds us that sociology originally 
believed itself capable of ‘liquidating’ philosophy and theology 
insofar as sociology solved the questions that philosophers and 
theologians had traditionally raised. Kilminster narrates how 
following the likes of Comte and Marx philosophy and theology 
were earmarked for obsolescence within the early sociological 
imagination because questions such as the good life and the good 
society and human happiness were largely determined by social 
conditions and therefore were the proper domain of sociology 
rather than philosophy or theology. However, this early promise 
of the ‘sociological revolution’ has failed insofar as sociology has 
not only failed to tell us what the good society or social order 
consists in or how we might arrive there, but no longer even 
understands such tasks as the concern of sociology, far less its 
special provenance. If the original promise of an engaged or public 
sociology was to take over erstwhile philosophical questions 
such as the nature of human freedom and agency because 
social conditions were fundamental to how real human beings 
exercise agency and freedom, then sociology has failed. While 
previously sociology promised to dissolve the pretentions of ‘pure 
reason’ found in philosophy and theology, the same socialisation 
and historicisation of reason that dissolved the ambitions of 
philosophy and theology have been turned upon sociology itself 
and so it has become mired in the ‘sociology of knowledge’ 
(Mannheim 1936) debate for half a century and shows no 
prospect of escaping.
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If the sociological revolution is at an end, then, it is because 
sociologists no longer believe they are capable of answering such 
philosophical or theological questions and do not proclaim upon 
the nature of wisdom, happiness and the good society nor imagine 
their use of reason can escape the forces of contextualisation. 
However, in answering in the affirmative that a public sociology 
can serve society and is able to contribute to the liberation of the 
individual and the nation in a way that surpasses the contributions 
of theology and philosophy, I will argue that a properly sociological 
reading of the self is able to answer traditional philosophical 
and theological questions such as, what is Man’s natural end or 
perfection, or in what proportionate end does our happiness lie? 
The section Special Ontology, then, provides a description of an 
act of understanding which I describe as the natural apotheosis 
or ne plus ultra of working-class dasein and that the silence of 
philosophers, theologians and sociologists on the question of what 
is Man’s proportionate natural beatitude is the result of this 
question having had to await the current post-Enlightenment 
ethos to arrive and allow a hearing for the proposition that 
only a post-secular or integral sociology can satisfactorily answer 
this question.
In what follows the distinction between nature and ‘secondary 
natures’ is vital as it has been for much of the history of social 
theory (Bauman 1976). As a working definition, “what is second 
nature to the individual is accumulated and sedimented history” 
(Jacoby 1997, p. 31) so that an integral sociology develops the 
argument that there has to be a moment of ‘pure nature’ – in 
opposition to every kind of supernaturalism – as natural or purely 
social and cultural human being has to be understood on its own 
terms before its relation to any kind of transcendent or supernatural 
destiny can be discussed. More generally, retrieving this dialectic 
is an important part of re-founding the Scottish imagination at 
this pre-Referendum point in time because Scotland by the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the development of 
the theory of the ‘divine right’ of kings to rule (Wolter 2001, 
p. 13n) and by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ advent of 
industrialism an original twelfth century advent of the modern era 
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had degenerated into a one-dimensional modernism as a result of 
the failure to maintain a dialectical tension between immanence 
and transcendence. Our ‘present as history’ is characterised by 
post-industrial working-class generations being more or less 
coerced into posing the question of what it means to ‘be national’ 
and ‘be in history’ and ‘be modern’ in a new manner, so that 
what is needed today is the retrieval of the original twelfth 
and thirteenth century discovery of the sui generic causality of 
‘secondary natures’ free of metaphysical errors such as modernism, 
secularism, naturalism and materialism that stand in the way of 
achieving a non-reductionist or integral reading of Scottish dasein 
and an integral reading of the ‘present as history.’ Having 
previously described how I began to suspect that beneath the 
rise of nationalism and the imminent restoration of Scottish 
independence something more fundamental was involved, this 
something more is the original European project of modernity so 
that the Scottish project of independence in Europe needs to be 
aligned with thinking that is freed from the baleful influence 
of supernaturalism (Tyrrell 1909) and the ‘scarcity thinking’ of 
secularism and materialism.
While it has long been recognised that the 18th century 
Scottish Enlightenment holds a special place within the history of 
sociology, historians now identify the twelfth century as the point 
when across Europe after 1150 there emerged into documentation 
and awareness a new era characterised by social and economic 
change where ‘public things’ or rei publica became the object of 
inquiry and reflection among incipient State officials (Bisson 
2009). At this time there occurred the shift towards recognising 
‘society’ in theory and practice as a sui generic category of reality 
in light of “the appearance after about the year 1000 of new 
social groupings, including urban guilds and a consolidated family 
structure, and, on the other hand, the emergence of the anonymous 
poor and the urban crowd, with the accompanying sense of 
alienation and anomie and the polarization of society and threats 
of disorder” (Constable 1996, p. 301). In this new periodization, 
then, the modern era ‘begins’ with the likes of Duns Scotus (1266-
1308) articulating a “complete statement of the theory of 
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sovereignty and the social contract, not unlike that enunciated 
later by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau” (Harris 1927, p. 347) and 
a theory of human society which “was to revolutionize not 
only the thought but the practice of the Western world, and it is 
to him that we can trace in a very real sense the beginning of 
modern political science” (Harris 1927, p. 357). According to 
Wolter (2001, pp. 16-17) “[Scotus] does not derive the power 
of princes directly from God…but rather from the consent of 
the community given in the voluntary compact of the social 
contract” and so there is a clear link between Scotus’s modern 
theory of the communitarian basis of political sovereignty and 
the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 where we find the same 
modern doctrine stated.
When we remember that Scotus was twenty years old when 
Alexander III died in 1286 when riding his horse only a few 
miles from present-day Cardenden, and that this event saw the 
English king Edward I initiate the Wars of Independence between 
Scotland and England, and that Scotus upon his arrival in Paris 
soon thereafter became embroiled in the great topic of the day 
which was the long-standing feud between Philip the Fair and 
Boniface VIII over whether Philip owed his political authority 
to the pope as the Vicar of Christ or through his own authority, 
we see how useful and timely is Scotus’s communitarian theory 
of political sovereignty in resisting not only ecclesial rulers over-
reaching themselves into secular affairs, but useful and timely 
in peoples having the right to resist secular rulers such as 
Edward I overreaching themselves into other kingdoms. More 
philosophically stated, then, modernity begins with Scotus’s 
critique of fideism or supernaturalism and papal theocracy in 
order to allow humanity to embrace its proper freedom and 
autonomy. Hardt and Negri (2000), then, locate the origin of 
European modernity in Scotus’s turning to the realm of immanence 
and the mundane at this time and the Anglo-Catholic theologian 
John Milbank (2006, p. xxvn) sees Scotus as the turning point 
of the European mind to the extent that Scotus exemplified the 
signature innovation of modern thought which was to understand 
created finite reality on its own terms i.e. as a secondary nature 
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exercising its own ‘secondary causality’ independently of its 
divine origin:
The new insistence that Scotus is perhaps the central figure 
(amongst many others including Avicenna, Gilbert Porreta, 
Abelard, Roger Bacon, Henry of Ghent, etc.) in the crucial 
shift within Western thought within which Kant is still 
located is not original to RO [Radical Orthodoxy], but  
has been elaborated by L. Honnefelder, J.-F. Courtine, O. 
Boulnois, J.-L. Marion and J. Schmutz, amongst many 
others, ultimately in the wake of Etienne Gilson.
According to Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 74), however, this 
revolutionary innovation of Scotus provoked a counterrevolution 
or “second mode of modernity” in the shape of the Renaissance’s 
ambition to “oppose the reappropriation of power on the part 
of the multitude” (2000, p. 74) so that since the twelfth century 
European history has been “the uninterrupted conflict between the 
immanent...and the transcendent” (2000, p. 76) and the development 
of a fully modern contextual sociology and theology has been 
prevented because of counterrevolutionary forces for whom “it 
was paramount to avoid the multitude’s being understood…in a 
direct, immediate relation with divinity and nature” (2000, p. 78) 
and because what was to be resisted was “every movement of 
self-constitution of the multitude” (2000, p. 79). The relevance of 
these long durée concerns to our present-day ethnographic study 
is that while the existential discovery of both the purely natural 
apotheosis of fully contextualised Scottish working-class dasein 
and the supernatural realm is not dependent upon any kind of 
knowledge or awareness of developments within eleventh, twelfth 
or thirteenth century Europe, and while it is clear that a holistic 
or integral conception of a Scottish and European modernity and 
the development of an integral sociology do not depend for 
their arrival upon the conclusions of historians, the fact is that 
acknowledging the ‘return’ to the twelfth century is far more than 
scholarly etiquette or acknowledging one’s historical debts as this 
long durée historicity is the necessary ballast that is required to 
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ensure the ‘tasks of freedom’ released by affluence do not descend 
into nihilism and the ‘crisis of the West’ and to ensure that ‘Scotland’ 
authors a new alliance or covenant with the Christian legacy upon 
a new synthesis and avoids pagan forms of holism that would 
otherwise threaten Scotland’s historical continuity with the European 
imagination.
Before such grand vistas are opened up to view, however, 
there is the mundane task of describing and articulating what 
working-class dasein is capable of as this is the central concern 
of an integral sociology. In what follows the shift beyond a purely 
naturalistic sociology is founded upon a purely natural achievement 
so that a moment of ‘pure nature’ (Long 2010) is the keystone of 
an integral sociology. In what follows I adopt a ‘two-storey’ 
anthropology where human beings or fully-contextualised Scottish 
working-class dasein has two distinct and separate ends: a natural 
or proportionate end vis-à-vis their human nature and a 
supernatural end or perfection that is disproportionate to their 
human nature. This two-storey model is fundamental to ensuring 
an integral sociology is kept separate from what Milbank (1990) 
has termed ‘the integral revolution’ in Catholic theology which 
seeks to collapse the two orders of the natural and the supernatural 
into each other. In Chapter 8 I will argue this is a temptation 
that must be consciously resisted as it is a residual form of 
supernaturalism which I identify in Milbank, de Lubac, Luigi 
Sturzo, Karl Rahner and other advocates of Christian sociology 
and Latin American liberation theology.
In resisting ‘theologism’ and maintaining a two-storey model 
a price to be paid is to be accused by supernaturalists of advocating 
the separation of the natural and the supernatural or the separation 
of faith from reason. I not only distinguish between these two 
orders but argue that events in the natural order are the precondition 
for the advent into the natural order of the supernatural. According 
socialised human nature its due ontological density is non-
negotiable for an integral sociology and talk of a Scotist position 
leading to the ‘secularisation of social theory’ is facile and needs 
to be replaced with the recognition of a perennial tension which can 
only be resolved by a living synthesis between the two orders. 
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Strictly maintaining the two-storey model of the human being 
distances an integral sociology from all theologies and all forms of 
supernaturalism which have no use for purely natural and social 
realities, nor how such realities are capable of opening the human 
being up to his or her supernatural destiny.
Predictably, ‘integralists’ do not engage in ethnographic or 
sociological research in order to construct their account of 
redemption so that, in contrast, an integral sociology is built 
upon a foundation of ‘integral contingency’ or a moment of ‘pure 
nature’ and a performative account of the natural desire for 
beatitude or perfection at work upon the basis of a determinate 
socio-economic context; something which safeguards integral 
sociology from being an adjunct or ancillary discipline to theology. 
Importantly, only a two-storey model of human being safeguards 
against the twin errors of supernaturalism and secularism. Finally, 
insofar as the twelfth-century view was “that it was harder and 
more worthy to achieve salvation in the world than in solitude” 
(Constable 1996, p. 311), then this view is of special relevance to 
a social class freshly configured by the advent of affluence and 
deep literacy. I argue then that defending a secularist social theory 
reproduces the original counter-modernity of the Renaissance and 
against this I argue that an integral sociology using purely 
‘profane’ material gives an ethnographic ‘demonstration’ of grace 
or redemption thanks to the operationalisation of situated being as 
a result of a sociologically-come-ethnographically constituted act 
of self-understanding (Chapter 6).
If this achievement is an ‘original moment’ in the history of 
spirit it signals the need to succeed in the twenty-first century 
where the twelfth century failed insofar as if the great success of 
the European intellect in the twelfth century was the discovery 
of ‘secondary natures’ and ‘secondary causality’ and the invention 
of the secular and the political and social realms, which thereby 
opened the way for the natural and social sciences, its great failure 
was not developing a fully-contextual account of how a universal 
objective truth is historicised and particularised in different times, 
places and social contexts so that Long (2010, p. 1) has observed 
that: “Many contemporary Roman Catholic theologians – to the 
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degree that they engage this question – incline to accept an 
account of the relation of nature and grace that dissolves the 
entire structure of human nature and its proportionate end.” Both 
Feingold (2010) and Long (2010) have characterised the Christian 
mind as being mired in a non-Christian supernaturalism which 
I define as the view that ‘secondary natures’ and ‘secondary 
causality’ are not integral to Christian redemption. This diagnosis 
is the result of the failure to articulate a fully contextual or fully 
socialised phenomenology of redemption and is the failure that 
explains why “theologians barely know how to think about the 
proportionate nature of the human ens creatum any longer” 
(Long 2010, p. 2). An integral public sociology, then, intervenes 
into this long durée failure to free Christianity from supernaturalism 
as well as free sociology from secularism and I will demonstrate 
how to accomplish these tasks by not only giving a credible 
account of Man’s purely natural beatitude or happiness but an 
account of how Man brings into view and prepares for his 
disproportionate or super-natural beatitude by demonstrating 
the sociological constitution of Man’s natural end and his 
supernatural sanctification, thereby fulfilling the original twelfth 
century discovery of secondary causality and the original project 
of modernity. 
In light of Long’s (2010, p. 2) observation that, “precisely 
insofar as human nature has an ontological density and 
proportionate end, just so far is the knowledge of these essential 
to the work of the theologian,” the question is how is the 
philosopher or theologian to come to know Man’s proportionate 
end or which discipline will pronounce upon Man’s proportionate 
end? Will the philosopher or theologian pronounce upon the 
realm of secondary natures or the social structures in which 
Man is immersed from the point of his conception until his last 
breath? How can a theologian or philosopher acknowledge what 
Scholastics term the ‘obediential potency’ of Scottish working-
class dasein, for example, unless a sociologist or ethnographer 
articulates it for him? How can a theologian or philosopher give 
an account of an individual’s natural beatitude, happiness and 
perfection unless a sociologist or ethnographer articulates for him 
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the ontological density of working-class human being and a 
phenomenology of how the working-class person achieves his 
proportionate end? In the absence of breaking free of philosophy 
and theology it is difficult to see how Long’s claims can be known 
by the philosopher or theologian except as a matter of abstract 
formalism, so that the question is how is it possible for the 
non-sociologist to recover a rigorous theonomic concept of 
secondary natures and secondary causality unless they engage in 
non-philosophical and non-theological research that genuinely 
discovers these contingent secondary natures to be theonomic and 
of soteriological value?
It seems to me that this kind of research is a fundamental 
prerequisite and the philosopher or theologian who fails to 
venture outside of philosophy and theology in his attempt to 
recuperate the ontological density of secondary natures must be 
fated to fail as a Christian theologian, and this is why the school 
of liberation theology that emerged in Latin American distinguished 
itself from previous ways of doing theology by acknowledging the 
findings of sociologists as fundamental material for the work of 
the theologian. For the individual sociologist, achieving this task 
is to achieve a sociology which delivers upon the promise of 
sociology if not to ‘dissolve’ theology and philosophy (Kilminster 
1998) then to safeguard the theonomic potency of social reality. 
Hence, while St. Thomas taught the doctrine of a specifically 
proportionate natural end for the human being (Feingold 2010), 
we require more than abstract philosophic reasoning, and while 
the natural desire for knowledge of God via his essence is a 
natural elicited desire that must be awakened as a result of 
knowledge and cognitional development on the side of the knower 
(Feingold 2010), it is an integral sociology that effectively elicits 
such a desire and does so not upon the basis of divine revelation 
or a priori belief but upon the basis of an act of self-appropriation 
achieved upon the basis of integral contingency; and this is a 
more efficacious departure point for the supernatural than merely 
philosophical or metaphysical knowledge as in any number of 
Scholastic texts one can find the truism that nature is preamble to 
grace and in an a priori manner speculate about the relationship 
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between socio-historical conditions and the supernatural. 
Metaphysical propositions, however, no matter how true can 
never replace the need to actually instantiate metaphysical 
truths and can not move anyone one inch closer to their real 
accomplishment. While the medieval distinction between nature 
and grace (Viladesau 2006, p. 145) involves the discovery and 
affirmation of nature as a sui generic realm of its own, the 
existential verification of the claim that nature is preamble to 
grace is something that must be performed if it is to be existentially 
known to be true, so that, if not the subject of a performative 
verification then the project of an integral sociology must fail.
It is because the human being has a twofold end– a natural end 
proportionate to nature as well as a supernatural end that is 
disproportionate to his or her nature – that means a sociology that 
is adequate to theorising human being must integrate these two 
elements and cannot be satisfied with the binary thinking of the 
twin errors of supernaturalism and secularism. An integral 
sociology will be Thomistic and Scotist insofar as it articulates 
the proportionate end of Man and, thereafter, approaches 
the question of his final supernatural or disproportionate end. 
However, it is necessary for the doctrine of a specifically natural 
or proportionate human beatitude to break free from the grip 
of philosophy and theology and only a sociology can provide an 
example of socialised human nature achieving its proportionate 
end and thereby being opened up to the supernatural upon that 
basis. That the contingent socio-historical realm has theonomic 
significance is fundamental for an integral sociology given the 
fact that, were it otherwise, men and women would have to resort 
to supernaturalism to have any experience or intimation of the 
divine. By overcoming supernaturalism, then, an integral sociology 
safeguards the ongoing historical and social nature of Christian 
redemption.
The theologian not weighed down by the painstaking 
investigation of ‘secondary natures’ pays the heavy price of not 
knowing whether nature or integral contingency are able to bear 
up the natural man to receive the free gift of his supernatural life. 
Indeed, any such role or function of socialised dasein must be lost 
xliii
i n t r o d u c t i o n
sight of for such a theologian. The cognitional life informed by 
purely natural acts of understanding and loving are ‘secondary 
causes’ or causis secundis and contingent means that are revealed 
a posteriori as providentially related to the eternal offer of 
salvation. If secondary natures were not so ordered, both the 
contingent social order and the structure of cognition and Man’s 
intellectual life could not be described as theonomic or within the 
ambit of divine providence. In contrast to supernaturalism, then, 
our purely natural cognitional life and our purely natural acts of 
love and understanding are not accidental extras to the main event 
but are essential elements of divine providence over the purely 
natural, the modern era and the realm of man-made secondary 
natures. The alternative to the position that integral contingency 
is providentially designed to bear the full weight of mediating the 
supernatural is the twin errors of naturalism and supernaturalism. 
Hence, instead of ‘hot-wiring’ nature to the supernatural and 
dispensing with the purely natural end of Man by integrating it 
with his supernatural life via ‘the integral revolution’ as in Sturzo 
or de Lubac or Milbank or via the ‘supernatural existential’ of 
Karl Rahner, an integral sociology anchors the supernatural in 
ordinary socialised contingent dasein that it may bear that 
socialised and historicised human being to its supernatural destiny.
An integral sociology by definition rejects any effort to 
prematurely ‘integrate’ the social means by which the supernatural 
is ‘made real’ as the only adequate foundation to ensure escape 
from supernaturalism is to take social-historical human nature as 
the starting point as no other basis can hope to avoid the charge 
of fostering either supernaturalism or its frustrated offspring of 
naturalism and secularism. If proportionate integral contingency 
cannot bear the full weight of achieving man’s proportionate end 
as well as provide “the very act which bears us up” (Maritain 
1954, p. 110) to the supra-natural level, it does not deserve the 
name of a sociology because it does not genuinely achieve this 
elevation through a purely social mediation. An integral sociology, 
then, is constituted by what socialised dasein is capable of 
achieving as well as what it is capable of receiving thanks to 
bringing to perfection its natural active powers; so that a purely 
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naturalistic sociology is driven to transcend itself as a result of its 
own inner dynamism into becoming an integral sociology. It is 
because working-class human being is revealed as theonomic and 
has soteriological potency as a result of exercising its ownmost 
nature and powers that means sociology must allow the reality of 
the supernatural onto its horizon, just as the individual who 
triggers the advent of the supernatural into his life upon the basis 
of exercising his purely natural powers would act contrary to 
reason if he were to deny or refuse this development of himself in 
his capacity as a social researcher and social theorist.
If the intellectual agency of successfully reducing contingent 
dasein to a pure (proportionate) act of self-understanding is 
possible, then an understanding of redemption in which a man’s 
being working class is accidental and irrelevant to how he 
co-operates in his redemption would reveal the soteriological and 
sociological orders as fundamentally discordant and that nature is 
not in fact preamble to grace. The notion of secondary natures 
and secondary causality having significance for redemption and 
how the two orders of ‘the social’ and ‘the supernatural’ are 
brought into alignment (or to use theological language a covenantal 
relationship) is what I propose to show in due course. From the 
standpoint of an integral sociology, for a person to become 
redeemed is to undergo the odyssey of bringing one’s natural or 
contingent socialised self to a purely natural ‘moment of truth’ or 
a point of luminosity that orders and readies the self for the 
advent of the supernatural so that we may speak of a sociology 
of the living God. This ‘taking aim’ at a radical act of self-
appropriation is integral to the phenomenological account of 
Christian redemption that follows because sociological knowledge 
is necessary for (working-class) human being to achieve its 
natural or proportionate end. An integral sociology then should 
be judged according to whether it is able to take the full weight of 
individuals’ immersion in secondary natures and be prepared to be 
judged as to whether it provides an illuminating and empowering 
self-knowledge or not, and this should be the test as to whether or 
not sociology is delivering upon its promise to end philosophy 
(Kilminster 1998).
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An integral sociology rejects the idea of an innate efficacious 
natural desire for God as this would make any contribution 
sociology might make redundant. If human beings enjoyed a 
constant innate desire for God regardless of class or gender or 
culture or education, then all contingent secondary natures would 
have no role to play in the drama of redemption and would have 
nothing to add to the story of such a desire; a desire which could 
happily remain the preserve of philosophers and theologians. 
However, because the desire for both our natural and supernatural 
good is not innate but must be elicited, its fate in the life of any 
individual is dependent upon social conditions and it is these 
which determine whether such a natural desire is elicited and 
comes to dominate the life and efforts of an individual, so that the 
sociologist has something to say about how men and women 
achieve their supernatural destiny insofar as they are able to 
explain how the person prepares for grace thanks to reducing 
himself to act via the understanding of his socialised dasein and 
mitsein and upon this basis orders himself to his supernatural 
beatitude. An integral sociology, then, is indispensable in 
overcoming ‘pure reason’ to the extent that it understands how 
free and contingent elicited desires for natural and supernatural 
happiness can be sufficiently efficacious because of their anchorage 
in the real, and as a result of this anchorage can bear the weight 
of a purely natural liberation and subsequent opening onto the 
supernatural.
As I will argue in Chapter 8, neither liberation theology nor 
previous attempts at a Christian sociology can be the departure 
point for an integral sociology because both presume to know 
precisely that which must be evidenced: the existence of the 
supernatural. No theology or philosophy can articulate Man’s 
natural or proportionate end in a concrete existential sense and so 
it is sociology’s task to do this and thereby assume the responsibility 
of ‘re-founding’ the Christian doctrine of nature as preamble to 
grace upon the basis of integral contingency. The current situation 
where the Christian does not inherit a model of how to integrate 
the mundane and the divine remains the defining aporia of 
Christianity in the modern era in the West because the inability to 
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locate the supernatural at work in the post-gemeinschaft industrial 
order exerts a pressure for de-Christianisation insofar as it puts 
the very existence of the supernatural into doubt among individuals 
living with this failure and everyone alive to “this singular and 
crucial loss of the Catholic intellectual life” (Long 2010, p. 2).
In what follows I give an ethnographic account of the 
integration of the two distinct realms of the social and the 
supernatural from a particular class and national standpoint at a 
particular point in time; an account of supernatural experience 
upon the basis of socialised ‘second nature’ which alone can 
justify the contention that if social theory is to address the reflexive 
acts of human beings then it must also address the experiences 
and realities these reflexive acts make Scottish working-class 
dasein capable of receiving. The term ‘integral sociology’ then 
adverts to giving a complete picture of the range of human 
experience, and in this regard openness to the supernatural is just 
one defining characteristic as the task of articulating the properly 
natural end or beatitude of the human being is equally foundational 
as an integral sociology is not merely about the inoffensive task 
of integrating the social order with the supernatural or refusing 
to settle for the unsatisfactory choice between supernaturalism or 
secularism, but pressing the claim that the class structure mediates 
the structure of salvation.
This is what I mean by the idea of putting the full weight 
of people’s destiny upon secondary structures and secondary 
causality, and until this position is achieved I see no prospect for 
the desire for a post-secular social theory being fulfilled (Archer 
et al. 2004; Habermas et al. 2010) nor any reason to dissent from 
Turner’s (1991, p. 61) view that Christianity “does not provide a 
genuinely satisfactory solution to the problem of class and class 
conflict in industrial society.” Indeed, from this perspective, non-
ethnographically grounded and non-sociologically constituted 
theologies are partly responsible for the privatisation of religion in 
contemporary Western societies as unless a theology (by which 
I mean a level of discourse beyond fundamental catechesis) is 
sociologically constituted it must be ranked as another species 
of pre-sociological ‘pure reason’ that will have little conceptual 
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purchase upon real men and women and remain unable to 
address the challenge of articulating the soteriological value 
of integral contingency. Those advanced Western societies that 
have become most de-Christianised are likely to remain so and 
theology will remain in its pre-modern and pre-sociological state 
until it comes-of-age not simply by rejecting the immaculate and 
‘infantile’ universalism of much theology but produces a theology 
constituted by the class-inflected nature of the constitution of 
redemption.
The departure point followed here will be an empirical and 
ethnographic engagement with real mundane conditions of 
post-industrial locality and work and housing and a step-by- 
step inquiry and construction of conditions, consciousness and 
comportment which rejects any appeal to theological principle or 
religious belief. Instead, appeal will only be made to ethnographic 
data and particular acts of understanding which create new 
realities and which justifies the move beyond naturalistic or 
secular sociology, and upon this basis is also achieved a decisive 
break with supernaturalistic accounts of the relation between 
the natural or the social and the supernatural. The ‘pursuit of 
being’ made possible by the sociological imagination fulfils this 
traditional concern of Western culture thanks to thinking 
industrialised human being, and in light of which comes the 
recognition that thinking human being with the non-industrialised 
tools of pure reason, whether it be philosophy or theology, is 
unable to generate sufficient purchase on the reality we ourselves 
are. From the standpoint of integral sociology, the super-natural is 
mediated through each human being’s contingent ‘secondary 
nature’ and in post-gemeinschaft industrialised societies, without 
the necessary social and cultural mediation of ‘causality’ a person 
cannot exercise the secondary causality he must exercise if he is to 
order himself towards the supernatural. If the actual advent of the 
gratuitous gift of sanctifying grace requires a ‘triggering’ event on 
the part of the individual and if we accept Kerr’s argument that 
“it is by one’s own activity that one is drawn into God” (2002, 
p. 173), then the advent of the supernatural is dependent upon the 
occurring of a purely natural event within the person, and insofar 
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as the individual by achieving his or her purely natural or 
proportionate perfection “gives the created agent a special 
participation of the pure act of being” (2002, p. 163) we have the 
solution to a problematic first sighted in the twelfth century and 
whose lack of a solution condemned attempts at an integral 
sociology throughout the twentieth century to failure: evidencing 
the supernatural upon the basis of ‘integral contingency’ and 
thereby achieving a way out of the ‘modernisation as secularisation’ 
paradigm of much European sociology.
The book is divided into two parts: Part 1 gives a set of initial 
descriptions and a series of conceptualisations of different aspects 
of working-class dasein, followed by an account of understanding 
and a series of liberations that follow upon this act of self-
understanding. If the first five chapters constitute a more or less 
standard ethnography, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are far from standard 
as they deal with Special Ontology and have as their basis a 
performative verification of the project of self-appropriation 
outlined in Lonergan’s Insight (1957). In this project, the defining 
tension within the manual labourer is that between two very 
different worlds and two very different aspects of the self. On the 
one hand, the self to be appropriated is the situated labouring self 
that may care nothing for intellectual inquiry, and to complicate 
matters further there is the question of which self is to be 
appropriated? Lonergan’s (1990, p. 193) answer is that the self to 
be appropriated is “the rational, intelligent, experiencing man” 
and so from the existential standpoint of a particular individual 
labourer this means he must embark upon the intellectual pursuit 
of himself and in doing so will need to break with an established 
‘immediate’ relationship to himself and make the shift from 
being a worker to a worker-inquirer. The final three chapters are 
devoted to articulating this journey and the issues involved in 
successfully accomplishing this shift. In these chapters I trace 
the development of an initial set of data and give an account of 
self-appropriation in which the manual worker of Chapters 1 to 5 
becomes a worker-inquirer and proceeds to the further development 
of himself as a worker-inquirer-knower, and in giving my account 
of these developments I take my doctoral supervisor’s words that, 
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“The self is the essential element of anthropological fieldwork” 
(Cohen 1987, p. 207) as far as I am able.
While an integral sociology is built upon the fact that “there 
does exist a proportionate natural end distinct from the supernatural 
end” (Long 2010, p. 3), the pressing need is for an ethnographer-
come-sociologist to give an account of that natural end and this is 
what I provide in Chapter 6 because the dasein it unfolds is not 
readily available either to working-class people themselves or to the 
social researchers who reflect upon working-class lives. This ‘special 
ontology’ is working-class dasein considered from the point of view 
of being in reflexive possession of the truth of itself; of being 
‘structured in the truth’ insofar as a particular ‘operationalisation of 
being’ via an act of self-understanding is achieved. The section 
entitled Special Ontology is written in the wake of secularist 
humanists having failed to articulate the working-class human 
being’s natural or proportionate beatitude but also in light of 
Christian theologians’ failure which has been noted by Long who 
has observed that “the natural end that de Lubac and Balthasar find 
so mysteriously impossible to locate in man as he is” (2010, p. 90) 
is a failure that is widespread among theologians.
My view is this inability to locate any natural end and the 
cognition that achieves it is also endemic within the social sciences 
and humanities, so that an integral sociology must succeed where 
a number of disciplines have failed to deliver the original twelfth 
century project of modernity which included the need to effect 
“the refraction of the gospel’s truths throughout a determinate 
social structure” (Chenu 1997, p. 38). This signature task of 
‘being modern’ also comes to the aid of Lukacs’s History and 
Class Consciousness ([1923] 1971) where the task of articulating 
a phenomenology of how the proletarian subject achieves the 
Hegelian condition of being ‘identical-with-itself’ is outlined. I 
argue that Lukacs’s classic text simultaneously contains the great 
promise and the great failure of Marxism and the left-Enlightenment 
tradition to give an account of the proletarian subject’s purely 
natural beatitude. Similarly, while the fundamental anthropology 
of existentialist texts such as Sartre’s Being and Nothingness 
(1966) is compatible with the dynamism of Christian anthropology, 
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existentialists likewise evidence the failure to articulate an account 
of the natural and proportionate perfection available to Man, to 
say nothing of the happiness that is ‘above nature.’
I contend that not only Christian but major post-Christian 
intellectuals have failed to provide a credible account of (working-
class) Man’s purely natural beatitude, so that providing such an 
account will be the ground upon which this text will dialogue with 
others. To this end the first five chapters consist of empirically-
based descriptions and follow a standard ethnographic strategy 
of establishing some of the fundamental elements involved in 
a description of a working-class population, beginning with 
a consideration of the relationship to community/locality 
(Chapter 1). This emphasis upon locality draws upon the insights 
of Herzfeld (1997) and Cohen (1996, 1997) who are exemplary 
in their appreciation of the role of locality for the practice of 
imagining the nation. Chapter 1 also introduces the idea of 
the 1945 and 1979 generations which I develop as a heuristic 
device to organise my data and begins by focussing upon the 
local perception of the decline in local public space as a result 
of deindustrialization and cultural change.
Chapter 1 is followed by a description of the social practice 
of manual labour and the first steps in conceptualising manual 
labour as a fundamental ‘category of being’ of working-class 
dasein based upon working as an agricultural labourer and 
drainage operative with East of Scotland Water as well as other 
pre-doctoral periods of working as a day-labourer in the fields 
of Fife. Being employed meant being able to conduct participant 
observation in a crucial social context and was fundamental to 
my research strategy and methodology since being a worker 
gives access to conversations and groups and gives an identity 
that others readily understand and accept and access to rich 
‘webs of signification’ which form the substance of belonging. 
Doing a manual working-class job, then, guaranteed me access to 
areas of practice and discourse where working-class structuration 
occurs, and if the problem of method and data-gathering 
largely involves the search for locations that afford access 
to learning what points of ‘structuration’ there are in the field, 
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Chapter 2 comes to grips with ‘worked subjectivity’ as a 
preliminary step to being able to understand the subsequent 
politicisation of this worked subjectivity. This emphasis upon 
manual labour has fallen out of favour among social theorists 
and researchers for many reasons, such as the shift from blue to 
white-collar work in late-capitalist economies and changes in the 
international division of labour so that “the labouring body has 
been displaced from current consciousness and is not merely 
separated from the consuming body, which exists in its own 
right, but does not even stand next to it as an alternative 
conceptualisation” (Lyon and Barbalet, cited in Csordas 1994, 
p. 52). There is a palpable representational deficit insofar as the 
labouring body is conceptually non-existent in much social science 
literature and I argue in this regard that just as the local without 
a job is more or less in a state of crisis, so the ethnographer 
without a grasp of the structuring relevance of manual labour 
and its consequences for dasein is likewise more or less in a 
perpetual crisis of understanding vis-à-vis working-class reality 
whether aware of it or not.
More broadly, insofar as the social sciences have failed to 
achieve an “anthropology from the body” (Csordas 1994) and 
have failed to adequately conceptualise labour from the labourer’s 
point of view, it is guilty of the same fatal weakness of (Hegelian) 
Marxism which, while it philosophically intuits the significance of 
labour, is unable to render labour as a sui generic category of 
being and so is unable to convert labour into a category and 
conditione sine qua non of ‘cognitional agency.’ It is in the work 
experience then that I locate a fundamental element of working-
class structuration and the keystone to working-class dasein upon 
which I build my conception of working-class subjectivity and 
structuration and its purely natural beatitude.
Chapter 3 is based upon my time spent as a Fife Council tenant 
at 51 Cardenden Road and describes how the nineteen months of 
fieldwork conducted while living there was dominated by the 
experience of contesting antisocial neighbours. This chapter seeks 
to appreciate and understand temporality as a structuring force 
and seeks to articulate the ‘temporal horizon’ of working-class 
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being by drawing upon the prolonged process of having an 
upstairs neighbour evicted, and drawing upon this fieldwork 
experience as “a limited area of transparency on the otherwise 
opaque surface of regular uneventful social life (Turner 1957, 
p. 93). Only via the attempt at constituting neighbourliness were 
the hegemonies which constitute particular lives made visible; 
only by being drawn into this antisocial space did I gain insight 
into the existential ground of neighbours’ experiences and 
begin to suspect the reach of working-class structuration and, in 
particular, begin to understand the agency of time upon dasein. 
Chapter 3 also details the beginnings of my break with positivism 
insofar as the data that forced itself upon my attention was 
evermore personal and specific to my fieldwork situation so that 
I faced a choice of either ignoring the data to keep alive the 
positivist ‘ideal of knowledge’ or embrace the ‘slippery slope’ of 
the interpretive turn.
Chapter 4 emerges from data gathered while attending weekly 
meetings of the local history group for over two years. In 
this chapter national identity is conceived diachronically or in 
relation to ‘being in history’ and in relation to the rejection of 
or the appropriation of a long durée symbolic patrimony. To 
understand working-class nationalism is to advert to historicity as 
more or less integral to dasein and to firstly study the relationship 
between social class and the ‘realm of meaning’ and resist the 
temptation to reduce nationality and/or historicity to ciphers for 
social forces. After this attempt at incorporating an understanding 
of historicity as an integral element of Scottish working-class 
dasein, the section General Ontology concludes with a description 
and analysis of the relations between social class and politics 
and the ongoing movement towards political independence that 
was already evident in the nineteen-nineties and, at the time of 
writing some sixty-four days before the 2014 Referendum, may 
well be upon us.
While working-class nationalism involves an imagining of 
the national community, explaining Scottish nationalism using 
the idea of the nation as ‘imagined’ is somewhat hazardous as 
‘Scotland’ has survived despite a long campaign of ‘forgetting’ and 
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‘non-imagining.’ Chapter 5 is based upon the material gathered 
from conducting door-to-door interviews with residents from 
selected streets from each area of the village in the aftermath 
of the first elections to the new Scots parliament in May 1999. Of 
particular importance in my account of nationalism is the notion 
of embodiment and the link to practice (Bourdieu 1977; Brubaker 
1996) in an effort to overcome the “pervasive substantialist, realist 
cast of mind that attributes real, enduring existence to nations” 
(Brubaker 1996, p. 15n) and the move to define nationalism as “a 
category of practice, not (in the first instance) a category of 
analysis” (Brubaker 1996, p. 7) and I further mediate this emphasis 
upon practice by attending to the practice of manual labour. What 
emerges is a post-substantivist emphasis upon action as a source of 
being which points to the conclusion that what observers of 
nationalism are immune from grasping insofar as there is a crucial 
link between an ontology informed by labour and nationalism as a 
subsequent politicisation of that ontology is what Bourdieu (1977, 
pp. 1-71) has named “the objective limits of objectivism.” The 
victim of his own habitus, defined by Bourdieu (1990, p. 56) as 
“embodied history, internalised as a second nature,’’ the scholar’s 
detachment and privileged positionality which he believes empowers 
him to observe nationalism ‘fairly and impartially’ in fact traps him 
into the philosophy of consciousness tradition and what Bourdieu 
names the “synoptic illusion” (1977, p. 101).
Chapter 5 also addresses the task of explaining why Scottish 
nationalism is such a recent phenomenon and the answer given is 
that, thanks to the continuing absence of a middle-class national- 
ism, it is only within the last forty years (1967-2007) that the relation 
of union has became a working-class issue so that uncovering “the 
social bases of nationalism” (Gellner 1983, p. 113) requires an 
investigation of how the working class have mobilised a symbolic 
patrimony for class ends. In explaining why this has occurred only 
recently I argue a new post-affluent working-class generation 
mobilises via nationalism because unlike previous generations 
during the long durée of the “dictatorship of scarcity” (Beck 
1992, p. 20) a new generation is entering a new relationship to the 
realm of meaning in stark contrast to previous generations 
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immersed in ‘scarcity thinking’ who entertained a very limited 
and very dominated relationship to the realm of meaning. Across 
what I call the 1945 generation and the 1979 generations, one 
relationship is over and another is at hand.
If Chapters 1 to 5 are standard ethnographic descriptions the 
final three chapters take the data of the first five chapters to a higher 
level beyond the words and experiences of informants and beyond 
standard academic texts that have a focus upon working-class 
experience such as Charlesworth’s Phenomenology of Working 
Class Experience (1999) which is not only resolutely naturalistic in 
its horizon but does not articulate the purely natural perfection 
working-class dasein is capable of. Charlesworth’s text not only 
leaves working class being in a pre-supernatural state but fails 
to alert the reader to the purely natural cognitional agency 
and performance working class being is capable of, and so this 
work fails to articulate an adequate understanding and account 
of empowerment from the standpoint of labouring humanity as a 
result of failing to give an account of the ‘integral operationalisation’ 
of situated humanity.
In constructing a standpoint which relies upon a psychological 
and intellectual development within the worker-inquirer-knower, 
Chapter 6 privileges the specifically intellectual nature of liberation 
and argues that a turning to cognitional theory is necessary in 
light of texts purporting to deal with liberation but which suffer 
from more or less completely undeveloped theories of cognition 
and which as a direct result fail to give an account of intellectual 
liberation that is in any way rigorous or convincing. Chapter 6 
is written in the shadow of Marx’s view that “liberation is 
an historical and not a mental act” (Marx and Engels 1974, p. 61) 
and makes the counter-argument that ‘liberation’ for human 
beings is above all a mental act. I argue that how this act of 
understanding is achieved is important not simply because of the 
metaphysical truism that “before a man can contemplate his own 
nature in precise but highly difficult concepts, he has to bring the 
virtualities of that nature into the light of day” (Lonergan 1957, 
p. 535), but because of the paradox that a nest of cultural and 
social conditions stand in the way of the working-class individual 
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achieving this self-understanding and yet are the conditions for 
making this radical act of understanding (and act of love) possible. 
Chapter 6 develops the Thomist-Scotist realism or ‘moderate 
nominalism’ by drawing upon the developmentalism that lies at 
the heart of Thomas’s account of human beatitude which 
according to Kerr (2002) emphasises the insight that sanctification 
occurs at the end of a journey of the human being operationalising 
his situated or socialised ‘secondary nature.’
While traditional Thomism affirms the need for an 
operationalising of our intellectual nature, contemporary Thomism 
emphasises the need for an ethnographic turn to achieve this 
operationalising of that intellectual nature. Because it has been 
my experience that “it is precisely in relation to the end 
proportionate to human nature that the supernatural end comes 
properly into view” (Long 2010, p. 29), the need to give an 
account of the purely natural end or perfection of working-class 
human being was necessary before proceeding to give an account 
of the disproportionate or supernatural capacities of working-
class dasein. Chapter 6 was written, then, because it seemed wilful 
not to proceed by way of auto-ethnography to give an account 
of this act of understanding which is the key stone in my own 
intellectual itinerary and in light of the fact that: “Up to that 
decisive achievement, all leads. From it, all follows” (Lonergan 
1957, p. xviii).
The significance of Chapter 6 derives from the fact that the 
notion of a natural proportionate end and beatitude available to 
Man is a doctrine which even non-religious humanists routinely 
deny or certainly do not trouble themselves to give an account 
of, while as for the subject of supernatural or religious experience, 
this for many Western intellectuals trapped in metaphysical mod-
ernism is nowhere to be found among their concerns. Chapters 6, 
7 and 8, therefore, pose a direct challenge to those whose imagi- 
nation and representations are immersed in what I term ‘scarcity 
thinking’ and these final three chapters argue that a realistic 
account of fully-contextualised Scottish working-class dasein is 
the anthropological basis that makes a subsequent experience of 
supernatural grace possible and intelligible. To this end, I give an 
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account of how the worker-inquirer-knower prepares for the 
utterly gratuitous gift of supernatural grace by acts of under- 
standing and loving and argue that the moment of sanctifying 
grace occurs in the aftermath of the worker-inquirer-knower 
achieving his natural proportionate end and when most reduced 
to intelligibility, love and understanding, when the worker-
inquirer-knower is “actually, actively and repletely knowing and 
loving” (Kerr 2002, p. 190).
If some writers such as Charlesworth (1999) fail to overcome 
naturalism in their representations of working-class experience, 
others who are open to the supernatural fail to overcome 
supernaturalism. Hence, if Chapter 6 was written to articulate the 
purely natural achievements working-class dasein is capable of 
and bring to perfection the naturalism found in Charlesworth’s 
Phenomenology of Working Class Experience (1999), Chapter 8 
identifies what I see as the residual supernaturalism of a text 
such as Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular 
Reason (1990) which raises the question of the relationship 
between theology and the social sciences but fails to give a 
satisfactory answer. Milbank’s important intervention is another 
text of ‘pure reason’ which maps a particular history of ideas in 
an objectivist manner and fails to model a living synthesis of the 
social and the supernatural from any particular social or 
ethnographic context. In contrast, my final three chapters are built 
around a performative emphasis that models how working-class 
dasein is actually liberated through its own agency or by its own 
hand in a purely natural manner because it is an account of 
integral liberation based upon a cognitional performance grounded 
in the very social ontology it constructs, conceives, understands, 
liberates and sanctifies.
As already stated, going beyond the bounds of ordinary 
or General Ontology in order to complete or perfect the 
ethnographic data and the exigencies outlined in the first five 
descriptive chapters meant writing the section on Special Ontology 
and once this decision was made the logical thing to do next was 
to add the final chapter on transcendence upon the basis of the 
preceding act of self-understanding. Chapter 8 then details the 
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supernatural element of working-class dasein and is the final stage 
in the journey begun with a series of descriptions of the worker, 
who in Chapter 6 becomes the worker-inquirer and finally the 
worker-inquirer-knower. Chapter 8 details the worker-inquirer-
knower-Christian in light of the advent of the supernatural as a 
result of the worker-inquirer-knower reaching the apotheosis of 
his natural powers and these four stages comprise the journey that 
is outlined. The final three chapters, then, make common cause 
with those social theorists who call for a holistic sociology 
(van Steenbergen 1990; Game and Metcalfe 1996; Bhaskar 
2012) and who wish to renew sociology and see the long overdue 
reconciliation of the social sciences and the question of trans- 
cendence and seeks to make common cause with the view that the 
time has come for social theory to transcend its residual secularist 
self-understanding as belonging to a ‘scarcity era’ that has passed 
and needs to be transcended in a post-secular turn in light of the 
“emergent anthropological orthodoxy on secularization is that it 
hasn’t happened” (Stewart 2001, p. 323).
Having completed my study of nationalism only to realise 
nationalism was a fraction of what is emerging in contemporary 
Scotland, I felt obliged to give my version of what this ‘more’ is 
in the shape of the question of what Habermas has termed 
the unfinished project of European modernity. Chapter 5 and 
subsequent chapters pursue this ‘deeper element’ by adding to 
the description of contextual dasein the further element of its 
reaching the apotheosis of its natural powers. In terms of 
explaining my decision to include far more of myself than I had 
bargained for, I cite Gouldner’s (1971, p. 493) observation that: 
“The knower’s knowing of himself…and of others and their social 
worlds…are two sides of a single process [and]…the search for 
knowledge about social worlds is also contingent upon the 
knower’s self-awareness. To know others he cannot simply study 
them, but must also listen to and confront himself.” I take, then, 
my lead from Gouldner (1971, p. 481) who has written:
I have come to the end of my work here, and I am aware 
that…there remains the uneasy feeling that something more 
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needs saying…that something has been omitted or glossed 
and that if I fail to clarify it the preceding work will be not 
only incomplete but dishonest.
The final three chapters, then, were written not only upon the 
basis of field data but as a result of developments within myself 
that went back to undergraduate research and intellectual and 
spiritual breakthroughs which influenced doctoral fieldwork to 
the extent that to pass over these developments in silence would 
have been dishonest. Thanks to these developments I share with 
Bhaskar (2012, pp. 117-164) a deep interest in the relationship 
between “social science and self-realisation” and understand 
sociology as having an indispensable role in articulating the 
purely natural beatitude or self-realisation of the fully-contextual 
human being. More generally, in light of the recognition among 
Scottish intellectuals such as MacIntyre, Muir, MacColla and 
McDiarmid that “the failure of Scottish culture to be whole” 
(Craig 1999, p. 22) is the central problematic, the final three 
chapters give the existential grounding of an integral or whole 
dasein, the reconciliation between Christian tradition and the 
Scottish ‘present as history’ and an answer to ‘the death of God’ 
in modern Europe proclaimed by Nietzsche. In describing how 
Nietzsche characterised his own ‘present as history’ Fried (2000, 
p. 258) has put it as follows:
In his fundamental outlook towards beings, Nietzsche took 
as his starting point the knowledge that historical Dasein is 
not possible without God and without the gods. But God is 
God only if he comes [kommt], and indeed, if he must come; 
and his coming is possible only if the creative preparedness 
and the daring wager based on the ultimate limits are held 
up to him.
The final chapters contextualise Nietzsche’s challenge to retrieve 
a tension that has been lost in the European mind, the tension 
between Christianity and modernity and seek to articulate a 
credible response. If Scottish culture and the Scottish imagination 
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has suffered from ‘tension-less’ anthropologies as a result of the 
‘Knoxian deformation and destruction’ (McRoberts 1959) and 
the loss of parliament and independence, then other national 
contexts across the North Atlantic share in this condition. In light 
of the long and tortuous path that the Scots have taken to 
politicise their national identity I am more aware than most of 
how easy it would be to conclude that the ‘tasks of freedom’ 
I begin to refer to in passing in Chapters 4 and 5 would be 
regarded as fanciful or perhaps well-meaning projections of pure 
reason unless some description or account of them was given. 
To meet this not unreasonable scepticism the final three chapters 
are dedicated to giving an account of the free development of 
the intellectual and psychological aspects of working-class dasein 
that open it towards transcendence in order to ‘flesh out’ claims 
made concerning the emergence of a free Scottish modernity.
The final chapters deal with ‘special data’ as they concern 
aspects of contextual dasein that my informants were not able 
to help me with by supplying the data as the data is simply too 
rare and intimate for it to have been handed to me as an 
ethnographer. To explicate the data further, then, anthropology ‘at 
home’ had to become auto-ethnography and this meant drawing 
upon the example of other ethnographers who have found it 
necessary to do likewise. In this regard Engelke (2002, p. 4) has 
argued that Evans-Pritchard and Victor Turner both ‘de-privatised’ 
their research methodology as “each tried to fold their ‘inner lives’ 
into the work of their anthropology. For Evans-Pritchard and 
Turner belief became an element of method.” Similarly, when 
Coleman (cited in Pina-Cabral 2008, p. 43) asks “should one 
study…Christianity by letting the faith ‘get inside’ oneself,” my 
response has been to dissolve the Chinese walls between the 
personal and professional as a result of the fieldwork process. 
In Chapter 2 my method was to access the reality of the 
labouring body myself by becoming a labourer and then to bring 
this to the page via writing, and in Chapter 3 my method was to 
study housing conditions by recognising how these housing 
conditions entered and determined myself and again to bring 
this to the page via writing. However, thanks to the experiences 
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I describe in Chapters 6 and 8 my problem became more radical 
as from that point onwards I was more or less coerced into seeing 
as integral to the question of an honest reflexivity the question 
of transcendence and how to account for the advent of the 
supernatural as an existential fact as a result of achieving a 
sociologically-constituted act of self-understanding. In light of 
these developments it seemed that to not develop an integral 
sociology that described these two ‘perfections’ would be to 
misrepresent what the purely natural was capable of making itself 
capable of achieving and receiving i.e. its own apotheosis and the 
free advent of the supernatural. Finally, mindful of the example 
of others such as Blondel (1984) and Heidegger (1962) but 
primarily as a result of having achieved these developments within 
myself (as well as being mindful of the great MacDiarmid who 
called upon the poet to assume the burden of his people and to 
dare to break their living tomb), it seemed daft to contemplate 
not giving an account of that performative cognitional act 
“whereby [working class] Dasein is liberated for its uttermost 
possibility of existence” (Heidegger 1962, p. 350).
Having embarked, then, upon the ‘slippery slope’ of reflexivity 
or what Levi-Strauss (1908-2009) memorably termed ‘the swamps 
of experience,’ the ethnography that follows may be described 
as an ethnography of becoming fully modern insofar as it is a 
sociological mediation of that ‘daring to know’ (aude sapere) 
upon the basis of contemporary and contingent social conditions 
that Foucault identified as defining of modernity; the concern with 
“the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent” (cited in Rabinow 
and Sullivan 1987, p. 164) and, echoing Chenu (1997), defining 
the modern condition as the necessity of “recapturing something 
eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but 
within it” (Foucault, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan 1987, p. 164). 
This capture of the eternal upon the basis of the contingent is why 
modernity begins in the twelfth century and the Franciscan secular 
turn and the mendicant reform of Christianity. The view that 
giving ‘secondary natures’ their due means entrusting the full 
weight of the supernatural to the shoulders of integral contingency 
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is the true ancestor of the various ‘politics of identity’ movements 
we see in post-affluent societies as more social groups attempt to 
make a stand upon their preferred ‘integral contingency’ – whether 
it be gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class identity - as the foundation 
for the democratic up-take of the twelfth-century project of seeing 
how far ‘secondary natures’ can go in bearing the full weight of 
identity, liberation and salvation.
In attempting an integral sociology I have had to reveal much 
more of myself than I ever imagined when first entering the 
field and I am reassured by Ortner (1995, pp. 173-4) who has 
eloquently written that ethnographic research “has always meant 
the attempt to understand another life world using the self – as 
much of it as possible – as the instrument of knowing…Classically, 
this kind of understanding has been closely linked with fieldwork, 
in which the whole of the self physically and in every other way 
enters the space of the world the researcher seeks to understand.” 
Because what follows is an ethnography ‘at home’ I am, of course, 
involved in the trajectory which I describe the 1979 generation(s) 
as instantiating and am caught up in the present moment as a Scot 
among fellow Scots upon the cusp of an unprecedented act of 
national self-determination on 18 September 2014. Having spent 
much of my adult life arriving to this point, then, and viewing the 
effort as a whole I identify with the following point made by 
Spencer (cited in Ingold 1990, p. 21):
Many years ago, at a seminar at the University of Edinburgh, 
I remember Jimmy [Littlejohn] commenting that in order to 
attempt the task of anthropological comparison we should 
aspire to ‘become coeval with our own history.’
What follows, then, is my attempt and my journey towards 
becoming coeval with my times and my class and my nation 
and my people as a native ethnographer who believes that “if 
anthropology cannot enlighten the complexities of its own 
national contexts, then it is impotent and trivial” (Cohen 1987, 
p. 17). I have managed to secure the privilege of attempting and 
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completing a rather long journey that has convinced me that 
a public sociology and sociological theory and anthropological 
inquiry are far from impotent and trivial but are rather unique 
and indispensable sources of liberation. Whether what follows 
succeeds in making a convincing case for such claims is of course 
for each reader to decide.
Part 1
(i) General Ontology

11
Cardenden:  
Post-Industrial Village
This is Cardenden. This is Scotland.
Anne-Marie Hankin (age 6)
Good Friday, 1999
1.1 Ethnography from Nothing
If identifying a particular day on which fieldwork began is quite 
artificial as I was researching my natal village, my doctoral 
fieldwork began in July 1998 after returning from getting married 
in Spain, and when some twenty months later I began the process 
of writing up my research, I found myself sitting in front of a 
blank computer screen on 15 March 2000 facing the problem of 
where to begin. Which story, event or observation about Cardenden 
should I start with? Ordinarily, it would have made sense to begin 
by communicating my ‘first impressions’ of Cardenden or the 
moment of my first arrival but in light of conducting ethnography 
in the village I grew up in, there was no first impression or ‘arrival 
narrative’ to solve the problem of how to begin. Instead, I settled 
upon the strategy of beginning by communicating a sense of local 
history and the predicament Cardenden shares with many former 
industrial-era villages in Fife and many locations throughout 
central Scotland that have recently been made to enter the post-
industrial era. Struggling to find a way to capture this reality, 
however, I stood up from my computer and began pacing around 
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the cramped converted attic that served as my study to relieve the 
tension of sitting in front of a computer screen that I fancied was 
patiently waiting for me to begin. I then thought to begin writing 
up my years of research by describing how I had moved to a new 
address in Station Road that overlooked Cardenden Mining 
Archives and how I had been able to confirm my suspicion that 
the Archives had closed before the death of its seventy-seven year 
old curator. As I paced back and forward I thought that perhaps 
the view from my study might be a fitting way to begin describing 
how those locals who remember the industrial era of the village 
were themselves passing away, and how ‘the human means’ of 
curating the memory and identity of the industrial era were 
coming to an end. I sat down again at my computer, only to 
immediately stand up to look outside for another look at the 
Archives, perhaps hoping for some inspiration to begin writing an 
account of the contrast between the industrial past and the post-
industrial present. To my surprise, however, the always-drawn 
shutter of the Archives was drawn up and upon seeing this novel 
sight I assumed a new curator had been appointed and the 
Archives were reopening, and having only been inside on one 
occasion where the premises had to be specially opened for me 
after I had arranged an appointment, I was only too glad to escape 
the problem of how to begin writing and see the collection of 
mining memorabilia one more time as an obvious way to begin 
writing about a sense of locality and history in a former pit village 
like Cardenden.
Stepping inside the Archives, a sudden and palpable sense of 
disappointment hit me as I scanned empty walls and empty floor 
space and saw that, far from reopening, the premises were being 
cleared with all of the mining memorabilia already having been 
removed, leaving only dark and empty display cabinets ready for 
dismantling. As I stood taking in this scene Wullie Braid emerged 
from an open door at the back of the room. Wullie was a former 
miner who had been responsible for establishing and financing the 
Archives “tae the tune e eighty thousand pounds” as he presently 
informed me. I introduced myself and explained I had been hoping 
for a last look at the Archives but could see that I was too late. 
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Wullie asked me my name, if I was “connected to the Gilfillans in 
the village.” As we chatted I told Wullie I was in my last year of 
doing research in the village, at which he told me his daughter was 
doing her honours year in psychology at Stirling university. While 
cursing myself for not having previously taken advantage of an 
ethnographic site that was literally on my doorstep I tamely 
enquired what was to happen to the collection. Wullie told me 
he would have “given the lot to Fife Council” if the Council 
guaranteed the collection would be displayed but, as the Council 
did not promise this, he had declined the option of having the 
collection put in storage by the Council and the collection was to 
be split up between a local mining historian Dan Imrie († 2010), 
the Scotspeak project at the Greig Institute in Leven (Fife) with the 
rest going “down to Wales.” Standing among the empty shelves 
and cabinets we talked briefly with no enthusiasm of the demise 
of the Archives. Wullie identified a lack of interest, and at this 
I remembered when interviewing the late curator he had told me 
that the problem the Archives faced was not being located “on the 
Queen’s highway” as he had put it, and that this accounted for 
the failure to attract interest from tourists and casual visitors. 
With nothing left to say and not wanting to interrupt his work any 
further I asked Wullie about the Visitors’ Book as for a long time 
I had wanted to see the entry made by Dom Helder Camara and 
record any comments the eminent Brazilian churchman made 
when he had visited the Archives. Wullie advised me to come back 
the next day when his wife would pick out the book for me.3
I returned home to face my blank computer screen again but 
instead of writing I tried to come to terms with what I had just 
learned. I was saddened the more it sunk in that a local attempt at 
‘remembrance’ and curating the identity and history of the 
village had come and gone. As myself and Wullie had talked, 
3 I had previously been in the Archives on Sunday 23 March 1997 interviewing 
the curator (Bien Bernard) who had mentioned the visit of Helder Camara. 
I never saw the Archives open again and never did see the Visitors’ Book. 
Sometime later the space occupied by the Archives was taken over by the offices 
of Ore Valley Housing Association.
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neither of us mentioned the fact that anyone under twenty years 
of age in the village could have any direct or even indirect 
experience of the coal mining era, and that the real problem facing 
the Archives was overcoming locals’ fragile connection to their 
own industrial past; that the circle to be squared was how to 
establish any kind of ‘living relationship’ to an era that had passed 
into history. For the years 1991-2000 the village had been 
fortunate to possess a well-designed and well-maintained venue 
dedicated to its industrial past but after two years of fieldwork, 
even the unexpected occurrence of the Archives closing quickly 
felt like a familiar tale: a lack of interest, the inability to generate 
an audience or clientele and thereby revenue to keep the premises 
financially viable, made all the more poignant as the Archives as a 
space for memory and local identity was unique and there was no 
other comparable effort at memory and representation of locality. 
In the historical shift to a post-industrial economy and society it 
seemed that even well-resourced efforts at remembering in small 
localities were fated to offer little resistance to new forces whose 
“historic role is to destroy history, to sever every link with the 
past” (Berger 1979, p. 213). As the curator himself had told me:
You’re researchin’ because it’s a race against time. What wis 
this a’ aboot? An’ it’s a fascinatin’ story, there’s no’ a story 
like it. Bit a lot e the community disnae even want tae listen 
tae that. They’re jist no interested. They’re no interested… 
Ma ain brither says as faur as Ah’m concerned, the history 
e the miners firget it. Ah’m oot the bloody pit; Ah’ve got ma 
redundancy money and that’s it!
To explain why the end of the Archives felt like ‘a familiar tale’ it 
was necessary to start at the beginning of fieldwork and so as I sat 
in my study at the end of the doctoral-phase of fieldwork I recalled 
the beginning of fieldwork which had started ten months after the 
referendum of September 1997 to establish a mandate for the new 
Scots parliament, and what stood out were the numerous instances 
when locals expressed puzzlement as to why someone would want 
to research Cardenden. For example, on a Saturday morning in 
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July 1999 when buying bread from Bayne’s bakery opposite my 
flat in Cardenden Road, as it was early and business was slow, 
I spent some time chatting with the woman who had served me 
behind the counter and informed her I was a student researching 
Cardenden. At this, she told me her son had graduated the week 
before from Heriot-Watt University in physics and that he was 
“waiting for clearance before going down south” to join the 
Ministry of Defence. “Well...” she concluded, “there’s nothing up 
here, is there?”
Similar views were expressed by retired miner Hugh Young 
(2 May 2000) when he told me that: “The only thing Cardenden is 
handy fir is Glenrothes an Kirkcaldy,” and I found among local 
residents who enquired what it was I was studying that I stood a 
good chance of eliciting recognition of the value of my research if 
I replied “working-class nationalism’’ as locals intuitively regarded 
this as a real and more or less important ‘something.’ Alternatively, 
I invited bemused incredulity if I simply replied: “I’m studying 
Cardenden,” as if that answer was intuitively regarded as insufficient 
and in need of further elaboration and justification. I implicitly 
presumed the non-plussed reaction to asserting ‘I’m studying 
Cardenden’ was based upon locals’ view that “there’s nothing here” 
as they so often said, so that in interpreting Hugh’s remark cited 
above the obvious interpretation is that the ethnographer who 
wishes to capture something important or meaningful should go to 
Glenrothes or Kirkcaldy as nothing much can come from studying 
Cardenden, and that by studying Cardenden I was setting myself 
the challenge of how to make something from nothing.
Nearly three years into fieldwork on a sunny afternoon in 
April 2001 I took a walk with my then three-year-old daughter 
in her buggy to the local park. As it was a working day the park 
was empty except for a local taking his dog a walk and a local 
unemployed history graduate practicing his golf swing on one of 
the football pitches created from land that had been reclaimed 
from the mining industry in the nineteen-nineties. My walk took 
me through the landscaped area that had been planted with large 
patches of trees interspersed with small paths to allow locals to 
walk through and ‘enjoy’ these new ‘post-industrial’ spaces; 
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spaces that throughout my childhood had been off-limits as the 
entire area until the nineteen-nineties was a huge smouldering 
bing. As usual, I had not particularly enjoyed the walk as I was 
coerced as usual to think about how the poor quality of soil used 
to reclaim the land resulted in Nature having little to work on so 
that its task of reclaiming space from the ravages of the industrial 
period or making ‘something from nothing’ would be a depressingly 
long-term generational affair. Walking through what I fancied was 
not Nature but the endless monotony of what seemed to be the 
same tree repeated again and again thanks to the same one species 
of tree having been used everywhere, I noted the absence of 
wildlife and birdsong so that the silence and the landscape through 
which I was walking and trying to spot something interesting 
to point out for my daughter to look at eventually became a 
depressing sign of the advent of ‘industrialised nature’ and a lost 
opportunity to properly post-industrialise local space.
On this particular day, however, I had heard an unfamiliar 
sound coming from somewhere in the village that I couldn’t 
identify. Thinking no more about it, I continued my walk before 
turning back to head home to 113 Main Street. As I turned into 
my street the town clock which I hadn’t even suspected was 
capable of sounding the hours suddenly started to chime, and at 
that instant I realised that the strange noise that I had been hearing 
whilst out walking had been the town clock: a town clock that 
only at that moment did I realise had been silent all my life; a town 
clock that only then did I realise had been designed to chime the 
hours. Only upon hearing the clock sound, then, did I realise it 
had been broken all these years. After more than sixty years of 
silence the Number 1 Goth town clock which had been installed 
in 1920 but which I was informed had never chimed since the 
Second World War of 1939-1945, began chiming the hours again. 
Such was my surprise and delight that throughout that evening as 
each hour approached I stopped what I was doing and made my 
way to a part of the house where I’d be sure to hear the hour being 
sounded; as if still not believing it was true until I heard the clock 
strike. My taking delight in the sounding of the clock was shared 
by other locals. As community activist Wullie Duncan informed 
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me later: “Ah wanted tae greet when Ah heard the toon clock 
chimin. That’s how Ah felt.” If the task of the ethnographer is to 
study others in ‘‘their space and time’’ (Burawoy 2000, pp. 3-4) 
then it seemed the sounding of the passing hours was so pleasing 
because it called to mind or ‘called to presence’ the long history of 
silence residents had endured; as if the ‘lived experience’ or 
meaning of the sounding clock within every local inhabitants’ 
hearing was its liberating the accumulated years of silence.
The chiming of the hours was architecturally significant as 
the town clock forms the top part of the Goth building which is 
the most recognised landmark within the village, and thinking 
upon my own and Wullie’s response, the significance of the clock 
chiming seemed to be because it felt as if for more than sixty years 
local ‘public time’ had stood still, and so for at least one sunny 
April afternoon and evening a ‘spell’ that had been cast and then 
been long forgotten had suddenly been broken and locality had 
awakened, and local time had returned and been re-united with 
local space and in our hearing the clock, sixty years of space-time 
‘‘distanciation’’ (Giddens 1981, pp. 90-108) had come to an 
end. Perhaps also, this public marking of time gave inhabitants 
a new medium through which they could experience their mitsein 
or ‘being alongside’ each other in their local space and this 
temporality was a new mediation of sociality and so residents 
were decanted and delivered from a long unnoticed mitsein 
characterised by a kind of sonic privatism. Throughout that 
first evening it felt as if publicness had returned in a new and 
unsuspected manner; as if this new temporal-come-aural mediation 
of locality or sonic structuring of mitsein revealed something 
primitive about the nature of sociality that had been lost, as if 
the town clock made present once again the original ‘publicity-
making’ function of time-keeping. Insofar as time was made 
public thanks to the town clock chiming, it made public the prior 
privatisation of time so that it suddenly felt as if locality itself 
began again or came freshly into being because time literally took 
place that evening and Cardenden was returned to an era when 
“time and space were inseparable, congealed in locale, that is in 
‘place’” (Burawoy 2000, p.3), so that a clock striking reunited 
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everyone within earshot into an aural community of listeners by 
making a physical connection ‘out of thin air.’
If the town clock resuming striking meant the history of silence 
was made present, something else that was made present was the 
question as to who was responsible for this long silence, and local 
history group members informed me that the Community Council’s 
achievement in renovating the clock came after the Goth closed as 
a pub and after previous offers by the Goth management to pay for 
the clock’s restoration were refused. When inquiring why it had 
taken more than half a century to fix a clock I received no clear 
answer, although one community council member informed me the 
reason was a long-time Community Council member who lived 
opposite the clock objected that it would disturb his sleep and this 
was why the clock stopped chiming after 10 p.m. and before 9 a.m.
If the resumption of the town clock sounding the hours had 
intimations of a post-industrial return to a slower bucolic pre-
industrial era, the industrial era of locality as ‘pit village’ (1895-
1965) had its own way of marking time as revealed by one of the 
members of the local history group (Adam Ingram) who recounted 
his memories of locality and in particular the colliery whistle 
sounding throughout the day:
The first blast of the day was at five twenty-five a.m. and 
lasted for five minutes. Shorter blasts were then emitted at 
six a.m., nine-thirty a.m., nine-fifty a.m., one-thirty p.m., 
two p.m., five-thirty p.m., five-fifty p.m., nine-thirty p.m. 
and finally at ten p.m. There was, too, the sound of silence. 
I can recall five: learning the deaf and dumb alphabet at the 
Cubs; watching the funeral procession of Johnny Thomson, 
the Celtic goalkeeper, in September 1931 and eight weeks 
later, the funerals of nine of the ten men killed in the Bowhill 
Colliery disaster; looking at the first pictures of Belsen 
Concentration Camp in the Pathé news at the Goth;4 and 
4 There was once a Goth picture house adjacent to the No. 1 Goth pub which 
has long since been demolished and recently made into a small car park where 
I would park my East of Scotland Water van each night when living in Station 
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finally the two-minutes silence at eleven a.m. on November 
11th every year in remembrance of those who died in the 
service of their country in two World Wars.
This evocation of the pit horn sounding to mark the progress of 
the working day is a poignant representation of village and 
provincial life in light of the practice of all the collieries throughout 
Fife sounding their horns in unison every year at midnight on 
Hogmanay to greet the New Year. What is also clear is that time 
was not simply marked by industry but time itself was industrialised 
as time did not stop or come to rest or follow any natural or 
seasonal rhythm but was subject to ‘total mobilisation’ as every 
hour of every day was dedicated to economic activity. Also within 
this context of industrialism, there is a clear evocation in the 
above testimony of a sense of a shared experiencing of day-to-day 
time and the passing of the years and sharing in the major events 
of world history. This era, however, has passed thanks to the 
process termed ‘deindustrialization’ which must dominate any 
attempt at rendering ‘the present as history’ in light of the fact that 
the original raison d’ être of industrial locality has passed, raising 
questions as to the meaning of place and highlighting the problem 
as to which generation’s view of locality will prevail and which 
generation will assume responsibility for naming and interpreting 
the post-industrial present.
1.2 The Advent of the Post-Industrial Era
The shaft for Bowhill Colliery was sunk in 1895 and seventy years 
later in 1965 the colliery closed. In 1931 the village population 
peaked at over 10,000 while the current population estimate for 
Cardenden stands at 5,270.5 Among the material gathered by the 
local history group I attended during fieldwork were many 
Road. The only remains of the cinema’s existence is a rusted rectangular metal 
frame still attached to a wall of the pub where the cinema bill was displayed. 
5 General Register for Scotland. www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics. [Accessed 
8 December 2010]
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newspaper clippings and photographs depicting the social history 
of the village, and what I found striking about many of the 
photographs were the ubiquitous crowd scenes such as gala 
evenings, summer balls and the many annual dances of the many 
local clubs, civil and church associations and various branches of 
national organisations. Photographs, for example, of the formal 
opening of new local amenities such as the cinema or the local 
park with its meticulously cared-for gardens, which are a record 
of a confident industrial era. Another striking feature of the 
photographs is the formality and visible ranking of the subjects 
posing for the camera: prominent members of the local middle 
and even upper class such as mine owners, local landowners, 
managers or business proprietors in their top hats accompanied 
by wives wearing expensive gowns in the forefront, clearly 
illustrating social standing and their ongoing patronage of 
locality and local events and financial investment in locality, 
all surrounded by the ‘rank and file’ and illustrating an era 
where attending such local events was a spectacle and source of 
distinction. Adding to the formality and significance of such 
photographs is the fact that they were taken long before cameras 
were affordable to most people so that this technology remained 
largely monopolized by professionals, with the result that older 
locals tend to have little or no photographic record of their early 
lives with the local history group having very few photographs 
of miners in informal settings or depictions of mundane domestic 
life.6 The preponderance of colliery managers, businessmen and 
their wives in the photographic record of locality is also reflected 
in the present-day architecture of the village where, as a rule, 
simply walking through the village and noting large detached 
stone-built houses is to identify the former residence of pit 
managers, doctors and other local professionals of the industrial 
era before this professional class more or less vacated Cardenden 
6 On New Year’s Day 2012 one elderly informant told me of a woman in 
Cardenden who was married to one of her husband’s brothers, and not only did 
she not possess a photograph of her dead husband but did not possess a single 
photograph of her wedding day. 
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as a result of post-industrialisation. What is also clear from the 
photographic record is that the industrial era of the village was 
also the heyday of class distinction and unambiguous social 
ranking. As one older informant (Bien Bernard) told me:
See when ye were a boy, if ye saw the minister comin’ ye 
crossed the street, if ye seen the docter comin’ ye crossed the 
street. If ye saw the police comin’ ye crossed the street. See 
that wis the elite, the literati, ye didnae...ye jist never mixed. 
Never. Never the twain shall meet, right? The minister wis a 
pal e the coal owners, he wis in the manager’s pocket. They 
were a’ in the manager’s pockets; a’ the business men. Oh 
no, ye never mixed wi naeb’dy, never mixed wi naeb’dy.
While most of the practices and visible significations of class 
difference and social status are now long gone, such class-based 
practices were endemic throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century when Cardenden was economically profitable and 
attracted primary and secondary businesses and private investment 
as well as workers, which meant Cardenden had its own local 
bourgeoisie and saw the cultivation of an intense localism and the 
minute organisation of locality in great detail. If the obviousness 
of the class system has sharply retreated there has also occurred 
a parallel decline in the practice of local politics from being 
something assiduously cultivated and competed for among local 
professionals as part of a commitment to civic life, to the present 
day Community Council of little power comprised of pensioners 
backed up by popular apathy.
In addition to a certain retreat of the class system, a description 
of the advent of the post-industrial era must also include the 
physical transformation that began in the nineteen-eighties and 
the many land reclamation schemes7 to treat the widespread 
physical and environmental scarring caused to the Fife landscape 
7 On the outskirts of Cardenden is the Purvis land reclamation site where rubble 
from the building trade is recycled and resold. The site is shared with the RWE 
npower renewables depot which supplies timber-based fuel for the new biomass 
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by the industrial coalmining which have returned Cardenden to 
something of its pre-industrial rural appearance.8 Growing up in 
Cardenden in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies 
I remember playing on the long-abandoned bing and buildings of 
the old Cardenden pit that even then had been long abandoned 
with no effort having been made to make the land fit for 
commercial activity or agriculture; as well as playing on the 
vastly larger bing beside the much larger Bowhill colliery complex 
which dominated the local landscape until the late nineteen-
eighties and which, because it remained too hot to touch just 
below its encrusted and smoldering surface, was always a tempting 
playground for local young boys looking to ‘get chased.’9
If we look to the literature on post-industrialisation the follow-
ing definition or description from Castoriadis (1997, pp. 32-3) is 
a useful starting point:
Something in reality corresponds to the term postindustrial. 
Briefly speaking, in the rich countries at least (but not  
only), production (whatever that may mean) is moving 
away from old dirty factories and blast furnaces toward 
increasingly automated complexes and various ‘services’…
Automation and data processing were supposed to transform 
power plant supplying power to the Tullis Russel papermaking plant in nearby 
Markinch.
8 An excellent photographic illustration of this return to a pre-industrial 
appearance is the aerial photograph of Cardenden in Alastair Campbell’s Fife 
From Above (2011, p. 76). 
9 The history group members have so far been unable to locate the dates of 
Cardenden pit which closed circa 1920. Bowhill Colliery (Lady Josephine) 
officially closed in 1966 (although locals advise the year 1965 because this was 
when coal production ceased) with a peak employment figure of 1,544 in 1962. 
The Minto pit closed in 1967 with a peak employment figure of 757 in 1957. 
The Lady Helen pit closed in 1960 with a peak employment figure of 474. The 
Number 1 Dundonald pit closed in 1961 with a peak employment figure of 260 
in 1952. Bowhill (Cardenden) Power Station had a peak employment figure of 
36 in 1974. Further afield, Seafield Colliery (Kirkcaldy) closed in July 1987 with 
a peak employment figure of 2,472 in 1974 and The Michael, the largest pit in 
the Fife coalfield, closed in 1988 and had a peak employment figure of 3,296.
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the repetitive, alienated industrial toil of old…In actuality, 
none of all this has materialised…For the bulk of the 
remaining employees, in industry or in services, the nature 
of work has not fundamentally changed…‘redundant’ 
[industrial] workers, and youth, have mostly found 
employment in second-rate, poorly paid, ‘service’ industries.
With this definition in mind the following interview transcript 
from a former miner and his wife gives us a precise point in time 
for the end of the industrial era in Cardenden.
Me: The miners went back in nineteen-eighty-five. Was 
that when a’ the redundancies were? 
Eileen: At the end e the year. They hid a tae come oot. The 
last day e nineteen-eighty-five.
John: The last day e nineteen-eighty-five Ah worked.
Eileen: Right up tae the thirty-first e December cause if they 
didnae come oot then, they widnae a got dole the next year. 
Because they hid nae stamp fir nineteen eighty-four. That wis 
the year they were on strike. Ye hid tae leave in eighty-five.
John: Ye hid tae leave the pit in eighty-five. Ah cannae 
mind e the reason fir it. It hid somethin tae dae wi the 
benevolent system.
Eileen: They’d nae stamp on their caird ’cause they hid never 
worked that year so they hid nae stamp fir nineteen-eighty 
four. Eighty-five he [John] come oot. Eighty-six we got the 
dole. Fae then we’ve lived like that.
Me: So basically the last day e nineteen-eighty-five?
Eileen: He worked the last shift. 
Me: So basically fir maist Cardenden miners that wis there 
last day?
John: Aye. The pit broke aff fir new year holidays. An that 
wis yer last day e work. A lot e boys came aff days afore it, 
a week afore it. Ah says no. Ah went right up tae the very 
last day, the last minute. Ah didnae even come up the pit 
early. Ah came up wi the rest e the men, come up richt on 
ma time. They were even sayin ‘What the hell e you daen 
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oot tae yer work?’ They says, ‘Yer packin up next week.’ 
They says, ‘That’s you finished!’ Ah says ‘Ah’m needin a’ the 
money Ah can git, even though it’s jist a days wage, Ah’ve  
a lot e debt. Ah cannae afford tae take time aff.’ Ah’ll tell 
ye, if they hid asked me tae come back an worked on as 
casual labour Ah’d a come back. If Ah could get ma dole. 
See when we first moved up here [from Cluny Park to 
Whitehall Avenue] this wis a’ miners. No everybody bit the 
majority, the majority were miners. Danny Laferty and 
Wullie Blair an Balfour an Howie an Cockie, auld Martin, 
Eck Kenny, Kennedy, Ned Campbell across there.
Eileen: They were a’ miners wane time. 
John: A’ miners. The majority. 
Eileen: An they hid a meetin in the [Bowhill War Memorial] 
Club10 mind an they were bringin folk in fae ootside.
Me: What dae ye mean they brought folk fae ootside?
John: They were bringin boys in fae the West e Fife. They 
hid tae bring in folk tae agitate. Whenever somebody got  
up tae speak ‘Away ya shower e gutless...’ An’ a’ this.
Me: Is that right?
John: Oh aye! A’ the agitators brought in. Agitators. 
Strangers. They didnae live in the village.
Eileen: Ah mean they never hid a vote or anythin.
John: That’s when Arthur Jack got up an Ah’ll gie that boy 
his due. The hall wis packed an ye could see he wis shakin. 
He says: ‘There’s a feelin in the village among a lot e the 
men, they want the strike tae finish. They want tae go back 
tae work an Ah think we should have a vote.’ An Ah’ll tell 
ye, see when he done that, a’ the agitators comin an shoutin  
ya shower e gutless so an so’s an a’ the rest e it.
Eileen: An it’s no only that, when they did go back tae work 
a bing e men fae the East coast hid a’ been workin! Eh?  
Up the coast. They’d a’ went tae their work.
10 Locals recall that into the 1990s the Club was the centre of weekend nightlife 
and anyone wanting a seat had to be in by 6 p.m. On Sunday 2 June 2013 The 
Club closed as a result of unpaid utility bills. 
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John: See places like Glenrothes, Kirkcaldy, an’ even Leven, 
they’re big toons, folk could hide bit ye cannae hide here.
Eileen: ’Cause a’ body kent ye.
John: Ye cannae hide in a minin village...Kinglessie, Ballingry, 
Lohore, Bowhill. There nae wiy ye could hide, ye couldnae 
hide here. An they boys that stayed in Kirkcaldy, 
Glenrothes...a bing e thum were workin. Ken, you’re in a 
big city, an wane neebor works in a factry an wan neebor 
works in a thing. He’s no bothered whether you’re scabbin 
or no! He couldnae care less! Bit doon here it’s different. 
Anyway, as Ah wis sayin, whenever there’s a wee bit  
e trouble between workers an employers there boys is in. 
Young socialists, an’ Marxists, an’ a’ the Communist party. 
They were right in. An they were telln boys how tae organise 
their strike an’ everythin. How tae hiv maximum effect an 
everything. Create the maist damage.
If the last day of 1985 was the end of life as a miner, it was not 
until 1990 that Cardenden became ‘post-coal’ as this was the year 
when many informants advised me they had gas central heating 
installed in their former Council houses and when they began 
living without coal in their lives. It was the summer of nineteen-
ninety, then, that coal as a ‘way of life’ came to an end and became 
a memory so that today, apart from the chimneys atop every 
house that was built after the War in the late nineteen-forties and 
fifties, the only other physical evidence of the coalmining era are 
the original coal bunkers that remain in the back gardens of 
elderly widows.
When the older generation and former miners in particular 
attempt to articulate ‘the present as history,’ the strike of 1984-1985 
is their usual departure point for discourse upon a wide variety 
of topics: the experience of becoming ‘postindustrial,’ the meaning 
of their lives, working-class history and the problematic question of 
what remains of local identity and community. When locals talk of 
the strike they remember a period of crisis but also that they did not 
suspect the advent of a new order, so that the strike today symbolises 
the advent of post-industrialisation and a sense of ‘loss’ that many 
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informants openly expressed to me. Only in the aftermath of the 
strike has it taken on a powerful symbolising function for the 
ending of a way of life, so that closely related to talk of the miners’ 
strike were queries about the cause of the present-day ‘collapse’ of 
shared values. For some of my informants there is no doubt that a 
certain symbolic order, as revealed in the self-assured semiotics of 
workers’ struggle reproduced in trade union banners for example, 
has fallen apart and a way of life has been made redundant by 
events. As a National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) official at the 
time of the strike (Alex Howie) told me:
It wis a Monday durin’ the strike; Ah cannae even tell ye the 
month an’ the front page e The Sunday Mail: ‘Ravenscraig 
To Shut.’ The front cover an’ we were there hudin it up at 
the gate; an’ ken the shift jist walkin’ in. Ken they widnae 
even jist stop tae talk tae ye. Ah could aye mind that. Ye 
wonder if it’d a’ been any different ken if the steel worker 
boys had helped us. Fae what Ah’ve seen Ah’m still 
convinced she [Margaret Thatcher] wis wantin’ tae defeat 
the lot e us.11 She jist wanted tae f***in’ destroy us an’ she 
succeeded tae the extent that Ah think she f***ed the 
country. An Ah’ll tell ye this: any joab Ah’ve had since Ah 
left the minin’ industry it’s dae this, dae that. Dae it or yer 
oot the door. Ye’ll never ever hae a workin’ class union noo. 
Never. Ye’ll never ever have a workin’ class union. In any 
joab noo ye’ll never have a workin’ class union. Cause ye 
cannae even trust yer neebor. They’ll play wane against 
wane. They’d rather shop wane anither thin stick thegither. 
Management’s actually got everybody tae obey the rules or 
yer oot the f***in door. When Thatcher beat the miners she 
beat every industry. They’re no’ like the management that 
11 In the aftermath of the death of the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
on 8 April 2013 it emerged that Alex was right to have his suspicions as it 
emerged in television footage that the British government delayed the closure of 
the Ravenscraig steel mill as a reward for the Scottish steelworkers’ refusal to 
help the miners during the 1984-1985 strike. 
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wis in the pit. Once upon a time in the pit ye could talk tae 
management how you seen it. Ye could f***in argue 
hammer an’ tong, bit ye still hid a union. Noo ye cannae.
In a similar vein, former miner Bien Bernard told me:
In Cardenden here, ye hid little or no choice, there were  
two thousand miners here, ye hid little or no choice. Ye  
were lucky if ye were a joiner or an electrician. Bit there 
werenae they type e jobs tae be had. An’ they wernae sae 
ready gi’en miner’s sons better type joabs. So yer more or 
less bogged down tae the pit...yer faither worked in the pit 
an’ yir grandfaither worked in the pit, an’ that wis it. Ye jist 
followed in his fitsteps ye ken. As a matter e fact ye went 
doon the pit at fourteen, the smells in a pit, the water smells, 
the earth smells, the coal smells, the stones smell. A’ different 
smells, an’ ye ken ye remember them a’ yer lifetime. Ah stull 
git thum yit. Bit naeb’dy wanted Communists but ye see in 
this village, the hale lot e us, the minute ye rebelled yir a 
Communist, disnae maitter if ye ir a Communist ye were 
branded a Communist...yir jist dirt...ye were a coal Jock...
yir dad wis a miner ye were nuhin...we were a’ branded 
Communist. See the minute ye rebelled yir a Communist. 
The first Communist upon this earth wis Christ. The first 
one tae rebel. He was a Communist! An yet what did we 
ever want? We wanted a pint at the weekend, a guid drink 
at the weekend, an’ their bauchy an’ their bet at the horses. 
Ye see that wis the life. An’ ye couldnae change that. That 
wis the environment ye ken. That wis their way e life. An’ 
you couldnae change that. They didnae want tae own a 
hoose; they wid a felt oot e place if they hud owned  
a hoose. ‘Oh no Ah’m stayin’ the same as the rest. Ah’m no 
changing.’ Ye ken what Ah mean? That wis oor environment 
ye ken. An’ Ah’ll tell ye somehin, classes will never mix. Ah 
mean until the end e time. Burns said, ‘Man tae man the 
world o’er shall brothers be fir a’ that.’ It’ll be fine if it did 
bit that’s the perfect utopia, bit that’ll never happen. There’s 
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no’ a lot e people look back wi’ pride onywiy on that strike, 
as when they did wi’ 1926. See we were broucht up wi 
stories fae the old men. When we were young, used tae sit 
an’ men tell’n us a’ the stories e what they did durin’ the 
strike an’ everythin’ ye ken? Auld Cocky Wotherspoon ken? 
They were a’ young boys durin the strike ye see. What they 
used tae dae durin’ the strike. Bit when the strike finished a’ 
they boys thought they would be like their uncles, their 
faithers and the grandfaithers. They wid dae the same thing 
ye ken. Bit the spirit wisnae there, the heart wisnae there. It 
wis different. We hid a lot mair money in oor pocket. We 
were a lot mair sophisticated noo. At that time the miner hid 
nuhin onywiy. Even when they were workin they hid nuthin.
Reflecting upon my interviews and conversations with local 
miners and members of the local Strike Committee and their 
wives, and some of the women involved in running the soup 
kitchen set up during the nineteen-eighty-four strike, I am struck 
by the idea that within the mind of many informants a fundamental 
thesis underpinning much of their recounting of the strike is that 
at this time a normally drawn veil was lifted, and that the longer 
the strike wore on the further the veil was lifted and the more 
informants glimpsed the true nature of the society they lived in, 
and they were remembering what it historically had meant to be 
working class, so that the longer the strike wore on the more they 
were becoming ‘class-conscious.’ As one former-miner informant 
told me when remembering the strike:
Go against the establishment and see how f***in free ye are! 
There’s boys that have tried it. An’ boys that have went 
against the establishment an’ jist aboot hid the revolution. 
In 1926 when Wullie Gallacher an’ a’ that wis oan the go. 
A school maister tae! An’ they pit him up in Peterhead 
[prison] an’ poisoned um. Cause he wis gonnae lead it, an’ 
it wis on. The revolution in Scotland wis on then. That wis 
1926. An’ we’re that f***in naive we’ll never learn. They sat 
aroond the table in 1974 and said the workin’ class will 
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never do this tae us again. They brought oot a’ the golden 
carrots. Sell their hoose, gie them that. There’ll be nae mair 
wane third deposit fir a car. Gie thum the money. Got oor 
hooses, car. That wis us beat! Gie them a taste, make wee 
capitalists oot e us. There’s only two people boucht their 
hoose in this street, an’ they’ve changed. Utterly changed. 
Attitudes changed. An’ that’s hoo they done it. Ah think the 
community’s changed. Some e the attitude in the community 
has changed. Ken, at wane time we were a close knit 
community, we a’ helped eachither oot. Noo that disnae 
happen. Ah dinnae think so, no’ tae the same extent it used 
tae. Ken we’ve no’ got the same neighbourly love, friendship, 
that we used tae have. Ye ken, it wid a been a guid thing if 
somebody hid kept a diary. Ah got tellt, after the strike they 
tellt me tae get rid e a’ the minutes e the meetins. They a’ 
went up the lum. Ah got tellt fae the hierarchy in Dysart...
instructed us tae burn a’ the meetins. It’s a pity somebody 
didnae keep a diary. See ye wernae wantin tae leave nuhin 
thit could be fund at a later date. A’ they boys were watchin’ 
their ain position, watchin’ their ain back cause ye actually 
didnae ken what ye were gaun back tae. See ye’ve got tae 
cast yer mind back. Well afore the strike ye hid a’ yer local 
pits gaun. Dundonald, Bowhill, they were a’ village pits. An’ 
then when Ah went tae Seafield [Kirkcaldy] ken it wis 
cosmopolitan. Miners always identified theirsels wi’ the pit 
they came fae. Ken, they were always Michael men, Bowhill 
men or ken whatever. There wis a sort e a thing wi’ the pit 
they come fae. At that time minin’ wis local, everybody lived 
in each ithers pockets. Ye kent sort e everybody’s business ye 
ken. It wis a close knit community at that time. That’s no 
here noo. It’s a different thing a’ thegither. It’s a different 
ball game. There’s somethin’ missin in the community, the 
companionship, the camaraderie. The pits is a’ shut, there’s 
somethin’ missin’. Pit it this way. You’re gaun doon workin’ 
in a stinkin’ black hole, ye depend on folk. Noo you’re sort e 
lookin’ oot fir him an’ he’s lookin oot fir you. He’s there tae 
protect you an’ you’re there tae protect him. Ye dinnae get 
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that noo. That’s a’ gaun noo. It wis clannish. The East coast 
boys wis bad. Seafield wis mainly West Fife men.
Similarly, from the following testimony from Davy Murdoch 
and Shay Kenny when interviewed in Bowhill Bowling Club, 
we can glimpse how abstractions such as ‘class solidarity’ 
and ‘internationalism’ and notions of the nineteen-eighties 
involving a formative experience of the ‘crisis of the State’ 
emerge from a real and ongoing set of concrete circumstances 
and experiences:
The strike meant a lot of aggro. Special boys in wi nae 
numbers on. Six foot police men. The local boys [police] 
didn’t go o’er the score. Trainloads and busloads e cops. 
And some e thum werenae even cops. Word got oot aboot a 
mass picket in The Frances [pit]. Boys (police) comin fae as 
far as Paisley. Pig wagons. Monkey cages. Ah mind eh the 
Inverness caper. Wane weekend every month we’d go up 
picketing, monitorin. See there wiz nae coal gaun doon the 
Caledonian canal. Invergordon and Ardesier was where  
the coal was bein delivered. A’ the wee oot the way harbours. 
The coal wis lorried doon tae power stations. Anyway, 
Dysart [strike committee] would organise lots e pickets to 
Invergordon… The railway workers were brilliant. They 
refused to touch it [the coal]. That’s why it was lorried tae 
wherever. At the coal depots there was plenty picketing 
there. The coal deposit here at Bowhill was still supplying 
schools and hospitals. Drivers had a dispensation slip signed 
and dated fae Dysart [strike committee]. The bugbear wis 
Ravenscraig when they started takin coal in there. Yuill  
and Dodds was the firm that lifted coal to Ravenscraig.  
A Kirkcaldy firm! Hunterston to Ravenscraig. They were 
shippin coal in fae Australia. They were also bringing Polish 
coal intae Perth… See Maggie [Thatcher] wis determined 
she wis gonnae break the union. We hid a rally in London. 
Davey wi a stick, a walkin stick, got done fir carryin an 
offensive weapon…Freddy Karate [proprietor of local fish 
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and chip shop] used tae fry the chips fir us. He’d be supplied 
wi the tatties. Dundee was a good supply e food, sendin 
butcher meat an everythin. Dundee has always had an 
affiliation, a history wi the Fife miners. Expectant mothers 
were gien a liette fir the bairn. We got grub fae Germany,  
a boat load of it come intae Dysart [harbour]. Cardenden 
delivered food fae Dysart tae Kinglassie too. They got 
landed wi a’ the tomato soup cause naeb’dy here liked  
it. They sent soap. Smelly soap. Cases e jars e pickled cellery. 
Tony Pavers wis a Latvian, a displaced person durin the war. 
He got the full case e it. Anyway, Ah’m no sure if it wis 
because Germany wis a communist country fightin capitalism 
or what. The French miners sent toys at Christmas. They 
were stored at the [Miners’] Institute. Ah’ve still got a set e 
bools in the hoose. Bit as fir support here, Ah wid say 
Dundee really wis brilliant. The boys fae Mossmoran [local 
ethylene production plant] - at that time it wis under 
construction - took us through tae Glesgae tae the big 
warehoose. Toys fir the kids’ Christmas. Solely fir the bairns 
roond aboot here. They also set up a fund. The dockyard in 
Rosyth helped oot wi the grub. They had a fund too. Kelty 
Club. A’ the local shops were good. Bowhill pipe band 
marched. Andy Donaldson wis the pipe leader. There’s three 
world championship pipe majors stay here in this village. 
‘There’s nae way Ah’m gaun up here oot e tune,’ he says! We 
hid the Gala doon in the park. Summer e 84. Like the 
Bowhill treat. Tossin the welly etcetera. An then when ye 
were back at work at Seafield they were spying in the tower 
at a’ the pickets. Ah wis sent tae work wi three scabs. They 
boys got a privilege o’er the tap e us. In an argument the 
scab wis always right. They boys used tae get up a tow their 
sel. They got a tow, and up and through the bath afore us. 
Right efter the strike they were never on the same shift as us. 
It wid a been great tae keep a record. Bit the minutes e 
meetins were all pit up the lumn. The hierarchy in Dysart 
instructed us tae burn a’ the meetings. They never ordered 
me, bit they made it known.
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Macintyre’s study Little Moscows (1980) argues that ‘being local’ 
is an important aspect of working-class dasein insofar as more or 
less throughout the twentieth century in small mining villages in 
Scotland the experience of locality and work were contiguous, 
resulting in an intense identification with work and locality that was 
impossible to reproduce in larger urban contexts. It is not simply 
then that miners belong to Cardenden but Cardenden belongs to 
them, their localities are ‘theirs’ in an uncontested fashion in the 
sense that, with the end of the local mining industry in the late 
nineteen-sixties and nineteen-seventies and the local bourgeoisie 
having vacated locality, there is an uncontested appropriation of 
and identification with locality: locality is theirs and belongs to 
them in the sense that there is no ‘them and us’ in this identification 
with locality, so that what might appear as a remarkable level of 
class unity during the miners’ strike of 1984-1985 is indistinguishable 
from a defence of and identification with their locality.
The historic significance or even ‘trauma’ of the miners’ strike 
of 1984-1985 stems from the fact that it was the last great 
strike of the industrial era. The defeat of the miners was not just 
another instance of defeat comparable with other defeats but was 
unique because it marks in time the end of a way of life and so has 
come to symbolise the end of an era and the beginning of an 
uncertain post-industrial present. When the Mining Archives 
opened in June 1991, then, this was the point in time when a way 
of life was transformed into a heritage. The village’s will to 
remember its history was similarly evidenced when locals gathered 
in September 2011 for the annual Johnny Thompson tournament 
to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the death in September 
1931 of the young Celtic and Scotland goalkeeper, and soon 
thereafter on 30 October 2011 when locals gathered to mark the 
80th anniversary of the Bowhill Pit disaster where ten miners died 
after an explosion on 31 October 1931.
The one hundred and seventy-four people who processed 
through the village to lay wreaths in Bowhill cemetery on this day 
were demonstrating their will to retain their connection to their 
past, and while the era of heavy industry has passed the basic 
‘laws of motion’ governing a free-market economy and society 
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continue into the post-industrial era, so that something else which 
continues across the industrial and post-industrial eras and 
continues to connect the generations is the enduring structural 
weakness of working-class agency. During the 1984-1985 strike, 
then, something informants that I interviewed told me they were 
increasingly aware of the longer the strike continued was that in 
defending their jobs and their way of life, the miners were putting 
their jobs and that same way of life in jeopardy. The dependency 
upon economic relations and the resultant dependency on the 
persistence of these relations for survival in the free-market 
economy and society is a truism of their lives that enjoys ample 
empirical verification, so that a ‘first principle’ of being working 
class is that it is a class that is not the master of its fate, is 
condemned to be dependent upon an ever-changing ‘capitalist 
industrialisation’ so that any local working-class population is 
condemned to be either playing ‘catch up’ to the new economy or 
being ‘finished off’ by the latest phase of capitalism, so that forms 
of working-class consciousness are likewise condemned to be 
either ‘polished nostalgia’ in an older generation or incoherent 
and unformed consciousness in the next upcoming generation.
When researching the strike of 1984-1985, then, I was struck 
by the relevance of Gorz’s (1997, p. 75) observation that: “Both 
the strength and the weakness of the post-industrial proletariat lie 
in the fact that it does not have an overall vision of future society.” 
In terms of their daily practice both generations across the 
industrial and post-industrial eras agree that there is no escape 
from the need to internalise the ‘mirror of production’ (Baudrillard 
1975), so that the strike for each miner and his family was a 
defining event because people defined themselves and their 
behaviour in relation to it, and it was a character test they had to 
pass in their own eyes and in the eyes of their neighbours. When 
interviewing former miners and noting their ease and fluency 
when remembering the strike, when I asked about the shape of the 
future there was a marked silence as their narratives came to an 
end and informants lost their surefooted conviction and fluidity. 
Whereas the past has a definite shape, then, representations of the 
future have yet to take shape in their minds, and an awareness of 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
24
a traditional habitus giving way to new conditions explains the 
paucity of representations of the future, so that while the strike 
grounds the older individual in history and gives him biographical 
and personal security (Berger and Luckmann 1987), this very 
embeddedness makes the future obscure for this generation.
The 1945 and 1979 Generation(s)
Prior to beginning interviewing I selected a number of streets from 
each area of the village where I would conduct door-to-door 
interviews, and in preparation I obtained a copy of the electoral 
register for Cardenden and copied the details of each household of 
each selected street onto an A5 size card. A few days prior to the 
first elections to the new Scots parliament on 6 May 1999, then, 
I was walking through the village finalizing the streets where 
I would conduct interviews and found myself in Cluny Park 
standing in the middle of the road with clipboard and electoral 
register in hand. As I stood there, a young girl approached on her 
bike and stopped to have a look at me, perhaps trying to figure 
out who I was and what I was doing in her street. “Hiya” I said, 
to acknowledge her presence. I then tried to anticipate the girl 
wondering what I was doing by telling her: “It’s okay. I’m not 
lost.” After a few seconds, she got back on her bike and cycled off 
and as she did so she turned her head and shouted in my direction: 
“This is Cardenden. This is Scotland.”
Immediately after the elections to the new parliament as 
I began interviewing locals about their views on politics and a 
whole range of issues and began transcribing my interviews, 
I began to organise my data according to two Weberian ‘ideal 
types’ and began classifying interviewees into what I call the 1945 
generation and the 1979 generation. As a generalization, members 
of the 1945 generation include those born before nineteen-fifty, 
while those born from nineteen-sixty onwards I classify as 
belonging to the 1979 generation. While this leaves those born in 
the nineteen-fifties in something of a classificatory no-man’s land, 
I intend this simple distinction as a shorthand device to indicate 
whether a particular interviewee tended to identify with the 
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industrial past or the post-industrial present of the village. As 
fieldwork and interviewing progressed, however, these two 
categories also came to indicate a range of related opinions so that 
I began to use this distinction as a heuristic device to frame social 
change via the lived experience of these two generations and as 
a way of generationalising the major ruptures and continuities in 
the experiences of locality, society, culture and politics across the 
industrial and post-industrial divide.
Each generation or ‘ideal type,’ then, has its own ‘signature 
sociology’ as a result of having its own characteristic socialisation 
or acculturation. Again as a generalization, I characterise the 
primary socialisation of the 1945 generation as dominated by 
the era of the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ (Beck) and a comparatively 
stable cultural and social sphere along with a stable, though 
far from uneventful, experience of locality. Also, among the 
’45 generation, their being-for-others or mitsein is characterised 
by the experience of ‘thick’ locality and thick intersubjectivity 
along with the ‘heavy’ presence of society and a non-privatised 
experience of society, morality, belief and conventions. In contrast, 
the younger ’79 generation’s primary socialisation is dominated 
by the advent of affluence and post-industrialisation that occurred 
during the nineteen-eighties, and the massive production and 
importation of commodified culture, along with the decline in 
the ability to remember, far less reproduce, a substantive local 
public realm in comparison to the ’45 generation which is able 
to look back with nostalgia at ‘something lost,’ while the 1979 
generation(s) is hard-pressed to identify their experience of 
locality as ‘something’ at all.
With the closure of Bowhill Colliery in 1965 and the closure 
of the local coal washer in 1974 and the closure of Seafield pit 
in nearby Kirkcaldy in 1986, the relationship among the ’45 and 
’79 generations to locality is different. However, this generational 
gap is not confined to the shift from an economy of heavy industry 
to a service sector economy and the consumer society as, in 
addition to the historical and economic differences that separate 
the two generations, there are just as significant technological and 
cultural differences that separate them as a result of social change 
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since the nineteen-seventies, radical changes in family formation, 
the revolution in sexuality from the nineteen-seventies and the 
integration of working-class mothers into the occupational 
landscape and the normalization of dual-earner families. Finally, 
the ideal types of the 1945 and 1979 generations usefully maps the 
sharp differences in the political socialisation of each generation 
and draws attention to watershed events such as the election of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the miners’ strike of 1984-5, the end 
of the Cold War in 1989 and the 1979-1997 years of ‘democratic 
deficit’ which, when taken together, constitute a sea-change in 
political, social and economic conditions that more or less separate 
and define the formative experiences of the two generations. 
Deploying these two categories, then, allows for the handling 
of large amounts of otherwise disparate data and brings into view 
the fundamental positions behind empirical data and particular 
details, so that much of this ethnography is about arguing the point 
that the 1979 generation(s) faces a new and a defining social and 
economic and cultural and political situation and that the ‘nothing’ 
which 1945 generation locals describe is an opportunity for a new 
‘public emergence of working-class reality’ and a new practice and 
conception of a Scottish modernity (Chapters 4 and 5). Finally, if 
these new conditions give rise to an unprecedented recognition of 
the continuing reality of class, they simultaneously give rise to an 
unprecedented disappearance or ‘forgetting’ of class reality among 
the ’79 generation(s), so that holding onto the truth contained in 
both positions is necessary for an accurate understanding and 
representation of the new way in which each generation experiences 
personal, public and national space.
Fundamental to mapping the many issues involved in this 
fundamental change-over between the two generations is the 
advent of affluence and the ‘post-materialist’ politics and the new 
possibilities for human being and human sociality that it makes 
possible among the affluent ’79 generation.12 Where members of 
12 1945 generation housewives say it was only in the 1970s that beggars 
knocking on a back door in search of something spare to eat disappeared from 
their experience. 
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the ’45 generation remember: “In 1953 there were three tellys in 
Cardenden. One in Mrs. Spence’s hoose watchin the Stanley 
Matthews cup final. We aa thought this wis oot e this world;” and 
another can advise that: “Everybody’s no the same noo. Aa tryin 
tae keep up wi the Joneses. So that’s the Tory part e ye” (Roberta 
Catherine, Orebank Road), such declarations which may be 
interpreted as ‘primitive’ attempts at post-materialist or post-
scarcity thinking and which advert to the caesura of affluence and 
the shift from behaviour shackled to material necessity to the 
collective entrance into the realm of symbolic goods and the new 
kinds of individuation it brings, are very strange to members 
of the ’79 generation. The 1945 generation, then, is the last 
generation that will be able to remember the first time they got 
into a car, saw the change from gas lamps to electric street lighting, 
remember the first time they watched a television programme or 
ran barefoot during the summer months in the Back Raw, or recall 
their parents hiding the newspaper if the front page reported a 
murder. This older generation remembers society and locality as 
an occupational community and its female members remember 
their first job being “in service” as a maid to an upper middle-class 
household. This generation remembers the experience of sociality 
before the post-war penetration of everyday life by technology 
and the rise of the consumer society, and instantiates a resilient 
Britishness which has survived eighteen years of democratic deficit 
and Tory minority rule from 1979-1997 and again from 2010-
2015, the miners’ strike of 1984-1985 as well as deindustrialization 
thanks to a ‘background’ British identity that is the product of a 
primary socialisation where from early childhood this generation 
was literally schooled into an identification with Britain and its 
Empire at the expense of all other identities. As the local history 
group tutor (Anne Mead) recalled in an article in one of the local 
history group booklets:
Auchterderran was my primary school in the thirties...The 
school had no wireless. I especially remember that. On the 
day of the launching of the Queen Mary, a pupil was 
dispatched to the lodging of Miss Mackay in Woodend 
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Road, near the school to await the naming of the liner. Her 
landlady listened to the launching on the wireless, then the 
pupil was sent back to school with the name written down 
and sealed in an envelope. The message went round the 
classrooms and the pupils were able to pass the news on to 
their families at home, for few people had wirelesses at 
home either.
Local History Group, vol. 2 (np)
1.3 The Lived Experience of ‘Being in Cardenden’
The idea that we live in society is taken for granted but the notion 
of ‘society’ is an abstraction. Where we actually live is in particular 
places such as Cardenden, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy or St Andrews 
and even this level of particularity such as ‘Cardenden’ is an 
abstraction that misses the further nuance that the village is 
nucleated into the areas of Auchterderran, Bowhill, Cardenden 
and Dundonald with each area having its own shops and pub and 
identity. Also, writing about a post-industrial locality over time 
involves engaging with the relationship between ‘place’ and 
economic forces; the doctrines of neoliberalism and the free-
market economy and the many consequences for those localities 
‘suffering’ macro-social and economic processes; questions about 
whether the free economy is better than the planned or command 
economy in terms of creating village life ex nihilo and bringing 
that life to an end; questions about whether locales can be 
‘humane’ enclaves relatively free from market forces, or should 
be thrown open to free-market forces to decide whether they 
thrive or barely survive, and whether locals would be best-advised 
to leave rather than remain faithful to a sense of belonging whose 
time has come to an end. Imagining an answer to the question 
whether a village or locality is economically viable impacts upon 
an individual’s decision to stay or leave his natal village; impacts 
upon how his remaining local is deemed rational or baffling, 
a sign of talent or a sign of a lack of ambition, of embracing a 
new post-industrial modernity or a hiding from the challenges 
of ‘being modern.’
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While Cardenden is physically present to its inhabitants as 
they live there and leave it in the morning and return to it after a 
day’s work, a question for the ethnographer who would attempt 
to grasp locals in their own space and time (Burawoy 2000, 
pp. 3-4) and how residents think and feel about their village 
is what is Cardenden’s psychological reality or psychological 
presence within its inhabitants. If residents by definition physically 
live in Cardenden, do they also psychologically or imaginatively 
live there or perhaps elsewhere?
Early on in fieldwork (10 December 1998) when leaving the 
flat to do some shopping I passed a newspaper board outside 
Kooner’s corner shop (opposite the police station) which had 
the words Scotland’s Children of the Damned indicating the day’s 
top story, while next door to the newsagent was a hairdresser’s 
shop not yet open and on its wooden shutters I noticed fresh 
graffiti: Mellon Wiz Ere and Rikki M. Sucks C*** for 10p. While 
waiting to be served in the newsagents I listened to two women 
talking about a woman who had been sacked for stealing petty 
cash in one of the local shops. I headed next to the local Costcutter 
mini-supermarket13 which is the main shop in the area, and while 
waiting to be served I noticed a number of Milk Tokens pinned to 
the perspex barrier separating customers and staff, and each token 
had a name written on it and what looked like an ongoing record 
of the amount of credit remaining. When it was my turn to be 
served I asked the assistant about the tokens and she advised they 
were part of a Department of Social Security welfare food scheme 
for those on state benefits with young children, adding that it 
wasn’t unknown for people to ask if they could use the cash value 
of the tokens to buy cigarettes instead of milk.
13 Locals still refer to this building as ‘the Store’ in reference to the Co-Operative 
Store that was based in the building for many years and which they grew up with 
since before the Second World war. Sometime in the mid-to-late nineteen-eighties 
the Co-Op closed but locals kept the building open as “The Community Store.” 
Initially this venture proved successful and was publicised in the local press as an 
example to be followed, but after a few years this effort ended due to a lack of 
profit and today it is run and managed by the Costcutter chain of stores. 
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In terms of official statistics, then, Cardenden is an area that 
suffers relative deprivation. The Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (SIMD) database, for example, divides Scotland 
into 6,505 areas ranked according to their level of deprivation 
(which is calculated by measuring seven variables: income, 
employment, health, education, geographic access, housing and 
crime). According to SIMD, then, the area with the ranking of 
number 1 is the most deprived area in Scotland and the area 
ranking number 6,505 is the least deprived area in Scotland. In 
the SIMD database Cardenden is divided into seven data zones 
and they are currently ranked 1047th, 1100th, 1196th, 1341st, 
1475th, 2476th and 3585th. When ranked solely according to 
income, Cardenden’s seven data zones are ranked 661st, 1196th, 
1269th, 1368th, 1410th, 2216th and 3990th, so that three of 
Cardenden’s data zones are within the bottom 15-20% of this 
scale of poverty or at least 80% of Scotland is more affluent than 
these three areas. 14
While there is an objectively measurable and well documented 
material poverty, locals also point to the reality of cultural 
decline; a topic that was never far from many elderly residents’ 
conversation when I talked to them. At one local history group 
meeting (18 May 1999) I noted the following exchange:
Tam: Ye’re feared ta gane doon Bowhill noo.
Jock: Once being auld wis yet guarantee e safety. Noo yer 
a target.
Anne: Would you walk through Lochgelly at night? Folk 
being put up in the Hotel. Some fae Alloa. Scumbags! 
Paedophiles! Dae ye ken there’s seven paedophiles in 
Cardenden? An they complain aboot the food. It’s all 
DHSS15 folk in Piates and in the Central. 16
14 See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/SIMD. Accessed 10 January 
2013.
15 Department of Health and Social Security, a UK government department 
from 1968-1988.
16 The names of local pubs which also offer accommodation. 
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Jim: Johnny Hamilton fae Carden Avenue. He’s banned fae 
the [Corrie] Centre. The Youth club. He’s always in trouble. 
His dad’s got a new girl friend, so Ah’m told. So watch that 
name, ye’ll hear it again.
Ronnie: That young arsehole Johnny Hamilton’s mum, she 
wis at college, an on the till at Poundstretchers [shop in 
Kirkcaldy]. Nae faither on the scene of course.
Bill: Wee Hughie fae Bowhill, he’s away tae Kirkcaldy 
noo. We were well gled tae get rid e him.
Ann: There was a boy wi an ear ring the day asking for 
a meter to pay his electricity. He’d been cut off. Standin 
there in the office. They’ll no remember comin hame tired. 
Or struggling tae pay their rent.
Jim: Young folk the day’ll no walk the length e theirsel.
As an ethnographer of a deindustrialised space such as 
Cardenden, there is a sense that an integral part of my job is to 
research what might be termed the flotsam and jetsam of 
deindustrialization, and to capture this sense of decline which for 
some has reached dystopian levels, as for example in the comments 
of Ena Herd (Orebank Road, 14 November 1999):
Imagine getting tae ma age an everythin’s worse! Ken, 
everywhere ye look aboot ye. At ma age, every value, everythin 
Ah ever thought aboot the way tae go aboot things, every  
idea Ah ever hud, every value that Ah ever had, every way  
e daen things, everythin Ah’ve got in ma heid, jist turn that 
aboot, totally roonaboot, totally completely reverse everythin 
Ah’ve ever believed in an Ah might jist get it right fir 1999.
In the above testimony it is clear that there is a deep sense of 
locality having lost its way, and mapping the specifically cultural 
changes that animates and exercises older inhabitants it is clear 
that underlying their many anecdotes of change for the worse was 
the insistence that, having moved from a ‘society of scarcity’ they 
now found themselves living in conditions that may be described 
as ‘scarcely any society.’ Alongside their repeated lament regarding 
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the ‘end’ of locality and the family was a parallel lament for the 
‘thinning’ of and decline of sociation and interpersonal association 
now that ‘everything’ has been liberated from tradition and 
convention, so that the crisis in reproducing village life or family 
life is only a fraction of the crisis faced by younger generations. In 
trying to capture something of the concrete empirical content that 
is the basis for these firmly-held views concerning a precipitous 
decline in the quality of social life, my living in 51 Cardenden 
Road meant I was able to observe the daily comings and goings 
within the shopping area in this part of the village, and when 
I later moved to the main street of the village (Station Road) I was 
again able to witness a range of behaviours to substantiate locals’ 
concerns.
For example, then, when putting my daughter Candela to bed 
one summer evening when living in Station Road and well before 
it was dark outside, I heard the screech of car tyres breaking and 
looked out to the street and saw two young men in a car that was 
reversing in order to confront two older men coming out of the 
Caspian take-away and who, judging by their dress and physical 
appearance, were from the Indian sub-continent. With his car 
stopped in the middle of the road and the engine still running, the 
driver got out and walked towards the two men. Although I could 
not hear what was said, I could clearly see the young man said 
something to the two ‘foreigners.’ Faced with what I assume was 
a calculated insult or provocation, the two older men exchanged 
words between themselves rather than reply directly to the young 
‘native.’ At this, the youth stood his ground and seemed to repeat 
his verbal challenge or insult and, again, stood waiting for an 
answer. As this confrontation was unfolding, I looked and saw the 
other youth in the passenger seat of the car laughing and making 
what seemed like an exaggerated show of enjoying his companion’s 
brinkmanship and the predicament of the two ‘foreigners.’ By this 
stage, cars were being held up in the street while this confrontation 
was unfolding and pedestrians in the street were now alerted 
to what was going on so that this scene was now commanding 
general attention. After a few more seconds of waiting, the youth 
returned to his car and drove off with tyres screeching, while the 
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two older men exchanged a few words to each other before 
walking the few yards to their parked car and driving off.
At the time of this incident Cardenden did not have a non-
white resident population to speak of as it was comprised solely 
of three or four Pakistani families who owned or worked in local 
shops or a retired professional and his family who had worked in 
the village for years. Despite this nominal presence, however, shop 
shutters in the main shopping area of Bowhill during fieldwork 
were daubed with graffiti such as NF [National Front] and Blacks 
Out, while the local health centre had NF, BLACKS OUT and 
PAKI B******S spray-painted on the metal security shutters 
and this was visible for all to see when the shutters were drawn 
each night. However, to judge by its faded appearance it seems 
likely that this graffiti was done in the wake of the first arrival of 
Asian shopkeepers to the village in the nineteen-eighties so that, 
while it is evidence of ‘racial’ prejudice, I would not confine 
its meaning as evidence simply of ‘racism’ as the real source of 
such prejudice is a more general ‘personality structure’ which 
I would characterize by a general intolerance or an indiscriminate 
‘disposition to discriminate’ that over its lifetime will have many 
targets in addition to non-white ethnic minorities. For example, 
then, objectionable graffiti such as the word ‘wankers’ scored 
into the front doors of the local and exclusively white Church 
of Scotland building I would judge as sourced in a youthful 
disposition of ressentiment characteristic of a minority of local 
youth, so that any building whatsoever or any minority social 
group whatsoever are likely to be targeted as such a disposition can 
always find a symbolic ‘other’ to target as somehow inferior in a 
hierarchy of status, such as a member of the underclass, a long-
termed unemployed individual or any other low-status identity.
As a result of the legacy of the British Empire among the 
post-Protestant working class, the disaffected Scottish proletarian 
youth has available to himself a colonial or imperial ‘British’ 
relation to the rest of humanity. What is clear is that consubstantial 
with visible signs such as dress, appearance and language and 
related differences of religion and culture, these signifiers of 
‘difference’ provoke acts of discrimination and forms of violence, 
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whether purely imaginary or behavioural, from a fraction of young 
white working-class boys and men who, armed to the teeth with 
such dispositions as the inheritors of a toxic cultural legacy, are 
more or less fated to come across occasions to be provoked – such 
as the eve of the 80th anniversary of the death of Scotland and Celtic 
footballer Johnny Thomson which provoked supporters of an 
anti-Catholic football club in Glasgow to pour blue paint over 
Thompson’s grave in the local cemetery in an effort to spoil the 
wreath-laying ceremony at Thomson’s grave which forms part of 
the annual football tournament held in Cardenden in his memory.
Language as cipher for fully-contextualised Dasein
Language and labour are outer expressions in which the 
individual no longer retains possession of himself per se, but 
lets the inner get right outside him.
Hegel 1967, p. 340.
More juvenile forms of this toxic element within Scottish working-
class culture include a range of resentments that are expressed 
in a variety of antisocial expressions such as a bus shelter 
advertisement for an American brand of rice being made to read 
‘Uncle Ben is a Child Molester,’ while the graffiti on the lamp-post 
opposite this advert on the main street reading:
Nessie is a f***ed up hore
who has AIDS and
recks of pish and fish
and crabs and HIV plus scabies.
When interviewing a resident of Orebank Road quoted earlier she 
recalled an incident that had taken place while she had been 
walking in the local park and had been confronted and verbally 
abused by two young boys.
Ah wondered where the hatred fae they two laddies…
imagine bein born intae a world when only bein fourteen an 
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havin a’ that hatred inside ye. And nae respect fir a woman 
oan her ain. Ian ma husband he said tae me ‘You mind you 
keep yer mooth shut! You just let them dae whatever they’re 
gonnae dae. You just let them dae it because you could end 
up, they could batter ye,’ ye ken. Well the young ones dinnae 
ken ony different. Ah mean that fourteen year auld an 
sixteen year auld on that motorbike they didnae ken how tae 
be any ither wiy, right? And we were a million miles apart an 
Ah wis standin there an there is basic hatred starin inches fae 
yer face and ye’ve come tae that in Cardenden park.
The use of language by local boys who may be described as 
‘armed to the teeth’ with ressentiment (‘re-feeling’ and re-living 
something over and over again) indicates that nothing much has 
changed since Muir (1935, pp. 118-119) wrote of working-class 
youth and commented upon: “The terror and corrupt knowledge 
of these children can be heard in their voices… This terror breaks 
out in early youth, that is as soon as these boys are strong enough 
to fight for themselves, in revengeful violence and cruelty.” This 
use of language is valuable data insofar as how people speak and 
use language is a cipher for their social and cultural and political 
condition, so that language and the social practice of speaking is 
socially determined insofar as it passes through the gauntlet of 
a particular social and cultural context, so that the textual violence 
referred to above is isomorphic with the linguistic violence of 
teenage boys and girls in public. When a young teenage boy 
and his girlfriend, for example, are greeted by a teenage boy 
beside the busy children’s play area in the public park shouting: 
“Are ye shagging her yet? Eh? Have ye hid a blow job yet?,” such 
use of language by young people involves the “open publication 
of their degradation” (Muir 1935, p. 122) and a coming to terms 
with their objective social position. Following the quote from 
Hegel, this use of language reveals a profound intergenerational 
failure of autonomy insofar as it is firstly through the medium of 
language that young people take their first steps as individuals, 
so that data gathered on language-use among young working-
class individuals-in-groups is more or less fated to reveal that: 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
36
“Individual consciousness is not the architect of the ideological 
superstructure, but only a tenant lodging in the social edifice of 
ideological signs” (Volosinov 1986, p. 13).
This heavy social determination of language and thought has 
been seen and described before by the local writer Joe Corrie in 
Black Earth (1939) where he asked of his fellow Cardenden 
residents: “Was there ever such a set of people who actually knew 
so little? They lived in a mean little narrow world of their own, each 
with the same views, the same thoughts” (1939 p. 70). Likewise, 
from the vantage point of the ‘society of affluence,’ historian T. C. 
Smout describes novelists such as Corrie depicting the depression 
years of the nineteen-thirties as confronted by lives as “miserable as 
the ‘insect life’ lived by Sir James Barrie’s characters” (Smout, cited 
in Muir 1985, p. xxiv), so that when Corrie (1939, p. 239) wrote: 
“Mrs. Gow never minced her words and if there was a vulgar 
alternative for a decent word she used it, it gave her more 
satisfaction,” he is describing how discourse is inter alia a cipher for 
a structured and socialised libidinal ‘economy of expression’ 
characterised by ressentiment that is constantly satisfying itself via 
language because language is a source of satisfaction insofar as it 
expresses this condition of resentment.
Because pre-eighteen year olds are not allowed into pubs, a 
feature of local street life in the village at weekends was pre-teens 
and teenagers congregating in the local park and its environs such 
as bus stops and fast-food outlets, which meant the issue of 
unsupervised teenagers gathering and binge drinking was a well-
worn theme among locals and letters to local newspapers. I recall 
on one occasion when driving along Station Road at five o’clock 
on a summer evening stopping with a friend to help a young girl 
who was laying face-down on the pavement and unconscious as a 
result of having drunk too much. After trying to persuade other 
young people in the street to come forward and tell us who she 
was or where she lived, it seems she had been abandoned where 
she had collapsed because anyone drawn into answering questions 
from the police or having to accompany her home or to hospital 
was inviting problems for themself. As a result of the regular 
occurrence of young people from Cardenden and further afield 
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gathering in large numbers on Friday and Saturday evenings, the 
risk of fighting between individuals or rival groups of young 
people from different places outwith the village meant the presence 
of police surveillance units video-recording these crowds was not 
unfamiliar, and public space after dark was predictably likened by 
older residents to ‘running a gauntlet’ and an unsurprising ‘moral 
panic’ about young people was heard.
However, adults were not innocent of violence of course and 
the passage to adulthood did not necessarily mean more laudable 
behaviour. Hence, as it was my habit to spend many nights 
reading and writing until late in my attic study, I came to expect 
some incident or other to occur within earshot after closing time 
at weekends. On one particular occasion at around one in the 
morning, a peaceful night was interrupted by the noise of the drawn 
metal shutter and neon sign of the Caspian takeaway on Station 
Road having a brick thrown at it, while on another occasion at four 
in the morning I watched unseen from my attic study window as 
two locals methodically set about smashing the glass panels of the 
bus shelter opposite. As I watched I could see that, being drunk, 
each kick aimed at the panels required some concentration, and any 
particular effort that failed to produce the required effect meant 
each vandal took the time to steady himself in preparation for 
the next attempt. Once the job was done to their satisfaction, they 
did not flee the scene of the crime but resumed walking home with 
no change in gait. Such were the actions of two grown men.
On another occasion on a warm day in June 2001 when again 
in my study and with the window open, I heard from the street 
below a young girl’s voice shouting: “Are you a paedophile?” 
I looked out onto the street to see five girls and two boys making 
their way to a local primary school sports day in the nearby park. 
I looked in the direction faced by the school children and saw 
the question had been directed at a young man waiting at the 
(repaired) bus stop. The man looked like he was in his late-
twenties or early-thirties, and was being approached by the pupils 
who proceeded to congregate around the bus shelter and poke 
fun at him. As I watched it became apparent very quickly that the 
stranger was uncomfortable with this sudden ‘publicity,’ despite 
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not reacting to the children and their remarks and questions that 
were being aimed at him. As I watched this scene unfold, it was as 
if the pupils were testing for any weakness and I watched as the 
man’s head turned to look up the street every few seconds, 
signaling (I imagined) his mounting disquiet and desire for the bus 
to arrive. With their intended ‘victim’ refusing to react, the pupils 
next proceeded to poke fun at his clothes. As I thought about the 
initial shouted query that alerted me to this scene I remembered a 
conversation with a local history group member (Annie) who had 
informed the group at one of our meetings that the hotel fifty 
yards from the bus stop outside my window was “putting up 
paedophiles” as part of an arrangement with Fife Council social 
work department. I wondered whether this local rumour was the 
reason behind the girl’s question, whether these primary school 
children might even unconsciously be attempting to protect the 
borders of their village from unwanted outsiders. After a few 
minutes more teasing an older man arrived to wait for the same 
bus to Kirkcaldy, and proceeded to ignore what was happening 
around him. The next question from the group addressed to the 
man that I could clearly make out was: “Are you on drugs?” After 
another minute or two, the young man suddenly walked off up the 
street away from his tormentors, at which the group of Denend 
Primary School pupils resumed walking to the park, laughing 
loudly and leaning into each other and exclaiming loudly among 
themselves, as if they had scored the victory they had wanted.
It is my presumption that such behaviours are viewed as 
unprecedented and the empirical cause of the ‘moral panic’ of an 
older generation, and such practices are held to have been 
‘impossible’ and unheard of previously. However, when older 
informants themselves reminisce about when they themselves 
were young and describe themselves as “mad for the dancing,” the 
fact is that while Cardenden had venues that meant dancing until 
two or three in the morning was possible every Thursday, Friday, 
Saturday and Sunday night, informants also admit when asked 
why the popularity of dancing is a thing of the past that “there 
was too much fighting and drinking” – even in the allegedly 
conformist nineteen-fifties and sixties. If the same working-class 
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communities across the industrial and post-industrial divide then 
have always faced the issue of young people and violent disorder, 
there is undoubtedly the sense of a behavioural and generational 
divide, and in this regard I quote from an article which appeared 
in the Fife Free Press newspaper (12 October 2001) entitled 
Villagers Seek Action to Halt Hooligans:
Cardenden residents say that they are living in fear after  
an upsurge in violence and vandalism on their streets. The 
village’s active tenants and residents’ association says that 
over the last six months groups of teenagers and young 
adults have been making lives a misery for others, particularly 
the elderly. And they claim it is only a matter of time before 
someone is killed in a drunken brawl.
This article included an interview with an unnamed local resident 
who was quoted as saying: “I have lived in Cardenden all my 
sixty-odd years and, in that time, things have never been so bad.” 
Such views I found were common. Three weeks into fieldwork a 
retired couple who have lived all their married lives in Cardenden 
in Whitehall Drive told me that Cardenden is “a quiet wee place,” 
but after a subsequent weekend where their windows were the 
target of a local boy high on drugs who had smashed windows 
while making his way home, they peremptorily informed me 
the next time we spoke: “This f****n place is turnin to shit.” 
Something else that is undoubtedly new is that since most locals 
have bought their former Council houses they are alert as 
never before to behaviours which threaten their property and 
have taken to ‘policing’ the behaviour of others by forming 
Neighbourhood Watch schemes and, given their long intimate 
knowledge of their areas, could not be better informed as to the 
individuals and families in their area they openly say they would 
like to get rid of. In addition to the formation of Neighbourhood 
Watch schemes there were other associations such as the New 
Carden Residents’ Association, which was another forum where 
locals came together and which attested to the centrality of 
housing conditions in locals’ lives.
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The first public meeting I attended during fieldwork was the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the New Carden Residents’ 
Association on 28th April 1999 in the Corrie Centre.17 Unlike 
ordinary meetings held throughout the year, the AGM was 
publicised throughout the village and a sizeable number of 
residents had gathered to voice their opinions regarding various 
housing-related matters. Typically of AGMs, however, the business 
of the meeting was the election of members to executive positions 
within the Association, with the result that what actually happened 
at the meeting was residents came in numbers eager to raise their 
practical concerns about their specific housing situation while the 
office-bearers or ‘managers’ of the meeting insisted such concerns 
were not part of the agenda of the meeting. This conflict of 
interests and agendas was compounded by the physical separation 
of the tenants and office-bearers with the latter seated at a top 
table facing the tenants, and compounded by a procedural dualism 
so that the meeting proved largely ineffective from the outset and 
throughout. With the exception of the chairman (Wullie Duncan) 
who was a local resident, those seated at the table facing the 
tenants were neither known nor introduced to the gathered 
tenants and none volunteered to introduce or identify themselves, 
and this procedural omission meant that as the meeting progressed, 
the tenants’ frustration led to the standing of the office-bearers 
(chairman apart) deteriorating and fuelled the assumption that the 
“three suits gittin payed tae be here” – as one tenant18 beside 
me described the office-bearers – were not from the village but 
from the Council and were obliged to be present to be harangued 
by women complaining about bad joinery work. 
Because what the tenants had come for was essentially a 
‘housing surgery,’ two meetings were trying to happen at the same 
time: there was the official meeting that followed procedures, 
17 The Association was formed in 1986 with Mrs Ellen Guild as the first 
chairman. 
18 This tenant also informed me that her mother was a previous tenant at 
51 Cardenden Road where I lived, and made a point of telling me she had been 
in my house far more than I’d been in my house. 
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raised points via a chairman and discussed in a set order the items 
on a pre-circulated agenda, and then there was an unofficial 
meeting, the substance of which was obviously unhappy residents 
armed with particular grievances and questions but, receiving no 
answers, resulting in a disgruntled and unhappy atmosphere for 
everyone present.
Among the residents there was no one agenda as some were 
present solely to raise particular ‘private’ points and had no 
interest in anything else but were simply waiting for the opportunity, 
for example, to talk about antisocial neighbours, while others 
wanted to concentrate discussion on housing repairs policy. As the 
meeting broke up there was a palpable frustration and over tea 
and biscuits it was only a matter of time before a tenant, who 
happened to be employed by Fife Council to carry out repairs to 
the local Council housing stock, observed that those in charge at 
an executive level neither lived in Council houses or Housing 
Association houses or lived in areas of council housing and were 
in no position to identify with Council tenants and their concerns. 
This opportunity for ‘civic participation’ in the shape of engaging 
with the Residents’ Association, then, only served to make for 
disappointment at the level of response from Council officials in 
attendance; where a perception of lack of response meant the 
chairman admitted: “A lot of the residents have lost faith in us,” 
and the attempt at public engagement only reinforced a sense of 
frustrated passivity that hardly encouraged future participation.
The process that begins with interested participation which 
then becomes an experience of powerlessness and ends up 
becoming a resigned ‘privatism’ or even convinced ‘absenteeism’ 
was also something I experienced at the first Community Council 
meeting I attended (20 May 1999) during fieldwork. At this 
meeting an item on the agenda was how the village would mark 
the beginning of the new Christian millennium, and when this 
question was put to members for discussion I had naively hoped 
this would open a window onto the ‘realm of meaning,’ but in the 
event no discussion that touched upon the millennium or local 
identity took place, nor any exchanges regarding a post-industrial 
vision of Cardenden or any discussion of an artistic commission 
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to mark the new millennium or to celebrate the many centuries 
of Christianity in the local area. Instead, what the Community 
Council settled upon as the means to mark the new millennium 
was half a dozen hanging baskets on lamposts within the village 
– with the much-discussed proviso they be placed high enough to 
be out of reach of the local vandals. And, as if to confirm members’ 
focus upon the mundane, the next item on the agenda was 
concerns over bus shelters still being covered in graffiti, at which 
the chairman explained that this work had recently been 
subcontracted to a private company and in this change-over, 
problems regarding insurance had arisen which was why there 
had been a prolonged delay. Finally, the last item on the agenda 
was a status report on a previous suggestion about erecting a 
public notice board in the village, with the chairman advising 
members: “Apparently it costs too much,” and suggesting instead 
procuring “space in a shop window somewhere.”19
At another Community Council meeting (April 2001) it was 
announced that the Number 1 Goth, the pub on Station Road, was 
to be mothballed for the foreseeable future in light of the new 
management team previously announced that would reopen the 
premises as a going concern had failed to materialise. In light of this 
unexpected development, ideas were solicited from those present at 
the meeting about how to save the Goth from closure.20 As I was 
nearly three years into fieldwork by the time I attended this 
particular meeting, this felt like a familiar request to ‘save locality’ 
which was met with an equally familiar silence from residents as 
they tried to think of ‘something from nothing.’ From this particular 
silence came the suggestion by the local Labour Party councilor 
19 While both the local Tesco Express and local branch of the Co-Operative (the 
latter being a David Sands shop until 2012) have spaces that act as makeshift 
notice boards, in April 2013 a dedicated Community Notice Board was finally 
erected in the village at the junction between Station Road and Orebank Road. 
20 Two days after this meeting the windows on the Goth were boarded up. Until 
2008 only the upstairs function room was used once a week by the local pipe 
band to practice and an upstairs room used for free beginners courses in 
computing. 
43
c a r d e n d e n
(Mrs Doig) that the Goth could be used as a community resource 
“for single mothers,” while another idea was to create a Rebus 
Tour where visitors to the village could retrace the “old haunts” of 
the fictional Rebus character from the novels of local author Ian 
Rankin. As I listened to members discuss this proposal I could not 
help but think how ironic to suggest the production of ‘locality’ and 
‘something’ based upon a local émigré’s literary career which has 
been founded upon the voluminous commodification of locality as 
‘absence’ and ‘nothing.’ Whatever the merits of such proposals, 
each was met with no particular interest or enthusiasm by the dozen 
or so residents in attendance and, as if to add to the sense of 
impotence, the time available to discuss this item was brief as there 
were other items on the agenda to be discussed, such as the new 
police constable MacFarlane introducing himself and advising the 
Council “from now on there will be two police officers patrolling 
on foot throughout the village.”
Not for the first time I left a public meeting feeling frustrated as 
a result of an encounter with powerlessness. I found such meetings 
humiliating ‘conscientisations’ to the fact that there has occurred a 
process of divesting localities of executive decision-making power 
thanks to the centralisation of power away from localities. In this 
regard Harvie’s (1998, p. 141) observation that, “The abolition of 
parish councils in 1929 heralded forty years of indifference to local 
democracy” has meant the centralisation of power has effectively 
‘privatised’ power and taken away the raison d’ être of local 
democracy and the responsibilities and rewards of participation in 
locality. The ‘depoliticisation’ of locality then is the more or less 
inevitable result of political choices and impacts upon the different 
experiences of the different generations where ‘society’ as much as 
‘locality’ has become privatised (Bauman 2001) thanks to power 
being relocated outwith the village, so that we might say that 
‘society’ has replaced ‘locality’ and ‘community’ over the course of 
the twentieth century. If understandably the range of concerns 
ordinarily addressed by the Community Council was in keeping 
with the range of powers it possessed, the source of frustration 
was that whenever any issue was discussed in a substantive and 
unrestricted manner, all sorts of macro-social realities were 
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implicated and discussants were more or less fated to feel our verbal 
exchanges had little ‘exchange value’ insofar as we came up against 
the realization that the power to meaningfully discuss change 
or recognise local realities lay outside Cardenden in the hands 
of others.
The experienced members of the Community Council had 
learned a realism that meant their expectations were aligned with 
their powers and so they addressed themselves to the ‘trivia’ they 
could influence and without any obvious desire to challenge or 
reverse this lack of power over local affairs. In contrast, those 
locals such as myself who had yet to learn this realism, naively 
imagined the Community Council to be the place to take their 
local concerns. Hence, at the April 2001 meeting a local woman 
attended her first Community Council meeting to share her 
concerns over the number of mobile phone masts being sited 
within the village, and to ask what the response of the Community 
Council should be. This young mother came to the meeting with 
a large brown envelope full of material on the possible dangers to 
health posed by mobile phone masts and was quickly given the 
opportunity to speak and was listened to. However, the only 
agreed action was to write a letter to a local newspaper signed on 
behalf of the Community Council as the Labour councillor present 
at the meeting pointed out that Fife Council had no authority in 
the matter of mobile phone masts, and from the councillor’s 
comments it was clear that nothing would be done as a result of 
a resident bringing her concerns to the Community Council. 
My presumption is that this concerned mother went away 
from the meeting disillusioned about the merit of participating in 
local affairs and I would surmise that, generally speaking, the 
deliberations of the Community Council upon the local public 
realm mean little to locals who stay at home and are of the view 
that nothing is lost by non-participation or being unaware of the 
Council’s deliberations. Such reflections on involvement in local 
affairs were consubstantial with data collected from other sites 
that afforded an opportunity to witness the same frustrating and 
fruitless clash of realities and powerlessness that seemed to define 
the experience of participation in the local public realm.
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Insofar as locals are more or less powerless to respond to 
the macro issue of deindustrialization as a locality, the onset 
of the post-industrial era appears synonymous with the demise of 
the village. As a direct result of deindustrialization there began the 
steady decline in population and decline in frequenting local pubs 
and the end of miners having a drink after a shift before making 
their way home as the Number 1 Goth public house was a short 
walk from the colliery.21 The end of coal mining has also resulted 
in a decrease in the significance of public houses as sites for the 
reproduction of locality and sociality as they increasingly become 
the preserve of a younger set of locals with an older generation 
only frequenting pubs or the local War Memorial Club at 
weekends or special occasions. The nine licensed premises within 
the village reflect the industrial era of the village and a cultural 
and social era before the advent of home leisure systems and 
satellite television and today’s music technologies and generalised 
affluence which is allied to a new ‘privatism’ and withdrawal from 
locality. 
In addition to the end of coalmining and depopulation, in 
February 1987 the local Rex Hall bingo venue, formerly one of 
three local cinemas, was closed and subsequently demolished with 
the space created made into a car park, and in July of the same 
year the village’s Auchterderran Junior Secondary school closed. 
In 1997 the local Baptist church closed and on 11 June 2000 St. 
Fothad’s Church of Scotland church (built in 1910) closed with 
both churches being demolished in November 2001.22 In February 
2001 the petrol station in Station Road closed and in February 
2010 the last remaining petrol station closed. In addition, several 
long-standing businesses that had their beginnings in the industrial 
21 The walk home from the colliery would also take the miners past the 
swimming pool which they had directly financed from their wages and past The 
Miners’ Welfare Institute building which in 1992 was post-industrialised and 
renamed The Bowhill Institute, although its original name remains etched in 
stone above the main entrance.
22 The stain glass windows designed by local artist Alexander Gilfillan were 
rescued from St Fothad’s church and placed in Auchterderran church.
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past of the village, as well as more ephemeral business ventures 
such as local hairdressers, video hire shops, fish and chip shops, 
hardware stores etcetera have closed, so that local wisdom has it 
that when not being converted into private housing, business 
premises are replaced by other business ventures that last a matter 
of months before closing and resuming the process all over again, 
with the result that village commercial life is increasingly simplified 
to comprise of either general grocery-type shops that do most of 
their trade by day, or fast-food outlets that do most of their trade 
in the evening and night. 
With the same number of pubs trying to attract fewer custom-
ers there has emerged the novelty of having to advertise events to 
attract customers such as the St. Andrew’s Night Extravaganza 
organised by the Number 1 Goth at which the folk band Kinrik23 
provided the evening’s entertainment. This evening was of 
particular interest because it consisted of a steady flow of songs 
referring to events of Scottish history, such as the Jacobite rebel-
lion of 1745 with references to the “exiled king” and “the English 
butcher Cumberland” that hold a special place within the nation-
alist imagination, along with commentary from band members 
and shouted agreement from the audience. Indeed, throughout 
three years of doctoral fieldwork (and prior to the setting up of 
the Yes Cardenden group in 2012 in preparation for the indepen-
dence referendum on 18 September 2014)24 this occasion was one 
of the very few where an explicitly nationalist ideology was pres-
ent and where the stage was literally set for the production and 
23 The Scots word for ‘kingdom’ and a reference to the tradition of designating 
Fife as a separate kingdom deriving from Fife having been one of the seven 
ancient Pictland kingdoms. 
24 At the 2012 annual summer fayre on 26 August, the nationalist Yes campaign 
for the 2014 referendum had a stall at which the local SNP councillor (Ian 
Chisholm) and campaign members from Cardenden were asking locals to pledge 
their support for independence and sign up as volunteers for the pro-independence 
campaign. To date, the local Yes Cardenden group have organised three public 
meetings. Firstly at the Corrie Centre where the launch of the Cardenden Yes 
Campaign took place on Friday 14 July 2013, and then on 30 April 2014 and 2 
June 2014. 
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consumption of nationalist rhetoric. Having said this, however, 
even explicitly ‘pro-Scottish’ or ‘anti-English’ sentiments which 
one might presume indicate a nationalist viewpoint, are in fact 
compatible with political loyalism to the United Kingdom so that 
the ‘nationalism’ being performed on this particular night may 
well have been a cultural and non-political nationalism.
On the Sunday before the St. Andrew’s Night I had sat drinking 
in the Goth after interviewing residents of Orebank Road and 
I began chatting with the bar manager (Geraldine Wallace) who 
told me she had arranged for Kinrik to play the following Friday, 
and that there was a more or less ongoing need to constitute a 
calendar of events to attract customers. Abstract ideas such as 
‘post-industrialisation’ and ‘the reproduction of locality,’ then, 
concretely mean a bar manager having to ‘think of something’ to 
offset realities released by recent economic changes in order to 
maintain her job and her presence in post-industrial Cardenden.25 
If there has been a shift to a service-sector economy at a macro-
level, there is a local struggle to sustain a local clientele and 
service-sector economy that results in the novelty of having to 
‘produce leisure’ and import entertainment with the prospect 
of failure never far away.
As of February 2001 a notice of temporary closure was placed 
in the windows of the Goth advising the pub would reopen on 
February 26th under new management. In the event, however, the 
pub remained closed long after February until it was finally 
reopened, but only as a result of the management of the nearby 
Central Bar deciding to transfer to the premises of the Number 1 
Goth. The closing of the Number 1 Goth was evidence for many 
locals of the failure of the local community to maintain itself as 
a viable ‘going concern’ and was seen as the latest failure in the 
attempt at reproducing locality in the post-industrial era and 
was significant as the Goth had been taken into “community 
ownership” only a few months before and had undergone a major 
refurbishment thanks to a substantial grant from Fife Council and 
25 Geraldine subsequently left Cardenden to live and work some 200 miles away 
in Oban (Argyll), after which she returned to the village.
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the European Union. Being situated in a former mining area, the 
project had qualified for special funding and the rebranding of 
the Goth from traditional working-class pub to upmarket bistro 
had been the subject of positive media comment at the time26 
and, much like the Mining Archives, had been something of a 
show-case effort at investing in locality and, as evidenced by the 
many mounted photographs depicting scenes and local landmarks 
within the village from the early twentieth century, illustrated the 
desire to simultaneously adapt to the post-industrial era and 
remember the village’s industrial past.
There is then an undeniable empirical reality that is inevitably 
seen as decline, and while it is also inevitable that the ‘loosening’ 
of practices of locality and sociality are much lamented, I will 
develop the argument in later chapters that what we might 
describe as the secession from industrial forms of collectivism 
has also meant a welcome freedom from the ‘tyranny’ of locality 
as occupational community, and that the advent of the post-
industrial era has also been good insofar as it has more or less 
rendered obsolete a previous cultural and political status quo and 
forced the 1979 generation to free itself from a self-understanding 
and view of their locality that was forged in the industrial era 
and in the image of tartanry, Robert Burns and the Masons and 
within the all-British NUM and all-British structures which tied 
the imagining of locality to Britain and fuelled the reality and the 
‘imagining’ of Britain. If the ethnographer must sympathise with 
informants he must also break with informants’ self-representations 
where need be, and I have often had to criticise myself for falling 
into the ‘mirror of production’ (Baudrillard 1975) which imagines 
26 The publicity surrounding the commercial failure of The Goth drew criticism 
from Fife councilors representing middle-class localities such as Dalgety Bay 
who wrote letters to the local press complaining about Fife Council wasting 
money on ‘dead-end’ projects and which applied the neoliberal critique of ailing, 
non-profitable state-subsidised industries to ailing and non-productive localities 
such as Cardenden, as dependent upon state-funding to maintain their artificial 
state-subsidied existence i.e. locales which cannot survive on their own two feet 
in the free market, far less contribute to the common good. 
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the local industrial era of 1895-1965 as the gold standard by 
which to judge the health of sociality and locality and village life. 
I often characterised to myself this shift from (working class) 
‘collectivism’ to (bourgeois) ‘privatism’ as the movement from the 
‘society of scarcity’ to ‘scarcely any society,’ but events such as the 
prolonged snow and icy conditions in the winters of 2009 and 
2010 revealed the superficiality of such privatism, and practices of 
community such as the local shops having lists of names and 
telephone numbers of locals to be called when bread was delivered, 
and the thick level of casual conversation in the crowded shop 
aisles made it abundantly clear that below the onset of a degree of 
‘privatism’ there remains a traditional collectivism which easily 
resurfaces at such times.
1.4 The Fun Day (2000)
Every year in the village there occurs set-piece occasions such 
as the annual summer village fayre or the winter bonfire and 
fireworks display where residents come together to participate in 
these established events in the local calendar. In the summer of 
2000 the village’s Bonfire & Fireworks Display Committee 
organised a ‘Fun Day’ on 5 August, and this particular day began 
for me by being awakened at nine o’clock in the morning by the 
sound system in the local park that had been hired for the day 
blaring out the Vengaboys’ pop song We’re Going To Ibiza some 
hundred yards or so from my flat at 113 Station Road. By the time 
I had eaten breakfast and was making the short walk to the park, 
I was savouring the prospect of the day ahead as I was relishing 
the prospect of the day providing me with something for my 
research; a new idea, a good quote perhaps, or a new informant. 
As I approached the stalls that encircled an area that had been 
fenced off for the day I was introduced to local mining historian 
Dan Imrie. I noted the badge Dan wore on his lapel: Fife Miners’ 
Community Culture Group. For a number of years since doing 
research on the miners’ strike of 1984-85 I had meant to interview 
Dan and as I began to tell him about my research he peremptorily 
asked: “How come you haven’t talked to me?” Dan’s forthright 
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query almost made me confident enough to tell Dan the truth of 
the matter was that, as I was researching the Cardenden of today 
and there hadn’t been a miner in Cardenden for twenty years, 
I saw no point researching the past. As Dan was deeply involved 
in the coalmining era of the village I was keen to get his views on 
how Cardenden might deal with the transition to the post-
industrial era, and for a long time I had wanted to interview 
him about how he saw the present-day. However, Dan’s firm 
conviction was clear: to study Cardenden was to study miners, 
and this necessitated contacting the recognised local historian of 
coalmining i.e. himself.
Despite not coming anywhere close to steering him towards 
my research interests, Dan was in good form and we began 
chatting and were soon joined by more men who were mostly 
former miners. Upon being introduced to each other, the topic of 
conversation turned to nicknames, which led to comments such 
as “all the local characters are gone” and which were met with 
universal agreement. The next topic of conversation turned to 
how funerals in the village used to be occasions that were 
“watched,” and this led to Dan recalling how he had ‘lost’ three 
brothers. Half way through Dan’s recounting how his second 
brother was lost i.e. had died, I became anxious not to get caught 
up in the company of entertaining but didactic old miners, and 
I excused myself from the company and walked over to the 
fenced arena where Cardenden majorette group The Suzettes 
were being introduced to the crowd by the master of ceremonies 
(Wullie Duncan).
After the girls marched in formation into the arena with 
their shiny blue uniforms and took their positions, they waited 
until the music for their routine began and started their opening 
dance. After this first routine, one of the girls danced solo to the 
song What a Feeling made popular by the nineteen-eighties 
American television drama Fame. When the routine ended 
I resumed walking around the stalls along with everyone else 
who wasn’t watching the dancing. Walking between stalls men 
greeted each other by the query, “Were ye oot last night, then?” 
and fell into brief conversations. After looking at a stall which had 
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mounted displays of black and white photographs of Cardenden 
from the first half of the twentieth century, I noted a group of 
young boys arriving on their bikes and from their comportment 
it was clear they were not rushing to join the Fun Day as they 
surveyed the scene without dismounting, as if drawn to the park 
by the music and crowd but unsure whether the occasion was 
worth their while. I was then approached by someone fundraising, 
asking if I wanted to buy a shot on a scratch card. I handed over 
two pounds and put my name beside the football teams Hibernian 
and Dundee, and shortly afterward the fund-raiser returned with 
the news that Hibernian had won me ten pounds. As I milled 
around the stalls I overheard a woman complaining that there was 
no ice cream van or ‘proper food’ available, presumably unaware 
that this was not due to bad planning but, as the point of the day 
was to raise funds for the annual fireworks display, the catering 
was being done by volunteers to ensure all proceeds were kept 
local. Unfortunately, this meant the choice of food available was 
not up to expectations. Next, another woman whose granddaughter 
had just won the Bonnie Bairn competition complained there was 
no photographer from a local paper to take a photograph, and 
this was followed by further complaints that there was no bouncy 
castle for the children and, to top things off, the face painting stall 
had run out of paint to the disappointment of the parents and 
children queuing.
As I continued my circuit of the stalls I spotted a cousin’s 
wife and began to make my way towards her to say hello. As 
I picked my way through the crowd, however, I began to suspect 
something was amiss, and started to doubt whether the woman 
was in fact Tess. As I carried on towards her I realised my doubts 
were because I couldn’t see any of her family nearby, and this was 
the first time I had ever seen her without her family and this had 
made me doubt my own eyes to the extent that I made a point of 
shadowing Tess for a few more seconds just to satisfy myself it 
was indeed her before walking up and saying hello. As soon as 
I did this, however, I realised that Tess was with a woman whom 
I had never seen before, and realizing this I said hello and 
introduced myself to the woman, but she did not reciprocate and, 
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significantly, was not introduced to me by Tess. I proceeded to 
chat with Tess as normal and after exchanging pleasantries we 
said cheerio.
I was not alone in wondering about the stranger accompanying 
Tess, and within a minute or two I learned from two female 
informants that Tess worked for Home Start which was an 
organisation that involved volunteers befriending (normally) 
women, and that in Tess’s case this meant she was helping a 
mother by giving her a few hours free from looking after her 
young children. While my female informants mused between 
themselves whether Home Start volunteers were paid or not and 
speculated upon the identity of the woman and the circumstances 
that led to her needing befriending, I returned to the fenced-off 
arena once more where The Suzettes had finished their programme 
and the MC was announcing that coming up next was a young 
local band called Cheap Day Return. As the band made their 
sound check in the arena I wondered whether their name was a 
clever way of signaling they had formed themselves into a band 
just for the Fun Day and had come up with a suitably disposable 
name, signaling the band was ‘valid’ for one day only, or whether 
they were expressing something about ‘core-periphery’ relations 
that had to be negotiated by a young and upcoming band from a 
small village seeking recognition from outside the village. When 
finally ready they began playing, but halfway through their first 
song a problem with the sound system developed. With the sound 
cutting in and out every few seconds the MC stepped in and 
announced the band would have to stop due to the faulty PA 
system. As the band began to dismantle their equipment, the MC 
took the opportunity to announce to the disappointed audience, 
despite everyone about-turning en masse and making their way 
back to the stalls, that the band was available for bookings and 
functions. Shortly afterwards I was approached by one of the 
day’s organisers to ask if I was interested in taking part in a tug-
of-war competition. Reluctantly, I agreed as I had wanted to keep 
observing but didn’t want to appear lacking in community spirit. 
As soon as I agreed, however, I was handed a pen and piece of 
paper and asked to get a team together.
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Having completed a circuit of the stalls there was little else to 
see or do apart from revisit the stalls and so my wife Eva invited 
my parents and some neighbours home for coffee. As we left the 
park the MC called for a second team for the tug-of-war as only 
one team had been mustered so far. At this point the rain began 
and shortly afterwards I reluctantly left for home. As I left the 
park I noted Dan and the group of stertorous old miners still 
going strong on the same spot I had left them earlier. Back home, 
from an upstairs bedroom window I looked out from where a few 
hours earlier I had looked out after being woken by the sound 
system and all that remained of the Fun Day were a few seagulls 
circling overhead looking for scraps of food. At three-thirty in the 
afternoon the first sunshine of the day arrived and lasted for 
fifteen minutes until the next blanket of cloud arrived. 
Returning downstairs, the first evaluation of the day came from 
Eva while we waited for the coffee. “That was rubbish! So 
boring!’’ Her comment seemed to sum up everyone’s thoughts as 
it was met with no resistance, and while I understood such a 
comment was only a matter of time, the day had held my interest 
throughout because, as I had made my way to the park a few 
hours earlier, it struck me that I was about to capture not only a 
quote which, thanks to an interpretive effort on my part, could be 
construed as evidence of a decline in locality, but I was about to 
have laid before me an entire language of decline, and from that 
moment I felt that after more than two years into fieldwork I had 
at long last brought my consciousness into alignment with the 
field and its data, and that instead of fighting against the data, 
the real meaning of this day and the whole of my fieldwork had 
finally come into focus. I was looking forward to the Fun Day as 
a welcome opportunity to spectate “the absence of culture” and, 
if only for a day, be spared having to painstakingly construct my 
object of analysis and enjoy a brief escape into empiricism and 
escape the burden of thinking ‘something from nothing,’ as finally 
the ‘nothing’ was about to be empirically ‘given’ to me on a plate. 
The day, then, was full of meaning and interest precisely because 
I was not straining for traces or signs of ‘something’ because my 
perception or expectation of the day was free from the mirror of 
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the industrial period: because I was expecting to see ‘nothing’ 
I was not disappointed.
My ‘reading’ of the day meant understanding it in its historical 
context and putting it into relationship to other different 
and successful Gala Days held throughout the industrial era 
of the village. What was ‘there’ to be seen was a comparative 
decline because such summer festivals were once grand set-piece 
occasions for the celebration of village life in all its industrial and 
communitarian fullness, where participants paraded into the local 
park and were piped around the athletics racing track by world 
championship winning pipe bands from the village; where printed 
and bound programmes of fifty pages and more were produced 
to list the various sporting competitions and their sponsors. Far 
from an overworked member of an organising committee acting 
as MC and having to press gang volunteers on the day to make 
up the numbers in a tug-of-war competition, such programmes 
detailing previous gala days had the names of each entrant for 
each of the many races printed in the programme with each race 
having its allocated starting time and its dedicated sponsor, 
normally a local business establishment, as well as notification 
of the prize money for first, second and third places, and with each 
event’s sponsor being introduced to the crowd after each event 
and applauded when asked to ‘do the honours’ and present the 
prizes to the winners.
The Fun Day (2000) was significant as it acted to not only help 
me grasp what there is to be grasped but to find a language to 
frame what is ethnographically significant. As the purpose of the 
event was to raise money for the annual bonfire and fireworks 
display held every Halloween, which is the only other annual 
event where locals gather together in any great numbers, crucial 
to the day’s success was the production of a sense of enjoyable 
community involvement, of spectacle and audience as in previous 
years. From the outset, however, the song which had awoken 
me to the day was already a summons to what Adorno would 
undoubtedly have called ‘fake’ post-industrial locality and its 
‘fake’ communal or collective presence. The very title ‘Fun Day’ 
was a glaring indication of the derivative bricolage that signals 
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deculturation and the advent of popular culture that is mass 
produced elsewhere and imported to locales of little cultural 
thickness and consumed by the flotsam and jetsum of deindustri-
alization and those without any culture of their own. I would 
go as far as to say that until this day ‘Cardenden’ had been 
unthinkable in me because its constitutional history had remained 
invisible or abstract or, perhaps better, what I had imagined 
Cardenden to be was put together by a private language or 
purely an idea of mine and so had lacked reality until that point. 
When walking around the various stalls, however, it was as if 
each stall took on its true form insofar as I viewed each as a failed 
performance of ‘being a stall,’ as if each became another ‘word’ to 
be added to a language of decline because each was a poor copy 
or ‘fake’ reproduction of a better and more ‘real’ practice of Gala 
Days and village fayres of yesterday.
The Fun Day, then, de-privatised my sense of ‘there’s nothing 
here.’ In this publication of what had been private, even locals’ 
participation was seen as a poor imitation or facsimile of the 
participation that occurred yesteryear insofar as, instead of actually 
participating in athletic events, the people had rather simply ‘turned 
up’ and were there not as participants but just to watch something 
or buy something or try their luck at some game or other to win a 
prize and in the process contribute to a local group’s funds. Thanks 
to the dozen or more stalls doggedly manned by local volunteers for 
the purpose of fundraising, the ‘nothing’ had took form and become 
many little somethings, a stall of photos from the old days, a stall 
for the local mining heritage group, a stall for the local Brownies or 
other stalls selling home baking. Necessary for the triggering of this 
‘private’ perception of mine was the conspicuous public empirical 
display of attempts at locality, the conspicuous public display of 
attempts at constituting a community and the conspicuous public 
display of attempts at constituting participation in the present. 
Whatever the practice, whether forming a team for tug-of- war, a 
highly pleased local mother successfully entering her child for the 
Bonnie Bairn competition despite initially remarking, “Ah widnae 
degrade ma bairn like that!,” each was a shadow or poor facsimilie 
of the previous practices of previous local crowds, previous 
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spectacles and previous participations that enacted these realities in 
previous years.
Because all of these enactments and social practices are 
traditional and a matter of learned practice that can be learned 
and so can be lost, the Fun Day 2000 for me was the public 
performance of ‘forgetting’ made empirically visible in the very 
attempt at re-enacting or remembering: only the attempt at 
remembrance publicly revealed or enacted what has been lost, and 
when viewed in this way each stall for example enacted and 
revealed in miniature a historical process that had culminated in 
the clear conclusion that constituting “the present as history” was 
failure, to the extent of being an embarrassment in locals’ eyes to 
the extent that people were relieved when rain provided an excuse 
to leave. Like Heidegger’s (1962, p. 98) insight that only the 
broken hammer makes the idea or essence of “hammer” present, 
so the failure of communitas, locality and spectacle made public 
everything that was failing to be present; that what was there to 
be seen at the Fun Day 2000 was what was failing to be there and 
failing in public to be there.
It would be something of a miracle if my account of the 
Fun Day 2000 could equal the ethnographic accounts of local 
festivals such as Turner’s study of The Gala Day in Cockenzie and 
Port Seaton in 1978.27 Ironically, where a previous generation of 
ethnographers when describing Gala Days during the industrial 
era imagined they were capturing the local culture and traditions, 
only upon seeing and recognising failed attempts at ‘sociality’ and 
‘community’ do contemporary ethnographers find their sight, and 
see what is there to be seen, become properly attuned to what is 
there to be seen. Only comparing this with prior gala days brought 
the present as history into focus and made ‘decline’ appear ‘in 
person’ and in public. By attempting to construct a communal 
event ‘Cardenden’ was made to ‘say itself’ out loud for the first 
time during fieldwork because its people were performing decline 
27 Robert Turner “Gala Day as an Expression of Community Identity” in A. 
Jackson (ed.) Way of Life and Identity, North Sea Oil Panel Occasional Paper 
No.4, [no date].
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in public for the first time since I entered the field, so that what for 
them was a moment of collective and public failure was for me a 
moment of insight. Finally seeing decline being performed before 
my eyes, I was able to see what had remained private and invisible 
for two years. Despite all the data collected in interviews, I still felt 
vulnerable whenever writing of decline, as if each individual’s 
testimony was only a private opinion that could be wrong.
In retrospect I see that each individual’s testimony wasn’t 
authority enough and that I needed a public demonstration of 
what individuals admitted to me on their doorsteps, and the Fun 
Day gave me this. While the ‘ideology’ of the day promised a 
reversal of normality via creating a sense of community where 
ordinarily there are privatised lives, the day only succeeded in 
highlighting this normality ever more clearly, especially among 
neighbours and friends and ‘kent faces’ who have not developed 
a vested interest in eliding failure when it comes. This day was 
cathartic, then, for me because I was freed from my private 
‘hermeneutical maze’ thanks to my interpretations being publicly 
verified, and this experience also allowed me to see clearly that 
previously I had been alone in attempting to make locality put 
itself into words, and had spent two years attempting an 
impossible intuition of ‘pure being’ as a result of grappling 
with an experience of locality that gave little significations and 
representations of itself. Until this day I had remained trapped in 
“the agony of seeing” (Gadamer 1979, p. 536) insofar as ‘seeing’ 
a particular day or long-term realities such as ‘decline’ was only 
possible via recourse to a construction of historical context that 
had to be painstakingly put together and learnt.
Being local involves memories of growing up in Cardenden in 
the coalmining era and annual Miners’ Galas and the annual event 
known as ‘The Club Treat’ 28 where everyone came with their 
family to the park and each adult and child received their white 
cardboard box of food and juice, and each family would choose 
their spot on the grass around the running track and camp there 
28 Bowhill War Memorial Club.
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for the day, and would picnic and socialise and take photographs 
and enjoy the races and competitions until late in the afternoon. 
Because communitas is not something that can be sub-contracted 
to an outside firm or hired in for a day, the Fun Day was a 
rebranding of the traditional and successful aestival Gala Day 
attempts at communitas and revealed the present condition as 
history (Jameson 1984). If in analyzing the Fun Day we follow 
Victor Turner’s method of taking specific events to reveal “a 
limited area of transparency on the otherwise opaque surface 
of regular uneventful social life” (1957, p. 93), the Fun Day 
was premised upon the attempt to escape the mundane and 
produce something extramundane as the stage was literally set 
for a spectacle. Indeed, successfully constituting the ‘spectacular’ 
is central to whether or not locality remains capable of mediating 
‘higher’ realms of human experience such as communitas and 
the aesthetic.
If locality doesn’t so much set itself the task of producing 
aesthetic experience or an experience of mitsein and sociality but, 
rather, locality itself only comes into being if these realms of 
experience become real, the concrete example of watching a local 
dance group may be a starting point. Hence, when watching the 
first dance of The Suzettes my initial enthusiasm soon waned, and 
while watching the second act which was a girl performing solo, 
I was struck by the thought that I was spectating a dramatization 
of my own predicament and ‘performance’ as an ethnographer: 
a young local attempting ‘art’ with an unlikely audience in an 
unlikely setting, so that her routine prompted a moment of 
mimetic recognition that just as she was ‘nature’ attempting 
‘culture,’ so any analysis I might attempt was a local example of 
‘nature’ trying to escape into ‘culture’ as the never easy task of 
dancing while throwing and catching a baton in time to music was 
made more difficult by the wind and uneven grass surface. As 
I watched, the baton being flung high into the air and waiting to 
see if the girl caught it was to see whether she succeeded or 
failed in reaching the aesthetic realm of experience and so 
the question for myself was whether any analysis of the data 
I might attempt would fall flat to the ground and, in the attempt, 
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reveal my own inability to ‘make it’ in the realm of authorised 
representations.
During this solo routine I also made a point of looking at the 
gathered crowd as they watched and I was struck by the thought 
that it was not simply that the dancers were poor but the audience 
seemed fated to feel disappointed with performances of such 
obvious lack of polish as they were accustomed to dominant 
aesthetics of performance thanks to the massive importation 
and consumption of culture as a result of the communications 
revolution in the late-nineteen-eighties and the advent of satellite 
television. It seemed the girl’s attempt at art was doomed and this 
added a pathetic quality to her performance. 
By its very nature dance is an enactment of a pre-established 
sequence of movements i.e. a structural practice which imposes 
upon its practitioners the necessity of disappearing ‘personality’ 
in order to achieve ‘impersonal’ or subjectless intersubjective 
co-ordination (which applies even more so if the dance is part of 
a tradition such as Scottish country dancing as it then becomes a 
variation on a canonical theme). Because it is a structured reality 
par excellence the dance requires each individual achieves 
‘subjectless practice’ (Bourdieu) so that ‘individuality’ is precisely 
what is not required to achieve the dance because to achieve 
the aesthetic experience within the audience presupposes the 
disappearance of the individual as an individual. Should any girl 
stand out the dance fails, and no aesthetic experience is available 
to the onlookers, and in the case of the dancer with poor technique 
or little talent, the onlooker sees someone who is simply energetic 
and enthusiastic and in a literal sense has no idea what she is 
doing; a leg or an arm jerks out here or there signalling the dancer 
doesn’t know what she will do next. She is untamed ‘nature’ with 
no ‘culture’ and the movements of her body express nothing 
because they are formless because no idea informs her movements, 
and she is defined by something that doesn’t exist in her, is trapped 
in nature and is unable to ‘say’ or use her body to articulate 
something because her body is preliterate and has yet to acquire 
language and so cannot transport its spectator to the aesthetic 
realm of experience.
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As I watched the next performance of The Suzettes, then, 
insofar as the non-performance or absence of symmetry was on 
view, what became empirically present was the failure or absence 
of dance and as a result of this unsuccessful attempt to access the 
realm of aesthetics, the observer had no spectacle by which to 
constitute the aesthetic gaze and instead is burdened with the task 
of constituting ‘something from nothing.’ This absence of spectacle 
is the result of the onlooker watching the dance and, by bringing 
the remembrance of past successful dances seen elsewhere, he 
brings to mind something that is failing to be present and this 
constitutes what is present to be seen. The ‘lived experience’ of 
spectating the dance is informed by memory so that it is this 
remembered something as much as what is empirically present 
that provokes the audience’s evaluation of the dance. Spectators of 
the dance bring to mind the reality of absence by remembering 
past days which act as absent interlocutors of the present-day 
insofar as they successfully instantiated the prized ‘something’ of 
spectacle and event and aesthetic experience.
In the case of dancers with technique and talent their 
co-ordination has an effect upon those witnessing the dance 
because an audience is able to come into being thanks to the 
practice of the dancers and, insofar as they maintain their 
performance, the audience as an audience is prevented from 
falling out of this particular kind of existence or mitsein and back 
into a collection of individual mothers, fathers, acquaintances and 
passers-by. The reason dance can produce this ‘magical’ or ‘group-
constituting’ effect is because, as a visual spectacle, when any 
onlooker’s eye comes to rest on any dancer it registers she is doing 
what any other dancer is doing so that the eye is not able to 
spectate individuality because it is not there as each dancer is 
dancing the dance. Likewise, insofar as each local girl is performing 
the dance she reaches the level of culture or aesthetic experience 
and escapes her identity as Jean Lowe’s daughter, for example, and 
this allows the audience member such as her mother, for example, 
to escape being a dancer’s mother and constitute another kind of 
relationship to her daughter-come-dancer and be immersed in 
another group reality or experience of mitsein i.e. audience 
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member. Insofar as each individual onlooker enters this mitsein 
reality they are de-privatised in their dasein and taken out of their 
privatism and constituted as the ‘we’ of an audience and thereby 
experience themselves and their intersubjectivity differently.
In being caught up in this new identity as an audience member, 
what also comes into being among the audience is a new relation 
to time insofar as there is a qualitative difference between waiting 
for the end of a performance or ‘killing time’ and being made 
unaware of the passage of time. In the former case the dancers 
are judged as poor and will remain poor until the end of the 
performance while in the latter case the dancers take control of 
the onlookers’ experience of time to the extent that the audience 
member is not waiting to see what comes next because he or she 
is carried along by every moment and the flow or ‘prolonged now’ 
of the performance. By controlling the audience’s experience of 
time the audience’s experience of themselves is also controlled, 
and so they do not hang around watching like youngsters on bikes 
waiting for something to convince them to stay because waiting 
implies the absence of something expected, anticipated or hoped 
for. With the successful performance the audience experiences no 
absence because each moment delivers the ‘something’ of collective 
presence so that the spectators are released from the ‘agony of 
seeing’ into the catharsis of submission to the authority of 
the dance and submission to the group known as an audience. The 
dancers take charge of the onlookers’ perception so that the 
audience members are freed from the burden of consciousness or 
awareness and having to decide the merits of each moment, 
moment by moment, and are released from the mundane into the 
aesthetic realm thanks to the ability and talent of the dancers. This 
realm that is accessed is normally given the name of the aesthetic29 
and, among other qualities, it is characterised by a ‘giving of 
self’ made possible by the action of others; a certain ceding of 
autonomy that is authorised by the performance of others reaching 
a certain level of quality.
29 The word ‘aesthetic’ derives from the Greek aisthesis meaning ‘perception.’
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Dancers taking control of what there is to be seen and taking 
control of the experience of perception, to the extent of rendering 
onlookers passive as their perception is taken out of their hands, 
is a power whose effect among the audience is a giving of self to 
the spectacle by each onlooker as each is lifted out of individual 
seeing into ‘groupness’ because each audience member is sharing 
in the same perception and the same experience of time, which is 
the intersubjective or ‘objective’ basis of the aesthetic realm. This 
aesthetic reality cannot be faked as its existence is based upon 
real ‘objective’ or intersubjective conditions that have to be met. 
Each audience member, then, is briefly but really taken out of 
their private and idiosyncratic seeing and released from ‘having’ 
to watch their nephew or daughter or neighbour insofar as the 
dancers constitute a mitsein reality among themselves. Both the 
collection of individual dancers’ and the collection of individual 
onlookers’ escape from the mundane to the aesthetic is dependent 
upon a cathartic process of de-privatising locality, dasein, mitsein 
and sociality so that, when the dance comes to an end the 
applauding audience is as much showing its appreciation for being 
given an experience of intersubjectivity it is unable to give itself 
as indicating their appreciation of the dance. This successfully 
instituting a particular mitsein via others’ doing is not something 
that is contemplated or passively spectated but something 
enacted and felt, so that the audience’s ceding of control is freely 
given. Because it is the dance that makes the audience, aesthetic 
experience is the public or intersubjective effect of the dance upon 
dasein and integral to the aesthetic experience it makes possible 
is the local production of publicity, so the question of reaching 
the level of culture is the question of locality being capable of 
producing a local public realm and, in this regard, alongside the 
power to bring mitsein into being there are powerful processes of 
individuation at work.
From the perspective of the individual dancer, to perform in 
public is to be tested, and should one fail, one fails in a public and 
very personal manner. On those occasions which fail to instantiate 
the dance there is a particular humiliating experience of self that 
emerges, so that a Fun Day that involves a collection of individuals 
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being put together for a day may result in humiliation because of 
the lack of talent or technique or preparation to enact the aesthetic 
realm and withstand the possibility of making a ‘spectacle of 
oneself.’ Likewise, among the spectators, just as perfect subjectless 
practice opens the aesthetic realm to them, so this practice 
convinces the observing ethnographer he is witnessing culture 
rather than a group of friends having fun or messing about. For 
the dancer, then, when the aesthetic realm is enacted, this brings 
into being a particular experience of dasein or ‘being there’ which 
convinces each individual dancer that the identity of ‘being a 
dancer’ can be internalised because it has objectively come into 
being via having been publicly made real and validated. If the 
dance successfully comes into being the identity of ‘dancer’ comes 
into being for each of the girls, and the success of this identity 
coming into being has nothing to do with the private opinion of a 
critic as it is a public and social affair. To the extent the dancers 
are visibly synchronized with each other and the music, the 
audience witnesses a triumph and for as long as it lasts the 
audience is not given permission to dissolve itself back into 
an aggregate of individuals and pre-performance behaviours such 
as remarking on nice dresses and make-up. The audience is 
compelled to watch in silence as they too fall into their own form 
of subjectless practice and refrain from inappropriate behaviours 
that would break silence or break rank and thereby break the 
spell cast over them.
The source of this compulsion or ‘coercion to convene’ which 
is central to the successful spectacle is the gathered collection 
of onlookers escaping themselves and entering the ‘realm of 
meaning’ thanks to a successful constitution of language being 
communicated so that in the unsuccessful performance, the effort 
is said to collapse back onto itself and, far from achieving the shift 
to ‘art’ or ‘meaning,’ it is described as artificial, pretentious or 
even embarrassing. With the successful performance permission is 
granted to enter the realm of meaning where a story is told or a 
meaning is communicated, so that the girls are judged ‘literate’ 
and the fact that they ‘know what they are doing’ is evidenced by 
their ability to ‘say’ or signify something meaningful with their 
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bodies which communicate a meaning that transcends their bodies 
as opposed to communicating a lack of preparation or their 
estrangement from culture. As Bourdieu (1977, pp. 1-2) has it: 
“[A]rtistic production is always also…‘pure practice without 
theory’, as Durkheim says” i.e. the meaningfulness of art is largely 
mimetic, a matter of physical imitation and kinesthetics, so that 
when local girls give an exhibition of their learning and control 
and skill and mastery of their movements, the spectators respond 
by freely allowing themselves to be ‘mastered’ into the mitsein 
of an audience which is held in existence until the dancers finish, 
upon which the audience dissolves itself via the practice of 
applause which is simultaneously the last act of the audience and 
the action which returns each audience member to a ‘private’ 
mundane individual again.
As the dancers take their bows there is the paradox where 
successfully performing ‘subjectlessness’ is a source of intense 
individuation and personal affirmation so that what can be 
achieved in such village festivals is nothing less than the enrichment 
of personhood, gender identity, locality, families and the national 
culture. Thanks to raw nature being disciplined by the talent and 
technique of culture, female dancers simultaneously perform 
‘being feminine’ and bring into being for future reference their 
belonging to locality insofar as being applauded by one’s ‘home 
crowd’ involves being uniquely recognised and individuated 
because it is one’s first audience and perhaps the most difficult 
crowd to constitute into an audience because for one’s home 
crowd one has until that point always been Jean Lowe’s daughter, 
for example, so that to become a dancer in such eyes and for the 
‘magic’ of the aesthetic realm to come into existence the girls must 
constitute this new identity and reality ex nihilo because one is 
performing in front of fellow locals, among whom are one’s 
mother, aunts, cousins, friends, schoolmates and neighbours. To 
be recognised by one’s locality is to know the power of the group 
to produce an affirmation thanks to this process of firstly nerve-
wracking and then powerful experience of affirmation and 
individuation which trumps all other realities because it is not 
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the result of a private opinion or some secret desire but a public 
affirmation that is incontestable because to contest it would 
require other publicly recognised grounds to contest the 
affirmations the public realm makes but, of course, we cannot 
put the social into question as there is no point of view upon the 
social that is beyond the social realm.
In February 2001, a meeting was held to discuss ways to 
ensure the disappointment felt at the Fun Day 2000 was not 
repeated and the result of these deliberations was that a Village 
Fair would be organised for 26 August 2001. However, in the 
Bowhill Centre Annual Report of 2001 the Fun Day was summed 
up in the following contradictory fashion:
Once again this was a successful event run in August 2000 
by the Bonfire & Fireworks Display Committee. Due to lack 
of volunteers and helpers this will be the last Fun Day 
organised by the Committee.
The trend subsequent to 2000 has been one of importing or buying 
in entertainment as the way to ensure something approaching a 
‘spectacle’ is enjoyed by the crowds that gather each summer. This 
problem of reproducing a sense of spectacle and community, of 
course, is not confined to Cardenden as in many locales there is the 
same struggle for a sense of local identity and a ‘new narrative’ 
after the more or less enforced collectivism of the industrial era. 
The Glenrothes Gazette (Thursday, May 27th 1999), for example, 
reported the failure of North Glenrothes Gala which had only 
been resurrected the year before in an article with the headline 
Apathy Kills Gala in North Glenrothes and which quoted the 
Gala committee secretary:
The public just don’t seem to be interested in helping at  
a gala in North Glenrothes. They may have turned up on  
the day, as they did last year, but it requires a lot more 
commitment than that.
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Now that much local industry and local jobs have gone there 
has emerged a generation that is stripped of the many bonding 
relations of locality as occupational community, resulting in the 
ongoing problem of constituting the positive meaning of locality 
and provinciality. Traditionally, annual miners’ galas and village 
pageants have been an obvious source of local identity so that today 
there is a perceived decline in local culture and identity within 
small communities across post-industrial Fife and Scotland more 
generally. Local newspapers report small former mining villages 
alarmed at the ‘loss of identity’ and, taking the recent example of a 
Cowdenbeath May Queen being stripped of her crown due to it 
being subsequently discovered her home address was outside of 
Cowdenbeath in Lumphinnans,30 and the subsequent decision to 
revive a pageant day for Lumphinnans as a means of addressing this 
‘insult’ and reasserting local ‘independence’ from the encroaching 
towns of Lochgelly and Cowdenbeath, such episodes illustrate what 
Cohen (1985, p. 50; 70) terms the symbolic construction of 
community when perceived local identities are felt to be under 
threat: “[T]he symbolic expression of community and its boundaries 
increases in importance as the actual geo-social boundaries of the 
community are undermined, blurred or otherwise weakened...as a 
consequence of social change, so people resort increasingly to 
symbolic behaviour to reconstitute the boundary.” 
We may say then that summer festivals throughout post-
industrial Scotland act out “a pervasive nostalgia for ‘real’ social 
relations” (Herzfeld 1997, p. 8), a nostalgia which is very much 
alive because the real experience of solidarity has been recently 
overtaken by the event of deindustrialization in the nineteen-
eighties. These festivals and fayres and galas aim to maintain a 
tension between locality and modernity and in this effort face up to 
the challenges of anonymous forces upon the basis of their often 
beleaguered locality. Having begun to recognise this challenge of 
producing ‘ethnography from nothing,’ the next section looks at 
writers who have lived in Cardenden and turned their attention to 
30 A former mining village known locally as ‘Little Moscow’ as a result of its 
historic Communist Party sympathies.
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the challenge of ‘writing locality’ where the problem of generating 
‘something from nothing’ has been addressed.
1.5 The History of Writing Cardenden
David Rorie (1867-1946)
During fieldwork I discovered the writings of David Rorie when 
I happened to leaf through Buchan’s Folk Tradition and Folk 
Medicine in Scotland: The Writings of David Rorie (1994) which 
I had purchased three years previously, but which for all that time 
I had never dreampt contained a collection of ethnographic and 
folkloric writings on Cardenden stretching back to the nineteenth-
century. To my surprise and delight, then, I read that Rorie came 
to live in Cardenden in 1894 as the medical officer for the Fife 
Coal Company at Bowhill Colliery and that Rorie, “was an 
ethnographer...the first folklorist in Scotland, and one of the first 
anywhere, to record the culture of an industrial community: that 
of the Fife miners” (Buchan 1994, pp. 5 & 11). I discovered that 
Rorie had a keen interest in collecting and commenting upon the 
practices and beliefs of the miners and peasants of Cardenden and 
its environs, and in his writings he drew upon the ethnographies 
of the Torres Straits Islands expedition of 1898 and the theories 
of magic articulated by George Frazer in The Golden Bough 
(1890-1915), and Rorie proposed a parallel between Cardenden 
farm workers’ beliefs regarding diseases and their ‘primitive’ 
practices of treating illnesses via mimetic magical practices with 
similar beliefs and practices among native Paraguayan Indians. 
However, having read the book I found there was no evidence 
of Rorie having set himself the task of articulating a ‘native’ point 
of view. At most, there is evidence that Rorie engaged in a form of 
‘salvage ethnography’ insofar as his writing seems to have been 
motivated by providing interesting amusement for the reading 
public concerning the provinces and backwaters, something 
textually confirmed by a throw-away remark when reviewing a 
case of ‘Second Sight’ which touches upon the battle of Culloden, 
and where Rorie remarks that the case “has no romance in it” 
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(Buchan 1994, p. 188), and so is to be dismissed as of no interest 
to his readers.31
This concern to identify ‘romance’ ties in with a wider debate 
regarding European Romanticism’s critique of industrialism and 
allegations concerning nineteenth-century Scottish literature’s 
flight from depicting the new industrial order of the time, so that 
in attempting to identify what Fredric Jameson (1982) terms the 
“political unconscious” of Rorie’s texts, a case can be made for 
the argument that his depiction of ‘locality’ is governed by two 
contradictory impulses: a search for the cultural survivals of a pre-
modern outlook among the Fife peasantry so that Rorie can be 
described as part of a ‘save the data’ campaign, and secondly, a set 
of modernist assumptions which effectively prevented Rorie from 
developing a conception of his data that could be more than a 
romantic hunt for ‘curiosities.’ In this regard I am unclear whether 
Rorie’s writing on the pre-history of medical science is a serious 
effort at recovering and recognising ‘lost knowledges’ or perhaps 
modernist condescension. I am unsure if a much-respected and 
high-status pillar of the community turning his attention towards 
coal miners and farm workers as sources of knowledge had to 
adopt a façade of condescension so that Rorie would not appear 
to his modernist ‘scientific’ readers as taking folklore too seriously. 
While I am unsure if Rorie deliberately wants to appear to 
trivialize the subject matter as a bit of fun in order to deflect the 
question why a qualified medical doctor would devote his time 
and attention to peasants’ superstitious beliefs and practices, it 
is clear that Buchan is keen to press the claim that a ‘native 
viewpoint’ was captured by Rorie, despite the fact that Rorie 
(Buchan 1994, p. 12) himself tells his reader:
It is not pretended that all the customs, etc., mentioned were 
universal. Many of them were dying out, and many more 
31 At the time of Rorie’s writing an indication of what was then popular with the 
reading public is given by Ian Maclaren’s kailyard novel Beside the Bonny Brier 
Bush (1890) having the distinction of being the first book to top the first 
American best-seller list which had been established in 1895 (see Harvie 1993).
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were referred to jestingly, often with the semi-apologetic 
remarks, ‘that’s an old freit [superstitious belief], that’s  
what the auld folk used to say, or do.’ But everything I have 
set down I have tested as having been at one time or other 
common in the district.
There is the assumption that there is a local or miner’s viewpoint, 
and that it is something available not only to miners themselves 
but can be grasped by a medical officer turned amateur medical 
folklorist. However, there is no actual exploration of the 
notion, for example, that the ‘viewpoint’ of miners or peasants is 
something that must be constructed or pieced together because 
it is not suspected that this viewpoint can not be simply recorded 
or read off or reconstructed from house call notes as it is not 
something so conveniently ‘given.’ What is clear is that Rorie 
never produced an account of the conditions of nineteenth-century 
miners so that my initial sense of good fortune at discovering 
Rorie’s works was to end in disappointment, as Buchan’s claims 
that Rorie actually studied miners’ culture is misleading to say 
the least. The quote from Rorie above clearly indicates that 
his informants were indicating their lives and consciousness lay 
elsewhere than Rorie’s folkloric interests, that the data being 
requested of them was already obsolete so that we may say the 
more Rorie restricted his inquiry to ‘medical folklore’ the more 
a native point of view was being marginalised and missed, and 
what in Rorie’s writings is glossed by Buchan as ‘the native point 
of view’ is in fact the afterlife of a pre-industrial era that was at 
an end.
This glimpse of the impending obliteration of the last remnants 
of a pre-industrial outlook is characteristic of pre-Malinowskian 
ethnography and understandable and laudable as Rorie conducted 
his research when various customs and beliefs were disappearing 
due to massive and sudden industrialisation. In this regard, there 
is a continuity between my ethnography and Rorie despite 
being separated by a century insofar as, whereas Rorie began 
his fieldwork at the point of the transition to heavy or ‘total 
industrialisation’ in 1895, my own research was conducted more 
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than twenty years after locality had become post-industrial; 
where Rorie sought the ‘survivals’ of a pre-industrial folklore 
I found myself piecing together ‘survivals’ of the industrial period 
of 1895-1965, and while Rorie is rightly lauded for recording 
medical folklore among late nineteenth-century miners and 
agricultural workers, it is a matter of dispute that Rorie researched 
‘‘the culture of an industrial community: that of the Fife 
miners” (Buchan 1994, p. 11) as Buchan claims. Perhaps a more 
accurate appraisal is that Rorie did not suspect anything in 
industrial workers’ lives of particular folkloric worth and he was 
probably right to draw this conclusion in light of the rapid 
de-traditionalisation that was already ongoing in 1895.
Rev. Archibald McNeill Houston (? – 1933)
If I contend that powerful forces more or less coerced or ‘decided’ 
the construction of what counted as data and which more or 
less rendered certain data ‘invisible’ and non-existent as candidates 
for representation in the writing of Rorie, this same ‘political 
unconscious’ is even more pronounced in the text left to us by the 
Church of Scotland minister the Rev. Archibald McNeill Houston 
who arrived in Cardenden nine years before Rorie in 1885 and is 
today remembered as the author of Auchterderran, Fife: A Parish 
History (1924). Rather than giving a parish history as we today 
would understand such a project, Houston’s text is essentially a 
collection of events and ‘eminent personages’ with very little effort 
at constructing any meaningful connection between the data, save 
that they occurred more or less within the same locality. What is 
remarkable about Houston’s history is not only the absence of a 
historical narrative but the author’s success in ‘emptying’ locality 
of any historic significance thanks to his suppression of history 
thanks to his monotonous enumeration of kirk session notes 
charting the relentlessly ‘remarkable’ and ‘faithful’ line of local 
ministers and schoolmasters and their relentless progress in all 
their endeavours. The remarkable absence of any narrative or 
story throughout the four hundred and more pages paradoxically 
ends in a representation of locality as a place where nothing 
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of historical worth happens because all political and historical 
dialectic has been removed, so that locality is made to participate 
in what Marinell Ash (1980) termed the “strange death” of 
Scottish history.
It is clear that Houston’s history was written after history 
has come to an end. As with local history group members and 
old women who prefer to slam their door shut than talk of 
the establishment of the Scottish parliament to be discussed in 
Chapter 4, in Houston’s text nothing enters his representation 
that would reopen or put into question the established order of 
things, so that even the recognition that the realm of political 
contestation and governance exists is off-limits; so that, if there 
is no ‘cut and thrust’ it is because the triumph of the British 
bourgeois Protestant order has brought all such drama to a 
happy conclusion and there are no more causes to be won. The 
significance or the intelligibility of the long durée of history is 
essentially constituted by the long gestation of Protestantism 
and what for Houston constitutes the meaning of history and 
historical continuity is deployed to close history and ‘naturalise’ 
the 1688 politico-religious constitutional settlement:
It is, therefore, worthy of importance to note how the 
Reformers connected themselves with the Lollards and  
the Lollards with the Culdees, as the Culdees connected 
themselves with the Waldenses, and the Waldenses with the 
Apostolic Church (1924, p. 29).
Much as Latour has described French historiography finally 
grasping ‘‘the revolutionary reading of the French Revolution…
had organised [French] historiography since 1789” (1993, p. 40), 
so Scottish historians highlight a particular era of Scottish 
historiography which was dominated by adherence to the Whig 
project of bourgeois Protestant modernism and support for 
the political union of Scotland and England. To read Houston as 
he wanted to be read is to play along with the Whig interpretation 
of Scotland and its post-Reformation history as progress and 
as the only credible hermeneutical standpoint. The ‘political 
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unconscious’ of McNeill’s text then consecrated the present social 
order with all other counter-imaginings of the past and present as 
in Catholicism, republicanism, communism, Scottish nationalism 
and socialism that were also present being rendered invisible. With 
the benefit of hindsight it is clear that throughout Houston’s work 
an unstated ‘politics of identity’ is in charge of his framing locality, 
where the present is narrated as the Christian God’s arrangement 
of Scottish history and to which the movement of centuries of 
history have been nicely brought to their providential conclusion 
(Kidd 1993). Whether via the reduction of the past to the degraded 
existence of ‘romance’ in Rorie or Houston’s parish history, 
Cardenden is framed within the larger historical paradigm which 
Young (cited in Broun et al. 1998, p. 105) characterised as follows:
Previous generations of scholars in the early twentieth 
century focused on a Whig interpretation of history, with 
history being fundamentally equated with progress, and 
viewed the Treaty of Union of 1707 as an act of liberation 
which civilised Scotland and freed her from the shackles  
of a barbaric past.
If Houston’s history is void of interest because it has been washed 
clean of any drama, of successes and failures, intrigues, villains 
and heroes and great causes to be fought for and won or lost, it is 
also a history that is free of the realities of socio-economic forces, 
industrialism, wealth, poverty and social classes. In Houston’s 
history the industrial revolution makes no appearance, nor 
does its transforming impact upon the local landscape, so that 
Houston’s descriptions of particular aspects of the local landscape 
are done in such a way as to remove the land from the impact of 
history. Significantly, despite being written by a Christian, there is 
not a single sentence in the book that could be described as an 
instance of critical social commentary. This suppression of the 
story of how the present came to be means that Houston covers 
‘everything’ with a pre-modern or ‘end of history’ tensionlessness, 
so that the text becomes interesting precisely because of what it 
suppresses and what cannot appear within the horizon of meaning 
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that is at work; a horizon of meaning that can not resurrect 
history and its clash of ideas and interests.
The spectre that haunts this imagining of Scotland is the 
thousand years of Catholicism in Scotland prior to the ‘invention’ 
of Protestantism, so that integral to Houston’s suppression of 
history is the myth of a non-Catholic ‘Celtic Church.’ In Houston’s 
horizon of meaning, that which is allowed to appear and be 
recognised is only that which has a role to play in the emergence 
of the present established order of things. This need to find a 
Protestant navel within Catholicism (Davies 1992; Hudson 1994; 
Clancy 1997; Veitch 1997) seems to indicate Protestants were 
not psychologically ready to accept the modernist rupture that 
Protestantism represented and so the Celtic Church is the ‘ballast’ 
Protestants needed to suppress their original modernist revolution 
so that, ironically, the invention of the Celtic Church was a form 
of Catholic ‘Protestantism’ that suppressed the novelty of the 
Protestant Reformation and repressing the truth of what they 
had done.
In later chapters I will argue this suppression of history 
underpins the 1945 generation’s British and Protestant identity 
and a political integralism and narrative or imagining of national 
and local history that is more or less fated to view the ‘reopening’ 
of Scotland’s history thanks to the establishment of the Holyrood 
parliament as profoundly unsettling. I will argue that what 
prepares the way for ’45 generation unionism is Houston’s prior 
‘theological cleansing’ of local and national history from local and 
national consciousness, and that this is isomorphic with a similar 
clearing of Scottish education and the removal of all political 
dialectic from Scotland and the reduction of the imagining of the 
future to the hegemony of Scottish unionism and the view that 
“1688 marked a grand turning point, when ‘ancient superstitions’ 
and ‘the old theological spirit’ were sloughed off, and the ‘real 
interests of the nation began to be perceived” (Beveridge & 
Turnbull 1997, p. 67). In the Protestant modernist imagination, 
then, the advent of Great Britain in 1707 was the great action 
of God in history that simultaneously marks the advent of the 
modern era and the political and religious liberation from the 
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medieval Catholic era. In this salvific-come-historical event, 
localities are also ‘liberated’ into the great polity of Great Britain 
and are modernised and liberated from ‘medieval particularism’ 
into the larger modern organising formation known as ‘society.’
While Houston shows us a neat way of having one’s modernist 
cake and eating it, the fatal price to be paid is that at the heart of 
the political-theological unconscious ‘governing’ Houston’s history 
and imagining of locality is the ‘worship of facts’ because nothing 
fundamental is left to achieve or happen. After the great salvific-
come-historical exodus event and period of 1688-1707, events and 
localities are fated to suffer from the ‘end of history.’ It is the 
internalization of this symbolic order that acts to render the historic 
events of ‘Scotland 1999’ or the upcoming referendum on 18 
September 2014 non-events for those elderly residents who align 
themselves with the historico-political-religious order articulated in 
Houston. Where the history of locality is only imaginable or able 
to appear within this horizon, the parish can only ever attain the 
‘romantic’ status of an “old-world quaint corner of Fife’’ (Houston 
1924, p. 12), despite Houston writing in the aftermath of the 
Russian revolution of 1917, the enfranchisement of the working 
class in 1918, the general strike of 1921 and the emergence of 
Cardenden as “the storm centre of the East of Scotland working 
class movement’’ according to the British Socialist Party’s weekly 
newspaper The Call (1921 or 1922, page unknown).32 
Because Houston was writing his history during the unprece-
dented emergence of class struggle and the contestation of estab-
lished cultural and political power, his text evidences the ‘dead 
hand’ of a modernism that kills the living tension of ‘being mod-
ern,’ ‘being local’ and ‘being-in-history;’ a Protestant modernism 
that having successfully exercised a will to power at a certain point 
in the nation’s history, thereafter became the creature and the cap-
tive of power and stopped being modern insofar as it succumbed to 
the desire to end the tension of ‘being modern.’ Insofar as Houston’s 
imagination became petrified into this mindscape, his local history 
32 I have since lost the exact details of this reference. 
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petrified Cardenden into this image. However, if Houston’s writing 
repressed the emergence of social critique and class conflict, the 
local miners who are absent from the texts of Houston and Rorie 
began to produce literary representations of their own, and with 
this development both Rorie’s and Houston’s texts and worldviews 
were fated to quickly fall into obscurity.
Joe Corrie (1896–1968)
Joe Corrie was a coalminer-turned-author and part of an inter-war 
generation of working-class autodictats that emerged from a 
recently enfranchised working class in Wales, Scotland and 
England which elected the first-ever UK Labour government in 
1924. This inter-war generation became ‘producers of culture’ and 
set about the task of representing their lives and localities and the 
political views of the twenty-one year old miner Corrie, like every 
politically-engaged working-class person, had been electrified by 
the 1917 revolution in Russia, and in his literary output Corrie 
pursued a conscious commitment to realism which sought to 
dispel the mists and fogs of the ‘kailyard school’ of the likes of 
Houston and Rorie that had obscured as much as revealed. 
Corrie’s play In Time 0’ Strife (1927) (see Corrie 1985, pp. 23-80) 
enjoyed international success while his other published poems and 
plays as well as unpublished manuscripts, represents the most 
credible and sustained attempt at representation of Cardenden 
as Corrie devoted himself to writing of the miners and their 
community during the years of the Great Depression. Importantly, 
Corrie’s plays went through many productions not only in 
Cardenden but throughout Fife and Scotland, as well as the 
mining areas of England thanks to the theatrical group Bowhill 
Village Players which later became the Fife Miner Players in the 
nineteen-twenties and thirties.33 As a committed socialist Corrie 
33 In the winter of 1930 Corrie was in Leipzig to see a production of his play 
In Time O’ Strife (1927) and was aware of the rise of Hitler. For years after this 
trip to Germany, Corrie corresponded with the German translator of his play 
who was a member of the Communist Party. When Corrie learned from this 
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understood his role as a writer in terms of class struggle and saw 
the role of the writer as one of rendering the standpoint of mining 
communities. As he wrote in 1933 (Corrie 1985):
I must write about the world I know best, the world of  
the working man and woman, their trials, loves, hates, 
suspicions, generosities and loyalties, I feel somehow that – 
well, it’s a contribution – I am doing what I love best for  
a class that needs it now.
In Corrie’s only published full-length novel Black Earth (1939) 
Cardenden appears as the fictional coalmining village of ‘Brandon’ 
and Corrie (1939, p. 88) pulls no punches in his depiction of 
Cardenden and its neighbouring hamlets:
Until he passed through the little dirty hamlet of Whitgrange, 
still as dirty as ever, still as depressing, the same long unbroken 
row of small houses with the water barrels to catch the rain 
for the womenfolk to wash their clothes with, the same 
uncultivated garden patches with their rickety old sheds, 
pigeon houses and rabbit-hutches, and the same drawn faces 
looking through windows at the falling snow. Then his 
thought suddenly went back to the days of his youth. It was 
in Whitgrange that he had been born and had spent the best 
part of his life. He looked out on the little house where he  
had spent his hungry childhood and fighting youth. And  
he felt slightly sick for many reasons.
Black Earth (1939) is the tragic story of two marriages and two 
Brandon men: of how one is corrupted by power while the other 
is corrupted by powerlessness. In the opening scenes Corrie 
depicts the homely life of Jack Smith, a miner and his wife Maggie 
and their three children; a happy and hard-working family headed 
comrade that the German Communists decided to support Hitler in order to 
defeat their rival Social Democrats, however, their correspondence came to an 
abrupt end. See Corrie (1985, pp. 175-7).
77
c a r d e n d e n
by a mother and father who, having been childhood sweethearts, 
were destined for each other. Despite this happy beginning, the 
novel becomes progressively darker as a result of Jack having an 
accident at work and eventually committing suicide in a desperate 
effort to save his family from poverty. While the opening chapters 
are dominated by the Smith family, the reader is introduced in due 
course to the other male protagonist, George Williams, who is the 
‘villain’ of the novel and who is another local man also employed 
like Jack in the local colliery but has married an outsider to 
Brandon whom Corrie (1939, p. 49) describes as a woman who:
[H]ated going to the pump…made no neighbours, and  
held no conversation with them. She had nothing in 
common with them, nothing at all. She hated them for their 
roughness, for their ill-manners, for their vulgarity, for  
their hopeless fatalism. They were low, in her estimation, 
very low. And to live among them was misery.
The character of Elizabeth is depicted by Corrie as having to 
endure local women’s use of language which amounts to barely 
concealed aggression grounded in a deeply internalised and deeply 
defining ressentiment. Corrie depicts Brandon’s women as viewing 
Elizabeth’s petit bourgeois standards as a standing provocation 
which triggers an ongoing aggression within them as a result of 
Elizabeth’s behaviours acting as a mirror in which is reflected back 
to the local women their defeatism and their resignation to their 
fate, so that Elizabeth acts as a scapegoat because these women 
heap upon her all of their resentments and bad conscience as 
a result of having settled for their lives with no thought of better-
ment. The outsider, then, is resented because her mere presence 
resurrects the long-dead hopes for a better life that 
local women have killed off within themselves. Elizabeth is pro-
vocative because she ‘deconstructs’ local women to the extent she 
is determined that she will not be mastered by her material condi-
tions and to the extent she acts with a view to making things dif-
ferent for herself and her family. Corrie, then, uses his fiction as a 
means of exploring and representing working-class dasein and to 
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capture the situation where material reality has been so pressing 
for so long that it has called forth within the human being living 
this reality so many chronic coping behaviours and accommoda-
tions that the slightest deviation from this repertoire of accom-
modation stands out; where the slightest ‘deviancy’ from this 
accommodation instantaneously calls forth within the breast of 
local women the whole force of their habitus as it rushes to defend 
itself in response to being symbolically challenged.
As Elizabeth endures her fate of being déclassé, her husband 
George enjoys promotion through the ranks of the local mine 
thanks in no small measure to the promptings of his ambitious wife 
Elizabeth; promptings such that she insists he take night classes 
to better himself, and which culminate in his being promoted to 
manager within the local pit. While her husband prospers, however, 
Elizabeth becomes increasingly mentally unhinged as a result of her 
years of having to endure the material and emotional and cultural 
poverty of working-class village life. As Elizabeth declines her 
husband George rebels against his formerly dominant wife and 
resurrects a sexual interest in Jack’s wife Maggie whose decline into 
poverty as a result of Jack’s failings has forced her to seek the help 
of the now-affluent George and draw upon the fact that they were 
once romantically linked as teenagers. In an atmosphere of suspicion 
and vicious gossip as to what is occurring between Maggie and 
George while Jack lies crippled in bed as a result of an accident 
down the pit,34 the finale of the novel sees the heroine in her hour 
of need brought about by her husband who had turned to gambling 
in an ultimately disastrous attempt to provide for his family, become 
a fallen woman.
Black Earth (1939) then is a novel that tells the story of how 
two marriages end in failure and how a working-class man makes 
his way up the occupational ladder and ends up becoming a petty 
tyrant; how power and powerlessness are related to material 
poverty, with the latter corrupting judgment and behaviour and 
34 My paternal grandfather who made common cause with Corrie in the local 
Communist Party lay for years in his bed suffering from the pneumonoconiosis 
contracted due to working in Bowhill pit until his death in 1966. 
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wreaking psychological damage. Black Earth (1939) is an ‘anti-
essentialist’ sociological novel which, step by step, sets out to 
show the reader how material poverty tears at the veil of ‘false 
consciousness’ that surrounds the myth and practice of conjugal 
love. In a very real sense, the real protagonist of Black Earth 
is material poverty insofar as it slowly but surely deconstructs 
everything it touches – human relationships, love, friendship, 
ideas of womanhood and manhood and individuals’ deepest 
beliefs about who they are.
For Corrie, poverty is the great source of ‘conscientisation’ 
insofar as the experience of becoming poor triggers the prota- 
gonists’ breaking free of their previous ‘humanistic’ relationship 
to their selves and society insofar as poverty imposes an endless 
questioning of self that gradually moves further and further 
towards a nihilistic gloom as a once naïve trust in life and love is 
lost. Poverty destroys the soul and the fabric of society because 
grounds other than improved material conditions cannot be found 
to maintain basic beliefs and practices regarding self-respect and 
interpersonal relations. The beliefs and practices concerning love, 
marriage, family, fidelity and relationships etcetera are decon-
structed over time to reveal they are in fact means for social sur-
vival, and it is only the desperately and chronically poor who are 
fated to arrive at this insight. Black Earth, then, is concerned with 
exploring the psychological condition of men and women and the 
reality and level of repression that accompanies poverty and how 
poverty traps and imprisons and determines the psyche, so that 
Black Earth (1939) is a novel about the clash or confrontation 
between the decentred reality of working-class masculinity 
and the myth of men being autonomous and centred, and how 
material poverty results in a psychological poverty of character 
and fragility that is only capable of imagining itself using one or 
two primary colours.
If this is the strength of the novel, a clear weakness is the 
tendency to reduce the representation of workers’ dasein to those 
aspects of their lives that are work-related, a weakness shared 
with much agitprop literature of the inter-war years. This 
weakness results in characters lacking psychological depth and 
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sometimes credibility. In this regard Black Earth (1939) is not 
comparable to Platonov’s The Foundation Pit ([1929] 1996) or 
passages of Brierley’s Means Test Man (1935). While I would 
never describe Corrie as being guilty of “the common reproach 
levelled by psychoanalysts at Marxists, that the latter speak as 
if a man has no psyche until he gets his first paycheck” (Sahlins 
1976, p. 8n), Corrie is clearly on the side of the Sartre who 
writes, “the truth of a man is the nature of his work, and it is his 
wages” (1963, p. 93). Also, in the unpublished manuscripts of 
Corrie that I have examined there is a certain materialist ‘flatness’ 
of horizon which is devoid of any attempt to paint dasein with the 
colours of historicity or culture or nationality to arrive at an 
in-depth representation of the complexity of human dasein 
beyond the representation of the worker as dominated by capital 
in his consciousness and behaviour, and caught up in structures 
and events beyond his control. If this limited use of colour to 
depict dasein is a weakness it was not unrecognised by Corrie 
himself. As he wrote in 1932:
It is a failing of mine, I believe, that I never enjoy a play which 
does not have a strong relation to real life. I know people who 
can go to the theatre and enjoy the technique of a play even 
if they scoff at the theme. I am not so fortunate. If the theme 
of a play is trivial, I immediately lose interest and make my 
exit from the theatre at the first convenient moment.
(Corrie 1985, p. 183).
Despite this self-criticism Corrie’s work endures as the articulation 
of a local and detailed standpoint which remains unprecedented 
in a Cardenden writer as there is no doubt that Corrie was 
committed to realism and locality and, as a result, representations 
of ‘ordinary’ people in their daily lives and so has produced a 
body of work of lasting ethnographic worth.
Ian Rankin (1960 - )
The first writer that has faced the challenge of representing the 
post-industrial era of Cardenden is also the most successful local 
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author by far, Ian Rankin. Beginning with his first novel The 
Flood (1986) Rankin has produced a substantial body of work of 
more than thirty novels, and in this body of work the dominant 
and perhaps only representation of Cardenden is one that is 
uniformly bleak, if not miserabilist.35 In Rankin’s texts the 
claustrophobic localism of Houston’s (1924, p. 12) “old-world 
quaint corner of Fife” is gone and macro-economic forces and the 
cut and thrust of political difference and class contestation is 
present along with the musings of the private, lone individual 
Rebus36 character who is more or less estranged from his natal 
village (1987, p. 3).
He drove quietly, hating to be back here in Fife [i.e. 
Cardenden], back where the old days had never been ‘good 
old days,’ where ghosts rustled in the shells of empty houses 
and the shutters went up every evening on a handful of 
desultory shops, those metal shutters that gave the vandals 
somewhere to write their names. How Rebus hated it all,  
this singular lack of environment. It stank the way it had 
always done: of misuse, of disuse, of the sheer wastage of life.
As if his own testimony concerning Cardenden were not enough, 
Rankin’s novel Dead Souls (1999) begins with the following 
35 This view of Cardenden is not reserved to native authors but is shared by 
architects to judge by the architectural magazine Urban Realm which in 2000 
inaugurated the ‘Carbuncle Award’ to highlight the worst examples of 
architecture in Scotland. In 2009 Cardenden was nominated for this award, 
although the Fife town of Glenrothes was the eventual winner. In arriving at their 
choice the magazine editors explained: “It’s a hard call when you get into the 
southernmost parts of Fife but since nobody other than characters from an Ian 
Rankin novel would dare step through the tumbleweed in Cardenden these days, 
the ‘Plook on the Plinth’ had to go to a place that was at least walkable and – 
more importantly – with potential to be salvaged.” http://www.urbanrealm.com. 
Accessed 5 Aug 2012.
36 The fictional detective ‘Rebus’ character is a native of Cardenden.
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excerpt from the American novelist Kate Atkinson’s Behind the 
Scenes at the Museum (1995):
Once I caught a train to Cardenden by mistake…When we 
reached Cardenden we got off and waited for the next train 
back to Edinburgh. I was very tired and if Cardenden had 
looked more promising, I think I would have simply stayed 
there. And if you’ve ever been to Cardenden you’ll know 
how bad things must have been.
A theme within Rankin’s series of detective novels is some kind 
of reconciliation within the Rebus character of the metropolitan 
‘somebody’ and the village ‘nobody,’ as Rebus is characterised by 
an ongoing psychodynamic of being troubled by memories from 
his past which come to haunt Rebus or surface and play on his 
mind, usually during a lull in the exigencies of solving a murder 
case and as a result of drinking too much whisky. In Dead Souls 
(1999, p. 55) we read: “He [Rebus] could see streetlights across 
the Forth in Fife. He thought of Janice and Brian Mee, who had 
never left their home town. He wondered how he’d have turned 
out if he’d stayed,” and further on Rebus asks himself (1999, 
p. 197): “If I’d stuck around Fife, he thought, not joined the 
army…what would I be thinking now? Who would I be?” (italics 
in original). 
The theme of unresolved questions of identity I read as evidence 
of Rankin’s ambivalence towards his decision not to base his 
writing within and upon his natal locality; as if Rankin simultaneously 
wishes to recognise and pay homage to his natal village and set 
himself the task of making ‘literature from nothing,’ but also seeks 
to justify and never seriously engage with the self that has left his 
locality behind. Certainly, this suppressed alter ego or former self is 
not invested with sufficient substance to force this reconciliation, 
so that in place of a genuine engagement with the relationship 
between locality and writing and an engagement with psychological 
repression to maintain the fiction of a post-provincial self, there is 
instead the resort to a formulaic depiction of locality along the lines 
of ‘there’s nothing here,’ and this reliance upon a readily available 
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pat answer is more akin to a cliché that, because it is ready to hand, 
avoids the challenge of thinking an answer. After each brief sojourn 
in Fife, then, the fictional protagonist removes himself to the 
metropolitan centre as if admitting it is only in the metropolitan 
“somewhere” that a village nobody can have a life of meaning and 
participate in history, and the post-provincial writer can have a 
locality that can furnish material of literary merit.
Paradoxically, then, whereas Houston banished the movement 
of history and politics from his representation of Cardenden, 
Rankin, by following the very opposite strategy and recognising 
the full ‘uglifying’ impact of these processes, produces a depiction 
of Cardenden that is strangely similar to Houston insofar as both 
construct Cardenden as a place where nothing of any real import 
or consequence happens. In his debut novel The Flood (1986, 
p. 24), for example, Rankin locates significance and the movement 
of history elsewhere in nineteen-sixties Paris: “This was 1968. 
Far away there was talk of revolution and radical change. The 
world was slipping and sliding on the edge of a new era of 
communication. Carsden [i.e. Cardenden] slept longer and deeper 
than most.” Rankin, then, reproduces the traditional representation 
of Cardenden as lacking significance, and whose inhabitants are in 
need of being rescued from their provincialism and insignificance. 
As Rankin has one of his fictional characters observe in Dead 
Souls (1999, p. 243): “He seemed really interested in Cardenden. 
I told him off, thought he was taking the mickey.” For Rankin, 
then, significance and meaningfulness are unequally distributed 
and this hierarchical geography of significance structures Rebus’s 
perception so that a kind of spatialisation of modernity cleanses 
villages and non-urban settings of significance so as to ‘essentialise’ 
and frame Cardenden according to an a priori template that 
is conveniently at hand, so that there is little reason, save some 
Rorie-like idiosyncratic curiosity in backwardness, for a young 
writer to look to his post-industrial village for anything of literary 
significance.
In this scheme of perception, the consequences for ‘writing 
Cardenden’ is that Cardenden is fated to be perceived and 
represented as a place containing ‘nothing’ populated by ‘nobodies’ 
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and is unable to appear as anything more than a cipher for 
already highly-structured perceptions, so that the idea that 
Cardenden may be a source of literary merit or interest is a non-
starter and never contemplated. As a result of this perception, 
‘being local’ is a predicament and the only solution is to leave. In 
a purely speculative manner, then, we can say that insofar as 
Rankin sees ‘nothing’ in Cardenden, his perception of his locality 
has entered into his self-understanding as a writer so that the 
fictional police Inspector Rebus character is the compensating 
somebody or alter ego who lives in the compensating somewhere 
of Edinburgh. In this regard the words of Kavanagh (2003, cited 
in Glen and Hubbard 2008, p. xv) are worth recalling:
Parochialism and provincialism are direct opposites. The 
provincial has no mind of his own; he does not trust what 
his eyes see until he has heard what the metropolis – towards 
which his eyes are turned – has to say on any subject…The 
parochial mentality on the other hand is never in any  
doubt about the social and artistic validity of his parish. All 
great civilisations are based on parochialism…it requires  
a great deal of courage to be parochial.
If Rankin himself instantiates in his own life the predicament he 
ascribes to his fictional Rebus character, this predicament is 
something that has not featured as material for his fiction i.e. the 
struggle to produce literature from ‘nothing,’ and we may say that 
while belonging to the ’79 generation and having seen the 
extension of the cultural franchise to the ’79 generations thanks to 
affluence and which Rankin has clearly taken up in exemplary 
fashion, and while wholeheartedly sympathizing with Rankin’s 
desire to run from ‘the data’ (see Chapter 3), he backs his writing 
into a corner where he must either stay and firmly base his writing 
upon this ethnographic reality of locality, or leave and ‘write from 
plenty’ and let his native cup as a departure point for writing 
pass him by. While Rankin pulls no punches and adverts to the 
‘nothingness,’ from a strictly sociological point of view Rankin 
is regressive when viewed within the context of the post-British 
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’79 generational trajectory of ‘producers of culture’ such as The 
Proclaimers, Deacon Blue, Irvine Welsh, Gordon Clegg, Gregory 
Burke, Laura Hird, Andrew O’Hagan, Ross Sinclair and Alan 
Bissett etcetera, insofar as he is not part of the emergence of the 
new wave of working-class literature and culture and politics that 
took place during the nineteen-eighties and nineties, so that if 
Rorie and Houston failed to attain a conceptualisation of working-
class dasein and the unique density of ‘being local’ in the industrial 
period, Rankin has reproduced this ‘failure of representation’ in 
the post-industrial era. While Rankin’s depiction of Cardenden is 
typical of the ’79 generation insofar as he does not shrink from a 
critique of local absence, Rankin’s writing to date is fated not to 
have the sociological significance it otherwise might have.
Insofar as other writers, however, have taken up the challenge 
of producing a ‘literature from nothing,’ the playwright David 
Greig (in Billingham 2007, pp. 77-78) when asked why he had 
written his play Europe (1995) gave the revealing answer:
There were two things concerned with the genesis of the 
play – one was travelling through Fife and the old Scottish 
mining villages there and realising that the trains didn’t stop 
there anymore – they just went whizzing by. I suddenly 
thought: the really violent places aren’t the inner cities but 
these deserted towns. I then tried to imagine myself living in 
them: I thought it would be intolerable. Why did these 
places exist, why did people still stay there, why didn’t 
people just f*** off? I don’t mean that aggressively to the 
people of those towns. So that was the central question that 
came to my mind: why were these towns deserted and who 
was still living there and why?
Like the great literary figures of Joyce in Ireland and MacDiarmid 
in Scotland, Greig is challenging himself as a producer of culture 
to assume the task of representing his people by taking upon 
himself the burden of their condition, and the merit of Greig’s 
comments lies in his resolve to constitute his ‘production of 
culture’ via meeting the challenge of ‘writing from nothing,’ of 
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rendering something of artistic and cultural merit upon this basis, 
as opposed to removing himself to the metropolitan centre and 
writing from its abundance. It is interesting to note that just as 
novelists, playwrights and artists face the decision of where to 
look for their material, social researchers likewise have to choose 
where to conduct their research and in this regard Nadel-Klein 
(1997) has argued that what little ethnography has been done 
in Scotland has predominantly been done in the Highlands 
and Islands, so that academic research has constructed Scotland 
along the received dividing line of the ‘exotic other’ of the 
Highlands and the familiar ‘at home’ of the Lowlands. As Condry 
has observed (in Wight 1993, p. 2):
Too much attention has been paid to the islands and 
Highlands, and too little to the anthropological study of the 
Lowlands and the urban areas. Despite the theoretical 
rejection of the urban – rural dichotomy researchers have 
remained firmly encamped in rural fields in the far north.
Within the research literature on Fife this representational divide 
has been reproduced as it has been in the picturesque coastal 
villages of the East Neuk of Fife, as opposed to the mining areas of 
central and west Fife, that has attracted the attentions of researchers, 
so that still relevant are Harvie’s comments (in Wight 1993, p. 1):
An unlovely ‘third Scotland’ sprawled from South Ayrshire 
to Fife...old industrial settlements that ought to have  
been evacuated and demolished...but were preserved...
Somewhat isolated, ignored, lacking city facilities or country 
traditions – even lacking the attentions of sociologists.
In a similar vein Nairn (1988, pp. 80-1) has neatly summarised 
how Fife is represented according to a well-established binary 
manner of imagining this old province:
Eastern Fife appears in holiday brochures; middle and 
western Fife in the unemployment statistics. With its 
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abandoned mines and defeated or problem industries it is an 
area typical of Scotland’s economic malaise...Not many 
foreign visitors turn off the prescribed Tourist Route to see 
this zone of dereliction… where else in Europe could one find 
a ‘High Street’ quite like Methil’s, not marked but blighted 
from one end to another by closure and disuse? This is not 
aboriginal poverty, an ancient or customary deprivation. It is 
the wreckage of quite recent prosperity: a small, once 
confident world broken by its fall from modernity, and now 
condemned to the grey fungus of loss and second-best.
By definition, the author of fiction is at liberty to represent or 
reject reality, while the ethnographer or sociologist has to justify 
any decision not to engage with this phenomenology of ‘nothing’ 
in a sustained manner because not to do so is to be open to the 
criticism of ethnographic refusal (Ortner 1995). As with Houston 
where the paradox was observed that, being the ‘captive’ of a 
particular long durée view of history which prevented any serious 
engagement with the cut and thrust of history, so in Rankin there 
is this same lack of engagement with real subjectivity despite his 
voluminous writing. While Rorie, Houston and Corrie had the 
abundance of industrial reality to conceal the question of ‘noth-
ing,’ Rankin is writing after de-industrialization and is clearly 
aware of this challenge, yet his many novels opt for rhetorical 
genuflections to ‘nothingness’ instead of meeting the challenge of 
transforming Nothing into a Story of Being, and so there is a 
‘flight from particularity’ in Rankin and a turning away from 
locality so that Houston, Rorie and Rankin have produced a lit-
erature that condemns Cardenden, and by implication every 
industrial and every post-industrial locale, to an unthought and 
unrepresented existence. Hence, just as there are accounts of local-
ity with all of its history and politics and ‘thick’ ethnographic 
particularity removed so that locality becomes a ‘timeless’ 
Brigadoon that is ‘out of history’ (Craig 1996), so even among ’79 
generation post-industrial era writers there is a surprisingly simi-
lar refusal to engage in particularity and which is alienated from 
anything approaching a holistic engagement with the realm of 
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meaning upon the basis of a particular locality, and so do not even 
approach representations of localities with the realism and mis-
erabilism of the likes of Irvine Welsh’s Trainspotting (1993).
It is because not every writer has the vision of the likes of 
James Joyce and the talent to write a work of fiction such as 
Ulysses (1922) that the challenges of ‘writing particularity’ are 
long-standing within Western literature. Another signature 
challenge faced by the writer is the unavoidable ‘alienation’ from 
self the writer must endure in the use of language, thought and 
writing because the writer must suffer as he puts his shoulder 
to the task of translating a particular dasein into its adequate 
literary form. From Hegel we take the sharp sense that between 
‘being’ and its ‘representation’ there is the gulf of language and 
conceptualization which are their own sui generic realities 
and which require their own specific labours and talent if the 
chasm that separates ‘reality’ and ‘representation’ is to be bridged. 
However, not every writer is defined by the desire to bring these 
two disparate realities or mediums into alignment through the 
practice of writing, and it is precisely because being and its 
textual representation are radically discontinuous that a writer is 
perfectly at liberty to refuse to align reality and writing. In this 
regard, then, insofar as Rankin is viewed sociologically he is 
defined by his misalignment with the signs of the times and is 
in no position to illuminate contemporary Scotland. Insofar as 
Rankin sees Cardenden only through the ‘mirror of production’ 
his literary depiction of locality can only see the absence of the 
industrial era.
To this structuring of perception I would add that Rankin 
only sees Cardenden through ‘the mirror of Edinburgh’ and 
that as a writer he does not show the necessary act of will to 
engage with the task of articulating a provincial or regional, or 
even parochial consciousness, so that in his literary ontology 
or landscape there is only oblivion outwith the metropolitan 
centre, and his literary consciousness not only offers no variety 
on the dominant metropolitan consciousness but extends its 
dominion to the provinces. While this sociological criticism of 
Rankin’s fiction is inherently ‘unfair’ and does not detract from his 
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undoubted abilities as a novelist, this criticism regarding the 
‘sociological purchase’ of Rankin’s oeuvre comes into play not 
only in light of the celebrated dictum of Alastair Gray that “if 
a city hasn’t been used by an artist, not even the inhabitants live 
there imaginatively” (1981, p. 243), but insofar as Rankin strays 
into making sociological claims by stating his aim in his fictional 
writing is “to explain Scotland to myself, to fellow Scots and to 
the outside world.”37
While representations of Cardenden in terms of decline 
are easy and readily available, in fact are clichéd because any 
village émigré relocating to any city at any point in time has these 
representations ready and waiting for him upon leaving local life 
behind for – pick one’s cliché – metropolitan colour or urban 
energy, such representations of de-industrial decline act as a valid 
departure point for the task of articulating what kind of self-
consciousness is now possible for post-industrial localities across 
Scotland. In addressing this question what is certain is that those 
who live in the national capital are hardly best placed to articulate 
this local form of historical consciousness. My aim in the following 
chapters, then, to paraphrase Marx and Heidegger, is to construct 
a local consciousness in possession of its unique ownmost 
self and tasks, so that the difference between myself and 
Rankin’s representation of Cardenden is that I centre decline or 
‘nothing’ within Cardenden itself and proceed to give an account 
of locality’s ownmost tasks and ownmost consciousness that 
owes nothing to metropolitan ontologies and that is a trajectory 
that is uniquely its own and which is not readily available or 
conveniently ‘at hand’ because it is not copied from elsewhere.
The aim then is to construct Cardenden’s own mirror by which 
its inhabitants may see their true selves and offer Cardenden its 
own density and free its residents from the modernist self-
consciousness by offering a model of what post-industrial 
consciousness might be and what might be the consequences 
of this for their ‘being local’ and ‘being provincial’ at this time. 
37 See interview with Rankin on http://www.ianrankin.com/interview.htm 
(June 2001).
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The aim is to make Cardenden ‘coequal with itself’ and bring 
post-industrial Cardenden to a sustainable self-consciousness 
that spans and encompasses the industrial and the post-industrial 
eras. In achieving this representation, the hope is to offer some 
ballast and resistance to any portrayal of locality where its very 
existence is the result of macro-economic forces which have the 
power to bring Cardenden into existence ex nihilo and have the 
power to end that existence. The aim is to resist the ontological 
violence of any imaginary whereby Cardenden has no ‘secondary 
nature’ of its own and where locality exerts no causality of its 
own, and so locality is void not only of its properly ‘natural good’ 
or perfection but has no literary or even transcendental worth to 
its inhabitants. From the standpoint of an ‘integral representation’ 
and an integral sociology that I will develop in later chapters, 
these views are unacceptable and are to be resisted.
What is clear from this opening chapter is that the industrial 
era has gone but its impact upon the local imagination is still 
felt. My task in the following chapters as another representer 
of Cardenden coming after this history of representation is to 
overcome its failures and address the omissions which I have 
identified and criticised. There is a textual history of engagement 
with working-class dasein, culture and locality stretching from 
1894 to the present and these writings highlight the challenge 
which the ethnographer faces if he is to take his stance upon 
‘nothing;’ a crucial problematic for rendering post-industrial 
working-class localities, dasein and mitsein. Perhaps the most 
salient point, however, is that with the exception of Rankin this 
tradition of writing is more or less unknown to locals themselves 
and does not inform their consciousness;38 something that was 
brought home to me when going into Cardenden public library 
in October 1998 and, enquiring of the (English) librarian what 
the library held on Joe Corrie, I was met with the reply: “Who?” 
Furthermore, obtaining a copy of Corrie’s Black Earth (1939) 
38 While Corrie’s work is no longer performed, local nationalist MSP Tricia 
Marwick and the 7:84 Theatre Company were promoting a tour of Corrie’s 
theatre works across Scotland in 2002. (See Fife Free Press, 31 May 2001).
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involved having to request it on Special Loan from the Bodlean 
library in Oxford (England) and, upon its arrival six weeks later, 
I was not able to take the book out of the library so that, due to 
a combination of the part-time opening hours of the library and 
when I was free to go to the library, I could only consult the text 
for one hour every Thursday evening; and when the date for the 
book’s return arrived I had to initiate the lending process all over 
again. When added to this is the absence of any of Rorie’s writings 
in the local library, there is a clear failure at curating the history 
of writing about Cardenden so that, despite the existence of the 
elements to constitute a literary tradition, ‘Cardenden’ has no 
(literary) consciousness of itself.
In the following chapters my own commitment to locality 
involves the attempt to think locality using local mirrors and 
thereby accord locality its own place within a non-metropolitan 
geography or a non-metropolitan ontology of space, as well as a 
local conception and form of ‘historical consciousness’ adequate 
to the post-industrial era. To resort to ‘the mirror of Edinburgh’ 
and to resort to clichés colludes with emptying locality and 
reproduces the hegemony of an urban metropolitan imaginary 
in the provinces. While recognising ‘absence,’ ‘failure’ and even 
‘nothingness’ is essential, the deeper intention is a ground-clearing 
exercise as a prelude to a new imagining of a post-industrial and 
local engagement with the challenge of ‘being modern’ and ‘being 
national’ at this unprecedented point in time. Informants advising 
“there’s nothing here” is a challenge to think the condition of 
‘being local’ without the clichés of industrialism and to produce 
a kind of writing that is stripped of the full, busy and thick 
industrial fullness of the 1895-1985 industrial era. However, the 
labour of rendering ‘something from nothing’ is just the beginning 
of redressing a long history of failure to give an account of the 
subjective structuration of working-class dasein and looming large 
in this endeavour is successfully rendering the ‘world of work,’ 
and it is to this task that I now turn as I explore working-class 
structuration by outlining the ‘subjectless practice’ of manual 
work where, unlike the failure to escape nature and reach the 
aesthetic realm discussed earlier, for example, the argument will 
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be that there is a realm of reality and structuration infallibly 
achieved via labour where not only is it impossible for the 
ethnographer to postulate an escape from ‘nature’ but it is vital 
to imagine no such thing, if the ethnographer is to engage with 
lives lived immersed in nature and immersed in the body as sui 
generic realities that act as ‘keystones’ upon which is built an 
entire edifice of individuation and sociation.
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2
The Being Brought  
About by Doing
‘One is’ what one does.
Heidegger 1962, p. 283
2.1 Physical Socialisation: The World Made Flesh
While working as a manual operative with East of Scotland 
Water authority during fieldwork a routine maintenance task 
at the wastewater treatment plant in the coastal village of East 
Wemyss was hosing down a fine screen with a high pressure hose 
to remove the layer of scum over the screen’s wire meshing. The 
meshing had to be regularly cleaned to allow the water to pass 
through to the next stage in the treatment process and, when suf-
ficiently clean and compliant with statutory Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA) standards, the water was pumped into 
the Firth of Forth estuary separating Fife and Edinburgh where it 
would be dispersed by tidal currents into the North Sea. To clean 
the steel mesh plating the drum, water was passed through a gen-
erator to produce sufficient pressure to blast the scum from the 
large rotating screen which filtered out solid human waste, rags, 
condoms, sanitary towels and various domestic and industrial 
waste products from the water entering the plant via the main 
inlet channel. The hose carrying the pressurized water was 
attached to a ‘gun-piece’ with a trigger which ‘fired’ the water at 
the steel mesh, and such was the pressure that the hose constantly 
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vibrated under the force of the water rushing through, that two 
strong hands and the continual application of upper body strength 
was needed to keep the gun-piece under control when the trigger 
was pressed.
Because of the level of noise and health hazards from 
exposure to harmful levels of bacteria associated with human and 
industrial waste, this routine maintenance task was performed 
by one man wearing a special bodysuit and mask. Each week the 
task took approximately thirty minutes to complete and, having 
done the job many times previously, I was not expecting to be 
interrupted and as the only effort required was physical, I used 
the time to mentally switch off, letting the rotating drum pass 
under the action of the jet of water while my supervisor (Rory 
McNeill) busied himself checking instrumentation panels and 
taking various readings.
With the plant checked and maintained we signed and dated 
the log book and returned to the van to head off to the next 
treatment plant in Leven on our route that particular day (Monday 
19th June 2000). As we drove off I intended to use the fifteen or 
so minutes driving time between East Wemyss and Leven to write 
down some thoughts that had occurred to me while working, and 
as I picked up a pen and shaped my hand to write, it suddenly 
began to shake uncontrollably. I immediately forcibly tensed 
my fingers, straightening and stretching them and then flexing my 
fingers by clenching my fist two or three times. At this, the shaking 
stopped. I shaped my hand to write again but, once more, my 
hand began to shake uncontrollably. Again, I stopped trying to 
write and straightened and tensed my hand, flexed my fingers and 
stretched and shook my hand and wrist for a few seconds. Once 
more I shaped my hand to write, and once more it began shaking 
uncontrollably. It then dawned on me that my hand was shaking 
because the writing position was mimicking the position required 
to hose down the screen, and that by assuming the writing 
shape my hand was triggering the ‘memory’ of work which was 
somehow still present within my arm and hand: attempting to 
write was evidencing the reality of embodiment and the content 
of embodiment, work.
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I recall this incident as an example of physical socialisation, 
of how the body is affected by its practices and how in this 
particular context the external world or that which transcends 
the body, via practice, becomes immanent or part of human being 
or dasein through embodiment insofar as work structures the 
body of the worker; produces a physical structuration that in its 
being or ontology is independent of awareness or consciousness. 
In the same way as the body’s production of sweat does not 
require awareness or permission from the worker, the body is 
an autonomous realm of reality and therefore socialisation or its 
own medium of becoming, so that manual labour is a source of 
structuration among those who perform manual labour; that 
the body or the ‘kind of embodiment’ of the labourer has its 
own dasein or being-in-the-world which achieves itself within 
the worker independently of his consciousness. In contrast to 
Castoriadis (1987, pp. 263-4) for whom, “The ‘product’ has to 
exist in and through the actual social imaginary before it can and 
in order to be ‘real,’” the physical structuration of dasein that 
comes into being as a result of doing manual labour is in no need 
of recognition or discursive articulation to come into being, and 
the possessing of this physical structuration is not jeopardised by 
the absence of its discursive recognition. Finally, not only is the 
body its own autonomous reality and source of structuration 
but the body is realistic insofar as it encodes real objective 
experience i.e. does not construct or imagine the world but is 
passively constructed by the real world.
This agency of the world or the agency of practice upon dasein 
and the agency of one’s practice in the world upon oneself 
illustrates Heidegger’s point that “ ‘One is’ what one does” (1962, 
p. 283) and critiques any ontology in which the environmentally 
‘ready-to-hand’ is marginal or mere ‘background’ to understanding 
human being ‘in the world;’ that spectatorial or contemplative 
ontologies are fundamentally inadequate insofar as the power 
hose incident shows that ready-to-hand equipment ‘answers 
back’ and conditions dasein; the ready-to-hand takes us ‘in hand’ 
as much as we take tools and equipment into our hands. More 
particularly, an understanding of human being that fails to 
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explicitly recognise this relationship between labouring and being 
is not only unlikely to grasp working-class dasein but is likely to 
fundamentally misrecognise or misconstrue such being-in-the-
world. In this regard the thoughts of Connerton (1989, p. 104) 
about “how bodies are variously constituted...the body is not 
seen equally clearly to be socially constituted in the sense that 
it is culturally shaped in its actual practices and behaviour...the 
body is socially constituted” are useful. Connerton (1989, p. 1) 
addresses the question of “how is the memory of groups conveyed 
and sustained?” and his answer is bodily practices.
Similarly, I propose that the life of manual labour is the 
‘mode of acquisition’ inter alia of a linguistic habitus and a 
particular manner not only of being-in-the-world but a manner of 
comportment towards the world, a manner of interpreting and 
orienting oneself to the world or a kind of somatic hermeneutic. 
The natural body by becoming the socialised body via labour also 
takes its place alongside other labourers who have likewise 
become this socialised self previously, and have embodied this 
embodiment for various lengths of time; who have exercised their 
freedom and tastes and lived their lives alongside others upon 
the basis of this embodiment. Becoming this (embodied) self then 
is to acquire a particular means or medium of sociality or inter-
personality, is to acquire an ontological likeness to others and 
to sow the seeds of the dasein and mitsein that the group has 
historically developed within the individual, and which the 
individual’s own use of freedom and personal taste will develop 
throughout his life as he lives his life from within the medium of 
this embodiment. Across the generations and across the industrial 
and post-industrial eras and their changing occupational 
landscapes, then, the body and the life of manual labour is a 
medium of continuity and memory which can only be uncovered 
insofar as we highlight its consequences for language, comportment, 
mental and social life.
As a general definition or description, a life of manual labour 
is that which involves work – including unskilled, semi-skilled 
or skilled – which routinely involves performing short bursts of 
working until muscle exhaustion, followed by pauses or rests to 
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allow the lactic acid built up in muscles to dissipate, before having 
to do more short bursts of work until muscle exhaustion sets in 
again and another build-up of lactic acid recedes by resting again. 
Any life where this is more or less performed on a daily basis is 
a life of manual labour and given this definition, a ‘manual 
labourer’ will include a skilled tradesman such as a bricklayer 
and such labourers will be acutely aware that, thanks to their 
practice of labour, there is a physical transformation of themselves 
as they notice that the body has to become accustomed to labour; 
that at first it is onerous and difficult and a continual subject 
of awareness and conversation with others, but also that the skin 
hardens and muscles become toned as the labourer becomes 
accustomed to work until, finally, his incarnation of his doing 
passes out of his awareness into the silence of his ‘secondary 
nature,’ the silence of the body accustomed to its social incarnation 
and the social practice of labour. If as a general statement we 
can agree that, “Neither our personal bodies nor our social bodies 
may be seen as natural, in the sense of existing outside the 
self-creating process called human labour” (Haraway 1991, 
p. 10), this is true in a pre-eminent way among manual workers 
insofar as their labouring ‘in-forms’ their dasein.
While there is a realm of reality brought into being by manual 
labour that exists outwith any reference to consciousness or 
the realm of meaning, this is not to imply “what it is that doing 
brings into being” (Castoriadis 1997, p. 168) is confined to 
the pre-linguistic biological realm of the body. Beyond physical 
structuration, then, the life of manual labour has consequences 
for the constitution and ‘kind of psyche’ that comes into being, 
has consequences for the psychological being-in-the-world of 
the labourer. If we extend the time-frame of performing work 
to include not only the few minutes after working with a 
high-pressure hose but a lifetime of work, and ask what other 
unsuspected consequences for dasein this enlarged period of 
time may entail, we might begin by noting manual workers 
evidence an earthy no-nonsense sensual ‘immediatism’ which it 
is not unreasonable to suppose is the result of the body being 
disciplined by performing labour over time, a disciplining of the 
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body that includes a disciplining or ‘repressing’ of the psyche over 
time, and which is inevitably taken up by active freedom and 
choice to produce a particular structuring of ‘personality.’ If we 
take this ‘immediatism’ as an object of inquiry and ask what are 
its social grounds or its medium of acquisition (Connerton 1989), 
the answer is the life of waged labour and the body. The relentless 
physicality of work and its effects upon the psyche are taken up 
by the exercise of freedom and the play of circumstance where 
they ‘in-form’ the psyche and make the psyche into its image; a 
psyche constructed according to a ‘homologisation’ of physical 
and psychological selves that comes into being over time.
The dominant social practice of labouring, then, informs how 
the labourer relates to reality but is also a gestalt that is the 
medium through which the labourer constitutes his relationships 
and his realities.39 While one can only speculate as to the many 
instances this ‘informing via doing’ will take over the course of a 
particular lifetime, in attempting to tackle the question of how the 
ethnographer can grasp the many consequences of performing 
manual labour and grasping the density and content of that which 
is embodied and its consequences for individuation and sociation, 
I propose that the self brought about by manual work or the 
‘worked self’ is a master of forms and ‘promiscuous’ in its 
informing the dasein and mitsein of the worker thanks to it being 
enjoyed and taken up by freedom and the life of the group, and 
that the task is to capture something of its existential hegemony 
and ‘promiscuity.’ I argue that a particular human dasein that 
comes into being is the keystone that not only constructs a 
determinate ontology but must also be understood as functioning 
as a hermeneutical key for the consciousness and intentional life 
within the dasein characterised by a constant conforming of its 
39 In describing manual labour as responsible for brining into being a gestalt 
I define this term as a “configuration of sensations: strain, aches, and fatigue...
thus, many physiological cues are involved, as well as memories of work 
situations and actual performances and the emotions associated with them…
Motivation and emotions during the exercise may also influence perception and 
performance” (Borg 1998, p. 3).
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‘lifeworld’ to the reality and exigencies of work. I argue that a 
process takes place within the individual that involves a reduction 
to an already long-established ‘objective’ working-class dasein 
and mitsein that is already established in others, and there is 
thereby formed a fundamental ontological horizon. Moreover, 
because human beings are reflexive and free, manual workers 
develop a worked-self-based consciousness which instantiates a 
kinship among its many behaviours and its many relations to 
a range of realities which includes the realm of meaning, and 
which impacts upon or in-forms the life of the psyche. If this is 
the abstract argument, the concrete ethnographic aim to verify 
this argument will be to reveal and capture a particular way 
of human being characterised by a series of nested realities or 
structurations or confinements to the real which involves:
1) a reduction to the body
2) a reduction to time
3) a reduction to social structure
Our opening anecdote from working during fieldwork confirms 
that “the past is...sedimented in the body” (Connerton 1989, 
p. 72) but is also evidence of how much that is real can quickly 
pass out of existence and leave no trace of itself. In this regard 
Connerton has written: “[I]ncorporating practices…are largely 
traceless and that, as such, they are incapable of providing a 
means by which any evidence of a will to be remembered can be 
left behind” (1989, p. 102). The effects of working seem peculiarly 
at risk of disappearing from the consciousness of the worker 
through time and in regard to uncovering that which is ordinarily 
subjugated, Connerton refers to kinaesthetic practice which is a 
kind of practice that (1989, p. 29) “is as nearly as possible without 
reflection,” and a kind of doing or practice that may be described 
as a non-conceptual kind of knowing so that “it is our body which 
‘understands’” (Connerton 1989, p. 95) and this explains why in 
most situations in life there is no weighing up of alternatives and 
no reflection upon consequences for our habits of behaviour are 
not propositions to be learned, so that only by “living with people 
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who habitually behave in a certain manner...[do we see] that 
neither the idea of a rule nor the idea of reflectiveness is essential 
to it” (1989, p. 30).
I begin from “labour process accounts of worker subjectivity” 
(Tanner et al. 1992, p. 439) and share “the insistence of labour 
process theorists that the point of production is the key source of 
worker consciousness in capitalist society” (Tanner et al. 1999, 
p. 439). However, while Braverman’s Labour and Monopoly 
Capitalism (1974) and labour process theory has exerted a lasting 
influence upon the sociology of work, I also have much sympathy 
with the view of critics who assert the “labour process is incapable 
of theoretical growth because of its…fixation on the workplace” 
(Tanner et al. 1992 p. 439) because I share the view that a 
preoccupation with the ‘extrinsic’ question of whether or not the 
worker is ‘exploited’ and a more or less obvious agenda to reach 
political and policy conclusions, that was endemic to such literature 
prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of Marxism 
as an alternative to the free-market economy, more often than not 
resulted in the inability to produce an adequate phenomenology of 
labour. If I have produced an ethnography of manual workers 
thanks to having worked full-time for a year and a half during 
fieldwork and because of the fundamental position that a focus 
upon the workplace is essential to the extent that ignorance of the 
workplace is fatal to the credibility of any subsequent analysis, 
I hope to avoid “the common reproach levelled by psychoanalysts 
at Marxists, that the latter speak as if a man has no psyche until he 
gets his first paycheque” (Sahlins 1976, p. 8n) as this is precisely 
the proposition that I want to explore: that the manual labourer’s 
psyche is formally constituted as itself via the web of relations 
entered into via his paid employment, and the relations at least 
symbolised by the receiving of the paycheque.
I do not pretend to know whether the free-market economy is 
unjust or a particular wage-capital relationship is unjust. Likewise, 
the choice between a focus upon the workplace or a focus upon 
wider cultural considerations has always been for me a ‘signature 
weakness’ of traditional Marxist and positivistic sociology that 
I wish to avoid. My experience of work varies from day labour in 
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a mechanised factory where I knew no-one to a workplace where 
work was mediated via ‘thick belonging’ thanks to family 
connections to fellow workers stretching back to childhood and 
school days and shared family/workplace relations with fellow 
workers stretching back to my father and the fathers of work 
colleagues. With the exception of working as a day labourer on 
potato-picking squads and a few weeks working at Kettle Produce 
in the summer of 1998, I never experienced a ‘pure workplace’ 
that could be described as free from cultural ties of kinship and 
locality. In this regard Tanner et al. (1992) have much right on 
their side when they argue the labour process approach has 
become sterile as a direct result of Braverman’s original refusal to 
deal with the subjective aspects of class relationships. Hence, 
I take as my starting point Thompson’s view (1990, cited in 
Tanner et al. 1992, p. 440) that inserting subjectivity and 
an adequate articulation of individuation into our accounts of 
workers is the “greatest task facing labour process theory” and 
align myself with those theorists of the labour process who frame 
the issue of worker subjectivity in terms of ‘immanence’ (Antonio 
1981; Van den Berg 1988) as I too propose to take the path 
of immanence but not as a retrospective search for why a 
revolutionary working class has not appeared, but as preamble 
to a liberating act of self-understanding accomplished within 
language and thought, and then to subsequently consider this 
question in relation to a nationalist politics and as a basis for 
a Scottish modernity and, ultimately, as a basis for a renewed 
Christianity that is free from supernaturalism.
Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the triumph 
of neoliberalism in the nineteen-eighties, much ink was spilled 
in the attempt to explain why industrial workers across Europe 
and across the generations had failed to develop ‘revolutionary 
consciousness.’ Today, it seems no-one is interested in resurrecting 
this question, perhaps because history has given its answer and so 
it has been buried within the European imagination. However, 
those who remain interested in this question have a ‘free run’ at 
the problem and are free to take it back to its fundamental 
ground. In resurrecting this question I locate myself within what 
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until recently was a mainstream concern of sociology, namely 
“The responses of workers – principally male manual workers – 
to industrial capitalism” (Tanner et al. 1992, p. 447), as I continue 
to share the “proposition that experiences at work and in the 
local community provided the raw materials out of which 
broader understandings of class-based inequality would develop” 
(Tanner et al. 1992, p. 447). However, while happy to locate 
myself within labour process theory and privilege “the confines of 
the workplace” (Tanner et al 1992, p. 448), I reject any idea of 
excluding other contextual information (generation, class, gender, 
nation etcetera) as non-empirical immaculate purism. Neither 
labour process theory nor every other theorist who has addressed 
himself to thinking about working-class dasein from Marx and 
Engels to Lukacs, Bourdieu and Charlesworth has produced a 
phenomenology of workers’ consciousness or a phenomenology 
of labouring, far less an account of the worker’s consciousness 
‘fully in act’ thanks to a cognitional event of self-actualisation. 
While Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness ([1924] 1971) is 
the closest the Western mind has come to a proper estimation and 
articulation of this task, Tanner’s (1992) failure to mention Lukacs 
signals Lukacs’s failure and that of labour process theorists to 
provide such accounts. It seems to me, therefore, that the task 
of articulating the dasein brought into existence by labouring 
remains whole and entire.
2.2 The Reduction to Reality
We call him Blister. He only shows up wance a’ the  
work’s done.
Tim Colville
Wastewater Worker
If the physical structuration of human being as a result of 
practicing manual labour is more or less straightforward to 
illustrate, evidencing in a convincing fashion how the realm 
of meaning as much as the physicality of working impacts upon 
the very constitution of embodiment is much more difficult, 
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largely because those authorised to produce texts upon the body 
or embodiment are not more or less coerced or ‘fated’ to discourse 
upon embodiment because the freedom they enjoy to discourse 
and represent in the public realm is largely synonymous with the 
condition of being free from one’s body evidencing one’s (social) 
fate. When we read Marcel Mauss (1979, pp. 97-106) on ‘body 
techniques,’ for example, we find rather abstract considerations 
of something called kinetics and ‘gesture systems,’ while the 
edited collection The Anthropology of the Body (1977) sees 
ethnographers write about blushing, the skin, bodily products, 
female sexuality, dance, possession, initiation rites and bodily 
symbolism. Such themes and such texts do not contest but confirm 
the scepticism that meets the claim that embodiment theory is of 
real significance as, on the strength of such evidence, the reality 
of ‘the body’ is weak or marginal and certainly of insufficient 
importance to bear the weight of an entire ontology and to bear 
up the individual to his natural perfection, far less the supernatural 
life. It is the aim of this and subsequent chapters to make such 
an argument and erect an ontology upon embodiment, to 
articulate the being of embodiment and how physicality is 
structured by social structure, culture and freedom so as to form 
the ‘cornerstone’ upon which I will erect an account of a fully 
Scottish contextualised working-class dasein and then an account 
of this dasein fully ‘in act.’
In affluent post-industrial societies the idea of economic activity 
as ‘selling one’s labour’ has the feel of being a relic from the 
nineteenth century for more and more of the population, and so 
‘the body’ becomes increasingly backgrounded for more and more 
people. Also, the body as the medium of repression and where 
one’s social fate is registered and lived as one’s destiny or fate 
seems likewise to be something of a relic insofar as ‘the body’ 
is seen as having been liberated from drudgery and necessity and 
scarcity, so that embodiment is increasingly experienced as the 
medium where we exercise choice, freedom, control and creativity. 
The body throughout the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ era was not 
only a fundamental medium of dasein but was a fundamental 
organising principle of politics and much of working-class political 
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mobilisation owed its success to addressing the needs of the body 
because in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the body-based 
politics of class gave materialist conceptions of class struggle 
not only their obvious and compelling legitimacy but their policy 
content. While the creation of the Welfare State and the political 
rise of the working classes and the Labour Party, as well as the 
social cohesion of post-war Britain relied upon the successful 
politicisation of the needs of the body in areas such as health and 
housing, this bodily-based coherence has been lost because 
affluence has made this ‘body politics’ obsolete thanks not only 
to the political agency of the working class but the free market’s 
‘conquest of bread’ (Kropotkin 1906). We no longer live in a 
society of scarcity but a society of affluence and a politics of 
affluence, so that our politics has lost its former coherence insofar 
as the working class do not politicise their cultural or geo-political 
conditions or mobilise upon the basis of symbolic goals.
This shift to affluence also fundamentally impacts upon 
sociology as labour or ‘work’ had been a standard sociological 
category in the investigation of Western societies throughout the 
twentieth century, so that the concept of post-industrial society 
means that an integral aspect of contemporary societies is the 
demise of manual labour from its former dominance. As McCrone 
has observed of today’s occupational landscape: “[T]here are now 
more workers in the service class than in the manual working class 
for the first time in Scotland’s history” (1992, p. 141). In this 
regard, I do not propose to contest such representations as there 
is no suggestion that this ethnography is relevant for the increasing 
percentage of the population that are far removed from the rigors 
and realities of the body and the life of manual labour. Similarly, 
having regularly sat in most of the local pubs and watched as local 
manual labourers send text messages back and forth to ‘ex-pat’ 
pipe-fitters from Cardenden and its environs working off-shore in 
Sierra Leone and elsewhere, for example, I am not oblivious to the 
evidence that the local is being globalised or that the “localisation 
of the context of proletarian life is radically in decline” (Schumann, 
cited in Offe 1985, p. 142). If the local is to be given its due 
density I recognise these ‘de-localising’ forces are at work. 
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Likewise, if I argue that work is a fundamental category of 
embodiment, it is not because I wish to negate the data but 
because I have conducted fieldwork among manual operatives and 
unskilled agricultural labourers, and this is the research context 
from which emerges observations that theorising the body 
without theorising work is theorising the body ‘from nowhere’ 
and is not theorising the body at all.
Also, by way of parenthesis we might note that what was once 
referred to as the woman’s movement has similarly the feel of 
being another relic from a bygone age as this politics of identity 
that was founded upon embodiment and the reality of physical 
differences between men and women has come to an end, not 
because of any failings of its white middle-class leadership or any 
interior conversion or change of heart among men, but because 
affluence and women’s entry into the post-manual occupational 
landscape has more or less swept away the objective social basis 
for the women’s movement so that, once again, there is scepticism 
towards the idea that the (female) body today can be the medium 
of a ‘secondary nature’ or a standpoint for a hermeneutic and a 
standpoint or basis for a different politics. 
If a dis-embodied feminism appears vacuous and wilful, and if 
feminism welcomes an ‘immaculate’ sexuality free from embodi-
ment and the issues of pregnancy and maternity as fundamental 
structurations of female dasein, this is a feminism that is also alien-
ated from class, poverty, manual labour and material conditions 
that is fated to become a cipher for an academic game reserved for 
middle-class white women reproducing a politics of identity which 
is more or less fated to lack sociological purchase and relevance, 
and which explains the crisis of third generation feminism and the 
exhaustion of the women’s movement. In Chapter 5 I will argue 
that a (traditional) politics of class is alive and well in Scotland 
because of its ‘post-materialist’ alignment with a politics of nation-
ality and its alignment with powerful geo-political events in the era 
of affluence. Similarly, it seems likely feminism can only survive 
insofar as it becomes allied with ‘extrinsic’ forces and until 
such alliances are formed the ‘liberation’ of feminism from the 
female body and the invention of ‘gender’ as a post-material 
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re-foundation of the woman’s movement will only convince those 
with ‘metaphysical’ tastes for non-empirical rationalist myths such 
as ‘patriarchy’ to retain some purchase upon the imagination.
More broadly, the exhaustion of the workers’ movement 
and then feminism signals how the imagining of the European 
project of modernity in the era of scarcity, whether in the guise 
of class-based materialism or in the guise of feminism, or 
secularism or rationalism or socialism has run dry, so that the very 
survival and constitution of the project of European modernity 
requires a post-material or new holistic foundation that 
simultaneously involves a turn to culture and the return to an 
older conception of modernity that is more appropriate for the era 
of affluence. I will develop the argument that there is a close 
and more or less direct relationship between the recent decline 
in the social significance of the body and what is known as the 
‘crisis of the West’ because convincing accounts of the body 
are exceptional today because those who live embodiment as 
their social destiny are hardly ever in a position to theorise this 
condition. As with their female feminist contemporaries, male 
academics instantiate a liberation from the body as destiny and 
their experience of embodiment is more the result of their private 
post-manual strategies than a fate they could not escape. 
While the occupational landscape described by McCrone 
indicates the increasing dis-alignment of the world of work from 
‘the body’ and a world of post-manual or clean labour, my 
fieldwork location meant I was more or less fated to argue that 
manual labour remains a fundamental explanatory category for 
individuation and sociation, and that an understanding of labour 
is an integral part of understanding other aspects of contemporary 
working-class politics and culture, and the world of work still 
dominates the day to day experiences and life of the villagers with 
manual labour of some description remaining central to this 
world, and it is upon this basis that I contest Lutz’s (1988, p. 4) 
assertion that there is “no privileged route to some underlying 
and unmediated psychophysical emotional reality” as the world of 
work remains such a ‘privileged route’ because it is a necessary 
daily practice that informs the construction of affectivity.
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Expressed more philosophically, in turning to embodiment 
I follow Gabriel Marcel’s (2001) rejection of the Cartesian cogito 
and the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ tradition and reject 
approaches to the body which take the standpoint of an attitude 
spéculaire. If no-one can spectate another’s being and so can not 
generate the categories by which to grasp another’s dasein, this 
truism is all the more appropriate when the dasein brought about 
by the life of manual labour is the particular object of inquiry. 
More generally, occupying a position of power is often fatal for 
original thinking insofar as to refuse someone’s particularity is 
to refuse the labour of thinking them in favour of a will to 
power which wishes to make every potential other into an already 
known image i.e. a prefabricated category. The method used to 
extricate my account of embodiment from the snare of power 
and the errors of pure reason and objectivism40 has been expressed 
poetically by Whitman when he wrote: “I do not ask the wounded 
person how he feels, I myself become the wounded person” (cited 
in Hall 1968, p. 60), as my view is one can only generate the 
relevant data on embodied dasein by becoming that dasein and 
by experiencing this positionality and experiencing what there is 
to be experienced from this positionality.
However, in the previous chapter we saw that what may 
be termed the ‘bourgeois gaze’ is not exclusive to members of the 
middle class, as a working-class individual may well share the 
spectatorial ‘bourgeois’ gaze upon embodiment as there I argued 
Corrie illustrates how the task of representation is a sui generic 
reality with its own exigencies, so that simply being working class 
is not enough to ensure its adequate representation, even in a 
writer whose aim is to write about the world he knows best. 
It seems to me that to adequately orient oneself to this task 
of translation is to reproduce within one’s own intellectual 
development Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the vocabulary of the 
philosophy of consciousness tradition and focus upon that for 
which there is no name in traditional philosophy (Lakoff and 
40 “Experience is not an objective fact. A scientific fact need not be experienced” 
(Laing 1982, p. 9). 
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Johnston 1999). If there is progress from Cartesian rationalism to 
embodiment theory, it is instructive that Lakoff and Johnston’s 
Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) purports to achieve a turning to 
the body yet never frees itself from pre-sociological thinking 
about embodiment and reproduces the usual flight from 
particularity thanks to the absence of any consideration of work 
as a fundamental way of incarnating the reality of embodiment. 
Indeed, the same criticism may be aimed at Merleau-Ponty’s 
category of the ‘flesh,’ as unless there is a turning to the labour 
experience, accounts of working-class dasein seem fated to remain 
stuck within a ‘philosophy of consciousness’ paradigm because 
the merely discursive disavowal of this paradigm is not enough.
Also, as a direct result of being fated to imagine itself free of 
social determination, the ‘bourgeois’ gaze is more or less fated to 
be tempted by the ‘culturalism’ of Geertz or the post-structuralism 
of Derrida (1976) that imagines dasein is akin to a ‘readable’ 
text whose meaning can be accessed cognitively via the act of 
decoding like the reader learning to read a new language. This 
idea that one can read an other’s ontology is an illusion that is 
typical of every literati and is the antithesis to my own view that 
to learn the ‘language’ of working-class dasein one must instantiate 
the class relation to the totality over time before it can appear as 
data onto one’s horizon. Because any contextualised dasein cannot 
be spectated, every kind of gaze remains inadequate even after 
the end of positivism and the embracing of reflexivity and the 
(rhetorical) end of universalism, as there remains the defining 
relation to the ‘totality’ and the fact that different relations to the 
real or ‘totality’ remain class relations so that the positionality 
of each class cannot be spectated and to propose to spectate, far 
less know, an essentially non-speculative reality that is enacted 
via praxis is the fundamental methodological error responsible for 
body-free and class-free accounts of reflexivity in much of the 
social science literature. As Sahlins (1995) and MacIntyre (1989) 
have argued, different classes mean different realities and different 
objectivities, rationalities and truths.
Hoberman (1984, p. 119) identifies a “renunciation of the 
body” among the academic left with Western social theory having 
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simultaneously required for its very existence and having been 
disadvantaged as a result of being the product of a leisured 
relation to material conditions, and Claus Offe has questioned 
whether work remains “the key sociological category” (1985, 
pp. 129-150), and usefully draws our attention to the alleged 
decentering of work as a source of self. If I develop the position 
that work remains a key sociological category that must be 
accompanied by theoretical attention to developing the subjective 
category of the ‘worked self’ as a key phenomenological category 
of contextual dasein, it is because I spent much of fieldwork 
among manual workers. 
Articulating the being brought about by labouring, however, 
is done without any wish to make universalist claims that 
the continuing centrality of work is true for every member of the 
working class, far less other social classes. Beginning from the 
minimalist position that manual work informs the manual 
labourer, the aim is to overcome the status quo long identified 
by Marx (1970, p. 121) when he wrote: “The chief defect of all 
hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that 
the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of 
the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activ-
ity, practice, not subjectively,” because, despite Marx having writ-
ten these words in 1845, the fact remains that even a theorist and 
empirical researcher like Bourdieu fails to give a phenomenology 
of work, so that the long-standing failure of intellectuals to give 
an adequate account of working-class dasein remains. This failure 
is undoubtedly sourced in the fact that there is very little that is 
spectatorial or speculative about working-class dasein as funda-
mentally it is enacted via practices tied to a particular occupation 
of social space and can not be known speculatively either by the 
working class themselves or the observing onlooker.
It is thanks to reflection upon the practice of manual labouring 
that abstract points such as it is through practice that the external 
objective realm becomes internalised and subjective through 
embodiment or, thanks to embodiment existence becomes essence, 
become rather mundane statements of the obvious. What is less 
obvious and certainly not mundane, however, is to systematically 
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develop the notion of a worked self where the body answers 
aporias of pure reason such as the binarism of the subjective and 
objective or the individual and the social. My opening anecdote 
concerning working with a high-pressure hose then is an 
ethnographic answer to Hegel’s analysis of the hand and his 
question whether the hand is an object for me or is part of me as 
subject, and his conclusion that the “inner and outer in this way 
fall apart [as the body is] this mediating term uniting inner and 
outer’’ (1967, p. 343). 
Recalling the incident at East Wemyss usefully illustrates the 
fact that whatever the being brought about by labouring is, it is 
not an objective reality that is objectively ‘out there’ for the 
researcher to come and see and ‘gather’ as data as he might pick 
daisies that are objectively there waiting for him in a meadow; the 
being brought about by doing is never observed and never known 
by the non-labourer as it is a reality that only exists to the extent 
that it is enacted, brought about at the end of a process, of acting 
or labouring over time. The body knows what hard work is like, 
and does not need a conceptualisation of it to know labouring is 
arduous. When one’s body is tired and one’s fellow worker is 
tired, there is the shared agreement to ‘take it easy.’ There is no 
‘objective’ means of knowing the worker is hard-working or lazy 
as the body is the only means available to answer these questions 
or, better, because it answers these questions, they never explicitly 
arise as questions. Only thanks to his body does the worker know 
he has worked hard, so that when a boss tells him different, his 
body’s knowledge robs the boss of the authority of knowing. The 
worker, thanks to his body, becomes something the supervisor 
doesn’t know; becomes something the supervisor is not.
That the body has its habits, reflexes, processes and conditioned 
responses that never require consciousness in order to be is not 
disputed. But what does it mean to say that the body is a source 
of knowledge or that the body knows? Is there non-conceptual 
knowledge? And what is the content of such non-conceptual 
knowledge? For example, is the reality of ‘being dominated’ or 
‘being dominant’ a condition that by definition is propositional or 
is it only known via embodiment? Likewise, if above and beyond 
111
t h e  b e i n g  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  d o i n g
the purely physical changes that come about as a result of working 
there develops a particular psychological being-in-the-world as 
a result of ‘doing through time,’ then this again will presumably 
not be ‘objective data’ objectively available to be observed and 
known by the non-labourer. As the next section will illustrate, 
the evidence for the existence of an embodied dasein or worked 
self is not sourced in having thought about cleaning a rotating 
drum in a wastewater treatment plant or from having watched 
my charge-hand clean the drum or having interviewed my 
chargehand about his work. If the attitude spéculaire is unable 
to suspect or guess at the being brought about by doing, so the 
body too is passive insofar as it can not conjure up what the 
hand both grasps and is grasped by. Because the body is the 
primary ‘material condition’ of labour, it is an autonomous 
source of structuration and has its own being-in-the-world 
and adaptation to the life of manual work which achieves itself 
because it does not become real because it is represented or 
recognised or brought to awareness as a res cogitans, but rather 
is embodied and sensuous i.e. ‘‘is embodied, not represented’’ 
(Calhoun et al. 1993, p. 54), and to empirically evidence this 
non-objective realm of data it is necessary to enter and describe 
the world of manual labour.
Kettle Produce, Back Shift (5 p.m.–2 a.m.)
On Friday 30 March 1997 I am in Cowdenbeath Job Centre 
looking for work and spot an advert for workers for Kettle 
Produce at Orkie Farm beside Freuchie (Fife). I enquire about the 
job to a member of staff and am given a telephone number to 
ring and told to ask for Yvonne. I ring the number and ask for 
Yvonne but am told Yvonne is not there. I explain that I am 
calling about “getting a start,” and ask if I can speak to someone. 
Initially, I am asked to call back in half an hour before the person 
adds: “It’s a pity you didn’t call a wee bit earlier as folk are getting 
picked up at half-three.” Sensing there is an opening I say, “I have 
my car. Can I just arrive for five and talk to someone?” The person 
says that would be okay, and there follows details about how to 
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get to Orkie Farm some twenty miles away. After being given the 
directions I am told to turn up at quarter to five and speak to 
Happy. “Happy?”’ I ask, to confirm I had heard correctly. “Aye, 
that’s the boy’s nickname,” I am told. “And who am I speaking 
to?” I ask. “John Reilly.”
At about four-fifteen I arrive at Orkie Farm and park in a large 
and rather empty car park. Once parked I look around to get my 
bearings and then go into a door to the right of a much larger 
doorway that is the main entrance to what I will soon learn to 
call ‘the shed’ where the vegetables are processed. As I enter the 
door I go up a flight of stairs and ask the first person I meet where 
I can find Yvonne or John Reilly. Both are not there I am told. 
I then ask where I can find Happy. “Don’t know. Try in the 
personnel there,” I am told. I go in the direction of where 
the person pointed and give my story to someone else, and am told 
to wait for Happy to arrive “in a blue transit van.” Back outside 
I wait. After about twenty minutes a blue transit van arrives into 
the car park and a few workers get out. I look at the boy driving; 
it’s a warm day and he has an open shirt, showing his chest, 
tattoos and sun tan. I approach and ask the question I had been 
trying to find a way of avoiding asking: “Are you Happy?” “No” 
he replies. I’m then told to wait for a blue transit van but this time 
one without windows, and at about ten to five a blue transit van 
with no side windows arrives into the car park.
As I follow the van to where it parks, I see a pair of feet with 
white socks and no shoes with jeans and calves hanging out the 
front passenger seat window, and the sight makes me think of 
a trapeze artist using the base of the window frame as a swinging 
bar. Once parked, I make my way to the driver’s side and begin to 
explain my presence. The driver cuts me short: “You’re Paul?” 
“Aye,” I reply. The driver explained he had received a call to say 
I’d be here. “So, you’re Happy?” I asked. “No, that’s him there,” 
the driver replied, motioning with his head to the owner of the 
two dangling feet I had spied earlier. At this, Happy, without 
moving or opening his eyes, told the driver (Jim) to look out 
a form for me. Jim then rummaged for and retrieved a form in 
the glove compartment and began looking for a pen, which he 
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eventually located attached to the rear view mirror from which 
hung a pair of Rosary beads and other Catholic devotional 
paraphernalia. Jim handed me the form which as far as I could 
make out was from the Inland Revenue. In the space beside ‘Job 
Title’ Happy told me to put down ‘Agricultural Labourer.’ The 
‘Personal Details’ section which the form indicated were to be 
supplied by the employer I was told to supply myself. As the form 
required my bank sort code details I took out my wallet to retrieve 
my cashline card and after reading out my sort code to Jim he 
asked: “Is that bank e Scotland, Main Street, Cardenden?” “Naw, 
St. Andrews Square, Edinburgh,” I said. At this, one of the 
workers (Rab) seated in the back of the van asked: “What were 
you daen afore ye came here? Hope it wisnae Saughton.” I replied, 
“Ah wis on the dole,” to which Rab replied: “Oh its only lazy 
bastards that are on the dole.” “It’s better than work,” I said. 
“No it f***in isnae. Nae money!” said Rab. Once the form was 
complete I was told to take it to Yvonne in the office. Back in the 
office, as I chatted briefly with one of the office staff about the 
need to fill in the form I was told: “It’s law. There’s no such thing 
as casual labour now. If there’s nae paper there’s nae payslip. Just 
check yer bank fir yer pay.” I then asked: “For tax purposes, 
should I not send you my P 45?” “We jist put you on emergency 
tax code. If you send us your P 45 then fine. Otherwise you just 
have to claim it all back yourself at the end e the tax year.”
When I returned to the car park I was handed a coat and hair 
net which Jim made a point of telling me as we proceeded to the 
main shed for the start of the shift were to be worn at all times. As 
soon as we entered ‘the shed’ I felt the cold air. Jim took charge of 
me and showed me up a short flight of steps beside a conveyor belt. 
At this particular time the crop being processed was carrots and 
Jim instructed me: “The split ones, the broken ones, the rotten 
ones etcetera, get rid of,” taking a few examples of rejected carrots 
lying around on the floor between the silent machinery to show me 
the kind of carrots not wanted. In the minute or two left before the 
shift began, I looked around to see there were four belts and on 
each side of the belts workers had stationed themselves ready to 
process carrots, and to the left of the belts where the workers were 
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standing were other belts and machinery that brought the carrots 
to the workers. At the far left of the building were large doors 
where lorries carrying loads of carrots would reverse and tip out 
their cargo into large vats of cold water where the carrots were 
washed before they were then placed by machine onto the black 
conveyor belts for distribution to the four belts to be processed by 
hand. At each work station the carrots had to be quality checked 
by workers before they fell into crates, with all substandard carrots 
being removed. After the carrots had made their way past the 
sorters they were belted directly into wooden crates situated to the 
right of the workers. When any crate became full, the conveyor 
belt changed direction and the sorted carrots were belted into an 
empty crate that was always already waiting in position alongside 
the full crate. Finally, the full crate was forklifted into what were 
referred to as ‘the chills,’ refrigerated spaces where the sorted 
vegetables were stored before the final ‘bagging’ stage before being 
transported to retailers across the country.
Just before five p.m. two supervisors appeared and made their 
way to a raised platform where they stood highest of all, and from 
where they surveyed the machines and workers for the duration 
of the shift, only coming down from their perch if there was a 
problem to be dealt with. A whistle was blown to signal the start 
of the shift and immediately the machines roared into life and the 
feeder machine and the platform I was standing on began to 
vibrate. From the starting-up of the machines to carrots arriving 
to be sorted at my belt there was less than a minute to wait. 
I began sorting at a frenetic pace. After ten minutes my back was 
sore as a result of having to lean forward to survey the moving 
carrots and having to work with both hands simultaneously, 
which meant my back taking all the strain. After twenty minutes 
or so I began to pick out the substandard carrots using only one 
hand at a time as this left the other hand free to lean upon the 
conveyor belt’s metal casing, thereby taking some of my weight 
and relieving the strain on my back. After about another ten 
minutes I began to imagine it was me and not the carrots that 
was on a conveyor belt, and that it was me that was on a conveyor 
belt passing an endless shelf of carrots.
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After two hours of non-stop work we stopped at 7 o’clock 
for a fifteen-minute break. At this point most of the workers 
headed out into the sunshine, with everyone either lighting a 
cigarette or eating a sandwich or having a drink before lighting 
up. After a few minutes some of the younger workers, teenagers 
or those in their twenties, began to throw a frisby in the car 
park. I went to sit in the blue transit van and rest my back. As 
I sat I listened as Jim and Jimmy talked. “…best tae get up north 
daen the landscappin, cuttin gress an pickin flooer beds. Braw 
min.” I asked Jim if the job he was talking about was something 
completely separate from Kettle Produce. “Oh Aye. Ah’m only 
at Kettle cause ma contract fir the ither joab didnae come through 
this year.” Presently, some of the younger workers who were 
throwing the frisby came over to the van to ask Jim for a drink 
of vodka. Jim refused point blank: “It’s ma joab on the line if 
caught. So no vodka!” As they turned and headed back to their 
frisby-throwing, Jim explained to me that Friday nights meant 
the possibility of buying bottles of whisky or vodka for five 
pounds each from the lorry drivers who brought cheap alcohol 
from France.
During the second stint from seven-fifteen to nine-fifteen 
I struggled to maintain any conversation as my back was becoming 
more and more sore. During this period Jimmy told me that 
Happy was drunk and that that had explained his behaviour. 
I hadn’t realised, nor did I know Happy was sleeping the drink off 
in a grass ditch beside the car park, only to emerge soon before 
10 p.m. when he approached me, rather sheepishly, to say: “Sorry 
aboot that bud.” During this second period a rumor spread that 
we might be finishing early as there were a reduced number of 
loads of carrots to be processed due to it being a Friday. While 
I welcomed the possible early release I didn’t press for details 
beyond establishing it was a possibility. Half an hour or so later, 
the rumour of an early finish was confirmed and we were told the 
normal break at nine-fifteen would be dispensed with as we would 
work through until 10 p.m. to finish the last load and then head 
home. At 10 p.m. a whistle blew and immediately everyone 
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stopped working and started to walk towards the exit. I staggered 
down the stairs, stiff and sore, stopping only to confirm with Jim 
that Monday at 4.p.m. at The Auld Hoose pub in Cardenden was 
the time and pick up point, before heading to my car and driving 
home. When I got home I went straight to bed, and as I lay in the 
darkness I became aware that my hands were tingling, became 
aware that it felt as if I was wearing gloves as my hands quietly 
tingled and began the process of callousing.
The following Monday at 4 p.m. I was standing opposite The 
Auld Hoose, and as I waited for my lift a local woman walked 
towards me on her way home from getting her messages. As 
we knew each other she stopped and we chatted briefly, and 
I explained I was waiting to be picked up as I had started work 
at Kettle Produce. At this she said: “Ah’d never heard e Kettle 
Produce until the miners’ strike. A’ the young boys wi nae money 
gaun there.” When my lift came I got in the van and as we headed 
towards Freuchie in silence I counted thirteen workers. There 
was Rab, a young lad from Cowdenbeath; Craig, another young 
lad who was listening to a Billy Connolly tape on his walkman; 
another young lad called Goldie (because his surname was Gauld); 
Jim, the driver whom I would guess was in his early fifties; Happy, 
who was in his mid-to-late thirties; John, Jim’s son; Annette, 
a woman in her late forties whom the younger workers liked to 
tease by calling her Miss Whiplash as a result of sometimes being 
given supervisory-type tasks to do; Jimmy, a quiet older man in his 
late forties or perhaps early fifties; Maggie, the soon to be ex-wife 
of Jimmy; Kelly, a young girl with a temper and who was to 
bloody Craig’s nose in a fight later that night in the van on the 
way home; Rob, a man in his forties; Michelle, a young girl in her 
late teens or early twenties, and finally James, a young lad with 
tattoos on his forearm and one with a dagger through a skull with 
the emblazoned motto: ‘Death or Glory.’ As we passed through 
Auchtermuchty we stopped to pick up Karen, an older quiet 
woman and a young girl who was working her last shift that day 
before going to stay with her father in Dundee. In Auchtermuchty 
Jim also had to stop to hand in time sheets to someone and as he 
returned to the van he announced he had bad news, that he had 
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been given a letter for employees to the effect that anyone found 
drunk would be dismissed. Jim informed us we were all to get 
a copy but no copy was handed out to us there and then. 
Happy, who as usual was seated alongside Jim in the front, took 
the letter and read it out to us: “Those who wish to purchase 
drink from the drivers must do so off the premises…” As Happy 
read everyone was quiet and after the letter was read no-one 
offered any comment.
On my first full shift I was on the second belt working with 
Michelle. As work started at the usual frantic pace, the noise from 
the machines was deafening as usual so that supervisors had to 
whistle to communicate above the noise, and when the relevant 
worker lifted their head upon hearing the whistle, the supervisor 
pointed instructions, such as for a worker to jump up to a part of 
the machine and free a blockage of carrots. Not long into the shift 
a supervisor pointed and shouted at me to put my hair net over 
my ears and to take my watch off. Some time later I saw for the 
first time there was a clock on a wall. Later I was told to climb up 
and free a jam of carrots in the feeder. As we neared the end of the 
first period Michele pointed at my fingers, and I looked and saw 
my middle and ring finger and pinkie on my right hand were 
bleeding. Such was the frenetic pace of the work that I hadn’t 
noticed. I then noticed blood stains on the steel strip where I had 
been alternately supporting myself with each hand and I hurriedly 
wiped away every trace of blood. As we started our fifteen-minute 
break Michelle told me I would need to get an Elastoplast from a 
supervisor. At the break I see that the quiet Jimmy has also cut 
himself and seeing him get some tape from Happy I do likewise. 
Just before the break, Annette had come around and told us all to 
clean up around and below the belts and tidy up any black baskets 
lying around before we went on break. Apparently we were not 
tidying up after ourselves and the supervisors were not happy. 
From nine fifteen to nine forty-five we have our half-hour break 
and as we come out into the car park I see the sun about four or 
five inches from the horizon. Some of the younger workers are 
about to play skipping and will be joined later by some of the 
female supervisors, and as we head for our break we each get a 
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slip of paper that has a printed text with the title: Communication 
from Kettle Produce to staff:
It has come to our attention that workers have been  
caught drinking before coming out to work this is not 
acceptable. Any one caught at work whilst intoxicated  
will be dismissed. Also the purchasing of alcohol whilst at 
work will not be tolerated. If you wish to purchase drink  
off any of the drivers at KP it must be bought off the 
premises. or you will be dismissed.
Back in the van I watch the quiet Jimmy roll and light a cigarette, 
noticing his shaking hands as he does so. I then look at Jim the 
driver who, hunched forwards and with his elbows resting on his 
knees and lunchbox resting on his lap, takes a sandwich up in 
his left hand and his cup of tea in his right hand, and remarking 
in passing to Happy, between taking big satisfying mouthfuls of 
tea and food, about “some c**t daen nuthin,” Jim makes light 
work of his first sandwich and, ready at hand, grabs his next 
sandwich without changing position. The van is quiet as everyone 
eats their crisps, chocolate, rolls or sandwiches and drinks their 
tea or juice before having a smoke. After a few minutes as 
people finish their food and light up, conversation begins and the 
first thing talked about is how many more weeks work they are 
likely to have left. Happy announces he’d be happy to get paid 
off as this will mean, “Ah’ll be on the lettuce.” The other workers 
express incredulity at this, as apparently this is back-breaking 
work. Michelle says: “What? You’ve got tae pu’ them and yer 
no allowed tae kneel.” Happy responds to this by saying: “F**k 
no that! Ah’ll be on the big machine. Inside. Ah’ll no be f**kin 
oot wi aa you c**ts pu’n them up. F**k that.” At this, one of the 
younger girls tells the story of how the last time Craig was on 
the parsnips, and only after an hour of work, he had a sore 
back and the next morning as he rolled out of bed, had to get 
his dad to tie his shoelaces for him as a result of being so stiff 
and sore. Craig laughs and confirms the story is true. Michelle 
then talked of how two workers (whom I didn’t know) were 
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needing all the shifts they could get because they were getting 
married on 28th August. At this, Kelly then shouted out to 
another female worker (whom I later realised was the bride to 
be) in the car park about some man (whom I later realised was 
the groom to be) of whom she said: “He likes getting blow 
jobs but doesnae ken how tae use his cock. Doesnae ken what 
it’s fir!” Jim then started another line of conversation by saying: 
“Ah got tell’t we could be finishin at wane,” at which Rab asked: 
“Who the f**k tell’t ye that?”
Happy: Some e the day shift finished at twelve o’clock.
Goldie: Was it the cleaner?
Happy: No, it wis Maggie.
Jim: Maggie! Might as well be the cleaner.
Happy: No it’s Eleanor tell’t Maggie and she gets a’ her info 
fae John.
Rab: So, then, Happy, what time are we finishin ye hink?
Happy: F**k knows.
Goldie: How many loads are there?
Happy: F**k knows.
Jim: Have they started unloadin yet?
Happy: F**k knows.
Jim: Ye cannae see it, no?
Happy: Ah cannae see f**k all fae here.
James: Whose got the time? How long have we got?
Michelle: Ten minutes.
James: Braw. Time fir anither fag.
Happy: Aye, cause ye’ll no hae time tae scratch yer baws 
when that f**kin belt starts gaun. Some c**t’ll need tae hae 
a word wi the f**kin fitters. F**k me!
Jim: F**k its jist hard work.
Rab: Aye, you’re right. Bashin ma baws workin like f**k.
Craig: Ah’m no built fir hard work. Need tae get some 
blacks in.
Rab: They should shoot a’ they bastards.
Craig: Cannae dae that. There’d be nae shops left.
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Rab: Look at that fat bastard, eating his Pot Noodle 
and throwing a frisby. His f**kin mither feeds um wi  
a shovel.
Five minutes into the third two-hour period from 9.45 until 11.45 
I noticed three of my finger-tips had turned a dark purple colour, 
and I started to worry I will permanently damage them if I don’t 
do something. I decide to hang on until the next break, periodically 
resorting to sorting the carrots with only my left hand and 
clenching my fist and pressing my nails into my palm to assure 
myself I can still feel my fingers and to force blood into them. 
Bleeding fingers are a problem because so frenetic is the gathering 
of spoiled carrots that the skin around the nail as one’s fingers go 
to pick up substandard carrots is constantly hitting against heavy, 
cold and hard carrots that are tumbling onto the back of the 
worker’s hands. Also, because after a while the skin becomes 
numbed to the pain of being hit by cold wet carrots, workers don’t 
feel any pain and so don’t suspect they are bleeding. While the 
obvious way to prevent this constant hitting of the back of one’s 
hands by carrots that are falling and tumbling onto the belt is to 
only start sorting the carrots after they have come to a standstill 
and settled, this would mean waiting until they are so far along 
the belt as to leave the worker not enough time to identify and 
remove the substandard carrots before they tumble into the 
waiting crate. Also, there is a very high level of motivation not to 
let any substandard carrots fall into the crates as supervisors are 
invigilating everyone’s work and will let any individual know in 
no uncertain terms and in front of everyone, if they are not doing 
their job properly, thereby giving fellow workers ammunition that 
you are a slacker, so that no fellow worker will want to work 
alongside you for fear of having to work harder to make up for 
your deficiencies. 
At a quarter to midnight we stop for our last fifteen-minute 
break. As I walk out of the shed it is now dark. I ask someone if 
there’s a canteen anywhere and am told to “follow them.” I follow 
some of the other back-shift workers who are not part of our crew 
as they walk to the works canteen. However, as there are only 
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vending machines I head back outside for some air and take off 
the tape around my fingers to let them breathe. I feel my finger tips 
tingle as the blood flows to them. Just before we resume work 
I tape them again, but try to do so not so tightly. Throughout the 
last stint from twelve until two I look at my fingers. They are still 
purple but I can feel them more. At two a.m. I finish my first full 
shift. As we pile into the van Rab announces: “Ah’m geld that’s 
f**kin o’er.” To this Jim replies: “That you happy, son?” to which 
Rab then retorted: “Ah’m gled. No happy or any shit like that. 
Ah’ve got tae dae it a’ again the morn.”
As soon as the last person is in the van we speed off. There 
is fifteen of us crammed into the back and everyone seems to 
be smoking. We drop Karen and the younger girl off in 
Auchtermuchty and head for the M90 and then Cardenden. At 
about 2.45 a.m. I am dropped off at The Auld Hoose. When I get 
home the microwave clock tells me its 3.09 a.m. I go to the fridge, 
have a drink of cold milk and then go straight to bed. The bed 
feels wonderful and the backs of my fingers seek out the cool 
and comforting mahogany wood of the bedframe. In the quiet 
darkness I prepare to greet sleep with gratitude, only to realise in 
the silence and stillness there is a loud ringing in my ear, in fact 
there is a noise pounding through my head, a constant and loud 
sound. It takes me a while to find any words to describe what is 
not a natural sound. I firstly imagine it is like the one unvarying 
note a television makes when all the programmes are finished. An 
unchanging and endless “oooooooooooooo” that seems to get 
louder the more I consciously avert to it, and which goes on and 
on. I turn over once or twice to see if I can get rid of it but can’t. 
It’s in my head. My body has brought the workplace back home 
and I can’t sleep for the racket of ‘machine noise’ sounding in my 
head. As fifteen, then twenty, then thirty minutes pass, I realise my 
eyes too have brought the ‘point of production’ home as, uncalled 
for and out of my control, mental images of endless carrots pass 
before my mind’s eye and I even catch myself seeking out the 
blemished, the split, the misshapen carrots, as if exhibiting my 
Pavlovian conditioning at the point of production. As I can’t get 
the image out of my head I have to open my eyes to stop the 
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images coming. Eventually, I fall asleep. When I wake in the 
morning I shower, and as I do so I get rid of all the black nasal 
mucus that has gathered during the course of the previous 
day’s shift.
Such were my first two shifts at Kettle Produce where I worked 
during April and May 1997. While the above descriptions of 
working I would venture to say are rather straightforward and a 
more or less universal kind of experience of such kind of work, 
beyond such empirical descriptions there is no such thing as 
experiencing working per se, and therefore there is no such thing 
as an intrinsic description of working per se. For example, then, 
an ‘extrinsic’ determinant of the experience of work might be the 
‘infinity’ of carrots a worker sees waiting to be fed onto the 
conveyor belt. The sheer volume or number of carrots is something 
the mind does not know exactly so the mind ‘instructs’ the body 
to ‘know’ or ‘register’ the fact that all those carrots represent 
‘endless’ effort and work until 2 a.m. The body may react to this 
knowledge by ‘sinking’ at the prospect, giving work an ‘endless’ 
Sisyphean aspect. While this reaction is likely to be universal, 
however, it is not intrinsic to work per se or inevitable, because the 
individual worker may have a different reaction to such a prospect 
because of a home situation that means they are happy to be 
at work.
Because the subjective experience of work passes through the 
filter of individual circumstances, wishing to write a phenomenology 
of work per se is an ideal that has to explicitly recognise this 
variation. What should be included in this ‘ideal type’ 
phenomenology of work is the experience of work where the 
worker looks and knows there will be no early louse or reprieve, 
and how this stabilizes the body or anchors the body to its work 
and configures the temporality of the seven-hour shift and informs 
the phenomenology of work. My experience was that the 
possibility of being tapped on the shoulder at any moment to be 
told, “You’re finished,” heightened awareness that we didn’t have 
to be here; that ‘being there’ was contingent, was not set in stone, 
that we might not be there in another twenty minutes and this 
meant one couldn’t settle quickly into the habitus as one kept 
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either hoping one was going to finish or had to keep telling oneself 
not to think about finishing, while knowing everybody else was 
thinking about a possible early finish, so that one never really 
settled to the work as a result of thinking of a possible early end, 
as in this instance the mind does not switch off and let the bodily 
habitus take over because, with the possibility of an early louse, 
one is continually being forced to ‘re-present’ oneself to the work 
at hand and ‘start again’ and keep deciding to keep working, 
which is draining.
In my experience, when a worker refers to him or herself as 
working hard when among his workmates, this might easily 
provoke a fellow worker to say in jest something such as: “You 
were working? What was wrong?” In my two months at Kettle 
Produce I never heard any such banter. At Kettle Produce the 
work conditions excluded the exercise of autonomy so that ‘feet-
dragging’ or ‘time-wasting’ was not possible because such 
decision-making is out of the worker’s hands. Also, the invigilation 
of time and space meant that whenever a worker looked up he or 
she was seen as the supervisors were looking over all of us from 
their perched position. Workers, then, keep their eyes down so 
that the workers’ eyes and attention settle upon the belt and the 
carrots. In terms of reflecting upon these conditions and their 
consequences for the free conditioning of dasein by the worker 
himself/herself, I assert this hyper-invigilation of time is learned 
and then internalised by the worker himself, and the worker 
subsequently ‘freely’ uses this internalised discipline as a weapon 
against others who are not working to this standard. The worker 
also, of course, uses this same weapon against himself to keep 
himself working. As well as this frenetic immediatism there is 
the internalization of hierarchy, almost to military standards, with 
the result that workers can be easily interpreted as full of what 
might be glossed as ‘free-market ideology’ insofar as their use 
of language is ‘programmed’ or ‘armed’ with the attitude that 
is ready and armed to declare, “Work or want!” at the slightest 
provocation by those not deemed to be earning their way. As I will 
describe in the next section more fully, all of this conditioning and 
internalization of the labour process or ‘point of production’ 
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comes out in workers’ psyche and comportment and their use 
of language which may be described as informal, personable, 
affectionate, casual and a constant exchange of crude or rough 
intimacies insofar as language is their cipher of choice for their 
conditioning at the ‘point of production,’ and a dominated use 
of and relationship to language that means it is never allowed to 
wander far from empirical reality.
East of Scotland Water
As part of fieldwork I spent four summers from 1997-2000 
working as a manual operative with East of Scotland Water 
(ESW) authority from June to September as cover for permanent 
workers taking their annual leave. As the senior engineer (Brian 
Robertson) told me when being interviewed for the position at 
Craigmitchell House (Glenrothes): “Ah always say that instead of 
one extra permanent man Ah prefer to have four students in the 
summer to cover for holidays. Four of you students cost one man’s 
salary.”41 At this initial meeting Brian also informed me that 
I would be sent to work wherever I was needed and with whoever 
needed a ‘second man.’ Brian also talked briefly about the basic 
statutory role of ESW: that it was responsible for the day-to-day 
running of two hundred and fifty plants, and the agreement with 
government was that only twelve plants in any one year could fail, 
but that in the event of an electrical or mechanical failure at a 
plant, ESW would contact SEPA [Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency] and they would agree not to come to that plant and take 
a sample.
The Pool Squad
As a manual operative I was routinely assigned by my line-
manager (Ivor Cox) to work with the ‘pool squad’ which was 
a three-man team tasked with those repair and maintenance jobs 
41 My weekly salary was £186.06.
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that men with regular fixed routes didn’t have the time or 
equipment to do themselves. The ‘gaffer’ on the pool squad was 
Paul Diamond, and Paul took pride in his range of knowledge and 
practical know-how. Along with Paul in the pool squad was 
Adam, also from Kirkcaldy, and one of the first jobs I was sent to 
do with Paul and Adam was to repair and replace the covers of 
oxygenating blades at Bowhouse wastewater treatment plant. As 
we drove to Bowhouse from our base at Pathhead works in 
Kirkcaldy, Paul informed myself and Adam that the aeration 
blades had been reported as hitting the covers and that on the 
previous Saturday some five days ago, Jimmy Melville, who was 
responsible for the day to day maintenance of Bowhouse, had first 
noticed this and so our job was to swap or move the affected 
covers. As Paul passed on this information to me he gleaned, 
perhaps from my expression, that I hadn’t understood him and so 
once we got to Bowhouse he told me to follow him to a raised 
grassed bank in the plant beside the perimeter fence where he 
began the first lesson of the day to his student-come-apprentice:
Paul: Okay, what you have to understand first is that 
Bowhoose is a fu’ treatment works. Ye’ll hae other plants 
like Ladybank o’er there [pointing] but that’s jist a pump 
station. So, at Bowhoose ye hae three pumps, three inlets. 
Ladybank. Giffordtown. Auchtermuchty [as Paul says the 
names he points in the direction of each location]. There’s 
actually a fourth for Dunshelt but that goes straight intae 
the aeration ditch. Ah’ll explain that in a minute. So, first 
stage is a’ the rags an shit an grease and grit are taken oot e 
the flow, then it goes intae what ye call the reception well. 
That’s that there [pointing]. It then goes into the ditch o’er 
there and it’s there for a number o’ oors. There’s bugs in the 
ditch. And the aeration blades pit oxygen into it. It then 
goes o’er the weir and into the FST [final settlement tank].
Me: The sludge goes o’er the weir? Is that no a fail?
Paul: The f**kin sludge doesnae go oot the weir! Treated 
inflow or dirty water goes oot the weir. The sludge is doon 
below cause it sinks in the tank and’s only moved by turnin 
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valves and pumps. Which is where us boys come in. That’s 
why in this joab yer ayeways doon ladders every day cause 
a’ yer tanks and the valves are under the grund. The sludge 
sinks and goes back to the ditch. The RAS valves…
Me: The what?
Paul: Returned activated sludge valves. They’re doon there 
[pointing] and they’re only touched by somebody who kens 
the plant.
Me: Why does it go back?
Paul: The sludge?
Me: Aye.
Paul: Well, think aboot it. If ye didnae you would kill the 
ditch by takin oot the live sludge and only puttin in dead 
sludge. You have to keep the sludge alive.
Me: [laughing] What the hell is alive sludge?
Paul: Sludge wi bugs in it.
Me: Are you serious?
Paul: Aye! A’ this, a’ this yer lookin at relies on bacteria. 
Bugs. It gets a bit complicated but what’s needed is a 
particular kind of sludge that settles and sinks and disnae 
disperse cause then it will go o’er a weir.
Me: Right okay. So it goes back, why?
Paul: Ah’ve jist told ye! Tae keep the sludge alive.
Me: If it wisnae returned what’s the worst that could 
happen?
Paul: Ye kill the ditch.
Me: What?
Paul: Fir a start, right, if a RAS [returned activated sludge] 
pump is switched aff too long that means nae treated sludge 
will be returned to the [aeration] ditch and so it’ll die. Also, 
the sludge, cause it wullnae be getting taen oot the FST [final 
settlement tank] and returned to the ditch, it’ll jist gaither at 
the bottom and die completely and eventually there’ll be 
that much of it it will jist go straight out o’er the weir and 
into a burn or river or whatever and fail. And then SEPA 
will get involved. Fines. Money. Folk gettin shouted at.
Me: Okay. Got it.
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Paul: So that’s why fae the FST tank the sludge gets returned 
back to the ditch. It’s a circuit. Ye’ve got tae keep it gaun. 
That’s the joab.
As Paul was instructing me on the basic layout of the plant an 
ESW electrician (Rab) drove into the plant, at which Paul 
dismissed me saying: “Right, f**k off an get some work done. 
Typical student. Raither stand yappin than work.” As I headed 
off to perform the routine manual task of scrubbing down the 
channels, Paul fell to chatting with Rab about how the fitters were 
getting their ‘dirty money’ and ‘tool money’ cut i.e. those amounts 
of money that the union had negotiated with management over 
the years in recognition and compensation for the men working 
in unsanitary conditions, and an amount of money to renew and 
or replace necessary work-related tools. 
Paul and Adam then started to inspect the covers in the ditch, 
but as they did so they disturbed nesting birds and soon discovered 
two bird nests and called a halt to their work. Paul’s view was that 
they should postpone the job until the young had hatched and 
flown the nest. At this, they turned their attention to Rab who was 
in the plant to look at a gear box. Rather than doing the job they 
were sent to do, then, Paul and Adam spent the next hour helping 
Rab to dismantle the gear-box used to turn the aeration blades. 
Once the job was done they chatted, and before leaving Rab told 
Paul and Adam of an incident that had occurred at the weekend 
when he was on ‘stand by’ i.e. a period of one week where the 
worker after completing his normal daily shift has to be ready to 
respond to any incident at any time of the day or night. “Ah got 
a phone call at half-two on Sunday morning and the guy said, 
‘There’s a low chlorine alarm flashing at a plant.’ ‘And what am 
Ah supposed tae dae about that?’ Ah said. So next thing Ah heard 
a rustle of pages and he says, ‘Oh, it’s the water inspectors Ah 
should inform.’ So Ah says, ‘Thanks for tellin me that!’ an put the 
phone down.” At the end of this anecdote Paul advised: “You 
should still put down for disturbance money on your timesheet.”
After we took our leave of Rab, Paul asked myself and Adam 
if we had our dinner or needed a shop. We didn’t need a shop. 
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“Right, then” Paul continued, “once we’re finished here we’ll go 
tae Ladybank and open the tanks.” Adam then asked: “What are 
we daen there like?” and Paul explained: “Ivor wants us tae hose 
doon the storm tanks.” As we made our way to Ladybank, Adam 
contacted the van that has day to day responsibility for Ladybank 
on the two-way radio that each van was fitted with to ask Jimmy 
Melville to confirm the two-inch pump we would need for the job 
was at Ladybank. When Mick Kelman answered the radio, Adam 
said: “Mick? Is that you? What the f**k are you daen in Jimmy’s 
van?” Mick explained: “Shanny’s oan holiday this week so Ah’m 
wi Jimmy.” Adam then asked: “Have you got the two-inch 
pump?” and Mick advised Adam he would bring the pump from 
another plant to Ladybank within the hour. As we drove along 
I asked Paul and Adam which were the main sewage plants in Fife 
that they dealt with. Paul informed me:
Well in Fife anyway Dunfermline is yer biggest sewage 
works. Then Ironmill Bay. Cowdenbeath’s probably got the 
deepest storm tanks in Fife. Cowdenbeath’s sewage used to 
be treated on site at Cowdenbeath before being pumped 
intae Lochgelly Loch. But noo it a’ ganes doon tae Leven.
Adam: There used tae be a belt press and dryer in 
Cowdenbeath, but noo Cowdenbeath’s no a treatment plant 
any mair, it’s storm tanks and a pumping station only noo.
Paul: Talkin aboot Cowdenbeath, the three e us’ll be 
shovelin grit in Cowdenbeath works maybe this week. A’ the 
inlet channels are needin a guid scrubbing accordin tae 
Jimmy Melville and Shanny. So when they tell Ivor he’ll gie 
the joab tae us.
Me: What about Glenrothes?
Paul: Glenrothes’s sewage ganes doon tae Leven Screen 
Hoose.
Me: An Kinross and Milnathort?
Paul: Milnathort is a third stage treatment plant. That’s 
Jimmy Melville’s. Near enough drinkable. Cause it’s pumped 
oot intae Loch Leven ye see and no the sea, so it his tae be 
guid quality as it’s naewhere else to go.
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Adam: Then ye’ve got Kirkcaldy Pathhead works. If it 
can get through a four mil screen it goes oot. Anythin bigger 
will be stopped.
Me: So Kirkcaldy isn’t a treatment plant really?
Adam: Pit it this way, ye’ll no see me gaun fir a swim doon 
there!
As we arrived at Ladybank plant I jumped out to unlock the 
padlocked gate to the plant and open the gates to allow Paul to 
drive in and park. We then proceeded to open the metal covers 
to vent the storm tanks that hadn’t been hosed down for over a 
year. Once done, we headed back to the van for our dinner. It was 
a warm sunny day and we had the doors and windows open. 
Adam put on Talk FM on the radio and we fell to listening to 
Nicky Campbell interviewing the SNP leader Alec Salmond.42 At 
one point the interviewer was heard to say: ‘Well Mr. Salmond, 
I’ve been reading up a bit on all this nationalism and are you 
not afraid it’ll all get out of hand?” At this point one of the men 
exclaimed: “Oot e hand ya f**kin spastic bastard! Out of hand! 
That makes me want tae jist punch f**k oot e that English c**t. 
Out of hand! What a f**kin bastard.” At this point Mick and 
Jimmy arrived in their van with the pump and parked along side 
us. Once they had put the generator and hoses beside the tanks 
they returned to their van for their dinner. After our half-hour 
break (which ended up being more like forty-five minutes) we got 
on with the job. I moved the generator closer to the perimeter 
fence and started connecting the hoses, one of which I put in the 
small stream that runs beside the plant, while the other hose with 
the nozzle that will aim the water into the tanks being attached to 
the generator. As we were about to start and, no doubt because we 
had properly vented the storm tanks before starting to do any 
work, Mick recalled an incident to myself and Adam about how 
hydrogen sulphide had got Paul in North Queensferry plant some 
42 The Scottish National Party (SNP) is the main nationalist political party in 
Scotland in favour of independence.
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time previously, and that Paul was lucky and could have been 
sacked for misconduct. I asked Mick to explain further.
Paul went doon wi a squeedgie intae a big tank. Nae gas 
monitor or f**k all. So he went doon his sel tae move it,  
and must have broke the skin e it and aff course he released 
the gas. So he got a whiff e it. So he bailed. Got tae the tap 
e the ladder and then oot like a light. Fell back doon. He wis 
really lucky. Didnae kill himself or break anything. He’ll no 
be sae lucky again.
As we started hosing down the tanks I looked inside, and when 
my eyes had become accustomed to the light, the scene below 
appeared to me like layers of mud and silt and sludge being 
loosened and peeled off like layers of ancient desiccated duffel 
coats being forcibly separated by the damaging action of the 
water. Soon, however, the pump began to stutter and the water 
pressure began to fail. Upon hearing the change in generator noise 
Paul exclaimed: “Oh what the f**k is it noo? Ah’ve changed the 
oil.” Mick volunteered that perhaps there was something wrong 
with the oil. “It looks a bit watery, maybe petrol is getting mixed 
in wi the oil; maybe too much pressure comin back and burnin a 
seal an the petrol’s gettin intae the piston chamber and seepin 
doon an dilutin the oil. Ken what Ah mean? So the oil’s loosin 
viscosity and no coating the piston shaft with the result that yer 
gettin metal against metal an scorin the bore, the cylinder, and 
losin compression and f**kin the pump into the bargain.” 
It turned out that Mick’s line of reasoning was far too 
complicated and the fault was entirely mine as I had failed to put 
an ‘arse’ (i.e. a metal meshed fixture) onto the end of the hose that 
I had put in the burn, and so little stones from the stream were 
able to get into the hose as it drew water. I found this out as 
I unscrewed the hose from the generator to look into the impeller 
of the pump and as I unscrewed the hose heard a stone falling out. 
After the inevitable slagging for “being a student” I corrected my 
mistake and from then on the pump worked fine. After two hours 
of hosing down to the bottom of the tank I got the job of going 
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down into the tank to hose down those areas of the tank that 
could not be got at from above. As I got to the end of the job and 
all that remained were the larger pieces of debris that couldn’t be 
broken down by the action of the water, I called for a bucket on 
a rope to be lowered down so I could start shoveling the debris 
into the bucket so that it could be lifted out. As I put my hands 
into the shallow soak away drain on the floor of the tank I lifted 
what turned out to be the corpse of a cat. I then put the cat in 
the bucket, taking care to have the head propped up over the 
bucket rim, so the cat appeared to be peering out of the bucket 
and so that Adam would be sure to see it when he pulled the 
bucket up.
As Adam began to pull the bucket up I stopped working and 
waited. Adam presently exclaimed: “What the f**k!” as soon as 
he saw the cat, and I went up the ladder to enjoy his reaction. At 
the commotion Paul and Mick walked over. Mick looked but was 
not impressed: “Ah’ve pu’d oot a lot f**kin worse than that.”
Paul: Oh f**k Mick, dinna get started on what we’ve pu’d 
oot e drains. We’ll be here a’ f**kin day.
Me: C’moan then, what?
Paul: Ye dinnae want tae ken.
Me: Come oan! What?
Mick: Jim Smith discovered a newborn bairn in Ballingry 
plant. Jock, Paul’s faither, went tae a choked drain an it wis 
an unborn bairn. A woman had gien hersel an abortion.
Adam: Gary Biel says he’s come up against dead dugs.
Paul: Twice Ah’ve come tae a choke at a hoose an it wis 
drooned Alsatian pups. Twice. Tae the same hoose. Ah pu’d 
them oot e the drains. Folk had flushed them doon the toilet.
Mick: That’s illegal.
Paul: Ah f**kin ken it’s illegal. Ah says tae the women if it 
happens again Ah’ll hae tae report it. So it did happen again. 
An Ah did report it. Dinnae ken what happened tae her like. 
Then there wis Jock McPhee an Davey at Cluny a few years 
back. They foond a women’s body doon at Cluny. Cluny 
dip. She had topped hersel. Jock wis doon there wi the rods. 
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Davey wi the hawk. Next thing a shoe pops up. That wis 
that. It wis a’ o’er the news before that thit the woman had 
went missin. There wis a big search for her. So Jock says as 
soon as him an Davey saw the shoe pop oot, the hair went 
up on the back e their necks. They jaloused right awa’ that 
it wis her. Jock says he kent straight away. An they were 
right. That wis Cluny.
Mick: A mind last winter Ah pu’d oot a rat that was blockin 
a sewer. This wis doon in Leven. It looked like a cross 
between a fitball and a cushion. It wis blue. All the fur had 
fell aff it. It wis that bloated. Imagine the smell e that when 
ye burst it!
As we were packing up our gear after we had finished, Paul 
answered the radio and afterwards informed us that the following 
morning Ivor wanted us to head straight down to Kinghorn for 
eight o’clock and we were not to bother with the usual morning 
brief in Pathhead works (Kirkcaldy) as we were to start removing 
grit from the holding tanks in Kinghorn, and the tide would be in 
our favour at that time of the morning. The next day, however, 
I was instructed to pick up Rory McNeill and came with Rory as 
usual to Pathhead to help Rory with a two-man job before Rory 
would head down to Kinghorn on his usual route and drop me 
off to help Paul and Adam for the rest of the day. By the time we 
arrived at Kinghorn it was well after nine, and as we approached 
we could see Paul and Adam were sitting in their van with no sign 
of any work being done. As we neared the van Rory said: “You 
two on strike then or what?”
Paul: Strike! Might as well be.
Rory: How, what’s up?
Paul: No got the tools fir the joab. A wanted a f**kin Hi-Ab 
wi a bucket. Two men at the bottom shovelin the grit in if 
need be. An what happened? The office sent a tanker. Jist 
two men. An they coodnae even go doon or nuthin. F**kin 
health and safety.
Adam: Aye, bit wait til ye hear the best bit.
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Paul: The tanker arrives an guess f**kin what? He’s no got 
a hose fir it. So they cannae even suck it up. What f**kin 
guid is that! One thousand pound a day. We’d tae f**k off 
tae Pathheid fir the two inch pump. The [tanker] boy wanted 
tae go an find a water mains. F**k’s sake. Ah says tae him, 
Ah’m no stay’n here a’ day daen this. See these boys this is 
their joab. They’re maybe cumin it ye ken. Tae get their foo 
shift oot e wane joab.
Adam: Widnae surprise me. F**kin tanker boys, eh? That’s 
what f**kin happens when they change fae a two to a wane 
man job. They’re no prepared fir half the joabs they get sent 
tae. Eck Beattie blames Mick Coulson and Dan Oseman. 
Antisocial c**ts that preferred being oan their ain which 
meant management got it intae their thick f**kin heids that 
tankers could be done by one man. They didnae realise that 
they were arseholes and that naeb’dy liked them or wanted 
tae work wi them, but they thought that the job was a one 
man joab.
Paul: Aye, well. So they hid tae gane away tae dump a load 
e water an gravel an then fill it foo e water again. F**k 
knows where they went tae dump it. Then they needed tae 
find water tae hose it doon, a’ the gravel tae the hose. Ah 
wanted a Hi-Ab f**kin lorry like Geordie McPhee’s. That 
wid mean it wid only be an oor’s wurk. Bit Christ! They 
never even dumped their silt. They were jist fillin up wi 
water. They could only use a wane inch pump. F**kin hell. 
Take them ages. Ah’ll tell ye it’s a guid joab noo the bonus 
is a’ the same. Hoo the f**k could ye make a bonus waitin 
fir a tank tae fill up a’ f**kin day?
The Daily Route
My line manager also often put me to work as ‘second man’ to 
one of the men who had a regular or fixed route and an assigned 
list of plants to get through either every day or checked at least 
every week. Often I worked with Rory McNeill (Kirkcaldy) on his 
route and, being assigned to work with Rory on a particular 
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Friday, this meant our first stop of the day was Kirkcaldy 
crematorium. Rory advised that the pump panel to be checked 
here was always done early so as not to arrive when a funeral was 
in progress. To ensure that the pumps were working, all that was 
often necessary was to open a pump panel (also known as ‘switch 
gear’) with a key and inside, usually, were three sets of circuits or 
one for each pump. More often than not, a pump would not be 
running at the moment it was being checked so each pump would 
be manually switched on so the ESW operative could be sure they 
were working. Normally, simply by listening to the sound of the 
pump starting up was enough to tell it was fine and, once running, 
the pump was switched off and the next one was checked. This 
particular day Number 2 pump was not working and so Rory 
asked me to take a note. “Need tae report that” advised Rory, “it 
might jist be tripped oot so might just need a sparkie [electrician] 
tae check it.” Next, we headed to St. Marie’s primary school 
grounds where we checked a sub-station and more pumps, before 
heading to Hendry Road where there was a ‘hydro-break’ and 
overflow chamber and screen rake. To check this, all that was 
normally required was to lift the covers and have a look inside. 
Next was Lauder Road. 
Much like when working with Paul and Adam, Rory too could 
be expansive when we went out on the route together. As we 
checked Hendry Road he explained that coming down this part of 
Kirkcaldy was once an open burn which had subsequently been 
covered up, so that now it was basically a series of pipes that also, 
usefully, ‘broke’ or slowed the water down. Piping the burn using 
large pipes meant that if there was a surcharge of water, this 
excess was now able to be put into storm tanks that were built 
underground. Sonic sensors hung within the chamber and picked 
up any rising level of water, and once a certain level was reached 
the sensors automatically started the screening process or began 
pumps to move water to storm tanks, thereby controlling the flow. 
Explaining the screening process Rory advised:
The screens here take a’ the shite and condoms and nappies, 
tights, fanny pads, rags, women’s things oot see. So’s tae 
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make sure it’s jist water that goes intae the burn. They spent 
a lot e money here. See originally if the sewers would 
overflow, which af course bein Scotland they always f**kin 
did at some stage cause e a’ the heavy rain we get, that 
excess went straight intae the burn. A’ the gulleys on the 
roads see are a’ connected tae the sewers. So they hid  
tae stop that. Ye cannae hae bairns playin in shite and  
fanny pads and God knows what. So they’ve piped a whore 
e a burn.
Our next stop was Charlotte Street, followed by Buchanan Court 
which was just a pump panel, and so Rory sat in the van while 
I checked it. After Buchanan court we headed along the coast to 
Kinghorn. Our usual routine was to have our nine o’clock cup of 
tea after checking Kinghorn, which consisted of going down a 
dry well to check sump pumps and six rotork valves and taking a 
note of the inflow to the plant and replace the 24-hour flow meter 
recorder and “do the screenings” i.e. remove any larger items 
caught in the screen since the previous check the day before. 
Rory’s routine complaint was that what we did at Kinghorn every 
day should all been done automatically, and that there should be 
no need to go down dry wells for half an hour turning rotork 
valves one by one to make sure the tanks’ levels were as they 
should be. After Kinghorn we headed off further along the coast 
to Burntisland, and on the way we met an ESW tanker driver 
(Wullie Pollock) who flagged us down to advise us: “It’s over-
flowing at Pettycur beach.” We headed off to look for ourselves 
and when we arrived we saw there was untreated sewage flowing 
onto the beach. Rory speculated that either a sewer had burst or 
the pumps installed to deal with the sewage from the new houses 
nearby had failed. Rory contacted Ivor:
We’ve got three manholes surcharging doon here at Pettycur. 
There’s nae screening getting done. There’s fanny pads 
everywhere. Ah’d say the pumps at the new hooses have 
failed. They probably cannae handle what they’ve got tae 
deal wi. If it’s the actual sewer then we’ll need the DLO 
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[drainage direct labour organization] boys tae hae a look  
at this the day. 
Ivor advised us to sit tight until he could arrange something, 
and twenty minutes later the drainage DLO boys arrived in their 
van and trailer. On seeing us in our van they parked opposite us 
and while their gaffer came over to us, his squad stayed in their 
van and took their morning break. After we had chatted and 
established they were here to have a look and see if they needed 
to repair or renew the main sewer, the gaffer headed back to his 
van for his cup of tea, and I asked Rory if he knew any of the men 
in the van. “Oh f**k aye. There’s Haggis on the left, Fortnight, 
Squeaky Baws, Jaffa, then Jock who’ll be on the digger, an Tam 
Jamieson the gaffer we were jist talkin tae.” “The guy’s name 
is Jaffa?” I queried. “Aye,” said Rory, “it’s short fir Jaffa cake.” 
As I was still none the wiser, Rory explained the reference was to 
the fact the boy had had ‘the snip’ (a vasectomy) which meant 
he ‘fired blanks’ i.e. was like the chocolate Jaffa cake biscuit that 
tasted of orange but had no orange seeds i.e. was seedless. Our 
next plant was Auchtertool which at this time was at a standstill 
because, as Rory explained:
A pipe wis ripped intae. It’s they New Works boys. That 
chinky boy [an ethnic Chinese ESW engineer] Ming, is  
it? Ming the Arsehole. Cannae dae their f***in joab. Bit ye 
cannae fuckin tell them f*** all. So Ivor wants them tae  
pit in a temporary pipe. So we’ll tell them today. Ivor wis 
tell’n me noo there’s not to be treatment e the sewage at 
Kinghorn or Pettycur. So much fir it no longer bein able to 
be untreated and pumped intae the Forth. So much fir the 
year 2000. A load e shite.
Me: Am no followin ye.
Rory: If a place has a population o’ less than ten thousand 
they can still pump oot untreated sewage.
As Rory tried to make contact with someone in the New Works 
department I got on with the usual routine of going down the 
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dry well to manually check a pump before scrubbing down the 
channels, and then heading to the plant outlet that ran into the 
stream that flowed past the plant and scrubbing the area clean. 
Meanwhile, Rory took one of the insurance certificates he had in 
the driver’s side door compartment inside the small building in 
the plant where he hung it somewhere prominent on display, 
“jist in case the health an safety boys pay us a visit” as he later 
explained. As we sat in the van once the plant was checked Rory 
advised:
That’s Auchtertool and Cardenden and Leven screenhouse 
all getting done over.
Me: What’s bein done in Cardenden?
Rory: There’s new storm tanks bein built. Cardenden will 
never be flooded again judgin by the size e the tanks in there.
Me: That’s guid. The play park in Bowhill is often flooded 
fir months on end at times. Ye ken Ian Rankin the author fae 
Cardenden?
Rory: Aye.
Me: His first ever book was called The Flood, and the title 
refers tae a’ the floodin that Cardenden a’ways got.
Rory: Oh right.
Me: And what’s the problem here in Auchtertool?
Rory: They’re re-doin it cause it’s failin. The quality isnae 
good enough. Apparently the set-up isnae regular enough. 
It’s variable. If the vandals stop the sprinklers then the water 
isnae gettin spread evenly. So the New Works design team in 
Craigmitchell Hoose [Glenrothes] say we need a new way at 
Auchtertool.
As we sat and talked a car came down the track towards the 
plant, and on seeing the car Rory told me it was not an ESW 
employee but someone from Klargester. “Don’t know if that’s a 
Dutch or German company but obviously Klargester won the 
tender. Of course they’ll sub-contract. They’ll get on the phone tae 
the cheapest Scottish company tae dae the civil, ken the donkey 
work e digging an whatever. Civil engineerin is jist donkey work. 
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Machines. Movin this and that etcetera.” Our next stop was 
Cluny which was only a pump station that required to be checked. 
Next, we headed to Kinglassie which was a pump station with 
large storm tanks and which took all the sewage from Kinglassie 
and, only screening the sewage as opposed to treating it, pumped 
it via a long rising main to the main trunk sewer which runs along 
the river Ore and which takes raw sewage from as far away as 
Kelty all the way to the river Leven and eventually into Leven 
screenhouse. After Kinglassie our next stop was Thornton, which 
in my memory is always associated with having to save frogs as 
a result of the fact that whenever it rained heavily during the 
night, for some obscure reason, this meant having to spend part 
of the following day rescuing frogs from various storm tanks and 
wells and Thornton plant in particular.
On this particular day I spotted two frogs struggling in the 
well and went to the back of the van for a bucket before heading 
down the well to rescue the frogs. The procedure at Thornton was 
to drain the well using the pumps until the level was sufficiently 
low, at which point the pumps were switched off and I could go 
down the ladder and wade through the water and get to the frogs. 
Safely in my bucket, I would give the all-clear to Rory to switch 
on the pumps again to pump out what was left in the well. Once 
a week we also had to thoroughly wash down the well, but on this 
particular day we hadn’t the time. Before we headed back down 
the east coast of Fife to Dysart, we swung by Kirkcaldy works for 
some degreaser for the floats at MacDuff. At MacDuff 43 we 
cleaned the floats and level censors that hung in the chamber and 
which were attached to cables and picked up the level of the water 
by measuring the distance from the floats on the surface. The 
floats had to be regularly freed from thick deposits of domestic fat 
and grease that accumulated around the censors. Our last job 
before stopping for dinner was to go to Dysart harbor to check the 
43 Whenever I was lone working and was my own boss, I always tried to take 
my dinner break at MacDuff to enjoy its secluded peace and beauty and walk 
through the trees until I could see the sea, and then sit and eat while daydreaming 
and gazing out to sea.
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pumps before driving to West Wemyss where we had our dinner 
overlooking the Firth of Forth. As we listened to the news on 
Kingdom FM, the newsreader used the phrase “the Scottish 
government,” and I was struck by this phrase and said to Rory 
this was a change. “Aye…” said Rory in agreement as he looked 
over the water to Edinburgh, “we’ve oor ain government sitting 
o’er there noo.” The next news item concerned allegations of the 
Indonesian army committing atrocities in East Timor, and as the 
newsreader reported how a UN peacekeeping force could be in 
East Timor by the weekend Rory commented: “We should get in 
there and kick f**k oot e they Indonesian c**ts. F**kin Hindu 
bastards.” Next on the news came a report that a new European 
Commission has been approved as a result of the previous 
Commission having resigned en masse due to corruption, and 
this new Commission was to be headed by an Italian named 
Romano Prodi. At this news item Rory commented: “So what do 
they do? Elect an Italian. F**k me! An Ah thought Italians were 
a’ Catholics? Some name fir a Catholic!”
After dinner we headed to East Wemyss plant, and as we 
parked the van Rory advised we had nine vents to clean for 
insurance purposes but this time-consuming job would have to 
wait for another day. East Wemyss plant was basically a screen-
house with two large Archimedes water pumps taking raw sewage 
and screening it before it went to the outfall untreated. After East 
Wemyss we headed to the last group of plants to be checked that 
day. Our first stop was to check the Satic pump beside The Empire 
pub in Lower Methil, before heading to what was referred to as 
the RGC (power station) but which had been taken over by 
Kvaerner Oil and Gas. This meant passing through a manned 
security checkpoint and barrier in order to check three large 
pumps. The next plant was the nearby Leven Roondall into which 
most of Leven’s sewage went, and from where it was gravity–fed 
to Methil power station (a.k.a. the RGC power station) and 
pumped from there to Leven Screenhouse, and then out to the 
Firth of Forth estuary. However, if there is too much inflow 
coming into the Roondall, the excess goes over a weir into another 
channel and from there is pumped untreated into the Forth where 
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the trained eye can spot the two marker buoys indicating the 
location of the end of the outlet pipe. After the Roondall we 
headed to our final plant of the day which was Leven Screenhouse, 
a very large building with a very large capacity. From the plaque 
on the building I could see the Screenhouse was opened in 1952 
by Lord Home, Scottish Secretary and was originally run by The 
River Leven Purification Scheme. Into this plant came all of the 
contents of the main trunk sewer that carried waste from as far 
away as Kelty, through Glenrothes and then Leven, before being 
mashed up by very powerful and very loud macerators before 
being pumped out into the Forth untreated.
As we headed inside Rory told me there was a problem with “too 
much shit” getting caught around the macerators as well as there 
being an ongoing problem with very large eels getting caught in the 
communators, with nobody being able to explain how they were 
able to get into the system. On this particular day one of the 
communators wasn’t working, so we opened the storm channel 
penstock and then shut the duty penstock to put the plant on by-pass 
to give us a chance to get our waders on and go into the water and 
give the communators a clean, initially using long brushes specially 
made for the purpose but, as it was difficult to get sufficient purchase 
on the machinery when using such long brushes meant being four 
feet away, we ended up doing the job by hand and putting our hands 
beneath the water to feel around the macerators for any debris. 
After cleaning around the macerators and having removed the 
larger items that had made it through we reset the plant and 
signed and dated the log book and headed back outside, where we 
met a SEPA analyst (Davie Black) who had come to take samples. 
As we chatted I asked him what he was looking out for. “Bad 
stuff” he joked. “What counts as bad stuff?” I asked. “Mercury, 
volatiles, iron, zinc etcetera. The pesticides farmers use. A sheep 
dip is probably the worst gaun aboot. Ye dinnae ken what yer 
eatin or drinkin. At Leven here Ah’ve found cryptosporidium. Bad 
if it gets into the water supply. Salmonella. E coli. Methane. 
Hydrogen sulphide.” After a quick chat we took our leave and 
headed back to Kirkcaldy where I dropped Rory off at his house 
before heading home. 
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While these two brief excerpts from my participant observation 
of work as an agricultural labourer and a manual sewerage opera-
tive are included in order to communicate something of the 
concrete ‘world of work,’ when writing about working it is 
actually very difficult to actually write about working and avoid 
writing about conversations, incidents, in fact everything except 
working. It is actually extraordinarily difficult to write about 
sorting carrots per se as this would require describing particular 
hand, arm and body movements that, because they were so many 
and done without thinking or reflection, are beyond recall and 
therefore beyond representation in writing. Hence, if one attempted 
to describe digging a ditch by hand, unless one had a video record-
ing of the process, it is more or less impossible to actually recall 
and describe in sequence the range and order of movements of 
one’s body as, again, they will be ‘innumerable’ and so nuanced 
that the time and trouble and necessary wordage required to 
communicate them to a reader in realistic detail would be 
practically impossible as they are beyond recall because the body 
acts and the mind deliberates and reacts so spontaneously to 
its environment as one digs a trench that the labourer is simply 
unable to recall and represent his doing afterwards, even if he 
wished to do so. Perhaps the following description of miners 
working by Nash (1993, pp. 173-174) is the only option if one 
attempts to describe working:
Manuel worked twenty seconds pounding, he stopped  
to measure the distance on the other side to see that it  
would line up evenly, then pounded the mallet one minute, 
rested fifteen seconds, breathing through the inhaler, worked 
another three seconds, paused, hammered another three 
seconds, stopped as another worker sidled by in the narrow 
passage…proceeded to work again, striking one minute, 
taking a five-minute break, striking thirty seconds with a 
thirty-second break, working twenty seconds…
When writing about working with East of Scotland Water it is 
difficult to resist describing everything but working because there 
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is a dignified relationship between the men and machinery, 
between the men and their work tasks and the time allowed to 
accomplish them. At East of Scotland Water the men know and 
use and fix machines and working with Paul, for example, it was 
clear there was a received wisdom ‘at hand’ about how to go 
about every job; that each wastewater treatment plant had its own 
history which meant a wealth of experience within the worker 
was ‘at hand’ to be displayed when maintaining any particular 
plant. However, when working at Kettle Produce one is forgiven 
for saying there is no relationship to machinery, and that any sense 
of self as agent is lost to the experience of self as pure passivity, 
and that the sense of immediacy has implications for the lack of 
reflexivity and the non-conceptualisation of their selves and their 
work. 
While rendering via writing the movements of the body while 
working is extremely difficult, the fact is without drawing upon the 
body and embodiment, one has no medium of knowing manual 
labour; that it is via the body that the reality of work is known long 
before it ever becomes a matter of words or conceptual knowledge 
– if it ever becomes these. The body, then, understands working, 
grasps what the mind forms no concept of, and registers what the 
mind finds uninteresting and pays as little attention to as possible. 
For the ethnographer, however, the impact of working upon the 
body must become an object of analysis. If the body ‘feeds’ reality 
to the mind or mediates particular realities to the life of the mind, 
this mental existence is another sui generic source and medium of 
reality which is responsible for unique human experiences such as 
meaning, insights and experiences such as ignorance and not 
knowing and the experience of the tension that is the discrepancy 
between seeing or ‘taking a look’ and ‘knowing.’ This radical 
difference between ‘taking a look’ and ‘knowing’ and the mental 
tension involved was a familiar fieldwork experience as I often 
looked at a diagram or flow chart describing a plant’s process and 
could only ‘gape’ at this symbolic representation because I did not 
have a clue what it meant. Likewise, technical conversations among 
workers I could sometimes only listen to without understanding 
insofar as the meaning escaped me.
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Another aspect of social behaviour that is of interest as an 
object of analysis is the use of language as it seems clear that 
workers have a very particular relationship to language, and 
practice a defining use of language which was often evidenced, for 
example, when driving from one job to another and I listened as 
the men enjoyed calling out to each other and assigning ‘ontological 
labels’ to the sights they passed by. For example, then, upon 
passing someone who, for whatever reason, was deemed to be 
wearing something unusual or had some kind of manner about 
him: “Look at that poof;” upon passing someone wearing large 
sunglasses: “Look at f**kin Elvis Presley there wi the seventies 
shades;” on passing a young woman: “Quite tidy. Nice tits. 
Ah’d shag her fir a start;” on passing two women: “Ah dinnae 
fancy yours much Adam;” on passing a child wearing a Rangers 
football shirt: “That’s a form e child abuse;” on listening to a 
radio announcer announcing the song Heal The Pain by the pop 
singer George Michael: “Feel the pain? Aye, the pain up your 
Greek arse loverboy!” 
This ad libitum use of language was something that more or 
less went on all day every day, and just as with the internalization 
of a hyper-invigilation of self and others as a result of a frenetic 
pace of working discussed earlier, so this use of language was as 
often aimed at themselves as much as others.
For example, then, when someone happened to be working 
for a length of time with the others standing about talking, instead 
of any trace of ambivalence, far less guilt, there would be 
comments such as: “Ye’ve missed a bit ya daft bastard. Are ye 
blind?” Language geared to constituting and maintaining a 
particular mitsein meant ‘having a laugh’ was a routine affair 
so that when three or four workers gathered together, this often 
meant an audience to be performed to and behaviours such as 
grabbing a screen rake to use as a microphone and clowning 
about and dancing while The Divine Comedy’s Generation 
Sex played on the radio with the dancing worker (and fellow 
sociology graduate) advising his observing workmates: “Heh 
boys, Ah’m tell’n ye, if they had done this dance on their video 
they’d have got tae number wane. Ah’m tellin ye. Brilliant, eh?” If 
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the reaction to such a show was a predictable chorus of guffaws 
and one-liners such as “Look at that c**t” (Mick)” or smiling 
wearily and observing: “F**kin students!” (Adam) and the 
worker-dancer retorting: “Superannuated slaves!,” in recalling 
such scenes the aim is not to describe a worker dancing but the 
enactment of a form of sociality or intersubjectivity or mitsein 
that was integral to the experience of working.
It is clear that in describing the world of work there are 
many different kinds of realities that are potential objects of 
analysis, but if we wished to focus solely upon actual ‘working’ 
we might begin with the basic point of Wallman (1979 p. 4) 
who describes how: “In physiological terms each [worker] is 
expending energy and is therefore altered by the work effort.” 
Regarding this socialisation of the body, then, insofar as the 
anthropologist participates in work, the ethnographer’s “body 
may serve as a diagnostic tool” (Blacking 1977, p. 5) and insofar 
as he is reflexive he is able to conceptualise the physical 
structuration brought into being by doing. As a first attempt at 
arriving at such a conceptualisation of the basic physiological 
alteration of the worker as a result of the expenditure of energy 
by working, I introduce the notion of a reduction. Hence, just as 
when applying heat to a foodstuff in cooking it is said to become 
more concentrated or reduced, so the activity of working when 
conceived as expending energy can similarly be described as 
reducing the body to a more ‘concentrated’ or basic or simple 
version of itself, so the body too can be described as undergoing 
a process of being ‘reduced’ by work.
I conceive the worked-self or the dasein brought into being 
by doing, then, in terms of a physical and biological reduction 
effected by the expenditure of energy in labouring and introduce 
the term reduction as a way of conceptualising the particular 
embodiment of labourers or the labouring body. The semantic 
cluster of food, reduction, digestion, ingestion and assimilation 
are suggestive of a condition that comes into being as a direct 
result of the burning of energy via working and the somatic 
quality of this becoming, with the culinary metaphor designed to 
communicate the notion of a dasein not only made real as a result 
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of undergoing a process but the visceral and bodily quality 
of becoming this dasein, as well as the quality of inalienability 
thanks to becoming this reality via bodily assimilation and 
‘ingestion.’ The worker then instead of becoming something 
radically other than himself is better described as changing into 
a version of himself that comes into being via performing or 
‘suffering’ the social practice of labour, with the culinary metaphor 
of ‘reduction’ suggesting the interior biochemical processes or 
physicality of this becoming that comes into being, and to indicate 
the processual nature of this becoming and to advert to the 
historicity of embodiment within the worker as a result of his 
practice of labour and to describe the labourer’s embeddedness in 
his ownmost being.
The term ‘reduction’ or ‘condition of reduction’ is also used to 
advert to the worker’s orientation to or anticipation of the future 
on the basis of this becoming; its dynamic and autonomous 
tendency and the decentred nature of the dasein of manual 
labourers as a result of this ‘worked condition’ informing the 
personality thanks to being taken up into the lifeworld through 
the exercise of freedom. The notion of a ‘worked self’ is used to 
conceive and indicate not only the historicity of embodiment 
but its dynamic orientation of the person towards his social 
environment and the future, an embodied and dynamic ‘secondary 
nature’ that informs behaviour and personality; hence, when 
viewed according to the lifeworld that is immersed in this class, 
what occurs is the reduction to reality, while for the outside 
observer a particular construction of a non-objective reality or 
‘secondary nature’ is brought about.
If the notion of a condition of reduction allows us to ‘‘see the 
agent not primarily as the locus of representations, but as engaged 
in practices’’ (Calhoun et al. 1993, p. 49), it also suggests the 
impossibility of a ‘spectatorial gaze’ capable of suspecting, far 
less knowing, this kind-of-being that comes into being via 
working. If the effect of work is inalienable, there is a becoming 
that is intensely private and personal yet shared and ‘objective’ 
among manual labourers and which cannot be appropriated 
unless one practices this form of life. I propose this ‘reduction’ 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
146
then as the basic universal category that describes lives of manual 
labour, so that anyone living this life will share in this ontology 
which spans the industrial and post-industrial eras. Also, while 
clearly not every working-class individual will share in this 
condition of reduction as their existential reality, those who are 
not manual labourers themselves can be described as being 
socialised in contexts heavily marked by the culture of manual 
labour and the dasein and mitsein such a culture or occupational 
community brings into existence. The reduced dasein is properly 
said to be for the worker only in whom it becomes a departure 
point for subsequent mediations and constructions of self.
The worked-self only exists as a personal dasein or a person’s 
ownmost existence insofar as it is enacted, so that the condition 
of reduction is a contingent process and condition. However, long 
before any particular individual becomes this dasein, it is very 
likely they have been surrounded by it as a lived condition they 
themselves did not instantiate yet as the living form of their life. 
Prior to the advent of their labouring existence, then, they are 
shaped by it via socialisation and share the intentionality and use 
of language it produces, despite the fact they may have no direct 
experience of manual labour. This condition then objectively exists 
in others before it is enacted via labour in any particular individual, 
so that when it is ‘becomed’ via labour, the ontology of adulthood 
and the socialisation of childhood and adolescence are aligned 
and integrated in a living synthesis and their antepredicative 
group membership is ‘thickened.’ This is how I meet Bourdieu’s 
characterization of the concept of a historicist ontology being 
‘‘truly oxymoronic’’ (in Calhoun et al. 1993, p. 273).
If one of the effects of manual labouring for workers’ dasein is 
“the extreme simplification of their situation [causing their]…
environment to become condensed and uniform” (Sartre 1966, 
p. 707) and the establishment of a ‘primitive’ mitsein, this is not 
to imagine the burden of freedom is lost as the manual worker 
at some point during every Scottish winter is likely to recognise 
within himself the predicament of the systematic divergence 
between the life he is more or less fated to live and the life he 
would choose to live if he were free to choose. There remains 
147
t h e  b e i n g  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  d o i n g
a dialectic or tension between ‘social determination’ and the 
exercise of freedom, and in this regard I argue that there is a 
specific form of individuation that takes its ‘social determination’ 
as its medium and starting point for the exercise of freedom and 
choice throughout the course of a lifetime.
2.3 The Reduced Person
In our inquiry into the relationship between material and mental 
life we began by raising the question as to what extent we could 
describe the socialised body as a ‘source of self,’ and began with 
a simple anecdote to illustrate how the body is socialised and 
how the external world becomes immanent and ‘made flesh’ and 
informs the physical body. I now proceed to articulate a second 
level where the reality of embodiment is extended and is a medium 
for the constitution of the depths of intentionality and personality, 
and I begin by reproducing some of the testimony of a thirty-five 
year old worker (Dauvit Urquhart, Orebank Road) who at the 
time of interview in November 1999 began talking about his work 
while being interviewed about his views on the new Scottish 
parliament, and whose discourse on a first reading appears to 
be an example of how work is not a source of self but an example 
of Offe’s (1985) assertion that, in the post-industrial era, work 
or occupational identity is no longer the dominating source of 
identity for workers that it once was. 
Dauvit: Everythin revolves aroond money eh...
Me: Where are ye workin aboot?
Dauvit: Bukos. Supermarket trolleys an that, eh? Ah wis 
there an Ah left. This is ma third time back. Ah’ve been back 
comin up fir two year noo or somethin. Bit Ah mean the 
money’s crap. Bit it’s only five minutes o’er the road.
Me: Ah used tae work back shift at Kettle Produce, 
packin veg.
Dauvit: Oh Ah wis up there an a’. Ah wis the same a couple 
e Christmas’ ago. In fact the wife wis wi us wane year. The 
bairn wis only aboot two or somethin, an ma faither said 
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‘Ah’ll watch it.’ Couple e shifts o’er Christmas on the night 
shift. Cannae mind what we were. Twenty quid a shift or 
something the night shift, bit c**t ye’ve got tae dae it eh 
when yer skint. Ye’ve got tae dae it, eh? Aye, Ah’ve been up 
there a couple e times eh, jist sort e on the side an that eh, 
workin away bit. Plus Ah never want tae go back tae cause 
it’s aye the winter months when everythin’s happenin ye ken. 
It’s f***in freezin ken.
Me: Ah see the tattie place in Cluny is shut.
Dauvit: In fact Ah went along, Ah wis strugglin aboot three 
year ago an a’. Ah went along fir a joab and what wis it fir, 
Ah wis back shift that first week Ah started. Ah done the 
Monday and the Tuesday and Wednesday. Ah come f***in 
hame. Went tae the portacabin, went fir a pish an the boy wis 
watchin the Liverpool game. An Ah said Ah’m no workin in 
here. It worked oot aboot twenty-one pound a night or 
somethin. Ken it wis say, four o’clock till twelve, or five 
o’clock till one in the mornin it wis. Bit it worked oot aboot 
a hunder an twa pound a week or somethin an Ah thought 
f**k, Ah wis desperate wi Christmas comin eh, wi the bairns.
Me: It’s jist what ye can get. Last Christmas I worked six 
twelve-hour shifts at the Post Office a week for two hunder 
an fifty.
Dauvit: Terrible eh? Bit everybody’s the same noo. Ah mean 
even wi the minimum rate an that. Ah wis oan four [pounds] 
sixty-three [pence] an oor there Ah think. Ah dinnae make 
bonus or that at ma work, eh? When Ah wis workin on the 
line operatin, Ah mean Ah wis getting o’er thirty-five pound 
a week bonus. Ah went hame wi two hunder an five, two 
hunder an six pound jist fir ma thirty-nine oors which 
wisnae bad. Bit Ah’ve got an easier joab noo, Ah jist drive a 
forklift an that an dinnae make nae bonus. Ken, bit four 
[pounds] sixty-three [pence] an hour an they’re that tight 
these bastards.44
44 In March 2000 the average weekly wage in the U.K. was £426, so that with 
the official government definition of poverty as less than half average earnings 
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Me: What’s the union at Bukos?
Dauvit: Transport and General. Half e Cardenden’s there. 
There’s loads an loads e folk.
Me: How many’s employed there?
Dauvit: Full time there’s usually aboot two hunder an fifty 
or three hunder ken, bit like the noo Christmas, that’s the 
rush. Ah think there wis four hunder an forty or something. 
They jist payed them a’ aff there.
Me: So they take on folk especially for the Christmas?
Dauvit: Aye. Ah’m usually aboot July, August time, right up 
tae Christmas ken. Usually get aboot six month, eh? Some 
folk are jist there six weeks an get paid aff again. Christmas. 
That’s a’ the orders. Shite, eh? Bit it’s a joab, eh? 45 
At no point in Dauvit’s discourse is work described as meaningful 
and we might even say that there is in Dauvit’s testimony 
a relentless unsaid advertence to the fact that his work is so 
meaningless that its presence in his consciousness is stripped to 
the bare minimum, that work is something that hardly merits 
being paid attention to and hardly merits existence in language. 
It seems clear that Dauvit’s work does not relate him to the ‘realm 
of meaning’ and that his work is purely functional, so that in 
contrast to traditional sociological studies of ‘occupational 
identity,’ for example, Dauvit’s relation to work is not sufficiently 
real or significant to him to generate a work identity, or at 
least one that merits being talked about. Also, however, Dauvit 
does not use the meaninglessness of work to highlight the 
meaningfulness of other realms of experience or contrast his 
Dauvit is classed as living in poverty, although he himself describes his weekly 
wage of £206 as “not bad.” In August 2001 a 30 year-old male informant 
showed me his Jobseeker’s Allowance letter of notification advising he was 
entitled to £53.05 a week or £7.58 a day; enough to buy four pints of lager at 
£1.75 from the local Railway Tavern. 
45 As reported in The Fife Free Press on 4 January 2002, Buko Ltd, a Glenrothes-
based supermarket trolley manufacturer employing 280 staff went into 
receivership in December 2001. 
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work experience to a non-work related world such as self, family, 
home or some leisure-time activity or interest, so that from 
Dauvit’s discourse it seems his work experience is isomorphic with 
his relation to the ‘realm of meaning’ and it is likely that his work 
experience ‘flattens’ his experience of non-work realms or fashions 
other realms of experience into its image, as if his relation to the 
market informs his lifeworld insofar as there is no surplus left over 
that allows his experience to reach escape velocity from the 
structuration effected by more or less ‘meaningless’ work.
The task of articulating the relationship between material 
and mental life is less than straightforward insofar as a worker 
is concerned to keep his ‘market objectivity’ at arms length 
from his sense of self, and at some distance from his self-
representation to others in language. However, the sharp existential 
preoccupation with maintaining a ‘live’ connection to the world 
of paid employment is the evidence for the inability to credibly 
imagine any manual labourer’s consciousness and dasein being 
free of deep accommodations to the market place, regardless of 
linguistic self-presentations. When listening to East of Scotland 
Water sewage operative Rory, in his early forties, recount how he 
had been a miner, worked as a cook, worked in the building trade 
and now worked as a drainage operative as well as having been 
unemployed at one point for four years, it is clear that finding and 
keeping a job had taken continual effort because it is fundamental 
to constituting his identity and the social status of an adult to the 
extent that his other identities as a man, a father or a husband or 
a son and brother all fundamentally stand in relation to his being 
employed, and stand in a relationship of dependency to being 
employed, so that the free market or the occupational landscape 
is the mirror in which every man must continually look if he is to 
see himself as a competent adult. However, while every worker 
I have ever worked with more or less accepted the social order, 
I have never met a manual worker who consecrated the social 
order he accepted.
Similarly, workers do not consecrate their occupation or 
turn their string of jobs or constitute their history of relationship 
to the market into a ‘career,’ so that while Rory has done a string 
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of jobs, he never imagines or represents himself as having one 
true vocation or path in life because his material conditions do not 
allow such a signification of his life; his manual-level occupational 
history forbids such reifications about himself, and for the truly 
decentred economic biography all such fictions are reserved for 
the elite caste of professionals, among whom the relation between 
material and mental life sees inflated mentalist theories of the 
self and personality which are isomorphic with consecrations of 
the social order thanks to the myth that one’s occupation is the 
result of one’s special vocation and unique talents operating in 
a just social order where talent and hard work are rewarded.
For all of Dauvit’s impersonal matter-of-fact and even ‘off-
hand’ manner of speaking about his working life that may 
mis-direct his interviewer into imagining a gulf exists between 
his material and mental life, it is clear how ‘ready to hand’ are 
not only the details of his hourly rate and take-home pay but 
his inability to be other than his objective economic position.
 I propose Dauvit’s testimony evidences his inability to be more 
than his relations and his subjectivity’s inability to be impersonal 
or distanced from his objectivity because of the inability to 
construct any distance between himself and the world: his 
personality and discourse and comportment are always reducible 
to his objective social position. In Dauvit’s discourse we have a 
self-assured telling of what ‘half of Cardenden’ would also no 
doubt have to say regarding their working life; a matter-of-fact 
relating how the impersonal practice of work produces a highly 
personable lack of personality or a ‘subjectless subjectivity,’ which 
instantiates the most personal relations with the most impersonal 
objective conditions so that Dauvit talks of himself almost in 
the third person. Under cover of matter-of-factly relating the 
matter-of-fact facts to an interviewer, far from an impersonal 
reality that has little significance for the self being talked about 
is the paradox of a person freed of any personal relation to the 
person he is; a person perfectly at ease with his alienation from his 
ownmost being.
The contextual dasein that comes into being via doing then is 
a complex reality because what comes into being is simultaneously 
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the worker’s ownmost being (Heidegger 1962, p. 307) insofar 
as the emotional life as a symbolic system is sedimented or 
embedded within the endoctrine system (Wilkinson 2000) of 
the worker thanks to the day-to-day necessity of ‘selling one’s 
labour,’ yet there is no myth of personality that accompanies 
this deep becoming. Also, because of the relentless experience of 
being related to one’s objective social position, using terms such 
as ‘economic behaviour’ is a false representation even of economic 
behaviours as these are never separate or free from social relations. 
Insofar as meaningless work does not make possible a meaningful 
family or social or inner life, the sociological imagination that 
posits the dualism of ‘work’ and ‘non-work’ is a flight from 
the reality of working-class lives because there is a relentless 
isomorphism. Indeed, one is tempted to write the lived experience 
of the economic is the extent of how they experience the social 
realm because the quality of their experience of ‘society’ has been 
more or less completely reduced to being dependent upon the 
purely ‘economic’ realm, so that there is no evidence whatever of 
the reification named the ‘work ethic’ because no ideological 
articulation of the necessary is necessary.
Listening to East of Scotland Water authority workers analyse 
and compare and discuss at great length the minutiae of their pay 
slips, and discuss the pros and cons of the immanent shift from 
weekly to monthly payment, was to become aware that these 
workers “have no margin of security’’ (Nash 1993, p. 102) so that 
an immanent absence of income for three weeks led to all sorts of 
pressures being felt, so that union and management took the step 
of making an interest-free bridging loan available to workers. This 
more or less permanent pressure acts as an existential horizon that 
acts to configure and confine the person to the real and explains 
another feature of Dauvit’s testimony which is the absence of any 
space or room for interpretation. For Dauvit there is no possibility 
of misunderstanding or ‘false consciousness’ to enter into his 
account or representation of work. In his friendly and assured 
performance there are no euphemising mechanisms whatever so 
that whatever is, is perfectly on view: the relentless determination 
and the relentless lack of power to change this condition of being 
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determined. There is no attempt to cover anything and there is 
no interpretation required from the ethnographer in order to 
attain a hidden or unsaid reality as Dauvit’s discourse simply 
mirrors Reality, and there is no room to engage in interpretivism 
or perspectivism.
As the dominant relation in the experience of workers is the 
labour-wage relation, this relationship realises in an eminent 
manner the fundamental structuralist principle that the real is 
relational, and the daily obedience to and daily performance of 
this ‘fact of life’ safeguards against temptations to a substantivist 
self-understanding by workers themselves. For the ethnographer, 
then, any realistic representation of manual workers must 
fundamentally concern itself with how work configures the 
relation between the material and the mental as a necessary 
‘odedience’ in the order of representation that mirrors the 
necessary ‘obedience’ to social reality which workers practice on a 
daily basis. Work is both structurally fundamental and existentially 
“f***in crap;” is despised as the source of unhappinesses and 
frustrations but also the sine qua non of maintaining one’s social 
identity and place in society. Because of this dual reality it seems 
likely that the manual worker will not invest time and effort in 
cultivating what is simultaneously his despised-yet-necessary 
identity as a worker, so that ‘being a worker’ seems fated to be the 
least likely standpoint upon which a worker would build a project 
of self-appropriation.
If workers ever do gaze into their ‘lived experience’ of the 
‘point of production,’ what is clear is that they require an 
interpretive horizon to prompt them to suspect their ‘point of 
production’ experience can be a point of departure for something 
such as a project of self-appropriation, and isomorphic with 
this finding is the fact that there is no automatic or direct link 
between the workplace and (revolutionary) consciousness because 
no situation whatever causes a particular consciousness about 
that situation, and to imagine this is to be in profound confusion 
as to the relationship between material or physical conditions and 
their symbolisation or interpretation. Lived experience can either 
come alive or remain largely inert thanks to the “large cultural 
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systems” (Anderson, cited in Bhabha 1990, p. 1) that are brought 
to bear upon its perception and interpretation, so that instead 
of assuming there is a univocal relationship between “life as 
physical existence” (Connerton 1989, p. 101) and consciousness, 
it is precisely this which requires painstaking investigation along 
with inquiry into the different cultural and symbolic material 
available to workers in any particular context with which they 
imagine their condition and bring their ‘secondary nature’ into 
the realm of language and consciousness. According to Tanner 
et al. (1992, p. 447): 
[N]umerous case studies, particularly in the British context, 
have consistently failed to document a strong connection 
between objective work experiences and working-class 
social imagery (Bulmer 1975)…in his study of American 
manual workers, Hallee (1988: 4) found evidence of  
‘multiple identity holding’. While work did provide them 
with a ‘working man’ identity (which governed their indus-
trial behaviour), this co-existed with a non-work identity, 
based on life-styles and consumptive patterns.
Hence, experiences on the job are not automatically fated to 
have exceptional ‘causal’ effects upon workers who have other 
identities that are the source of other ‘rival’ experiences competing 
to ‘cause’ or determine behaviour and consciousness. With multi-
ple identities being the source of multiple experiences, it is difficult 
to see why one identity and one source of experience should 
predominate over the rest, especially when the source of identity 
and experience is not judged pleasant or a matter of pride and 
self-esteem. It is because ‘work experience’ becomes caught in 
the realm of meaning where it is negatively evaluated (and the 
fact that bios as a sui generic realm can exist independently of 
logos), that explains why work as a source of self may not register 
in consciousness, far less be for the worker the identity that is to 
be privileged above all his other identities and experiences.
I argue it would be a grave mistake to imagine the presence 
of work in the ‘life projects’ of workers (Offe 1985) is becoming 
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marginal and to take discursive disavowals of work at face 
value. What is clearly on view in Dauvit’s testimony, but nowhere 
actually stated, is not just the constant presence of the need to 
keep reproducing week-to-week existence and the constant 
awareness that this is only possible via work and wages, but 
precisely because in such lives work’s presence outside work is 
never far away because “everything revolves around money,” 
Dauvit is inviting the conclusion that meaningless work renders 
‘everything’ meaningless insofar as everything enters into its 
sphere of influence and becomes reduced to its image and likeness. 
This would seem to contradict the notion that the meaningfulness 
of work is derived from its making possible non-work realities 
such as social life or family life, so that a lifetime of doing 
meaningless work is the ultimate proof of the meaningfulness of 
the most meaningless forms of work in the free-market order.
It seems clear that both positions are true and in a frank 
existential manner Dauvit lives the truism that social order and 
the desire to belong and maintain one’s place in society is what 
compels individuals to take up the practice of ‘meaningless’ occu-
pations, and that the free-market society is integrated via the 
market (Hayek 1976) and a shared non-economic realm of mean-
ing or a Durkheimian conscience collective is marginal to main-
taining social order. The paradox is that both the following 
contradictory positions are true: it is non-economic goals and 
motivations that are the only motivation Dauvit has available 
to motivate his economic behaviour and these non-economic 
values bear the weight of maintaining his integration into the free-
market order, an order which militates against non-market reali-
ties and motivations. Dauvit lives in a post-industrial eco- 
nomy that has been ‘‘disorganised’’ (Lash & Urry 1987) and his 
own imagining of his relation to work might also be described as 
disorganised, insecure and continually under threat, as both 
Dauvit’s accommodations to and his resistances to the discipline 
of the workplace are fragmented, private and even chaotic affairs. 
In contrast to the coalmining industrial era of his father and 
grandfather before him, there is little chance of this first post-
industrial generation reproducing the rich ‘workers culture’ that 
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developed across the generations until it came to an end in the 
late nineteen-eighties. However, even in such circumstances when 
not only is an occupational identity constantly under threat of 
dissolving into nothing and any attempts at worker organisation 
and empowerment via trade union activity is disorganised and 
flitting, Dauvit is unconcerned to hide or euphemise the omnipre- 
sent subjective consequences of his market objectivity as he knows 
all the evidence is stacked against any other self-representation, 
and his mindfulness of this fact results in his use of language 
which reflects his matter-of-fact acceptance of a defeat which in 
others can result in inarticulate rage.
Poverty as Res Cogitans in The Number 1 Goth
Going in the Number 1 Goth on a cold winter afternoon I ordered 
a pint and took a seat at the bar. After being served I was 
approached by ‘John’ who peremptorily informed me: “Ma car’s 
packed up.” From his speech and movement I immediately saw 
that John was drunk, and several times he announced in a loud 
voice to no-one in particular that he was about to head home; was 
going home to check his gas meter to see if he had enough credit 
to allow him to put the heating on “withoot feelin guilty.” As I sat 
on a stool leaning on the bar, John made a point of informing me 
he had twelve pounds and thirty-three pence worth of gas left in 
his meter. At first I thought that John was expecting me to start 
a conversation, and so I tamely asked: “How do you mean gas 
meter?” as at that point I hadn’t known anybody poor enough 
to have to resort to this way of consuming gas in their home. 
My query, however, went unanswered as John suddenly shouted 
“F**kin braw!” as if three separate and distinct words in the 
general direction of the mirrored gantry behind the bar. At this 
outburst the barman who was busy setting tables looked up in our 
direction but said nothing, and resumed his work. Next, John 
announced he would go to bed and that he wanted to read the 
paper in a warm bedroom until he had to “face the music when 
the wife gets in fae work.” John, however, didn’t go home but 
went to the toilet.
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I ordered another pint and in the brief interlude the barman 
sympathised with me on being accosted by a noisy drunk. 
Returning from the toilet, the next topic John suddenly fixed 
upon was the state of his marriage, as he began a fitful monologue 
or drunken lament in the tradition of Burns’ Tam O’ Shanter 
(1791) and McDiarmid’s A Drunk Man Looks at a Thistle (1926). 
For about twenty minutes John performed a kind of masculine 
monologue of visceral abuse and venom that consisted of shouted 
words, half-formed sentences laced with descriptions of his 
wife as “that c**t,” “cow,” “stupid naggin bastard” and “f**kin 
arse;” as if each out loud expletive or half-sentence emerged from 
dark painful musings as he brought to mind some previous 
painful experience or harsh exchange of words between him and 
his wife. I made out comments such as, “She kens how tae lay it 
oan. F*** me! The car’s f***ed! Aye, yer f***ed withoot yer 
car,” and quickly surmised that being married for John was 
another means whereby the pressures exercised by the relentless 
isomorphism between material and mental life took another form 
and made his economic failure all the more promiscuous in its 
informing all of his other relationships. 
I took John’s ejaculations as evidence that ‘everything’ is 
problematised when one lacks sufficient money to repair a car, as 
this inability signals other consubstantial inabilities such as 
reproducing the behaviours that constitute the local model of male 
sociality such as frequenting pubs, buying drinks and running a 
car. After a further twenty minutes of John’s company I left for 
home, where I reflected that as my encounter with John had 
progressed I had become unsure whether or not I had even been 
‘talked at’ by John. At one point as John kept talking I maintained 
my silence to see if this would elicit some sort of recognition of me 
thanks to my lack of response on his part, but no recognition 
occurred. It seems by simply talking at anybody John found some 
relief from the weight of being reduced to his objectivity.
It seemed clear that, to paraphrase Shakespeare, it was ruin that 
had taught John to ruminate thus. Insofar as his economic failure 
– no gas and no car – signalled a man’s inability to be generous and 
to practice the small behaviours that allow him to successfully meet 
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and thereby fleetingly transcend his material conditions, and so 
fleetingly allow him to be more than be reduced to his market 
objectivity. My assumption (and it is clearly an assumption) is that 
underlying this local man’s fractured and flitting discourse on one 
topic after another was a glimpse of the quality of his relationships; 
of how so many of his relationships were ‘at risk’ insofar as his 
relationship to money was ‘at risk’ because money mediated his 
ability to maintain (or not maintain) a range of social practices. 
I also assume that money mediated the quality of his presence to his 
own psyche as it was this relationship to money that was in charge 
of whether or not he was, in his own estimation, ‘good to think’ or 
‘be around’ or present to; as if, because his psychological existence 
was relentlessly enthralled to social structure, for him to believe in 
himself was not in his own hands because his self-estimation or 
mental health was a radically decentred reality at the mercy of his 
material conditions and not something he possessed as he possessed 
the car keys in his pocket, for example. 
In this interpretation behaviour is reliant upon self-esteem which 
itself is in a more or less direct and immediate relationship to 
money, hence the wisdom of Bourdieu’s (1979, p. 40) observation 
that: “unemployment is so intensely feared only because economic 
deprivation is accompanied by a social mutilation’’ and unemploy-
ment entails the alienation from one’s former grasp upon one’s 
former psychological sense of self. In such a context, to ask what 
freedom or agency is likely from the psyche that derives real pleas-
ure from having twelve pounds of credit for gas left feels akin to 
mocking the afflicted or asking the same foolish question of Edwin 
Muir (1935, pp. 142-3):
Once on a summer afternoon, as I watched the young men 
wandering among the ranges of slag-heaps outside Airdrie, 
I was foolish enough to wonder how it was that no sage or 
Mahatma had ever risen among them, for they seemed to me 
to have nothing to do but think.
Muir’s naivety was to wonder why the psyche immersed in 
material poverty could not be reflexive and ‘think itself;’ his 
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foolishness was to imagine the ‘life of mind’ did not have its 
own political economy and was a universal natural endowment 
that was free or autonomous vis-à-vis social and material 
circumstances. While peddlers of ‘pure reason’ define Man as 
a rational animal so that it seems no set of material conditions 
could divest any man of his nature, the fact is that the ‘life of 
mind’ is caught in a social determination and, given a relation 
of dependency exists between the life of mind and material 
conditions, for the young unemployed men mentioned in the 
above quote from Muir to produce ‘great wisdom’ would require 
not that these men overcome or transcend their condition of 
being ashamed of themselves as this is impossible, but that their 
relationship to their shame had become sufficiently free from 
shame so as to enable them to look at themselves and their shame 
‘freely,’ and exercise the freedom to use their ‘shame’ (and material 
conditions) as a standpoint or point of departure for their thinking 
i.e. would require them to have escaped the social determinism 
that dominates the symbolic order of the free-market realm of 
meaning that says poverty is ‘shameful’ and is not to be used as a 
standpoint for thought or an ‘identity’ to be represented because 
it is evil and not ‘good to be.’
In the philosophy of Aristotle things are made up of two 
realities, their matter and their form; and Aristotle describes the 
human intellect as the measure of all things or the master of forms 
because the intellect grasps the intelligible or spiritual form or 
eidos (idea) of things, and so is said to be able to become all things 
in a spiritual manner. In an analogous fashion I argue that poverty 
is promiscuous in its ability to ‘inform’ all things and make every 
relation and every reality into its image. This is because when 
poverty enters the symbolic realm as a res cogitans it means that 
being married for John, for example, became another mediation 
of not having any control over no longer having any control; 
having no say in a spouse’s reaction to a condition that must 
ordinarily wish to remain private, rather than yet another 
mediation of having to cede control over one’s lack of control. 
Being married meant that the facts of John’s objectivity or 
‘situation’ were taken out of his hands precisely when the wish to 
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be autonomous and have at his disposal sufficient agency to 
privatise the fact of his poverty would be most psychologically 
determining of his wishes and desires. As a single man the meaning 
of John’s poverty is far more able to be his own private affair, but 
from the moment he becomes a husband, the constitution and 
meaning and living out of his poverty is taken out of his hands and 
the defining of himself as a ‘failure’ is fated to be interpersonally 
mediated above and beyond being simply objectively real.
John’s discourse emerges from his awareness that he is fated to 
be relentlessly made aware of his objective worth or ‘market value’ 
as a result of being married; that in his mitsein or being-alongside-
others, integral to being sensitive is being sensitive to the criterion 
others deploy in their coming to their judgments about us and so, 
being sensitive to others will include learning ‘self-defence’ 
behaviours so as not to be the occasion for others coming to less 
than flattering judgments about us i.e. this dasein will develop the 
disposition to remove itself from the field of perception of others. 
Sensitivity to others, then, means the active non-representation of 
their being what they objectively are as they cleanse not only their 
own psyche but their intersubjective interaction and localities of 
their presence. This exigence will also inform their relationships to 
language and thinking and will exert pressure to give highly-
euphemised and highly-edited representations of themselves when 
among others because they know the judgments that await any 
objective or any free self-representation. 
The excluded, then, collude in their exclusion as they are under 
pressure to internalise the judgment that they are not ‘good to 
be or think’ so that, insofar as they are social animals and 
are sensitive to others, this very sensitivity leads to them ‘freely’ 
practicing self-exclusion; means their campaign against themselves 
becomes what a Scholastic thinker would term formally dynamic 
because it freely enacts and puts its exclusion together, and they 
‘freely’ do not produce true behaviours of their true selves when 
in the presence of others but rather euphemise, disguise and 
deceive and end up living what Rankin describes as “bitter, 
ignorant married lives’’ (1986, p. 148) thanks to such marriages 
being private and intimate spaces where market judgments are 
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intimately and relentlessly present, so that marriages become 
private sites for confrontations with the public market logic and 
its merciless classifying power that is capable, as per Corrie’s 
Black Earth (1939), of dissolving the family.
When a man is trained to see himself via the ‘mirror of 
production’ and he becomes unemployed, a series of psycho-social 
dynamics are released into the marital relation, routinely leading 
to the man’s withdrawal from his marriage; something which is 
more likely and more swift to occur among poor men as they are 
the more likely to be married to wives who use the same ‘mirror 
of production’ to see and judge their husband. Similarly addicted 
to the dominant symbolic order, the wife and the espousal 
relationship mediates a husband’s failure directly into his ‘inscape,’ 
and the husband-wife relationship seems fated to weaken as the 
man will psychologically retreat from the marriage and exclude 
himself from freely developing his relationship to his wife, and 
will instead practice withdrawal behaviours which will also 
inform his relation to his children so that in his fatherhood he will 
practice shame behaviours and withdraw from his children and 
this same psycho-dynamic will spread outwith the immediate 
family unit to his extended family and locality and will be ‘freely’ 
reproduced.
Baudrillard’s (1975) phrase the ‘mirror of production’ is used 
as shorthand for the idea that the horizon of the worker’s 
perception is limited to their occupation to the extent that they 
have no consciousness of their own outwith their industrial 
function. Examples of this are found in Corrie’s Black Earth 
(1939, p. 3) where we read: “There were long threads from the pit 
fastened to every soul in Brandon. The faster the pit went the 
faster the souls moved. When the pit stopped so did life.” Again, 
Black Earth (1939) opens on the morning of the elder son Jim 
about to start working down the pit for the first time and Jim is 
described as being glad to be going down the pit as it means 
becoming “a man at last and looking forward to the time when he 
would have a place of his own and make a real wage” (1939, 
p. 16). The common sense view that the labour-wage relation 
makes every other development of self or phase of the lifecycle 
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possible means the ‘mirror of production’ gives the true image or 
the true picture of what it is to be a man, and that only by looking 
into the ‘mirror of production’ can a boy ‘measure up,’ or see the 
true image of being a man and, on the basis that this image is 
shared by others, it is only by looking in the mirror of production 
that he can imagine a future for himself as a grown up competent 
member of the community. Industry, in the shape of the local pit, 
then, is the mirror boys look into to recognise themselves by and 
constitute their likeness to their fathers by and their belonging 
to locality. In this respect it is interesting to note that Robert 
Burns’ poem A Man’s A Man For A That (1795) which describes 
‘an honest poverty’ that ‘dares be poor,’ and how despite his 
poverty ‘a man’s a man for a that,’ so that poverty can not remove 
this inalienable dignity, obliterates the relation between material 
and mental life and is innocent of a sociology of meaning insofar 
as it represses the capture of the meaning of ‘being poor’ by 
‘the rich.’ My analysis rejects this immaculate universalist 
anthropology of pure reason and argues that a man’s poverty 
informs his ‘secondary nature.’
While any individual of any social class is characterised by 
their relations, the working class seem especially defined by their 
objective social relations so that there is a high degree of libidinal 
investment in the ordinary mundane relations of the marital, 
the familial and the interpersonal as to be truly defined by one’s 
relations is to be always likely to be put ‘at issue’ or ‘at risk’ by 
minor changes in circumstances. Perhaps this explains Lutz’s 
(1988, p. 65) observation that “it is the dominated members of 
this social system (such as women, children and the lower classes) 
who are primarily defined as experiencing emotion, both in 
general and to excess.” Also, beyond the interpersonal realm the 
working class as a social group are also at the mercy of either 
having their lives defined in a collectivist manner as found among 
the ’45 generation thanks to certain objective conditions, or 
being ‘disorganised’ as found among the ’79 generation as a result 
of changed economic and cultural conditions. 
As a result of this micro and macro-level inability to generate 
resistance to vulnerability, there is a particular social construction 
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of the emotions at work so that the working-class person is someone 
who is libidinally immersed in his relations and the subject of 
Lutz’s observation, unlike the figure of the dandy or the bourgeois 
personality who is fated to imagine and desire and experience 
himself as free of the immediate issues of survival, or free of being 
reduced to his objective structural relations. John, then, afforded 
a glimpse of the psychological ‘wear and tear’ involved in the 
internalisation of social structures, and the existential and 
psychological consequences of being placed in a hierarchically-
ordered structure which ‘roots’ or embeds the person to himself and 
commands the undivided attention of his psyche, to the extent of 
‘determining’ the psychological life of the individual.
2.4 The Isomorphism Between Material & Mental Life
In days gone by medieval theologians contrasted human nature 
with angelic natures by describing how the latter were creatures in 
full possession of their powers and potentialities from the moment 
of their creation, whereas human nature unfolded over time so 
that human beings first experienced infancy, then childhood and 
then adolescence before coming into possession of the full range 
and extent of their powers as adults. Human nature was conceived 
as having a set number of in-built ordered sequences that unfolded 
over time, and this human nature was objectively given and 
had its designated duration and was determined by the Creator 
so that no human agency or set of social conditions could 
change. Likewise, in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology the 
universal temporal horizon of Man is described as something 
that is objectively given by nature and stretches between a 
basic thrownness into the world and a defining self-consciousness 
that Man is uniquely a being-unto-death (Heidegger 1962, 
pp. 290-311) because each man knows he is going to die and 
comports himself throughout his life accordingly. 
This universal temporal horizon is not my concern here. My 
concern is the very particular and far from universal temporal 
horizon brought into being among manual labourers as a result of 
their ongoing doing, and the experience of time or the temporal 
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horizon among agricultural labourers in mechanised factories, 
for example, and how this informs their ‘selves’ and their 
intersubjective mitsein or ‘fellowship.’
In my interpretation of John I described a close relationship 
between ‘money’ and ‘manliness’ and identified a certain psycho-
dynamic that requires time to come-into-being. When ‘being 
unemployed,’ for example, is a newly arrived at condition as 
the result of a sudden event such as redundancy, the individual 
concerned draws upon his stock of accumulated symbolic and 
social capital and self-worth and dismisses with ease any crude 
materialist or sociological judgments that describe how self-
esteem, for example, is a decentred reality as any reduction of the 
self to the banalities of homo economicus and homo hierarchicus 
carry little phenomenological weight because at this point in time 
there may well be very little felt relationship between subjectivity 
and objective social position. However, through time, the self is 
more or less fated to become ashamed of itself as a result of social 
interaction evoking judgments of shame not simply from objective 
contextual considerations of being immersed in the symbolic 
order of a free-market society, but from interpersonal interaction 
among those who once ‘loved’ the social actor before he became 
unemployed. 
The unemployed man is fated to end up ashamed of that 
self which those around him ‘teach’ him is not lovable i.e. 
he is more or less fated to learn that to love such a ‘redundant self’ 
is unrealistic because it is not intersubjectively constituted as 
capable of being loved. He is fated to become ashamed of himself 
and repress himself, so that the longer the individual is unemployed 
the more he is fated to arrive at the kind of dasein that evicts 
itself from the ken of others as the ‘free’ decision of habitus as 
opposed to a one-off manoeuvre when confronted by a particular 
awkward situation. Finally, as the coup de grace, the individual 
is more or less fated to evict this eviction of himself from his self-
awareness and that part of his psychological life he allows himself 
to recognise, so that he becomes incapable of learning from his 
experience and is more or less fated to instantiate a host of further 
consequences for the intentional life of the psyche as poverty 
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over time effectively reconstitutes intentional life. Paradoxically, 
because he represses this repression of himself, the relentless 
isomorphism between liebenswelt and social structure leads to 
deviations from this ‘rule’ among those most disadvantaged 
insofar as they instantiate a disposition to illusion and escapism 
which becomes paradoxical evidence of objective social deter- 
mination, so that this condition becomes an unknown and even 
unknowable dasein despite many instantiating this condition.
As I adverted to previously, an obvious criticism of this 
interpretation or analysis is that I cannot pretend to know John 
nor the state of his marriage, and I accept such ‘empirical’ 
criticisms without reservation. However, the argument that wives 
internalise and reproduce ‘market judgments’ in their estimations 
of their husbands, while unlikely to be directly articulated in an 
interview or conversation with an ethnographer, is hardly a wilful 
or far-fetched interpretation because ‘being unemployed’ is 
despised for very good reasons, and wives do not want to be 
married to men who instantiate this condition for very good 
reasons. If wives instantiate such judgments within the marital 
relation it is not because of any particular weakness or fault of 
women but, once again, it is because of the agency of time which 
is capable of deconstructing love. A wife will not inflict crude 
materialist judgments upon her husband the day after he becomes 
unemployed, so that any accusation she instantiates such judgments 
will have little psychological purchase upon her self-estimation, 
and she will dismiss such a crude materialist sociological analysis 
with ease. However, by simply adding the passage of time, it is 
inevitable that she will become separated from this first reaction 
and it is more or less inevitable that her comportment will slowly 
deviate from the self-awareness she allows herself because, just 
like her unemployed husband’s sense of self, so a woman’s 
‘wifehood’ is a social and decentred reality that is never her 
private possession insofar as it is interpolated and informed by 
time and circumstance like her husband’s self-esteem is interpolated 
by time and circumstance. 
Also, the permission of self-consciousness is not necessary to 
instantiate particular attitudes and behaviours although, again 
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over time, it is more or less likely that a wife will not only 
increasingly take an ‘instrumentalist’ view of her husband but will 
take a stance upon taking such a stance. The dasein of wives and 
the mitsein of marriages are structural realities within which the 
plausible denial of the existence of objective market attitudes 
and judgements is always possible and probable. Because the 
phenomenological data a person or a married couple have about 
themselves is not an exhaustive inventory of the truths about the 
person or the couple, there is always the unlikelihood of objective 
realities being caught sight of so that, viewed from the confines of 
awareness, the phenomenological data of the reality of being a self 
or a couple who instantiate such a hermeneutic in their marriage 
is always likely to be disappeared from their self-awareness 
outwith times of crisis. 
Plausible denial is always sincere and always an option to the 
consciousness that nevertheless instantiates instrumental logics 
because denial rests upon conscious awareness alone, whereas a 
spouse’s instantiation of ‘free-market rationality’ in her judgments 
of others is not conditional upon explicit awareness for its reality. 
Just as the ‘worked self’ is a real structuration of dasein despite it 
not being a matter of conscious awareness on the part of the 
worker, so the representations consciousness gives itself are 
always likely to approach a clean bill of health so that the most 
upright of self-concepts coexist with impersonal and objective 
social logics within allegedly private and intimate spheres such as 
marriage which we like to imagine escape all such instrumentalist 
considerations, but which in our behaviours are tightly policed 
and disciplined by such instrumentalism.
If there is the agency of time there is also the agency of the 
symbolic order that assigns poverty its meaning. Why a broken 
car opens a window onto an informant’s ownmost self and reveals 
his inability to esteem himself is the result of the existence and 
internalisation of a cultural system that reads and evaluates 
poverty in a particular manner, and explains why being reduced 
to one’s objectivity is experienced as humiliating rather than 
affirming or liberating. What is revealed is that ‘esteeming’ oneself 
and esteeming others is a social practice that has to meet objective 
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criteria publicly set out, and thanks to John’s internalisation 
and everyone’s internalisation of ‘shame’ regarding poverty, 
a lack of money triggers the experience of being measured and 
being found wanting to the extent of mutilating an individual’s 
sense of worth. 
In my analysis John had no cognitive capital to resist this 
objective reading of himself and so had turned to the bottle and 
the first person to walk into the empty pub to ‘share’ this truth 
of his existence with. As a result of his poverty he was placed 
outwith this definition or construction of ‘being a person’ and 
was ashamed at no longer meriting this definition even in his own 
eyes, so that ‘being a person’ is revealed to be a social construct 
that he no longer had the means to maintain. Thanks to being 
reduced to his objective condition, John could not in good 
conscience summon sufficient ‘heart’ to engage with himself or me 
via his normal persona because this had been ‘deconstructed’ and 
put beyond his reach. Perhaps another aspect of John’s anguish 
was that this decentering experience had allowed him to glimpse 
the fact that his previous attempts at personhood had been ‘fake,’ 
so that integral to the constituting of the moment was having to 
bear the weight of his long ‘fake history;’ that his ‘manhood’ was 
revealed as all along having been the plaything of circumstance, 
and it was because “Money and manliness became integrally 
linked” (Gilsenan 1996, p. 282) that the absence of money had 
such emasculating effects.
The intense emotion and ressentiment on display in John’s 
discourse came from being reduced to his objectivity and his sensing 
the ‘end of self,’ belonging and participating. When one’s personhood 
and worldhood are at issue the only adequate response is the 
strongest of emotional reactions, but what is also revealed in such 
moments is the symbolic or cultural resources (if any) one has 
available to draw upon to cope with such a crisis, or to act as ballast 
as one navigates a reversal of fortune. Being objectified it seems left 
John with only one credible sense of self i.e. abject, miserable and 
shameful because he (and his ‘significant others’) had insufficient 
symbolic capital available to resist this reading. If it is certain that 
John’s car had broken down, it also seems clear that something else 
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had broken and a veil had been torn in the fabric of himself to open 
a window onto his wider cultural condition; as if something 
changed from a state of potency to existence or a structured 
possibility had become an existential event. 
If we make the reasonable assumption that this event was not 
adventitious or unique in John’s experience, what is revealed is a 
highly determined relationship between psyche, social position 
and culture or status where the very sense of self is ‘‘means tested’’ 
(Brierley) and is at the mercy of being constructed and deconstructed 
by events. If we assume that this kind of event and the resultant 
existential awareness has happened before or has threatened to 
happen before, it seems reasonable to suppose that living with this 
reality over time will fundamentally mark the life of the psyche 
even independently of such an event in fact empirically occurring, 
so that a reality that doesn’t actually empirically exist may more 
or less permanently exist within the individual’s intentional 
structure, so that we arrive at Sartre’s conclusion that human 
being is characterised as much by what does not exist as what 
does exist, and we may say that John’s dasein has integrated 
within itself the possibility of its ‘death’ or non-existence, so that 
this dasein has its very dissolution integrated into its constitution 
because of its adaptation, over time, to precarious material 
circumstances, and this raises the question of the consequences 
for the psyche as a result of continually living on the brink of its 
dissolution. 
What is certain is that the personality that bears no traces of 
these concessions to objective economic realities must appear 
unreal or childlike, and that the constitution of John’s perception 
of others will emerge from his dasein being characterised by its 
confinement to his relations; to not being able to not be its 
relations i.e. being defined by its inability to escape its objective 
definition and always being an incident away from an existentialism 
that will act as a cipher for its social position, so that its bearer’s 
consciousness is more or less fated to act as the ‘mouthpiece’ for 
its culturally-mediated material determination.
If such insights help to deconstruct the myth of our autonomy 
they also allow us to appreciate the fact that “the individual, 
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as possessor of the contents of his own consciousness, as 
author of his own thoughts, as the personality responsible 
for his thoughts and feelings, – such an individual is a purely 
socioideological phenomenon” (Volosinov 1986, p. 34). However, 
as a final thought we might add that when faced with this 
emasculation, John was being authentic insofar as it took courage 
to refuse to mask his emasculation, and it took courage of sorts 
to refuse to fake ‘personality’ when one’s truth is one hasn’t got 
the heart for it any more. John was being authentic insofar as just 
as for the slave to be authentic he must “choose himself on the 
ground of slavery” (Sartre 1966, p. 703), so he was determined 
to make a stand by ‘making public’ to an ethnographer out for 
a quick pint on a cold November afternoon the isomorphism that 
exists between the objective and the subjective.
Having begun this chapter by illustrating how the body encodes 
and remembers “life as physical existence” (Connerton 1989, p. 1), 
I argue the socialised body is also a medium capable of registering 
and making present to the individual the realm of “meaningful 
social action” (Weber) because judgements of meaning are 
accomplished through the body and these enactments or realisations 
of meaning are routinely immediate and instantaneous thanks to 
the relationship or symbiosis between mind and body. The body, 
then, not only encodes the vibration caused by working with a high-
pressure hose but the public realm of meaning so that embodiment 
is a medium of the social actor’s understanding or verstehen, and in 
Chapter 3 I will argue that ‘housing conditions’ are embodied and 
the body registers or ‘knows’ what it is to live particular social 
conditions. Thanks to the symbiotic relationship between the 
mental and the physical, the body is to be privileged as the locus for 
emotion and an analysis of emotion is vital because it is the medium 
and the location of the lived reality of ‘culture,’ so that if a ‘science 
of meaning’ is of interest then the body is of interest as this is where 
meaning is immediately made available to social actors in their 
spontaneous reactions. 
In terms of developing a contextual account of affectivity, then, 
I assert that the realm of emotions is often the extent of the 
psychological life of those members of a social group whose 
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primary social condition is a permanent reduction to being their 
relations, to being stuck fast to their reality. However, I also argue 
that if there is a self produced in work, for example, that is 
objectively and more or less forced into existence, this self becomes 
reflexive and generates an intentional and emotional horizon that 
can encode free responses to an infinite number of concrete 
situations which the subject meets with in life. In terms of the 
worker, then, the objective world becomes isomorphic with the 
inner world but this latter is taken up as a reflexive project.
Every day the social actor is simultaneously grasped by the real 
and takes the real in hand, so that over time there develops a 
feedback system that is long sedimented in emotional responses as 
a matter of habitus. Moreover, because objective social structures 
are stable and enduring, emotions too are patterned and stable, and 
each class develops its own ‘emotional geography’ with members of 
each class having their own psycho-somatic signature and socialised 
encrinology (Wilkinson 2000). Because objective social structures 
are stable and enduring, emotional reactions-come-judgments are 
able to become somatised systems of class intelligence or distilled 
class ways of embodied knowing, and judgements of meaning are 
immediately and expertly enacted via the body. A ‘sociology of 
feelings’ is possible, then, because our responses to stable social 
realities also become stable and patterned and predictable and one 
learns how to behave and can anticipate the required behaviours for 
most situations, including how to feel.
Among manual labourers the order of intentionality is simpli-
fied and disciplined by and conformed to objective reality, so that 
conformism becomes reflexive and takes on a life of its own and 
it is in the body-mind relation as opposed to overt empirical 
behaviour that the reality of, for example, being dominated is 
most free to constitute the reality of the condition of ‘being domi-
nated;’ is most free to fashion every realm of experience into its 
own likeness via the exercise of freedom and reflexivity, so that 
when reflecting upon particular individual lives we may ask 
whether the worker outside of work is free to be himself, or 
instead uses his freedom to reproduce his domination in every 
other relation he inhabits. The exercise of freedom and reflexivity 
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then in a particular individual may collude in closing the mind to 
the realm of meaning by freely developing the range and repertoire 
of its alienation from realms of human experience, and in such an 
impoverished consciousness, intentional life is restricted to the 
bare existence of chronic worry and occasional release, and is 
more or less another experience of poverty by another name.
The isomorphism that exists between material and mental 
life is confirmed by research into health inequalities between 
the social classes which highlights the damaging biological 
consequences of chronic stress as a result of ‘living in the moment’ 
over long periods of time beyond the ‘flight or flight’ response. 
According to Wilkinson (2000) the raised resting or baseline levels 
of the stress hormone cortisol and the release of adrenaline and 
noradrenaline into the bloodstream as part of the body’s natural 
‘fight or flight’ response, is damaging to health and is exacerbated 
by living within a toxic ‘realm of meaning’ in the shape of shame, 
fear and worry and fright (Scheff and Retzinger 2000), as such 
emotional responses over time become embodied and biologised 
and brings into being a psycho-somatic ‘secondary nature.’ The 
body registers social realities but also registers the length of time 
it has been embodying the same social realities so that time exists 
twice because any individual’s embodiment of time includes the 
embodiment of the length of time spent embodying time, so that 
the body cumulatively embodies its embodiment of time. 
This temporal and socialised body, then, is the medium that 
registers social conditions and social realities such as domination 
and the reality of social class, and it is because of our embodiment 
or the alliance and alignment of mind and body that these realities 
are real and far more intimate realities than can ever be suggested 
by the blunt instrument such as how we answer the survey 
question about one’s father’s occupation. If the experience of time 
is socialised and is a fundamental structuring reality in any 
individual, there is the further question of how the experience 
of time, self and social conditions are transformed by being 
experienced time and time again.
If we can say of any experience that its nature or its 
phenomenological reality is changed insofar as it is experienced 
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time after time, then we can also say that dasein’s experiencing 
of time as sameness is fundamentally altered insofar as this 
experience is self-aware or is reflexive. If we take the earlier 
example of an agricultural labourer in a mechanised factory 
working eight-hour shifts sorting vegetables and, upon hearing 
an unexpected noise looks up to see several tonnes of carrots 
being disgorged into an industrial vat from where they will 
make their way to the conveyor belt where he is working, an 
adequate understanding of how the moment is experienced when 
the worker knows the future has been determined for him, alters 
his experience of the moment despite the absence of any empirical 
difference. Knowing the future impresses the worker further and 
deeper into the present much more than the ‘merely’ present ever 
could, as time is said to ‘fall heavily’ as it is not experienced as the 
unfolding of fresh ‘nows’ but just more of the same, and knowing 
that the future will not involve any change in that situation alters 
how the situation itself is experienced, so that there is a specifically 
temporal imprimatur that puts its seal or mark upon dasein.
The labourer’s dasein, like every human dasein, is relentlessly 
caught in time and social and cultural structures, but far from 
human being suffering an endless becoming that warrants a 
Sartrean declaration of the impossibility of any man ‘founding’ 
himself, the fact is because much of objective social reality is more 
or less unchanging, so contextual human being becomes fixed and 
‘comes to a standstill,’ and the experience of time can likewise 
‘stand still’ in lives where there is no perpetual Heraclitean flux 
because, insofar as time makes structures structure much more 
than mere structures could structure, the lived experience (Erlebnis) 
of temporality itself is affected by the passage of time. 
Also, because secondary natures (such as the condition of 
reduction) are ‘fixed’ and static, this makes it possible for language 
to catch up with contextual human being and for dasein to be 
translated into consciousness and for consciousness to catch up 
with existence. Similarly, thanks to repeatedly performing work 
on a daily basis, the condition of reduction and the temporal 
horizon of immediacy become templates or patterns that are taken 
up by the body’s chemistry, nervous system and psychological life 
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as a result of being daily or serially enacted and more or less 
forcibly ‘becomed.’ Thanks to freedom, this secondary nature is 
also freely anticipated and taken up into consciousness and 
intentionality to become a ‘code’ or gestalt, so that in terms of the 
quality of immediacy as a feature of much behaviour, this 
quality of immediacy over time is established as a code within the 
working person, and is the result of determination and freedom 
and reflexivity and choice and establishes the autonomy of the 
condition of reduction, and this autonomy frees the body-subject 
from having to adapt afresh each new day to its environment and 
does away with the need to endlessly reconstitute itself ex nihilo 
as, once learned and established in behaviour, this code becomes 
spontaneously available to the body-subject so that the code is 
endlessly repeated in intentional and emotional life.
If my starting point in constructing the isomorphism between 
material and mental conditions is the ‘moment of labour’ there is 
also an isomorphism that comes to exist through time between 
the often frenetic pace of production line work imposed upon 
agricultural labourers in mechanised factories working to the 
speed of a conveyor belt or the internalised ‘time is money’ 
mentality of construction workers, for example, and the psyche 
and behaviours of the labourer outwith work. The moment, then, 
is an important object of analysis and an important medium of 
meaning so that in any ‘archaeology’ of the moment, the quality 
of intense presence that is often packed into the moment and the 
life of the socialised psyche must include an analysis of the 
freneticism of work, and to specify this relation I use the notion of 
immediacy to refer to this signature characteristic of the psyche of 
the labourer. 
Being objectively disciplined to live in the present means 
coming under pressure from sociological forces to not attend to 
the future or the long-term, and Scheper-Hughes in Death Without 
Weeping (1992) describes the barrio residents in north-eastern 
Brazil living lives dominated by living in the moment because their 
poverty means an enforced existentialism due to the lack of 
psychological or cultural capital to establish any other relationship 
to time. This more or less coerced immediatism helps us recognise 
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the instantiation of an ‘end-of-tradition’ tradition within the 
working class like no other class, and their alienation from any 
pretence to tradition and a common-sensical practicality that is 
often contemptuous of any attempt at a resentment-free relationship 
to the symbolic order or the ‘realm of meaning’ or time. 
Furthermore, it is because the condition of reduction is taken up 
into the personality and intentional life that it is as a res cogitans 
that it is reflexive or puts itself together i.e. it is in intentionality 
that it is formally dynamic or a source of self which anticipates 
itself and comports itself to the present as itself i.e. as the condition 
of reduction. Workers’ behaviour then is never a direct result of 
their particular practice that particular day as no human behaviour 
is so mechanistically produced. So it is that intimate relations, 
aggression, sexuality and that which requires individuality and 
freedom and intimate presence to self and an other is liable at its 
heart not only to be socially-mediated but co-constituted by the 
condition of reduction. It is not simply that in the midst of the 
interiority of psychic life there is an interlocution with the public 
realm but that much of ‘psychic life’ is constituted by this 
interlocution, so that a universal psyche or psychology does not 
exist and the psyche of the labourer is reflexively co-constructed 
via a dialectic that has two sources: the objective necessities of the 
life of labour and, secondly, the free decisions of a reduced self 
through time, so that it is in the interior and intentional realm, 
then, that is located and sourced a range of behaviours and data 
which will best reveal the promiscuous extent of the dasein that is 
‘brought into being by doing;’ the extent to which the practice of 
labouring over time is able to constitute the reality of subjectivity 
and establish an affective-come-libidinal horizon.
If in unskilled workplaces such as Kettle Produce there is an 
obvious level of supervision and control of behaviour, a window 
upon the tight isomorphism that comes to exist between material 
and mental conditions are those social spaces characterised by 
workers having greater freedom to ‘be themselves,’ such as those 
social spaces removed from public view and outwith formal 
regulation. Often the being brought into being by doing can not 
be expressed in the supervised workplace, and if in the course of 
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a working day there is the production of an ‘essence,’ it must 
postpone its expression as ‘existence’ in visible behaviour. Hence, 
workers will postpone their libidinal selves and ad libitum talk 
until they are in a suitable context. While the space par excellence 
to gather data on the consequences of work for being-with-oneself 
and being-with-others will be within the interiority of intentionality 
where the worked self is free to dominate the private moment and 
constitute an interior habitus of intentionality, this is hardly 
available to the ethnographer who must look to those social 
spaces and times, such as the daily journey to and from work, for 
example, or the daily twenty-minute break halfway through each 
shift, or the payday ‘drinking session’ in a local pub that are 
accessible.
From conducting fieldwork in such spaces it is clear that a 
characteristic of working-class dasein is its libidinal investment in 
language, and this is undoubtedly a consequence of their libidinal 
relation to their laborious being-in-the-world, and their characteristic 
lack of psychological distance from their subjectivity and their lack 
of psychological distance from their objectivity. This immediatism 
is the result of their chronic doing or practice under particular 
circumstances that, upon its internalisation, becomes reflexive and 
promiscuous outwith the objective demands of the workplace. 
When observing psychic lives characterised by immediacy, what is 
empirically given are views that are expressed with urgency and 
conviction, along with behaviours that are reactive, immediate, ad 
hoc and spontaneous as opposed to long-term, polite or strategic, 
along with a relentless cultivation of common sense at the expense 
of other ways of knowing; a matter of ‘taste’ that means a relentless 
bringing themselves and others to order should they stray too far 
from the practical and the empirical.
This signature development of common sense and practical 
functionality seems clearly to emerge from the more or less limited 
‘meaningfulness’ of the work that is done. As per our previous 
analysis, Dauvit’s discourse on his work involved coming to terms 
with the apparent ‘naturelessness’ of work and the ‘naturelessness’ 
of the self that does such work. Being thirty-four years old, Dauvit 
is a member of the first post-industrial generation and it seems 
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clear that he has no ‘occupational identity’ worth talking about as 
even his identity as ‘worker’ comes in and out of existence as he 
is a worker one day and then without work the next, and with no 
change in his sense of self. However, the notion that Dauvit 
thereby escapes the ‘mirror of production’ and instantiates a post-
industrial era authenticity insofar as his self-understanding is not 
fixed or essentialised as a worker is fanciful, as Dauvit does not 
have a mobile or liquid identity and escapes nothing as social 
forces remain just as thoroughly dominant of his life as they 
would have been for his father and the ’45 generation of the 
industrial era.
In any analysis of Dauvit’s testimony the notion of ‘resistance’ 
on the part of the individual to the dictates of the free-market 
economy is a forlorn hope, just as in our analysis of the Fun Day 
the notion that localities are able to escape the fate of decline in 
light of disinvestment by market forces is also a forlorn hope. Both 
the post-industrial individual and post-industrial locality cannot 
escape into substantive projects for the ethnographer to analyse 
in the style of Beck et al. (1994) and Giddens’s (1990) idea of 
“reflexive modernisation’’ or in the style of Bakhtin for whom 
an aestival festival involves the symbolic re-imagining of social 
relationships. In the case of Dauvit, responding to reality is so 
occupying and relentless that mere survival is its own achievement, 
so that establishing any kind of distance from reality does not 
even reach an imaginary or symbolic level of existence. Such is 
the hegemony of structure that among the consciousnesses and 
existences of even those only fitfully caught up in it, simply the 
renewal of social existence becomes an event every time a new 
contract is signed, and Dauvit celebrates each six-month contract 
with Bukos because it means his enthrallment or domination can 
continue, because he knows that being free of the free-market order 
is no freedom at all for a human being in a free-market society.
Just as economic forces created Cardenden out of its agricultural-
come-parochial life as a collection of farms and scattered households 
in the nineteenth century, and has now ‘disorganised’ the village life 
which the industrial era called into existence, a question for the sub-
jective ‘lifeworld’ is whether the advent of the post-industrial era is 
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a disaster or a liberation. Has working-class dasein been unfrozen 
from the inertia of poverty and heavy industry and, in its new ‘liq-
uid’ state, become free to become something new, or has working-
class dasein been disorganised out of existence?
While the occupational and much of the cultural landscape has 
changed, the power of the free market remains to exact an 
existentialism within workers; the relation to the cash nexus 
remains hegemonic in subjectivity across the generations, and 
across the industrial and post-industrial divide this relationship 
relentlessly constructs and produces no escape from the 
existentialisms it calls forth; a hegemonic structure that doesn’t 
require the ‘false consciousness’ of a work ethic to ensure its 
hegemony in the lives it reduces to reflections of its hegemony as 
it requires no consciousness at all, which explains the quality of 
disinterested detachment that characterises Dauvit’s ‘voiceless 
voice’ or impersonal persona, reflecting his reluctant engagement 
with his own activity. It is clear that for Dauvit there is no 
experience of the social realm that is independent of how he is 
economically positioned, or a realm of experience that is free of 
the influence of his menial low-paid work. Work makes non-
working life possible but does not make it meaningful. In the last 
analysis, both work and non-work must be meaningful upon the 
basis of standing upon their own two feet. 
There is then the ‘material determination’ of the mental life so 
that in working-class lives, family life, social existence and inner 
lives come under sustained and objective pressure to be ‘dumbed 
down’ to the same unskilled and menial level of their working 
lives. There is an unmistakable reproduction of economic realities 
at the level of symbolisation because rather than fuelling ‘escape 
velocity’ from material determination, one finds material 
circumstances pulling the symbolic level into its orbit, so that 
among the working class the doctrine of the determination of the 
superstructure by the base is a simple empirical truth. Asserting 
the isomorphism between the realm of work and interiority and 
intentionality, then, is an argument based upon empirical 
observation and does not rely upon any philosophical proposition 
such that the material base ‘determines’ the superstructure of 
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consciousness. There is no resort to crude arguments that human 
behaviour is ‘caused’ or that freedom or agency are illusory. 
Rather, while clearly there will be instances of workers cultivating 
personal interests, the general argument is based upon the analyst 
disciplining himself to follow Dauvit’s refusal of pretensions to 
meaningful work or occupational identity to the ‘bitter end,’ and 
to construct a Weberian ‘ideal type’ that remains valid even if in 
the case of Dauvit some details are not empirically true at a 
particular point in time.
There is a direct relationship between the ‘mirror of production’ 
and the ‘realm of meaning’ where the individual such as Dauvit 
learns a hermeneutic at his work that, if firstly an objective 
necessity, subsequently becomes a free principle of subjectivity 
with a life of its own which informs other relationships, so that 
the meaningless practice of the workplace habituates him to 
‘subjectless practice’ so that other realms such as family life, social 
life, political life, spiritual life and intellectual life all come under 
the force of social determination to become characterised by 
underdevelopment. Dauvit’s insistence that his work is meaningless 
when considered in itself and outwith its obvious functional 
utility, signals the fact that he endures ‘famine’ conditions because 
the self that performs meaningless work must in some way itself 
become meaningless in its own estimation and must impact 
upon the worker’s relationship to the realm of meaning, indeed 
marginalise the quest for meaning within himself precisely to stop 
the question of his meaninglessness arising. This, then, raises the 
question as to whether a man can live on bread alone, or whether 
subjectivity can survive on objectivity alone.
If this is the psychological price paid for performing menial work 
over time, it seems a famine hermeneutic must develop over time 
and develop a life of its own in the psyche and behaviour of the 
worker in the sense that necessity is taken up by ‘personal’ taste and 
developed by freedom. Such is the grip of his relation to the job 
market upon him that the objective relation to objective reality 
‘informs’ or is reproduced in the subjective relation to his own 
subjectivity: the same marginal or disorganised relation to work 
leads to the production of a marginal or disorganised relation to 
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self, and the inability to signify menial work as meaningful leads to 
an inability to signify not only the self that does this work but the 
self when outside of work as meaningful. The self that is uninterested 
in the work it does comes under pressure to not be interested both 
in the self when at work and the self when not at work. 
In terms of his interior life, how can there be a robust and 
dynamic self-consciousness when the reality of working is void 
of representations for consciousness to constitute itself in a 
robust and dynamic manner by? Again, if there is a permanent 
psychological absence caused by the absence of significant 
significations of work, must this absence inform or reproduce 
itself throughout the individual’s inner life, family life, and 
intersubjective social life? If the worker does not give himself 
representations of his work, what likelihood is there for the 
consciousness habituated to such absence developing any kind of 
‘true consciousness’ of his other realms of experience? Given a 
habituation to inertia and absence, how can the naturally dynamic 
desire to understand and the natural desire for experiences of love, 
beauty, truth or the transcendent and divine be present to such a 
consciousness? How can such desires and appetites fail to be 
drawn into an ethos of inertia and absence until they ‘spontaneously’ 
become interpreted as unreal and ‘not for me’?
The post-industrial imagination or symbolic order has not 
found a place for working-class dasein, and both politicians and 
formerly left-wing political parties have fallen into line with this 
new symbolic order, and so have become another source for the 
production of the invisibility of ‘working-class being’ and the 
widely-held judgment that a politics based upon this dasein is 
unrealistic. Consubstantial to this new illegitimacy of class-based 
politics is the notion that this dasein as a standpoint to produce 
knowledge is likewise under pressure of being considered of no 
practical merit, and so we arrive at the conclusion that in society 
in general a trajectory based upon being this dasein or representing 
this dasein, whether in the arts or politics, is a form of artistic and 
political suicide, and that occupying any position of importance 
requires the negation of this being so that, ever realistic, the 
working class themselves when outwith their localities have no 
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serious social or cultural use for their own dasein. Moreover, if it 
is true that a particular ‘worked incarnation’ cannot be spectated 
nor speculatively known in a contemplative fashion, it is also true 
that because the realm of representation is dominated by non-
working-class interests, it is more or less inevitable that Dauvit, 
for example, is ‘unthinkable’ because his culture gives him no 
representations of himself (outwith the miserabilism found in 
literature) and gives him no room to exist in the symbolic order so 
that his being-in-the-world is unrepresented, unthought and 
un-presented to his own consciousness. 
In these conditions of famine, so deprived is he of the adequate 
conceptual and linguistic vocabulary of his being that Dauvit is 
unable to appear to himself as he is, and insofar as his dasein 
is socially ‘recognised’ it is encouraged to improve or retrain but 
is never encouraged to be what he is, but thrown into trajectories 
of self-improvement and schemes and policies and initiatives 
sponsored by the State or its allies in the voluntary sector, and 
with all such schemes more or less considering working-class 
dasein solely from the point of view of economic functionality, so 
that ‘working-class being’ is the dasein society judges the most 
useless, unrealistic, dysfunctional and so its only space in the 
symbolic order is in trajectories that span all the options from 
dissolution to embourgeoisement.
Because the ‘condition of reduction’ is not objectively ‘out 
there’ and yet is the signature ‘secondary nature’ brought about 
by a lifetime of doing manual labour, attaining real conceptual 
purchase or knowledge of Dauvit requires a particular view of 
what is real as well as a particular understanding of what it is 
to understand. What must be simultaneously moved beyond is 
a positivistic understanding of the real as well as the idea and 
practice of data gathering as essentially ‘taking a look’ at what is 
‘out there’ because in such an understanding of the process of 
knowing, the knower is never ‘at stake’ in generating his 
knowledge. When we think about Dauvit and note a lack of 
substantive representations of self is reflected in a linguistic 
silence vis-à-vis his ‘work as work,’ this isomorphism between the 
material and the mental is also a clue for the ethnographer of 
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Dauvit and has important methodological consequences, such as 
to come-to-know the isomorphism that is in Dauvit the researcher 
must come to suspect an analogous isomorphism in himself. In 
Dauvit coming to be what he is he has been ‘at issue’ or ‘at risk’ 
many times, and the idea that we can know this reality but in a 
risk-free manner is to fall into the illusion that Dauvit’s ‘secondary 
nature’ can be spectated. The error of this view of knowing is the 
idea that all of reality can be spectated, or that all of reality 
is accessible to the researcher without the researcher having to 
undergo any change in order to suspect, never mind come to 
know, the existence of a particular reality. If the ethnographer 
faces the challenge of knowing how his informants are known in 
the field, the aim is to know Dauvit as he knows himself and the 
analyst can not know Dauvit if he does not arrive at the view that 
different realities can only be accessed or known through their 
particular mediums or ‘modes of acquisition’ (Connerton); that 
if one wishes to know, for example, a secondary nature brought 
into being by doing, one requires a non-objectivist epistemology 
in which enactment and bios are media of the real and coming to 
know the real.
Similarly, to know what it is to be confined to one’s relations 
and to live this determination over time is to know that to 
know Dauvit is to share the point of view that emerges from 
this positionality, and to understand that this ‘taking sides’ is not 
a matter of morality or intuitionism or humanist solidarity but 
an exigence of understanding Dauvit at all, because the only 
adequate method of knowing Dauvit is the one he uses to 
know and become himself, so that by engaging in the life of 
manual labour one instantiates the same isomorphism, so that 
suspecting Dauvit’s social determination is suspecting one’s own. 
A consequence of this tight isomorphism between social position 
and the knowing mind is grasping the impossibility of the social 
researcher carefully ‘extracting’ knowledge of this isomorphism or 
the social determination lived by Dauvit (or an entire population) 
and avoiding being ‘at issue’ or ‘at risk.’ Hence the idea that the 
social researcher can remain objective while being committed to 
understanding a group or class is a faulty idea of what knowing is 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
182
and an inadequate idea of what there is to come to know, and an 
inadequate idea of how to go about coming to know it.
In another similar context of menial or ‘meaningless’ work, 
Constable’s (1997) ethnography of Filipino domestic workers in 
Hong Kong argues that it is kinship and culturally-defined 
obligations which determine their ‘economic’ activity as opposed 
to some reified conception of ‘economic’ rationality. Among the 
low-paid it is extrinsic cultural factors or the non-work ‘realm of 
meaning’ which allows economic activity to appear as functional 
and rational, so that Constable’s unskilled informants instantiate 
in their behaviour the work ethic in a pure form i.e. they have 
a purely instrumental view of work with no conception whatever 
of having a vocation or special aptitude for the work they do. 
In their consciousness they are clear that work is about meeting 
the ‘timeless’ obligations of culture and kinship, and so in 
much the same way as the moon gives light to the earth though 
in itself it is dead and without life, so work has no significance 
in itself and is only meaningful when placed in the cultural 
context of the worker, so that the ‘work ethic’ is complied with 
behaviourally yet is utterly irrelevant in terms of providing the 
motivation and meaning required to ensure a lifetime of practice. 
Much like Constable’s informants, then, my own informants’ 
work is full of non-work related meaning and given the caesura 
that exists between praxis and consciousness about that praxis 
or between doing work and its meaning, it seems that among 
manual workers Offe’s (1985) argument that work today is 
becoming marginalised as a source of self is something that has 
always been true among those who have no trace of the elitist 
ideology of ‘work as vocation.’ However, should the occasion 
arise where there occurs a ‘contest’ as to the meaning of their 
work, the interpretation of work is tightly monitored or policed 
by workers in the sense that workers stand guard over the 
‘meaninglessness’ of their work, and workers jealously preserve 
their hermeneutical rights to state its meaning and are alert to any 
misrepresentation of their work by those who occupy positions 
reserved for those who are more or less fated to conceive of 
work via the language of vocation.
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Among manual operatives, for example, there were innumerable 
occasions when work was the subject of extended discourse as 
technical aspects of particular jobs were discussed among 
themselves on a daily basis. The most basic wastewater treatment 
plant or set of storm tanks or even the simplest pumping station 
contains a range of instruments for measuring and recording 
different sets of data that have to be attended to and interpreted, 
so that when anything malfunctions the plant operative is 
expected to realise this and to either fix it himself or advise 
the relevant person(s) what needs to be done. Without exception, 
then, workers were deeply interested in the minutiae of their 
plants and it was a matter of ‘honour’ that not only did 
nobody know ‘their’ plants better than themselves but that they 
demonstrated this expert knowledge. However, while discussing 
the purely technical aspects of work was more or less constant, 
such talk is resolutely different from any discourse regarding the 
‘meaning’ of work, and I found a fierce resistance to management 
attempts at ‘mythologizing’ work. 
Discourse vis-à-vis the meaning of work is associated by the 
men46 with ‘managers’ and as evidence of a lack of experience or 
a certain naivety they identify as peculiar to management and, as 
the next section attempts to demonstrate, a purely technical 
appreciation of work-related issues and a purely instrumental 
view of work is assuredly not in any way indifferent to struggles 
over definitions of being an authentic person, and different deeply 
held views that are very rarely forced to become a matter of words 
and, owing to individuals’ different positions within workplace 
hierarchies, deeply held views that are ordinarily fated never 
to meet directly in a face-to-face encounter, when they do in 
fact come together in the same space at the same time, much 
data that is normally unsaid is forced into the open, and opens a 
window onto deeply subjugated realities such as conflicts over the 
relationship between the ‘mirror of production,’ the class structure 
and the symbolic order.
46 As they refer to themselves in contrast to “staff’’ who work in the company 
offices.
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
184
Pathhead Treatment Works, Kirkcaldy
When working with East of Scotland Water in the summer of 
1999, a series of meetings were held to allow a new manager 
based in Edinburgh to “get to know the men” and to communicate 
imminent changes in working practices. Hence, at 12 noon on 
Monday 16 August in the main waste water treatment plant at 
Pathhead (Kirkcaldy) the men gathered upstairs in their bothy 
waiting for the manager to arrive and the meeting to begin. When 
the new manager arrived he was accompanied by his young female 
assistant who carried a plate on which was a packet of biscuits 
and a packet of small cakes still in their packaging. While the pre-
meeting banter was polite and friendly none of the men took up 
the repeated offers of a cake or biscuit. The meeting formally 
began when the manager took charge of proceedings by introducing 
himself at some length to us. In the course of his opening remarks 
he made a point of emphasising that, in contrast to previous 
“company culture” and management practice, he wanted to know 
“what makes you tick” and, to put these new ideas into practice, 
the new manager began by “sharing” something of himself and 
listing the various engineering and management projects he had 
been involved in beginning with Lothian Regional Council prior 
to his current position with East of Scotland Water. 
As the men sat listening, we learned which Edinburgh public 
school our new manager had attended as a boy, and that he was 
a keen rugby player, as well as something of his university career 
and the opportunities and interests he developed while at 
university. After this, each of the men were ‘invited’ or more or 
less coerced into introducing themselves and to say something 
about themselves, which they did by each of them stating their 
Christian name, that they were married and the number of 
children they had, how long they had been employed with East of 
Scotland Water and which football team they supported.
The next phase of the meeting consisted of another lengthy 
discourse from the manager concerning his determination to put 
in place “a new company culture” and how central to this goal 
would be the “empowerment” of the men and the introduction of 
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new working practices including “self-management teams” and 
“lone working within the waste water treatment part of the 
business.” As an example of worker ‘empowerment’ the manager 
cited the novel proposal that the men assume responsibility 
for handling their own absenteeism47 and that they assume 
responsibility for their “skilling up” on the job. Something also 
emphasised in this regard was the devolution of “continual 
professional development” and “all kinds of decision-making” 
from management to workers. In the course of this discourse 
the idea of workers’ autonomy was presented as the latest 
in management thinking on how to make a company more 
competitive. In the last part of his discourse the new manager 
outlined the timescale for the implementation of the new changes 
and informed us that a series of worker-management forums 
aimed at updating the day-to-day running of the company would 
be organised. 
At the end of the discourse the men were given the opportunity 
to raise any questions or clarify any points, but none chose to do 
so. Knowing the men I knew their silence had nothing to do with 
not having anything to say, but their shifting in their seats signalled 
they were impatient for the hour-long meeting to end so they 
could get their flasks and sandwiches out and get on with getting 
through their schedule for the rest of their working day. As the 
meeting broke up the men stayed in the bothy to take advantage 
of the opportunity to have their half-hour dinner break together, 
while the manager went downstairs to say his goodbyes to our 
supervisor before leaving with his PA and unopened biscuits and 
cakes for his next scheduled meeting with more of ‘his men’ in 
Cupar later that afternoon.
As the meeting had progressed I had felt tense at what 
increasingly felt like a stand-off that had begun with what I had 
felt was an initial refusal of politeness on the part of the men by 
their refusal of the gesture of commensality as this was something 
47 Far from any problem with absenteeism the East of Scotland Water employees 
that I knew were in the habit of not taking all of their holiday entitlement, and 
‘selling’ them back to the company as a way of making some extra money. 
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I had never seen before among them. I had also grew increasingly 
tense throughout the meeting as I was convinced that the new 
manager’s performance of middle-class distinction could only 
provoke the men, so that as the meeting wore on, the manager’s 
flagging up his middle-class credentials would mean a ‘retaliatory’ 
performance of a normally unsaid working-class identity; that 
this manager’s performance of his management identity would 
trigger an ‘essential’ proletarian identity within the men. At the 
same time, however, I was aware this may have been a misreading 
of the situation on my part, and I said nothing during and 
immediately after the meeting so as to wait and see if my intuition 
of ‘muted conflict’ was accurate or not. In the event I did not have 
to wait any length of time as immediately after the meeting 
a palpable sense of relief among the men was expressed, and as 
soon as the manager was out of earshot the views of ‘his men’ 
came thick and fast:
What the f***in hell wis that? Wi her f***in see if ye  
can see ma fanny [vagina] skirt on. Coming in and shoving 
cakes on the table expectin something. What the f**k is  
that a’ aboot? Some f***in tart wi a skirt half way up  
her arse. Treating us like f***in baubles. F***in prick. 
“Ah’ve got a f***in career!” Ya c**t! 
The contempt expressed by Mick was followed in quick 
succession by similar expressions by more of the men, and even 
unfailingly mild-mannered older men revealed a very different 
and unexpected side of themselves. My considered view is that 
the reason the men were angry was because behind naïve and 
easily dismissed attempts at making work meaningful they saw 
a manager attempting to ‘steal’ from them their own consciousness; 
an example of symbolic violence (Bourdieu) insofar as the 
manager, in his company role, wanted to make an intervention 
into the lifeworld or symbolic order of the men and assume the 
role of ‘teacher’ to his ‘pupils’ and more or less wanted to coerce 
‘his men’ into joining him in his illusions. What the men saw 
before their eyes was a new manager’s performance of his 
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misrecognition of himself, and their new manager’s misrecognition 
of his practice and his misrecognition of ‘his men.’ Hence, because 
so many rules were being broken, the normal rule concerning the 
‘privatisation of meaning’ whereby the men listen as employees 
listen to an employer in an ethos where each know their unequal 
place in which each side is more or less comfortable, was under 
severe strain.
What the new manager was proposing was that the men sign 
up to the fiction that a fundamental transfer of power from 
management to them was imminent, whereas the men knew that 
industrial relations between workers and management involve 
a basic agreed ‘stand off:’ management have their role and the 
men have their role and in which each have their freedom. 
Management is free to propose changes in practices to make 
efficiencies and savings, while the men have to listen. However, 
this new discourse was different insofar as the new manager 
wanted to de-privatise meaning by expecting ‘his men’ to 
misrecognise an established hierarchy and believe in this new 
‘discourse of equality.’ What the men were accustomed to was 
having to ‘lump’ the fundamental difference in power between 
management and workers where neither side pretended there was 
equality, but under the new manager they were being asked to 
believe a state of equality and empowerment was soon to be upon 
them, and this was a provocation because the manager was 
thereby attempting to extract not simply the usual ‘subjectless 
obedience’ that power can command, but was asking the men to 
‘buy into’ rather than tolerate the proposed changes; were being 
asked to believe the lie that these minor changes represented 
equality and empowerment, and so they sat ‘fixed and furious’ at 
the misrecognition of hierarchy the new manager was trying to 
achieve within the consciousness of the men themselves. 
The men were angry and were fated to keep their counsel 
because of the differences in power the new manager pretended to 
be oblivious to, and thanks to their silence were colluding in 
reproducing within the manager the illusion that they were listening 
intently to his fairy tale of empowerment and equality, and thereby 
colluding in preserving the new manager’s ignorance about how 
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they organised their perception, and colluding in reproducing the 
manager’s fairy tale that he was communicating with ‘his men.’
This meeting was memorable as a social situation where the 
objective and unequal power relationships were increasingly 
‘excruciatingly’ present in a meeting that, ironically, was devoted 
to equality and empowerment because this power differential was 
the only reality that was holding the meeting together or made it 
possible to occur at all, with the usual decorums and pleasantries 
failing to euphemise or mystify the reality of the situation. Such 
was the discrepancy between ‘reality’ and ‘representation’ that 
nothing was hid from view and nobody was ‘taken in’ as the men 
were aware the manager had power and they didn’t, and they 
had no intention whatever of telling their new manager anything 
of themselves and so, on the one hand, their subordination was 
in plain sight to themselves while their rebellion in the realm 
of meaning was totally invisible to their manager and kept to 
themselves. If a casual passer-by (or manager) were to judge the 
men by their observable behaviour he would have seen evidence 
of acceptance of the relations in place and no evidence that a step 
too far into the symbolic order had been attempted and had failed 
and had caused resentment, because a basic principle of the men 
was that ‘if as workers our behaviour isn’t our own to command, 
our consciousness is our own to command.’ Insofar as the new 
manager wanted to intervene into their symbolic order he revealed 
the extent of his ‘bad faith’ or misrecognition of himself and the 
extent of his power. If the manager was performing power and 
the men were performing their relative ‘powerlessness,’ as soon 
as the manager attempted to exercise power to extract more 
than the ‘dumb’ obedience of behaviour he became powerless, 
because there was no question whatever of the men adding ‘inner’ 
or ‘authentic’ or real subjective obedience.
If the men were acting out their habitus the manager too was 
acting out his fatedness to believe in his inflated discourse on 
changing ‘company culture’ while leaving the organisation of the 
company as an institution intact. As the manager’s speech had 
progressed I became more and more uncomfortable at the level 
of miscommunication and the contempt that the new manager’s 
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misplaced confidence was fated to inspire in ‘his men.’ As the 
manager was getting into his stride I tried to imagine the early 
social separation that he must have been subjected to in order to 
imagine to myself the remote ‘archaeology’ of our brief encounter, 
and marvelled at the new manager’s utter conviction about himself 
and his utter lack of conviction for his men; the utter lack of any 
consciousness about the level of non-communication going on, 
and the radical caesura between his being-for-himself and his 
being-for-others that seems essential to maintaining the social 
practice of management and the fiction of having ‘my men.’ 
Did the manager believe his discourse at night with only 
himself for company? Insofar as the answer is ‘yes’ we see that 
each class’s habitus is fatal in its hold upon consciousness, which 
is fated to be ignorant of how we are seen by others. Working-
class men never believe in their work role in the way managers 
seem fated to believe in their work role insofar as every day of 
workers’ lives their fellows lead them away from the temptation 
to believe their job is any kind of indication of their true self or 
vocation in life. The distinction between mere behaviour and 
unstated meaning is important for workers because the distinction 
between their mere ‘economic behaviour’ and who they really are 
is where they are free to exercise sovereignty over themselves.
If I marvelled at the manager’s entrapment within the confines 
of his class habitus, the same was equally true of the men for 
whom exchanging their presence and words was one thing but 
engaging in a token form of commensality seemed off the table. 
Again, then, what was the ‘archaeology’ of the men’s rejection 
of the new manager’s new ‘company culture,’ and what made this 
rejection so easy and so readily available to them as a matter of 
habitus? Were these expert sewermen also expert at imprisoning 
themselves within a ‘worker essence’ that meant they never gave 
their manager a fair hearing, or was it that they realise change isn’t 
permanent and soon enough their new manager would be replaced 
by another new manager with newer new ideas? Clearly their 
behaviour had nothing to do with having their own ideas on 
management theory and practice that were being discarded by the 
new manager, nor the result of any great investment into the best 
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way to manage absenteeism or continual professional development 
of the average sewerman. By commanding the men’s presence for 
an hour the new manager was drawing upon the organisation’s 
existing hierarchy as was his right, but for the men to ‘buy into’ 
his discourse or even show goodwill by eating a biscuit, for 
example, was to symbolically freely extend their subordination to 
a level that is not necessary, and therefore was tantamount to 
betraying their interests, and to freely legitimate and extend 
within consciousness a merely objective and enforced subjection.
However, because the men have a practical and decentred sense 
of themselves that is context dependent and so depends for its 
‘live’ existence upon ‘triggering situations,’ their resistance to both 
the man and his proposed measures was not necessarily a matter 
of holding clear and distinct ideas but was more intuitive and 
deeply felt. If we can analytically describe a life of labour as an 
existence-led dasein, this existentialism has long since become a 
matter of habitus or a pre-discursive antepredicative expertise 
which, when faced with the reality of the discourse of their new 
manager, means that two dialectically opposed habituses came 
into direct contact, and the men’s instinctive ‘incredulity’ being 
proportionate to the cumulative reality of their enduring selves 
and relations so that the meeting was fated to appear as the 
dialectical conflict of one ‘essence’ coming up against another 
‘essence’ that more or less determined their consciousness and 
comportment and the outcome, so that when the manager writes 
up his report on the meeting he believes it has gone well while 
the workers are ‘fated’ to see it as a waste of time.
While the new manager presented himself as changing 
‘company culture’ and wishing to empower the men, the fact is 
the information the men would have been interested in, such as 
on what basis he was hired by the company or whether certain 
managers were being retired and replaced by ‘hired hands’ such as 
himself to prepare the company for privatisation, this level of 
equality was never open for discussion. Similarly, the men were 
given no account of what was meant by ‘company culture’ and 
whether the existing power relations between management and 
men were to be involved in this change of company culture. While 
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such a devolving of power and such a sharing of information 
would have been of interest to the men and would have begun a 
real conversation, what the men got instead was their introduction 
to an absurdly artificial manner of introducing oneself by running 
one’s CV by total strangers. In the main part of the manager’s 
speech it was clear that by changing company culture and by the 
repeated use of the term ‘empowerment,’ the manager wished 
to intervene into the ‘personality’ of the men, but because the 
meeting from the men’s point of view was an illustration of 
management power being set to remain a ‘reserved matter’ in the 
new company culture, the reality that was practically affirmed 
even as it was discursively disavowed, was that the workers 
were to spectate their ‘empowerment’ and continue to consume 
management discourse as rhetoric so that the net result was the 
re-affirmation of the status quo. 
This explains the felt need among the men after the meeting 
to voice what they viewed as historic instances of the abuse of 
power by management, and so the men recalled that such was 
management’s disregard for communication that when men who 
had been off sick had died, the company did not inform fellow 
workers, and this had resulted in workers failing to attend fellow 
workers’ funerals and having to explain to a widow why no 
work mates of her dead husband had attended his funeral; how 
retirement collections for men who had retired five years ago 
and died four years ago were still sitting in an office drawer 
somewhere. As these recollections came thick and fast in the chat 
between the men before they left to continue with the rest of their 
day, it was plain the meeting had triggered a need for the men to 
reclaim their history; to tell it like it was, and thereby reject all 
hired ‘modernisers’ who could easily claim the past was dead in 
proportion to their lack of any knowledge of it.
Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, this meeting 
was the annunciation of the end of a way of working and the 
beginning of a new way of working. With the benefit of hindsight, 
the men viewed this meeting as the beginning of the end of an era 
for those men in their fifties and sixties who had enough years of 
service with the company so that the early retirement packages 
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they would subsequently be offered made financial sense, so that 
they took early retirement although they had no desire to retire 
whatsoever. In my last months with East of Scotland Water in 
2000, many of the men I had daily contact with took early 
retirement with many feeling apprehensive about the immanent 
changes in working practices. I remember one manual operative 
from Cowdenbeath in particular (Toaster Clerk) would always 
conclude any discussion on these changes by saying, ‘‘Aye, the 
job’s f***ed man!’’ and when I asked Mick48 (quoted earlier) what 
he thought of plans to merge the three Scottish water authorities 
he replied: “We’ll soon be runnin roond in vans wi Last o’ Scotland 
Water an eventually f***in Thames Water as the new logo” – a 
reference to the workings of the Competition Act which most ESW 
workers believed would mean the water industry in Scotland 
would be taken over by one of the larger privatised English water 
companies. Similarly, the men’s derision of ‘lone working’ was 
because this was interpreted by them as a means not only of 
downgrading health and safety issues thanks to the prospect of 
there no longer being a second man for safety but cutting staff.
More generally, what was felt to be under attack as a result 
of the new changes was the very worthwhileness of the work they 
did. The men were responsible for the upkeep and maintenance 
of plants and it was clear that this was something they took 
seriously and took pride in, so that what were no more than 
pumping stations that in some cases were no bigger than a garden 
shed, were routinely spotless inside while the surrounding grassed 
area likewise was well-maintained. This level of attention to detail 
and maintenance meant even the smallest buildings were regularly 
checked by the superintendent with a record kept in a log which 
was signed and dated by the workers, and then again by the 
supervisor making his own inspection. On the days when I made 
the rounds on my own with no chargehand to supervise me, 
I liked to stop for dinner in the little pump station in Ravenscraig 
48 Not yet fifty, Mick took an early retirement package in October 2001, citing 
unacceptable changes in working practices. He now works for a supermarket 
delivering leaflets to households in Glenrothes and the surrounding areas.
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Park (Kirkcaldy) and I often took the dust-covered maintenance 
logs from the shelves where they had lain undisturbed for years 
and look through them, sometimes noting familiar names and 
reading comments made, and taking a note of the very first entry 
made in the plant’s first logbook. I took great pleasure in reading 
these entries made by men who were now long dead, and spotting 
one or two familiar names and noting names of men no longer 
on the plant side and asking about them later and listening to 
anecdotes and stories about dead men. All of this meticulously 
gathered and recorded data held a fascination for me, perhaps had 
a certain poignancy because this level of local detail seemed fated 
to end. It was clear that there had once been a meticulous attention 
to detail and a meticulous cultivation of locality and care for 
locations that the men, on the cusp of another modernisation of 
their working practices, were apprehensive about. Having said 
this, however, the men freely admitted that not all change had 
been for the worse, as they talked of how previously they were not 
supplied with gloves or overalls and had to supply their own 
working clothes, in stark contrast to today with their uniforms, 
safety clothes and working gear all being supplied free of charge.
Men openly voiced their fears among themselves and with 
those managers with whom they had a long relationship, that the 
new management in Edinburgh were preparing for the privatisation 
and the deskilling of their jobs. With the benefit of hindsight 
many of the men’s fears have come true with the dissolution 
of East of Scotland Water and the other Scottish regional water 
companies being amalgamated into the new company Scottish 
Water in 2002. With the more or less enforced early retirement 
of many workers aged fifty and over there has been a reduction in 
personnel and there has been a reduction in the level of plant 
maintenance. Already in 2000 the men complained of plants not 
having their grass cut due to having to hire in machines and the 
time wasted in having them serviced and repaired, as well as 
getting the time to do the job in the first place. This particular 
aspect of maintenance was then sub-contracted to private tender, 
which effectively meant bringing in workers to do the job on the 
minimum wage. This opening up of part of the men’s jobs to the 
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competitive free-market tendering process was something deemed 
necessary by a senior engineer in one meeting (Brian Robertson) 
who advised the men it was necessary under the terms of the new 
Competition Act that had recently come into force. Managers at 
meetings referred time and again to ‘The Competition Act’ and the 
legal requirement to put jobs out to public tender, which many felt 
resulted in a race to the bottom in terms of prices, and thereby 
a drop in the quality of service.
In response to this new neoliberal reform, workers were expected 
to work ‘flexibly’ and ‘skill up’ on other competencies so that, 
among other things, students such as myself would no longer be 
required in the summer months as each job would be covered by a 
new ‘flexible’ worker. Among themselves the men referred to these 
measures as the new ‘policy of neglect’ as a result of one meeting 
where a manager (Roger Black) had replied ‘Yes’ when asked if the 
new management rhetoric was just the ideological justification for 
letting pumping stations and plants become nothing more than 
unkempt ‘‘shithooses,’’ as had already happened in England where 
the privatisation of the water industry was complete.
Managers at meetings openly appealed to the need to be more 
cost-effective and efficient in working practices in order to ‘‘save 
our jobs,’’ and when this bottom line was mentioned all objections 
tended, if not to fall away, then to lose their force as very quickly 
the ethos of meetings between men and managers shifted from 
a “them and us” ethos to one of “we’re all in the same boat” as 
managers themselves admitted they too were at risk of redundancy 
thanks to the ongoing process of ‘culture change’ within the 
company. The criticisms, then, of the men were taken on the chin 
by an older management cadre as time and again it was explained 
to the workers that the water industry was in a process of 
privatisation and that “market forces” were the real managers of 
the company. The men’s concerns about maintenance were usually 
dealt with by some generic reference to cost-cutting and efficiency 
so that, eventually, raising objections didn’t make sense when 
management replied to objections that individual unemployment 
and corporate failure would be the only alternative should 
management proposals not be implemented.
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In addition to the minutiae of changes to manual operatives’ 
working practices, more large-scale changes were happening. 
After years of failure to up-grade existing treatment plants a new 
treatment plant was being built in Leven and, when completed, 
was to be run and maintained entirely privately, so that those 
taking early retirement packages were advised to put in for the 
upcoming jobs that would be advertised when the new private 
plant was on line. Also, for St. Andrews, a new plant was being 
constructed and a major up-grade was planned for Kirkcaldy, 
Auchtertool and Kinghorn thanks to the private sector’s ability to 
attract millions of pounds of new money into the water industry, 
which was seen as the raison d’ être and appeal of privatisation 
insofar as it delivered better public utilities at no cost to the 
public purse. 
This view of the virtues of the free-market economy and the 
relation between ‘public services’ and ‘private goods’ goes back to 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) in which the village 
of Pathhead provided Smith with the opportunity to describe 
another new set of workplace practices in a pin-making factory, 
and allowed Smith to give to the world one of the earliest formu-
lations of the principle that a greater division of labour in the 
manufacturing process means greater productivity. Despite the 
two hundred and twenty-three years separating these two instances 
of changes in working practices in Pathhead, Smith was alive to 
the question of the relationship between worker autonomy and 
efficiency, and did not disguise the fact that during the advent of 
capitalism the worker’s autonomy did not feature in the drive to 
maximise productivity. Today, however, in the current era of ‘dis-
organised’ capitalism, economic productivity is now deemed best 
served by increasing as much as possible worker autonomy into 
the workplace. In this regard, Savage (1999) has discussed male 
manual work cultures and the advent of a ‘new managerialism’ 
and the “new individualism” (1999, p. 23) into the work experi-
ence to describe today’s increasingly ‘flexible’ industrial relations 
where a much greater level of reflexivity is required from workers 
on the shop floor and which entails higher levels of decision-
making and risk-taking for skilled blue-collar workers. 
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Undoubtedly, the new manager in Pathhead was attempting to 
introduce a form of “shop floor reflexive modernisation” among 
East of Scotland Water workers. However, while these changes 
represent the triumph of neo-liberalism and managerialism begun in 
the nineteen-eighties, in this latest re-organisation of the international 
free-market it is questionable if there is any fundamental change in 
the exercise or distribution of power at the shop-floor level as 
traditional power relations are not up for negotiation and are not 
devolved to the workers as part of their ‘empowerment.’
As mentioned, in my account of the meeting with the new 
manager the usual power relations were in place as far as the men 
were concerned, and it requires the possession of power to talk 
with great conviction to workers about the devolution of decision-
making and the empowerment of workers in a totally unconvincing 
fashion, yet command a show of attention. This ‘capture of 
language’ by power is something that is not lost on the men, and 
so when talking with Mick after the meeting he told me of 
previous occasions when his line supervisor had advised him he 
could ‘have his say’ so long as he didn’t swear or “come across as 
aggressive” when talking to managers. Mick took delight in 
recounting how he was required to act as his own spokesman, to 
speak for himself or ‘represent’ himself as if he were absent. 
Having to invent a polite persona to inform his managers about 
his ‘absent’ working-class self is something that is captured by 
Bourdieu (1984, p. 462) when he writes: “The dominant language 
discredits and destroys the spontaneous political discourse of the 
dominated. It leaves them only silence or a borrowed language…
unable to express anything true, real or ‘felt’, dispossesses the 
speaker of the very experience it is supposed to express. It forces 
recourse to spokesmen.’’ A contextual analysis of the use of 
language, then, opens a window onto the differential distribution 
and possession of power and status. In the discourse of Dauvit, 
Mick and John analysed earlier, there was an impersonal 
personalism in Dauvit, and with Mick there is a form of silencing 
because of being required to ‘say himself’ as if absent. With John 
there is a similar imitation of speaking as he stared into the gantry 
speaking a discourse that was evicted of personality because the 
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‘who’ or the subject speaking was ‘absent,’ as he too was forced 
to perform ‘subjectless speaking’ or fall silent.
In introducing the notion of a ‘worked self’ and the notion of 
a reduction earlier, physical labour was semantically connected to 
ideas of accessing or uncovering ‘genuineness’ or an underlying 
authentic reality as in the phrase “the salt of the earth” thanks to 
the salt being produced by the labouring and sweating body. More 
generally, the men discursively identified with their ‘hands on’ 
selves and an implicit discourse concerning human authenticity 
based upon this identification was voiced at particular times. The 
men would say they preferred manual work because they preferred 
‘being themselves’ because they identified the loss of free speech as 
an occupational hazard among those promoted to white-collar 
positions, as if moving up a hierarchy under these conditions 
required ‘selling out.’ The refusal of pursuing a ‘career’ under 
these conditions was justified upon the basis of refusing to lose 
their identity as the men seemed to believe that being successful 
meant successfully competing against competitors in hierarchies 
full of others similarly hoping to be successful; that being 
successful would mean buying into a culture of not cultivating 
friendships or solidaristic behaviours as they might jeopardise 
one’s ability to compete. My intuition is that the new manager was 
a model of inauthenticity thanks to his having ‘successfully’ 
negotiated his way through the occupational-come-institutional 
hierarchy and having instantiated a biography in which, along 
with solid material motivations for selfishness on the part of the 
individual, there would emerge over time an entire moralism 
and humanism to justify narcissistic behaviours. By refusing the 
treadmill of a career, then, the men were distancing themselves 
from an ethos of competition in favour of a more authentic and 
honourable way of working, and so they would relate among 
themselves instances of management favouritism and the practice 
of promoting inferior men to positions of greater responsibility, 
precisely because their relative incompetence vis-à-vis other men 
made them easier to control. 
More concretely, I believe that the men were disgusted at the 
‘false consciousness’ and narcissistic self-comprehension and self-
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representation of the manager, as well as his de-historicised and 
immaculate understanding of the company he worked for, and the 
danger such a ‘free man’ represented to them; a man ex nihilo 
with the power and will to make employees into his image. 
We may speculate, then, that the order of representation in a 
class-divided society is more or less fated to be a society where the 
symbolic order is built upon various class-based existences that are 
fated to more or less deny the reality of other existences that are 
differently situated vis-à-vis the social whole; that in such a society 
and in every game of distinction (Bourdieu) each participant is 
fated to routinely attempt to totalise their positionality to become 
the measure of all things, and there will be a hundred and one 
‘objective’ reasons to construct an entire realm of consciousness 
geared towards denying to oneself what one is objectively required 
to be in order to become a responsible and mature adult in such a 
highly competitive and hierarchically ordered society. If theory 
comes after praxis then, because they instantiate the trajectory 
through social space and biography of the inauthentic’s practice of 
authenticity, they are fated to believe the ‘lies’ they are fated to tell 
themselves, so that while the ‘semantic’ work middle management 
must do is fated to be seen by the men as nonsense, middle man-
agement in their discourse is condemned to believe and be caught 
in the illusion and ‘mythologise’ or over-interpret their practice.
In our analysis of ‘the worked self’ we drew upon Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method (1979) where the point is made that we cannot 
play at playing so that, for example, one can not play ironically or 
adopt a detached attitude so long as one in fact is playing, because 
to play at all one must be committed to or caught up in the action 
of playing so that self-consciousness destroys the reality or being 
of playing. With regard to our analysis of working, one similarly 
cannot ‘play at’ working because there must always be a surrender 
or giving of self to the work, so that to work at all means one 
can never opt out of the effects of working such as the sweat that 
forms on one’s brow. The effects of work, then, are accomplished 
within the worker regardless of the intentionality or disposition 
of the worker towards his work i.e. regardless of the distracted, 
bored or concentrated state of mind of the worker, he is always 
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delivered over to the effects of labour no matter if the task 
has been done a thousand times before because the body can 
not ‘switch off’ or absent itself from its working. Unlike one’s 
attention which may be put elsewhere, such absence is impossible 
for the body as it is condemned to being present to its doing. 
For the manual worker, then, his work makes the reality of the 
body present in its own right and yet, given time, this presence 
becomes routinized via the formation of a bodily habitus, and 
so a paradox of working is that it integrates that which is thought 
to be antinomous i.e. event and structure or moment and habitus 
so that ‘‘determinism and contingency…freedom and necessity 
come to terms unceasingly – in nature, in history, in the destiny 
of peoples as in that of individuals’’ (Rondet 1972, p. 4). Finally, 
because there is ordinarily nothing more immediate, pressing 
and real than sweating and labouring, a pattern is established at 
‘the point of production’ and this fundamental disciplining or 
simplifying of the person involves an habitual experience of being 
a self that informs other identities and practices such as being 
a father, son, brother and husband etcetera, but without suggesting 
that the ‘point of production’ determines all other identities 
but simply that it informs other identities or ‘ways of being.’ 
Empirically, of course, it may well be that among the culturally 
dispossessed who have little traditions by which they may resist 
the self brought about by working becoming all there is to their 
dasein, and they may fail to resist a kind of ontological dictatorship 
forming within themselves. Indeed, perhaps a kind of proletarian 
version of Marcuse’s one-dimensional man may be more or less 
normal in a market society and a free market in labour where 
people’s experience of society is being effectively reduced to their 
economic functioning.
Taking informants’ expressions of contempt for work as 
justifying the notion there is a separation between the real self and 
the self hired out to the labour-wages relation is an error. What 
informants say about their work and the changes work effects 
upon them must be distinguished. I reject the possibility of 
‘suspending’ the self and reject any real dualism and argue the 
contempt workers routinely express for their work does not 
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authorise the conclusion there is nothing brought about by doing, 
or the conclusion that there is no ontological transformation of 
dasein as a result of his life of labour, despite the worker not being 
interested in or wanting to be what he in fact is. Not only is a ‘real 
self’ produced via labour but at the ‘point of production’ there 
occurs a deep integration of self and world, and that it is here that 
a dynamic reflexive project comes into existence insofar as the 
condition of reduction is taken up by freedom, so that an initially 
purely physical condition leads to a Weberian ‘ideal type’ or a set 
of signature behaviours which are not produced mechanically or 
automatically or causally as, being human behaviours, they are 
as much sourced in human freedom as they are in objectively 
determining material relationships. 
Once the appropriate physical and attitudinal accommodations 
are made by the novice worker, the work experience is free to 
reproduce itself not only in bios but in eros and logos and other 
areas of experience and this adds a certain quality of fatalism or 
amor fati. In this regard Willis (1977, p. 102) makes the mistake of 
taking his informants’ ‘humanism’ as his guide when he argues: “In 
the end it is recognised that it is specifically the cultural diversion 
that makes any job bearable.” I argue that it is necessity that makes 
any job bearable; it is because it must be borne that it is bearable 
and has little to do with ‘‘cultural diversion.’’ The body, unlike the 
spiritual reality of mind and consciousness, is both incapable and 
capable of instantiating a ‘forgetfulness of being’ in order to negate 
the effects of labour. If the kind of work that possesses ‘intrinsic 
properties’ in Willis’s estimation is not manual labour, it is because 
he fails to conceptualise the body adequately as a source of self, 
and source of psychological life and a project of freedom and so 
fails to give manual labour “its own properties” and reproduces an 
ontology and understanding of meaning that privileges semanticism.
While production-line workers incessantly appeal to cultural 
values or ‘diversions’ to make their work more meaningful, the 
ethnographer is not authorised to imagine work is ontologically 
insignificant unless his theory of human being is content to confine 
itself to the reports consciousness gives of itself. While in work an 
embodied self is made ‘live’ and present, the difficulty in grasping 
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this self is due to it being embodied and fated to be ‘betrayed’ or 
lost in translation from real contextual dasein to its discursive 
representation. In any concrete research situation this ‘worked 
self’ will only be ‘given’ in moments or by events which ‘trigger’ 
it. As Bourdieu has written: “It is only in the relation to certain 
structures that habitus produces given discourses or practices…
We must think of it as a sort of spring that needs a trigger’’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 135). It is because of this 
radically non-substantialist manner-of-being that it is inevitable 
for a particular individual that is new to practicing introspection 
that he will search within for this reduced ‘worked self’ and 
reduction-based reflexive project and conclude there is no such 
self to find. If workers will always appear to discursively dissolve 
their work identities into other identities and will always refer to 
cultural values to find meaning in their work, none of this changes 
that which is brought into being by their doing, as nothing is 
forfeited by being forgotten or discursively disavowed. We may 
say that reality takes care of itself regardless of representational 
regimes, so that a lifetime of ‘forgetting’ to discursively constitute 
this level of dasein sits happily with the reality they are.
Attempting to analyse “what the being of doing is and what it is 
that doing brings into being” (Castoriadis 1987, p. 168) is unlikely 
if the ethnographer does not share in the daily life of manual work 
as part of his ethnographic practice, and he is unlikely to be able 
to report experiences with a trigger-hose that makes the previous 
point of Bourdieu’s as real as it is ever likely to be. Without such 
participant observation the attempt at articulating a ‘point of 
production’ or a ‘worked self’ will probably be suspected of being 
essentialist snark-hunting, and in this regard Hill Gates has written 
of Chinese women’s identity as workers as “always on the brink 
of dissolving into those of kinship’’ (in Perry 1996, p. 128), while 
women scholars have highlighted the difficulty of women thinking 
themselves sociologically thanks to the dialectical clash between 
‘being feminine’ and ‘being working class’ (Walkerdine 1996; 
Skeggs 1997). In terms of the ‘condition of reduction’ within the 
lives and dasein of women manual labourers, one reads Macdougall’s 
(1993, 1995) work, for example, on women manual labourers and 
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finds no interest whatever in the question of the structuration 
effected upon women’s dasein as a result of performing manual 
labour either in Macdougal or among the women workers 
themselves. It seems clear that the connection between men and 
manual labour is recognised in the symbolic order in a way that the 
relation between women and manual labour is not recognised, with 
the result that female manual workers will find it very difficult to 
articulate their ‘worked self’ and are likely to come under pressure 
from their culture not to allow the condition of reduction to become 
a free and reflexive project in their lives.
While a structuralist or relational view of reality and meaning 
implies a “break with the tendency to think of the social world 
in a substantialist manner” (Bourdieu 1998, p. 31), I reify or ‘make 
something of’ labouring subjectivity not by positing some unchang-
ing essence over time but by thinking through their radical suscep-
tibility to the world and the relentless condition of ‘relatedness’ to 
what are contingent social relationships but which are more or less 
stable over time. The embodied worked self then is a substantive 
reality notwithstanding the relational character of its constitution 
and its continual need of active constitution. Having paid our dues 
to the relational nature of reality I abstract a substance or ‘second-
ary nature’ i.e. the condition of reduction which in Chapter 6 will 
be taken up further as the conditione sine qua non of the intellectual 
life and an act of self-understanding that is available to manual 
workers.
This chapter has attempted to analyse the life of manual labour 
on its own terms and has argued that this life is one wherein self 
and world are integrated and this integration is effected via 
embodiment, time and intentionality which come into alignment 
to unite not only the self with the world and the self to itself, but 
provides the basis for the subsequent ‘free’ intersubjective 
development of that subjectivity. As Castoriadis (1987, p. 106) 
put it: “the support for this union of the subject and the non-
subject in the subject, the point of connection between the self and 
the other, is the body…The body, which is not alienation…but 
participation in the world.’’ This integration is pre-discursive and 
antepredicative and it is via work that is ‘produced’ within the 
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labourer not simply a particular experience of being a person but, 
over time, there is also established ontological continuity with a 
working-class tradition and the existential triangulation of self, 
intersubjectivity and the realm of meaning that is unavailable any 
other way. While there is a period of life that is innocent of the 
‘condition of reduction’ it is often a childhood and adolescence 
spent within the ambience of a working-class family, so that when 
one attempts to theorise the being brought about by manual 
labour it is always both something which is already objectively 
‘out there’ and something which comes into being as a personal 
existential reality because the individual who becomes this 
condition has long ago been surrounded by it and socialised 
through it via his experience of sociality among those who already 
are this condition. Via work the youth not only becomes an adult 
but becomes working class as a matter of his dasein and destiny 
and ‘secondary nature,’ as opposed to merely symbolically or 
vicariously via his primary socialisation and family life.
This chapter has argued that the ‘worked self’ or condition of 
reduction is the product of the conjoining of particular relations 
and the socialised body that are sufficiently enduring to mean 
the resultant way of being merits an analytical category of its own. 
In establishing this theoretical category a fundamental element 
of working-class structuration is in place and it is upon this basis 
that other structurations that are present can be more fully 
understood and brought into focus. The next chapter, then, opens 
other lines of inquiry into contextual dasein via a threefold 
investigation of:
1) a phenomenology of a set of particular housing conditions 
and neighbour relations.
2) the major cultural changes that inform the lives of the 
1979 generations.
3) the temporal horizon operative among residents as a 
result of ‘being local.’
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3
Housed Dasein & a 
‘Politics of Identity’
Ye cannae speak tae them. She bawls and shouts at ye.  
She screams! And ye think tae yersel, ‘Oh my God!’ That’s 
why Ah tend no tae approach them really. An the Council 
always says ‘Would ye like to come and have a meetin wi 
them?’ Ah says, ‘Look’, Ah says, ‘Ah don’t want to meet  
wi these people.’ Ah says ‘Ah don’t speak to these people.’ 
Ye ken what? It even affects me wise, even ma religion. It’s 
like yer supposed tae love thy neighbour. Ah cannae love 
these people! Ah cannae even be civil tae these people! It’s 
affected ma whole life.
Helen Sillar, Cardenden Rd, 27 June 2011
3.1 Fife Council Housing:  
17 August 1998–7 February 2000
This chapter explores the impact of living through a particular 
set of housing conditions and a resultant ‘politics of identity’ that 
dominated much of my experience in the field which, from the 
outset, was dominated by living below an antisocial neighbour 
and the process of securing their eviction. If a central concern 
in understanding working-class structuration is the workplace 
experience of time (Thompson 1967) and providing an account 
of what Husserl (1964) termed “the phenomenology of internal 
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time-consciousness,” the fieldwork event or set of conditions 
which highlighted temporality not only as a sui generic structuring 
force in its own right but as a structuring force that structures 
every other structuring relation, was my particular housing 
conditions for the first nineteen months of fieldwork.
In July 1998 I returned to Cardenden from my honeymoon 
spent in Vejer de la Frontera (Cadiz) and a few days later received 
a letter from a Mr. Donald Grant (Locality Manager) asking me 
to confirm that I was still looking for a tenancy. Having by that 
stage already been on the Fife Council housing waiting list for 
over a year, I was delighted as I knew this letter meant I could 
soon be able to bring my wife and daughter from Spain. Upon 
confirming to the Council that I was still very much interested, 
I was told a two-bedroom flat in Cardenden Road would be 
available soon and, sharing this information with some female 
residents, it was less than an hour before I learned the name and 
address of the person who was moving out, and so I went to speak 
to the tenant (Mrs Guild) who invited me in to see the flat for 
myself. As we chatted in one of the bedrooms, Mrs Guild gave 
some warning about noise levels of the neighbour upstairs but as 
she showed me the bedrooms and, after remarking on how her 
portrait of Pius XII was lit up by the afternoon sun shining directly 
into the bedrooms, she expressed her confidence that my family 
would “be happy here” as it was “a very sunny, happy flat.” On 
17th August 1998 I signed the tenancy for 51 Cardenden Road 
with a sense of relief at having finalised my living arrangements so 
that fieldwork could begin at long last.
After having painted and re-carpeted the flat, myself and Eva 
moved into our first home as a married couple. A few days 
after moving in, however, two Housing Investigations Officers from 
Fife Council knocked on our door and asked to speak with us, and 
proceeded to inform us that Fife Council was in the process of 
investigating our upstairs neighbour at number 57 due to a number 
of complaints regarding behaviour and noise. As we sat in our 
living room we learned that the standard Council procedure for 
dealing with antisocial neighbours was that, from receipt of a 
complaint, a process was begun which started with informal visits 
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and, if the problem continued, formal letters and ‘counselling 
sessions’ being set up to resolve the issue. When I queried the track 
record of counselling sessions and “last warnings,” the confident 
reply from one of the Council employees was: “We have the law, 
and nobody beats the law” (Stuart MacQueen). At this meeting we 
were also advised that while a process of evidence-gathering had 
already begun, the end result may not be an eviction as the tenant, 
when formally advised she would be evicted, still had the option of 
voluntarily giving up her tenancy, and therefore avoid actually 
being evicted by a court order. In the course of the meeting we were 
handed a supply of forms to be completed and which would be used 
“as evidence” by the Housing Investigation Team in a court of law, 
should Fife Council request an eviction order from a judge in the 
future. We were asked to help with the gathering of detailed 
information on our neighbour’s behaviour as this was necessary to 
secure eviction by compiling a Neighbour Complaint Incident 
Diary which involved myself and Eva compiling information under 
the following headings:
1. Date & time of incident
2. Where did the incident occur?
3. Brief details of what happened
4. Who did it?
5. Any witnesses?
6. Do you have their names and addresses?
7. Did you report it to anyone?
8. If so who? (e.g. Area Office, Police)
9. Any other complaints?
As the two Council employees asked us if we had any questions 
and it became clear they were ready to leave, I asked why we were 
not told about this problem tenant before we signed the tenancy 
and moved in. The two Council employees answered that prior 
to signing our lease we had no right to know Fife Council was 
seeking an eviction order on the upstairs tenant. However, now 
that we had signed the tenancy and now that Fife Council was 
our landlord, we were entitled to know. While we had asked this 
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question, however, it was not asked with any anger or exasperation 
as until this point we had not had any experience of the problem 
neighbour. In due course, however, it became clear I had made an 
awful decision in signing this tenancy agreement with Fife Council 
as the first nineteen months of our married life turned out to be 
more or less unhappy, unpleasant and sometimes desperate.
The problem soon manifested itself to us along with the 
specific behaviours that had led to complaints against our upstairs 
neighbour at number 57: communal front door buzzers sounding 
‘continually’ through the night and awakening neighbours; 
routinely having to answer our intercom well after midnight as 
another unidentified voice who didn’t know the correct flat to 
buzz asked to be admitted to the building (early on we learned 
to switch our intercom off at night);49 smoke alarms sounding in 
the early-morning hours while unattended food that was being 
heated started to burn; loud music being played anytime from 
midnight until three, four or five o’clock in the morning, so that 
being awakened at night became a more or less expected and 
regular event, as well as a general ‘continual’ coming and going 
of individuals and small groups from mid-afternoon onwards. 
To convey something of everyday life at this time I reproduce an 
excerpt from my field diary for 18 November concerning one 
incident among many other similarly fraught incidents:
11.30 am. I go to clean the common stairs and entrance  
hall at my flat. I hear from the first floor above a neighbour’s 
daughter who is about to leave her mum’s flat complain 
“Oh who’s a’ this noo?” I look up. About to enter the main 
door are four young people making for number 57, the 
problem tenant. First to enter is a young woman whom  
I recognise from previous occasions50 followed by three 
49 As the tenant was unemployed it is likely she was unable to afford a land-line 
telephone. Also, this was 1998 when mobile phones were not the ubiquitous 
commodity they are today. 
50 A single mother of two who had been recently evicted from her Fife Council 
tenancy in Cardenden. 
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young men. The first one I look at. He is gaunt with short 
cropped hair and two or three small round gold coloured 
earrings in his left ear. He looks old and he is thin. With a 
grin he says to me in passing, “A’right?” I don’t answer.  
I look at the next one passing. Young again with fair hair 
with his Glasgow Rangers football club sweatshirt on. I get 
back to cleaning and listen to the mumblings that follow  
the silence of passing. When they reach the middle floor  
I hear the words, “He’s a housewife” passed among them. 
The insult stings and reveals the muted conflict going on  
all around. A challenge has been made. I look up and am 
thinking to reply, “An Ah suppose you’re a hard-workin 
man?” but this is too cruel, too thought-out and personal  
an attack, so I settled on my own counter-mumbling retort 
of “Idiot” in the direction of the middle landing, loud 
enough to be heard. Amid the ensuing mumble I realise  
my counter-insult had been heard and await nervously  
their response. I can only make out “…come doon there an 
f**k you.” Nothing more is said. They go into number 57.  
I finish the stairs.
This journal entry was written at a time when I felt I had no 
reason, and certainly no desire, to conduct research into ‘neighbour 
relations’ or ‘housing conditions.’ While the incident was indicative 
of day-to-day living that was characterised by having to confront 
the continual threat of aggressive confrontation, and while these 
issues were very quickly occupying more and more space in my 
fieldwork journal and family life, it is clear with hindsight that 
it was with great reluctance that I began to come to terms with 
the fact that I was being more or less coerced into allowing this 
reality onto my research agenda, and thereby ‘spoiling’ my long-
awaited fieldwork. In the end, transforming my miserable situation 
into ‘data’ and an object of analysis became a kind of therapy 
that helped me to cope. 
Thanks to living directly underneath an antisocial neighbour, 
I realised very quickly that far from being ‘open to the field’ 
I shared in all of the prejudices against ‘the underclass’ as any 
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‘middle-class snob,’ but also that my prejudices ran deeper as all of 
the ressentiment that is a characteristic of much of the working 
class (and which I recognise within myself) was available to me to 
be mobilised against the problem neighbour. Far from the pieties of 
being ‘open’ to the field, then, it was beneath me to attend to this 
debased level of reality, and I strongly resisted condescending to 
give it my attention. I was shocked to find myself living with people 
who seemed to be “as tasteless and ugly as…could be” (Muir 
1935, p. 166) and so involved was I in reacting to this situation 
that I began to no longer trust my interpretation of the data.
Realising the scale of the problem we became angry that the 
Fife Council local area office in Cardenden had no responsibility 
to inform us of the problem as it seemed incredible that a landlord 
in the process of investigating complaints against our immediate 
neighbour for over a year had a policy that meant prospective 
tenants to the downstairs property were unable to make an 
informed decision as to whether or not to accept the offer of 
a tenancy. Due to Fife Council tenants’ rights to confidentiality 
and the police being “unable to discuss details,” the only source 
of information was neighbours themselves who had no such 
‘ethical’ or ‘professional’ concerns. What soon became clear was 
that it was only myself immediately below number 57 and the 
tenants living directly above number 57, Mary and Alan at 
number 63, who ever approached the problem neighbour in an 
effort to speak to her directly about the level of noise. Mary and 
myself bore the brunt of the problem and it was from talking to 
Mary that I learnt that, by the time of my arrival to the block of 
nine flats, the problem had been ongoing for a year, and when 
visiting Mary and her husband Alan for the first time, myself and 
Eva were informed that the police had raided the flat and lifted the 
floorboards searching for drugs; that the police were ‘constantly’ 
in attendance and that number 57 was used as a meeting point 
for other local problem tenants such as Rhona Sheed and her 
children; that number 57 was in effect a ‘gang hut’ for local 
unemployed youths. When remarking to a policeman entering the 
flats one day about his frequency in our building, for example, his 
reply was that number 57 was the first port of call when dealing 
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with child order breaches which required minors to be with their 
legal guardians at specified times.
If much of the social interaction that occurred within the block 
of flats often involved picking over the details of the latest 
disturbance, it was not only number 57 that came in for criticism. 
When I would clean the common stairwell on the ground floor, 
Mrs Davidson from number 53 would often emerge from behind 
her locked door and proceed to talk to me about the long-standing 
failure of the cleaning rota in our block, or some other neighbour-
related issue. In one sentence and with one accompanying 
movement of her walking stick she would point above her head 
complaining: “Her up there’s just as bad,” and with her stick now 
pointing at the door of number 49 tell me: “…and her over there, 
she never cleans. Ah’ve never seen her cleaning. And them up 
there....” Mrs Davidson was an elderly widow and made a point 
of repeating how she did not feel secure day or night in her home. 
Apart from her daughter who lived a few streets away and visited 
her more or less every day, her relations with her neighbours were 
non-existent, and she probably complained to me so often because 
I was the only neighbour in the block who made themselves 
available for her tirades against her neighbours and her complaints 
regarding her situation.
The first time I went upstairs to knock on the door of number 
57 to complain about noise I spoke to somebody who was not the 
tenant, and on the second occasion when I knocked on the door 
to complain about the noise, the only response was a woman’s 
voice in an irritated tone from behind the closed door telling me: 
“The music’s been turned doon.” On this occasion when I asked 
the person to open the door to speak to me, there followed a 
prolonged silence before she replied: “The door’s locked an Ah 
dinnae have a key.” At the third attempt at complaining about 
noise I managed to speak to the problem neighbour (‘Tracey More’) 
and put a face to her name as only at the third attempt did she 
answer her door. 
As the journal entry quoted earlier indicates, so disagreeable was 
the situation that neighbours felt unable to occupy the space 
between their door and the street with any sense of security and so 
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tended to hurry through such spaces. This sense of threat when hav-
ing to negotiate the immediate environs of the flats was brought 
home to me one day when, returning from work early at four-thirty 
in the afternoon, I found the door locked and, asking Eva why she 
had locked the door she replied: “I don’t feel safe here.” This sense 
of feeling displaced or ‘homeless’ when at home is also evidenced in 
the following letter of complaint from Mary at number 63 to the 
Fife Council housing officer dealing with our case.
63 Cardenden Road
Cardenden
Fife KY5 0PD
24th September 1998
Dear Mr. McQueen,
I am writing this time on behalf of Alan and myself and Mr. and 
Mrs. Gilfillan of number 51. We would like your advice on any possible 
further action we can take against Miss Tracey More of number 57 as 
at this present time we feel we would have more chance of sleeping 
in a crowded nightclub. The only word that we can use to describe 
our recent sleep patterns is non-existent. The last few nights have 
been ‘hell.’
Both of our families comprise two adults and a young baby. We 
are all having our sleep disrupted nearly every night of the week with 
some noise or other from no. 57. Mr. and Mrs. Gilfillan’s baby is very 
young and at this rate will never know when she is supposed to sleep 
due to unnecessary excessive noise from Tracey’s house at all times of 
day and night.
Mairéad (my 19 months old daughter) was up three times during 
the early hours of this morning crying, each time following loud bouts 
of laughter, shouting, heavy footsteps, incessant use of intercom (which, 
may I add, is a problem with most of the tenants in the block) or 
extremely loud banging noises, all of which were of course from our 
spiteful neighbour. Another four hours sleep lost. A huge amount of 
stress caused by tiredness and frustration is being forced upon both 
of our families as of the former tenants. We cannot understand why Fife 
Council would rather put more and more new tenants through the same 
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continuous hell, when the only person deserving this treatment is the 
uncontrollable, immature and totally inconsiderate tenant of no. 57.
Fortunately for Mr. and Mrs. Gilfillan, they heard nothing this 
morning, as after only three weeks (approx.) in their new house, they 
were pushed into spending a night or two with family to allow them 
to get at least one restful night. Only three weeks have this family had 
the tenancy for this flat and already they are desperate to be rehoused. 
Doesn’t this go for anything?
As previously discussed with yourself, further action from Fife 
Council is to be taken to rid us all of this nuisance, but it is now 
becoming clear that no visit from either yourselves or the police will 
intimidate Tracey. She is not responding to visits or warnings, I feel 
there must be something that can be done soon on our behalf. The more 
she receives such telling offs, the more rebellious she is becoming. She 
has no care for anyone. How much must we hear of her being told off 
by the police or by Fife Council? Please accept that this does nothing 
at all in our favour. Police and Council visits to Tracey are frequent but 
not one visit seems to have any better outcome than the previous.
Due to the build up of sleepless nights recently, my husband’s 
timekeeping at work is becoming very poor, and whether late or not, 
his efficiency level has dropped drastically, and unfortunately his place 
of employment consider this to be unacceptable whatever the reason. 
I would like to know if people losing their job because of nuisance 
neighbours, therefore unable to keep up rent payments, would be able 
to sit back receiving warning after warning for years with no severe 
action being taken?
I am nearing the stage of visiting my G.P. as I don’t think I can 
tolerate much more pressure as I already suffer from anxiety caused 
by stress and tiredness. Without all this hassle, people like the Gilfillan 
family and my own family would lead such an easy and straightforward 
life. Please advise us of anything we can try until the Council at least 
find us other accommodation (just like they had to for the previous 
tenants). Unfortunately for you, this will not stop the complaint letters, 
it simply means they will be signed by another tenant.
I would not advise anyone to accept a tenancy agreement at either of 
our addresses in the future, or anywhere even close to Tracey More. 
Please advise by return of any suggestions you may have on how we may 
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speed up this whole process of having her and her many noisy friends 
removed from no. 57 Cardenden Road.
Yours sincerely
Mary Mead
p.s. Mr. & Mrs. Gilfillan have read this letter and fully agree with its 
contents.
With effect from 4 November 1998 a Notice of Proceedings was 
issued by Fife Council against the tenant at number 57; a legal 
document which informed her that Fife Council had begun the 
process of seeking a court order to evict. In practical terms being 
evicted meant forfeiting one’s statutory right to be housed and 
not being able to be on the Council housing list for ten years. 
However, as one of the housing investigations officers told me, 
because the process of eviction is so lengthy, the actual number of 
evictions compared to the number of cases of antisocial behaviour 
any particular housing investigation officer is dealing with is small 
because, more often than not, in order to speed up the process of 
removing antisocial tenants, Fife Council advise the problem 
tenant that because they will be evicted at the end of a legal 
process, the best option for the tenant is to sign a form voluntarily 
surrendering their tenancy as this allows the tenant back onto the 
Council housing waiting list after one year.51 Hence, it is normally 
a tenant being informed of the start of the formal process of 
seeking an eviction that actually evicts antisocial tenants, and so 
on 7 December 1998 the tenant ‘voluntarily’ left her flat.
Upon the tenant’s departure there came an immediate and 
collective sigh of relief as the residents in the block in every 
conversation celebrated with each other the return of peace and 
normality and the repossession of shared space. As we joked 
among ourselves at this time, it was us who had been re-housed 
51 However, when interviewing with the housing investigation officer involved 
(Stuart MacQueen) he made a point of emphasising that Fife Council does not 
“advise” any course of action to the tenant.
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thanks to being able to take possession of our homes again. On 
the day ‘the problem’ left, I lay in bed at night confidently enjoying 
the silence and ended my field diary entry for the day with the 
comment: “At last I can begin fieldwork!” and for the next weeks 
we enjoyed a relationship to space which allowed us to have 
qualitatively better relationships among ourselves as neighbours. 
It felt as if existence had suddenly been augmented as it became 
co-existence again, thanks to our lives being suddenly ‘de-privatised’ 
and released from our alienation from our shared spaces and each 
other. We felt able to breathe again thanks to the communal air 
being decontaminated of the toxic and threatening presence of the 
former tenant. This re-established relationship to space and time 
made the present moment all the more sweet as integral to the 
experience of the moment was the anticipation that every future 
moment to come would be equally peaceful; as if each not yet real 
but anticipated future moment added another touch of sweetness 
to the present moment’s peace, as we were released from our 
individual bunkers and could constitute ‘being neighbours’ again.
During the month or so that number 57 lay empty I was able 
to get to know some of the neighbours better, and returning to 
my flat after a few days of peace and quiet I met the neighbour 
from number 59 coming out of the building, and she began a 
conversation by asking, in reference to the recent eviction of the 
problem tenant and the peace and quiet all of us were enjoying: 
“Enjoy a quiet night last night?” Before I could do more than 
smile in reply she informed me that her upstairs neighbour 
Siobhán at number 65 had a young boy who was “like a baby 
elephant when he runs across the room.” 
This was the first occasion I was able to have a real conversation 
with this particular neighbour, having had little opportunity to 
establish normal relations during the first four months of my 
tenancy, and it provided us with the opportunity to introduce 
ourselves and talk about ourselves, and so I learned she was 
originally from the nearby village of Ballingry but had moved to 
England where her two sons still lived and that: “They will not 
move up here tae Scotland. They’re mair English than Scottish. 
They were jist young boys when they went doon. They even talk 
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English. They dinnae speak Scottish. They dinnae want tae come 
up.” She then told me that when first married she was in a 
maisonette in Glenrothes and then progressed to a flat; that “every 
time” she would prefer a top-floor flat with nobody above her. At 
this I told her that Alan at number 63 had told me of how the 
police had ripped up the floorboards of number 57, to which she 
matter-of-factly replied: “It’ll be fir drugs. That’s the way it is these 
days wi young folk. They’re a’ intae the drugs noo here.” She then 
told me about her mother who had lived in her Council house for 
forty-four years and had died four years ago; how as the daughter 
she had “put in” for her mother’s house but didn’t get it, that her 
mother had been the only tenant in the house which had originally 
been built for miners but now “the police have been in it; raided 
the place fir drugs. We still think e it as ma mum’s hoose, ye ken.”
After enjoying conversations that centred around our new 
and improved living conditions, the subject of conversation 
among us turned to whom would replace the previous tenant, and 
the opinion of neighbours as to who was at the top of the Council 
housing waiting list was that it was one of two single women, and 
the tenant at number 49 advised (prophetically as it turned 
out) that of the two candidates one “would definitely be quieter 
than the other.” As it turned out, then, the relaxed mood among 
the tenants lasted until word spread that the tenancy had been 
given to another local young unemployed single woman (Sandra 
McCrossan) who came from a large family from the nearby street 
of Cluny Park that was described by one neighbour as “pretty low 
class” and another neighbour as “a’ rough as f**k.” 
The new tenant took up residence in January and so began our 
second phase of living with an antisocial tenant, with my first 
meeting with her occurring well after midnight when, unable to 
sleep due to the noise of wallpaper being scraped off walls and 
music from a radio, I went upstairs to explain to the new tenant 
that the flats had poor sound insulation and to ask her to “keep 
the noise down.” After knocking on the door it was opened by a 
friend of the tenant who then leaned against the door, and the 
conversation that followed was conducted with myself standing 
at the door and the friend helping with the redecoration holding 
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the door ajar while the tenant remained seated on the floor with 
her back against the far wall of the front bedroom with cigarette 
and scraper in hand. Taking a few seconds to realise the tenant 
was not going to stand up, her comportment and every sullen 
monosyllabic response of “Aye” and “Right” when I explained 
about the noise signalled to me an unwillingness to engage in basic 
conventions of civility.
I returned downstairs where Eva lay waiting to ask me about 
my first impressions of our new neighbour, and as I lay in bed 
replaying the incident in my mind it struck me that the tenant’s 
resolutely monosyllabic agreement to keep the noise down seemed 
like a calculated way to maintain the maximum possible social 
distance, and that any notion of apology for keeping one’s new 
neighbours awake because of noise after midnight through the 
working week was never going to be forthcoming, and that such 
behaviours meant the idea of introducing myself as her neighbour 
became absurdly formal and out of place.
This first meeting with the new tenant proved to be a sign 
of things to come and so at around two a.m. on March 27th 
I got out of bed to go upstairs and complain about the noise. 
I knocked hard on the door so as to be heard over the music 
and a few seconds later the music was turned down. I remained 
standing at the door waiting for someone to answer the door. 
After waiting longer than it would take someone to come to 
the door I knocked again. As I stood at the door I heard voices 
from inside, presumably discussing what to do. Because the hall 
light inside the flat was on I could see from the movement 
of shadows that I was being ‘spied on’ from the spy-hole in the 
door. Wondering whether I was better off just going back 
downstairs content that the music had been turned down, 
I decided to persevere and knocked again. Eventually a man 
opened the door and there was the following exchange:
  Me: Is the tenant there?
  Man: Aye. She’s in the bathroom.
  Me: Could ye tell her Ah want a word?
  Man: Aye.
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The door was then closed and he looked to the side, as if awaiting 
instructions on what to do next. The tenant then stepped from 
behind the door where she had been standing. The conversation 
was as follows:
Me: What’s wi a’ the noise?
Sandra: What noise?
Me: This is the second time the night you’ve woke us up.
Sandra: Ah’m seek e the police comin tae ma door every 
night.
Me: Ah’ve never called the police. Not once.
At this the tenant shut the door in my face. I took a step backwards 
in disbelief, before complaining: “What are you playin at? Look, 
open the door. Ah want a word.” As the door remained shut 
I opened it to go into the flat but, after opening the door a few 
inches, it was shoved shut again from the inside. From the strength 
it required from me to turn the handle to open the door it was 
clear someone on the other side was trying to prevent me from 
turning the handle. In this trial of strength I managed to turn the 
handle enough to force the door open but, in the ensuing battle to 
open the door, my bare feet didn’t allow enough grip to keep up 
the contest and I gave up. As the door stayed shut, each of 
us stood on each side of the door waiting for the next move. 
I returned downstairs without further comment and never spoke 
again to the neighbour. 
The following week, however, the new neighbour’s sister 
(Sharen) came to our door to explain there would be noise that 
night. Friday nights turned out to be party night and, in the only 
effort at ever acknowledging the problem between us, the older 
sister of the tenant had come, in her own words, to give us “fair 
warning.” At this unexpected turn of events my first thought was 
to invite her into my flat to take advantage of this acknowledgment 
of there being a problem, but as she stood on my doorstep flicking 
her cigarette ash onto my doorstep and floor, such a gesture seemed 
absurd, and in the conversation that took place between us my 
complaints regarding noise in general and throughout the night in 
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particular, and of having to endure listening to hours of videos of 
the American sitcom Friends and its endless formula of four lines 
of dialogue followed by punch line followed by canned laughter ad 
nauseam until six o’clock in the morning, were flatly denied: 
“Naw. Nut. Ma sister disnae dae that. Naw. Nut.” While the sister 
of the tenant had come to warn me of noise, she was not there to 
apologise for anything as there was nothing to apologise for.
Reflecting upon these incidents highlights how human behaviour 
is more or less always surrounded by moral evaluations and 
social interaction is infused by our internalisation of the ‘normal’ 
and the ‘correct’ way of doing things. Menley’s Tournaments of 
Value (1996, p. 104) observes that the etiquette of greeting 
a person has “a quality of moral compulsion about it,” so that a 
direct corollary is that to withhold or fail to practice such etiquette 
is to immediately suspend social relations. In light of much 
ethnography arguing that greeting practices and the etiquette 
and aesthetics of hospitality are central to the construction of 
personhood, so that to violate or withhold such social practices is 
to insult an other person (Altorki 1986; Biedelman 1989; Myers 
1993), it is easy to appreciate how in a context where one’s lived 
experience of neighbour relations is characterised by a lack of 
hospitality and practices of recognition, an individual who has 
to deal with antisocial neighbours such as Helen quoted at the 
outset become hard, and are more or less fated to instantiate an 
attitude and discourse towards their neighbour that is a cocktail 
of indifference, alienation and resentment. 
Hence, when cleaning the common stairs on a Friday afternoon 
(22 January 1999) Mrs Davidson at number 53 came out and 
stood on her doorstep for her usual chat with me when cleaning, 
and immediately announced without firstly saying hello or 
good morning: “This is a terrible place tae live. A terrible 
place tae live,” and there followed a litany of complaints. After 
Mrs Davidson had returned inside the elder of the two sisters 
at number 59 came out of her flat and, seeing me cleaning the 
ground floor, we began chatting about the rotas for stair cleaning 
which the Council drew up and distributed to the tenants via the 
Council caretaker (Tam Barr). This neighbour was middle-aged 
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and as on previous occasions when we had talked in the stairwell, 
she was personable and sympathetic in her conversation. On the 
subject of cleaning the stairs on her floor she told me: “Ah refuse 
tae dae it. Ma sister done it a’. Cleaned right doon the stairs bit 
they [the other tenants on her floor] never bother. See ye’ve got 
tae make yer mooth go.’’ Two days later when chatting with the 
tenant at number sixty-five, a young divorced single mother who 
worked in the supermarket opposite the flats, she informed 
me that the evicted tenant at number 57 had informed the Depart- 
ment of Social Security about her working, with the intent of 
jeopardising her welfare benefits. Next, she told me that she had 
just been to look at her new Council flat in Kirkburn Drive and 
that: “Ah’ll be oot e here in a fortnight!” From her comments 
on living in the block of flats it was clear she felt more or less 
compelled to leave.
During the time spent living beneath the second antisocial 
tenant the problem changed insofar as when living beneath 
the first problem tenant I felt she was indifferent to all of 
her neighbours, and so her behaviours were ‘anonymous’ or 
‘impersonal,’ whereas the issue with the second tenant involved 
behaviours that were personal and directed towards me. On one 
occasion late at night, for example, I heard the sister who had 
simultaneously acknowledged and denied the problem of noise 
enter the flat upstairs and immediately begin playing loud music, 
at which the tenant asked her to turn the music down, and 
to which the older sister replied: “F**k um. F**k um” (which 
I interpreted as referring to myself). On another occasion in the 
early hours of the morning music was played at full volume only 
to be turned down, and then turned up again to the maximum 
until my bedroom ceiling visibly vibrated. This behaviour carried 
on for hours and when the police were called a patrol car from 
Glenrothes six miles away would be sent, and soon after the police 
had spoken to the neighbour and started back to Glenrothes, the 
music and noise resumed. This second phase of living with 
antisocial neighbours lasted until 7 February 2000 when we gave 
up our Council flat tenancy and moved into a private flat at 113 
Station Road, which was inferior to what we had before and 
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double the rent we had been paying at 51 Cardenden Road but 
solved our problem of living below antisocial neighbours.
Learning How to Become Dominated
To live in the field I needed to obtain a Fife Council tenancy and, 
having been on the housing waiting list for over a year prior to 
being offered a tenancy, I was struck from the outset of fieldwork 
by the level of control that Fife Council and the local Ore Valley 
Housing Association52 exercised over the ability to live locally. 
In contrast to stranded American novelists like Kate Atkinson 
referred to in Chapter 1 “simply staying” in Cardenden, the 
difficulties involved in simply being present in Cardenden to do 
my research highlights the fact that resolving the question of 
housing independently of local government bureaucracy in the 
nineteen-nineties was far from straightforward, as private renting 
opportunities were very few and far between as there was very 
little in the way of a local housing market and so there were very 
few opportunities to privately rent or buy property in Cardenden. 
As a result of Fife Council’s de facto control over local housing, 
then, shortly after the first tenant at number 57 left I arranged 
a meeting with a Council official in the Cardenden area office 
to request some thought be given to who was allocated the vacant 
tenancy. From my initial phone calls to arrange the meeting, 
however, it was clear that in requesting this meeting at all 
I was being presumptuous; was getting ‘above myself’ and 
breaking the normal ‘rules of engagement’ and inconveniencing 
busy individuals. In the event, the meeting went badly. Our 
request for some thought on the part of the Council was not at 
all welcome given the irritated and incredulous reception our 
request was met with at the meeting. It was clear the Council 
official was unimpressed as a matter of principle at our desire 
52 In 1998 the only other renting option was to apply to Auchterderran 
Housing Association (subsequently enlarged and renamed Ore Valley Housing 
Association) for a tenancy and so I had also applied for a house with this 
organisation.
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to be part of the housing allocations procedure, and she was 
dismissive at our desire for a form of devolution of power to 
sitting tenants regarding having a role in who was to become 
our neighbour.
Also, in all probability, another contributing factor as to 
why the meeting went badly was my agenda to establish at the 
beginning of the meeting why I had not been informed of the 
ongoing situation of antisocial neighbours before I signed my 
tenancy agreement the year before, and why I was only informed 
of a problem after I had spent my savings furnishing the flat. 
To this particular query myself and Eva were told that what 
was or what was not happening with another tenant was a 
confidential matter, and the Council official was not aware of 
having received any complaints about our previous neighbour. 
At this ‘revelation’ I pointed out that neighbours at number 
63 had informed us the problem had been ongoing for over a year 
by the time we signed our tenancy in August 1998, and the police 
had raided the house on two occasions. To this we were told: 
“Well, you’re telling me that but I have no evidence. Who is to say 
what is unreasonable noise? I need proof.’’ Again, I felt incredulous 
at this request by a Fife Council local area office employee for 
evidence of antisocial behaviour concerning the tenant at number 
57 given her colleagues in the Housing Investigations Team had 
months before visited myself and Eva to advise us of an ongoing 
problem with the behaviour of our upstairs neighbour, and request 
we begin collecting evidence to be used in a court of law to secure 
an eviction order. In an increasingly fraught series of exchanges 
I told the Council employee: “We are here because if you can 
make a mistake once, then you will probably do it again!” 
Although told in no uncertain terms that housing allocation 
policy meant whoever happened to be next on the waiting list 
would be offered the tenancy, we took comfort from the words: 
“We will do our best to make sure the person is suitable” in light 
of the fact that the idea of organising a rent strike within our 
block of flats, for example, to impress Fife Council as to the 
unacceptable lack of action in resolving the issues of noisy 
neighbours was out of the question, given many did not pay rent 
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and therefore were not in a position to threaten to withdraw the 
monthly rent of £137.28. We felt coerced into pursuing what 
seemed like utterly dominated attempts at exercising some kind of 
agency to change our situation. The merest hint of complaisance 
from the Council was greeted with heartfelt relief, so that on 
our way home from this bruising encounter myself and Eva 
congratulated ourselves simply at having ‘done something.’
Other pathetic attempts at agency that were related to me, such 
as when chatting to one of Auchterderran Housing Association’s 
employees was local housing stock being used as “giro drops” i.e. 
the practice of individuals lying and presenting themselves to the 
Association as homeless, often presenting themselves as having 
split from their wife or partner and thereby qualifying for being 
deemed officially ‘homeless’ and therefore a new tenancy, which is 
taken but is not actually lived in so the house is simply used as a 
‘giro drop’ (and also securing more giro money on account of 
being single as opposed to married or living with a partner). 
Unsurprisingly, this practice of seeking a tenancy purely as a ‘giro 
drop’ fuels a sense of resentment among locals as the practice is 
often known or suspected by locals, and the issue of social security 
fraud was a constant presence in letters to local newspapers, 
such as the following from the Central Fife Times newspaper 
(6th September 2001):
Why do they get away with it?
It is no wonder there are so many homeless people in 
Scotland. Here in Fife and elsewhere you have people living 
often as not with someone else. While the council house or 
flat lies empty, they get their rent paid by the DHS. They 
often do not pay council tax yet they continue to cheat and 
lie their way into keeping the council house that some 
genuine family or single person needs very badly. So why do 
the DHS and councils continue to let these spongers in 
society away with this fraud?
SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR ALL,
Cardenden.
223
h o u s e d  d a s e i n  &  a  ‘ p o l i t i c s  o f  i d e n t i t y ’
Among locals it is well understood that ‘working’ the system is a 
spectrum, and while giro drops are extreme examples that are 
condemned, there are more or less accepted forms of exercising 
agency such as giving false or misleading information when 
form-filling in order to gain as many points as possible when 
completing a housing application form. Similarly, casual working 
while claiming unemployment benefit is another more or less 
acceptable form of dominated ‘agency’ among those who are 
often tacitly seen as unable to meet the standards of the majority. 
Related to new practices such as ‘giro drops’ is another novelty 
in Cardenden as regards housing which is the coming together 
or the ‘alignment’ of people on low incomes or the unemployed 
and Council housing, with the result that there is today a certain 
stigma attached to ‘social housing’ where previously there was 
none. As a result of the boom in former Council tenants buying 
their properties and becoming property owners from the nineteen-
eighties onwards, there is today a distinction made between those 
who have bought their house and those who have not, often 
with the presumption that the latter have not bought their homes 
because they are too poor to do so, and so whether renting 
privately or renting a Council property from Ore Valley Housing 
Association, there is a strong association of renting and poverty 
or some kind of misfortune.
Hence, some five months after moving the few hundred yards 
from Cardenden Road to our new address in Station Road, new 
neighbours moved into the flat beside us which until then had lain 
empty. Our new neighbour was an unemployed single mother 
(Charlene) who had two young daughters. Every morning their 
two Labrador dogs would be let out to defecate wherever they 
could find space among the parked cars, children’s toys and 
various patches of grass that served as gardens, despite the large 
public park being less than fifty yards away. On one occasion soon 
after our new neighbours moved in I came out of my flat with my 
two-year-old daughter and saw the two dogs were tied to the 
railings at the foot of the stairs we shared, while nearby Charlene 
was painting a used car tyre which she had salvaged from 
the rubble and junk lying in the property belonging to the Caspian 
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takeaway next door or one of the untended gardens belonging to 
an absentee landlord. As Charlene painted the tyre her daughters 
smoothed multi-coloured gravel around the plant they had placed 
in the centre of the tyre. 
Walking down the stairs I picked up my daughter and 
carried her, and as we approached the dogs I felt my daughter’s 
body tense in fear as she gripped my neck with her two hands 
and buried her face into my chest as we descended closer towards 
the barking dogs who had become agitated at our imminent 
arrival to the foot of the steps. As we approached the dogs I asked 
Charlene if she could keep the dogs to one side for a moment, 
explaining my daughter was afraid of the dogs. Given that 
Charlene could see I had a bag in one hand and my daughter in 
the other, I was not expecting her to refuse this request, nor her 
reply: “She’ll just have to get used to it.” As things turned out, 
however, my daughter had only seven months to get used to the 
dogs as Charlene moved out in February 2001 as a result of 
the Department of Social Security refusing to pay the rent her 
landlord was asking, and upon leaving she left dozens of black 
plastic bags full of rubbish at the foot of the common stairs which 
the landlord, who lives in a large private bungalow in Cardenden 
Road, had not removed six months later when we ourselves left 
113 Station Road. 53
In August 2012 Fife Council began a programme of renewing 
the roofs on their housing stock within Cardenden so that by 
simply overlooking the village one can immediately tell from the 
bright orange coloured roof tiles the extent of houses in the village 
still owned by the Council, and I would estimate that about a 
third of local houses are rented. It is also clear from simply 
walking through the village that some streets are more wealthy 
than others with particular streets such as Hyndloop Terrace or a 
certain section of Derran Drive, for example, being known for 
53 The issue of who was responsible for the upkeep of the spaces at the back of 
the buildings was ongoing, with the general lack of any cleaning or maintenance 
of these spaces having led to a Fife Council Environmental Officer inspecting the 
area due to complaints of vermin.
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housing tenants with little money and whose gardens and general 
appearance communicate a level of neglect going back to the 
‘dictatorship of scarcity’ period.
Given Cardenden’s SIMD rankings detailed in Chapter 1 it is 
undeniable that Cardenden suffers from levels of deprivation that 
are considerably above the national average. However, it is also 
true to say that for all of Cardenden’s inhabitants there has been 
clear material progress with improvements in housing conditions 
to the fore of a tremendous change for the better. While Corrie’s 
Black Earth (1939, p. 180) described a Cardenden where: “there 
was nothing better for them, for all the houses were the same. 
They were built cheaply by the Brandon Coal Company to house 
their workers,” these original miners’ dwellings which were built 
for the workers by the mine owners were demolished and the 
current houses seen today were built after World War two during 
1946-47. At this time streets were given their current names as 
previously they were simply numbered First Street, Second Street 
etcetera. When I asked the local history group members why the 
streets had originally been numbered this way, I was told the 
presumably apocryphal story of how a Mr. Muir who in 1895 was 
the manager of Bowhill Colliery had saw to it that upon his return 
from honeymoon in America the American system of naming 
streets was adopted in Cardenden, and as Adam Ingram (25 May 
1999) told me: “Once we discovered there was a Sixth Street in 
New York we felt better.” 
The following memory from Mrs Rollo (d. 1995) indicates 
something of the importance of housing conditions for improving 
the quality of life (Local History Group, vol. 5, p. 26):
In 1926 the Education Board opened a new primary school 
for the Roman Catholic children at the end of 17th Street. 
The Fife Coal Company built more houses at the end of 16th 
Street opposite the new school. These houses had a living 
room, two bedrooms and a scullery…their own gate and 
path to their door…a garden, front and back…Oh! What 
bliss!...hot and cold water laid on.
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Despite these post-war improvements, however, it was not until 
the nineteen-nineties that most residents in Cardenden began to 
enjoy homes that could be said to have ‘conquered’ the Scottish 
winter, and had upstairs bedrooms warm enough to spend time in 
during the winter months as a result of the installation of gas 
central heating and double glazing windows along with new 
bathrooms and kitchens and new wiring and loft and wall 
insulation at this time. Thanks to this revolution in housing it 
was not until this time that the majority of residents enjoyed 
adequate housing. As one informant (Tom Henderson) told me: 
“The best thing that ever happened wis sellin’ the council hooses. 
New doors, central heating, double glazing. The improvements 
are unbelievable. It certainly improved the schemes.” Similarly, 
when talking to another informant (Mr Duncan, Carden Avenue) 
when the subject of the ‘right to buy’ policy of the nineteen-
eighties came up, he remarked that this policy was: “The only 
thing Thatcher ever done for the working class.’’ As per the 
remarks of Tom cited above, the widespread uptake of tenants’ 
right-to-buy their council houses means the popularity of home 
improvement is ubiquitous throughout the village in the shape 
of conservatories, loft conversions and all manner of alterations 
to gardens. 
We may say that domestic space has been further liberated 
thanks to being taken out of the hands of local government and is 
able to be a substantial ‘something in itself’ that literally creates 
space for a more expansive sense of habitation and more possibilities 
for individuation and sociation, thanks to the ability to habitate 
spaces that have been liberated from nature and a prior dependency 
upon the weather thanks to being sufficiently warm to be habitable. 
This progress in housing was extended further between 2003 
and 2008 when property developers built approximately two 
hundred new private houses in Cardenden, while Ore Valley 
Housing Association built new ‘social housing’ properties for rent 
in Craigside Road, Whitehall Avenue and Bluebell Gardens.
Thanks to the shift from coal fires to gas central heating 
that occurred at this time, a whole series of practices came to an 
end, such as having to go outside for coal to put on a fire to heat 
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a house, and no more “putting the blower on” in the fireplace to 
heat water, and no more having to endure winters with ice forming 
on the inside of bedroom windows as a result of the cold. To sum 
up this recent revolution in housing conditions we may say that 
whereas Muir described and lamented a Scotland that was 
“covered with tasteless council houses” (1935, p. 69), a young 
mother-of-three and lifelong resident in Cardenden could remark 
after visiting one of the show homes in the new private housing 
scheme in the Jamphlars area of the village that was built in 2005: 
“When yer in the new hooses ye dinnae feel like yer in Cardenden!” 
Thanks to this revolution in their domestic spaces, the next 
section argues that a contextual “ontology of place” (Verran 
2002, p. 165) must include the emergence of the house as a new 
medium and mediation of ‘territorial sovereignty’ and control 
from the nineteen-nineties onwards, in contrast to social theorists 
who propose a liberation from place; that locals’ relationship to 
domestic space has been modernised and liberated from the 
‘feudal’ relationship to the local State in which it had languished, 
so that the home has become a new site for the tasks and tensions 
of ‘being modern,’ and insofar as this new empowerment vis-à-vis 
space becomes reflexive it is taken up by freedom and developed 
into a ‘doctrine’ of belonging and dwelling in other realms of 
experience, such as the geo-political and constitutional and the 
question of national sovereignty.
3.2 The Task of ‘Being Modern’  
Among the ’79 Generation(s)
In my meetings with both the local Fife Council employee 
described earlier and my meetings with the two members of Fife 
Council housing investigations team, I found myself up against 
individuals who were very guarded and more or less hidebound, 
with the result that very little information was forthcoming. 
However, when interviewing a Housing Studies student (Eddie, 
17 December 1998) which I had arranged to try to get some 
background information on housing issues, I was finally able to 
speak with someone who was very much alive to the general issue 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
228
of Fife Council allocating tenancies to antisocial individuals 
and the deeper cultural question as to why Scottish localities were 
producing so many ‘antisocial individuals’ in the first place. As we 
began our interview Eddie began by telling me of a new initiative 
concerning young people and housing:
Fife Cooncil have a scheme, Springboard Housing Project, 
where they assist young people in what they call independent 
livin. They gie them a tenancy an they show them how tae 
keep it. They teach them how tae look efter their hoose, 
how tae look after their tenancy. That’s their joab. Jist show 
them how tae budget, how tae cook, how tae clean, how tae 
run a hoose. That’s their joab. That wis set up in response 
tae the fact in the Templehall area [in Kirkcaldy] there wis  
a lot e young people gettin tenancies an abandonin it, ’cause 
they didnae ken how tae look efter it. They were up tae here 
in arrears, rent arrears. Their hoose wis a doss hoose, there 
were people in it a’ the time that they didnae ken. This wis 
set up in response tae that.
Eddie’s testimony alerted me to a wholly unsuspected level of 
dependency that I had no idea existed. While aware in a general 
and abstract manner of the neoliberal critique of the Welfare State 
such as Hayek’s (1944) ‘new serfdom’ thesis where, as a result of 
the qualitatively new socialisation role being undertaken by the 
State, the family and individual responsibility are being replaced 
by the State and creating new levels of dependency or ‘serfdom’ 
among a fraction of the poorest members of the ’79 generations, 
the information Eddie had at his fingertips was empirical evidence 
to safeguard against any temptation to imagine there is a new 
generation emerging from the industrial era with a clean pair of 
heels and that is capable of instantiating, for example, the new 
relationship to domestic space that has recently become possible 
and mentioned in the previous section, far less are capable of a 
return to a pre-industrial holism after the cultural and physical 
predations of industrialism. Having seen the many houses that 
are facsimiles of Corrie’s “uncultivated garden patches with their 
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rickety old sheds, pigeon houses and rabbit-hutches” (1939, 
p. 88), it is clear that such locals will never appropriate a post-
industrial narrative. As Eddie told me when I asked him to give an 
overview of the main issues in managing Fife Council housing 
stock in Cardenden: 
It’s come doon tae the legislation on home ownership  
cause anybody that’s in a decent hoose has bought their 
hoose. An a’ that’s left is a’ the shite hooses an the people 
that cannae afford tae buy them. That’s why it’s now called 
Social Housing, because it’s only the people that are on 
benefits that are in. It’s what ye call ‘residual housing.’ 
That’s a’ that’s left an it’s usually a’ the crap in hard tae let 
areas. If a’body in Cluny Park, Whitehall Avenue, Carden 
Castle Park [local streets] have bought their hoose and they 
flats [in Cardenden Road] is a’ that’s left, a’ the dregs are 
gonnae go there, a’ the dregs e society is gonnae git pit in the 
flats if that’s the only Cooncil hooses left. That’s the wrang 
term tae use obviously bit ye ken exactly what Ah mean. 
There’s a big issue in housin at the moment in that they’re 
wantin it tae take oan a more social role because it’s a’ poor 
people that they are basically dealin wi. They’re wanting it 
integrated wi social work, housin and social work’s the 
same department, because it’s a’ the poor people that’s 
rentin, so they’ve integrated wi social work. That’s why 
Ah’m daen a degree in housin. They’re tryin tae make it a 
professional qualification.54
Eddie’s experience of working with young people being in need 
of ‘charity’ and special welfare schemes to help them manage 
their tenancies relates directly to the closely-related crisis in 
such young people making the transition to being an independent 
adult insofar as the inability to keep a tenancy also implies 
54 Eddie was previously a pipe-fitter to trade but had subsequently completed his 
post-industrial “reconversion strategy’’ (Bourdieu 1984, p.125) and moved from 
skilled manual work to non-manual social work. 
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less-than-adult status in the eyes of the community. When talking 
with locals about their experiences of antisocial neighbours 
there was a sense of bewilderment and even bereavement 
surrounding a generational-fraction for whom effecting the 
transition to adulthood has become problematic. As one long-
term resident (born in 1940) commented on the day of the eviction 
of a young single mother (Donna Reid) in August 1998 from 
Cardenden Road, after I had expressed surprise as until then 
I had never heard of anyone being evicted in Cardenden:
Evicted today! At the bus stop, the double block. Mickey 
Ansel up Whitehall Avenue has got a key supposedly to the 
house. She’s got two laddies. Young one’s going in and out. 
Ah saw the bags. She’s away tae a homeless place. She  
come fae Lochgelly.55 They all got a petition signed. Saw 
their councillor an got a lawyer. Forced the Cooncil tae dae 
somethin. Ah dinnae believe in this silence crap. These Van 
Becks’ll be next.56 That Sarah pits her music oan. See they’re 
a’ oot e crap hames. Bit if ye jist sit an say nuthin they’ll take 
o’er the place...One e the Van Beck’s son-in-laws gave that 
Mickey Ansel a doin. He got taen away in an ambulance but 
the next day he was back. Thought he had broken ribs bit 
the next day he wis pinchin wheel trims! Nae wonder 
everybody wants their ain wee bungalow. Away somewhere. 
Peace an quiet. See the Council’s got a lot tae answer  
for. The lassies are the worst. The Cooncil’s gien them a’ 
hooses...Next door tae Wullie Doig, accordin tae Cathy 
(Whitehall Avenue resident), they were dancin naked oot the 
back. The RSPCA wis doon there fir the dug. Ye cannae take 
it tae a homeless shelter. See these folk cost the poll tax. Aye, 
they’re a burden tae society. See they’ve nae faithers. Nae 
work. Cause it’s ay been a decent area. Why let the thugs 
take over? An it’s a’ these wee yins, ye ken? Ah mean they’re 
startin young nooadays...jist a continual gaun oot an in yer 
55 A neighbouring village.
56 Tenants in Whitehall Avenue. 
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girden, a’ the time Ah mean ye ken. Ah mean tae hell wi 
that...their ain girdens are like middens...you’re workin 
tryin tae keep yer place braw...an they’re gonnae...ye ken?...
Och Ah mean when you were young it wis jist mischief...
ye’d go in girdens, ye’d steal vegetables or what...a’bdies 
done that bit wi thame they’re wicked some e thum noo. Bit 
ye see this is jist...see at sixteen year auld we were oot 
workin at fifteen year auld...bit noo they’re runnin aboot 
like bairns, ken what Ah mean! Sixteen year auld we’d been 
oot workin fir a year...an noo sixteen year auld they’re 
runnin aboot cryin folk poofs, ken what Ah mean? The 
mentalities jist no there, it’s no there!
This informant’s discourse is highly structured and highly 
‘available’ to her, so that we may say her experience has structured 
her perception and speaking so as to bring about a ‘social literacy’ 
that enables her to quickly read any ‘antisocial tenant’ as a matter 
of genre or as a variation on a well-established theme, so that her 
analysis ‘flows’ and is readily available when interviewed because 
her discourse is informed by an already established gestalt as 
opposed to being dependent upon first-hand knowledge of the 
particular situation. Integral to this informant’s perception is 
the fundamental notion that employment is the condition sine 
qua non of adulthood, so that she is baffled by behaviours and 
neighbours that are fated to appear to her as infantile and unso-
cialised, a concern that is shared by Eddie when he commented: 
“Young people are no mixin wi adults any mair...at work. They’re 
a’ on these trainin schemes.’’
In my nineteen months spent at 51 Cardenden Road the two 
problem neighbours were young and local single unemployed 
women, and while the particular set of housing conditions and 
neighbour relations within my block of flats is unequivocally not 
representative of Cardenden, they do share continuities with 
other more general behaviours observable on a daily basis. Hence, 
because the kitchens in the three blocks of Council flats in 
Cardenden Road were too small to fit a table, all meals had to 
be taken in the living room and so we ate breakfast overlooking 
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the spacious enclosed grassed area for the use of the tenants of all 
three blocks of flats. More or less daily we would watch a tenant 
from the middle block of flats come out and lean against the same 
clothes pole and light a cigarette and let her Alsatian dog exercise 
for as long as it took her to finish her cigarette. Because we were 
a ground floor flat she could see us looking at her before she 
returned to her flat without cleaning up after her dog. This kind 
of mentality or ‘privatised consciousness’ that is oblivious to basic 
standards and oblivious to how their behaviour is perceived by 
others echoed the views of another informant (Ena Herd, Orebank 
Road, 14th November 1999) who had observed that:
Young folk’ll sit in a beautifully decorated living room and 
they’ll no clean up their litter outside, young folk. They’ll 
withdraw intae their ain wee bit and they’ll no interact wi 
other people.
While informants refer to ‘mentalities’ that ‘are just not there’ and 
refer to a broken world of work, another theme that informants 
kept drifting back to was the reality of “broken families’’ 
or “broken homes.” Both Eddie and another local social worker 
I spoke to who was involved on a daily basis with children deemed 
to be ‘at risk’ and young people in residential care units, and who 
supervised home visitations by young people ‘in care,’ it is clear 
that their work experience has led them to their own evidence-
based ‘essentialism’ which they summed up in the truism that 
broken homes lead to broken children and then broken lives, in 
much the same way as apple trees produce apples. When enquiring 
about the background of the young people in the homeless unit 
Eddie worked in he replied:
A lot e them come fae broken hames. Ah’d say the majority 
e them come fae broken homes. An they’re stayin wi their 
mum or step faither or the ither way aboot an they cannae 
deal wi it. There’s letters in the press every week aboot 
Lochgelly. They’re sayin Lochgelly wis a dumpin grund  
fir bad tenants. A’ the antisocial tenants are dumped in 
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Lochgelly. An that wis happenin in Cardenden fir a while as 
well. Craigside Road. That wis a dumpin ground…cause it 
is happenin! Ah used tae say, this wis afore Ah got interested 
in this line e work, when the Cooncil first started daen a’ the 
hooses up, Ah used tae say aye it’s no the hooses they want 
tae regenerate, it’s the tenants they’re wantin tae regenerate. 
Because they’ve got a’ these braw hooses an then, ken, two 
weeks later some e they hooses are jist as bad. Broken 
windaes, ken? Three-piece suite lyin in the front garden, 
ken? So Ah think the problem has always been there; it’s  
jist worse. The Snell family’s [source of tension in Whitehall 
Avenue]been evicted fae somewhere in Kinglessie. Bit  
Ah’m no sure if the problem’s jist movin roond aboot,  
bein displaced, or if it’s growin. Ah’m no sure. Bit Ah ken 
Cardenden’s no the worse place. Ah can tell ye that.
After highlighting the lack of local employment and the demise of 
family life, my two informants with many years of experience 
of social work feel there is nothing more to be said in answer to 
the more general question as to why the various initiatives 
and services that are being put in place and provided by voluntary, 
local authority and State organisations were never required 
before.57 When asked to comment on the differences seen today 
and previously, for example, Eddie’s laconic reply was: “Well, that 
was when we had a family structure.” This was typical of 
informants who routinely referred to the breakdown of families, 
absent fathers and young unemployed locals lacking financial 
resources being given tenancies as either causing or appeasing the 
rise of antisocial behaviour.
57 Both informants had a vast repertoire of anecdotes and both told me their 
work load always increased during the summer months as a result of school 
holidays and parents having to be parents all day rather than just when their 
children were not in school; that such was the level of dysfunctionality that 
parents routinely looked to social workers to help them top up their mobile 
phones, rather than concern themselves with details such as shopping and having 
milk in the fridge for the following day’s breakfast. 
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My informants’ experience of dealing with individuals and 
families that have unsuccessfully negotiated the shift to the post-
industrial era and the new service-based occupational landscape, 
meant that they have become trapped in new forms of dependency 
upon the State. This predicament allows these social workers a 
daily view of their clients’ socialisation and individuation and 
reveals a deep dysfunctionality that is often ‘inherited’ from their 
parents; as if these ’79 generation individuals have lacked from an 
early age the mental and cultural wherewithal to equip them to 
successfully negotiate the shift to the post-industrial occupational 
landscape and so they remain trapped in a pre-adult stage. 
The fundamental impact of worklessness in the socialisation 
of young people into adult life is a clear theme among many 
informants, and in the discourse of the ’45 generation there is a 
persistent signalling of the sense of caesura between the ’45 and ’79 
generations and the fundamental fact of de-industrialization expe-
rienced during the nineteen-eighties. Traditionally, it has been the 
function of work to socialise young adults into their place within 
local society, and this had many other integrating consequences 
such as establishing psychological continuity between the genera-
tions and between fathers and sons and mothers and daughters. 
Prolonged worklessness, then, involves a loss of social ties and the 
loss of the means to belong, fuelling discussions of the creation of 
an underclass in deindustrialised areas throughout post-industrial 
societies. It is because the industrial era was characterised by a 
local world of work and a local public realm that their coming to 
a conclusive end in the nineteen-eighties means that, among the ’45 
generation, what is framing the ‘present as history’ is a more or less 
sharp decline in a sense of working-class cohesiveness and the 
sense of local community and the sense of a cultural tradition that 
no longer has a viable future.
Similarly, the ’79 generation are more or less removed from 
the lived experience of locality and traditions of their parents’ 
generation with the result that, as well as inheriting an undeniable 
freedom, they also inherit a vulnerability as they enter a new 
manner of ‘being modern’ and a new manner of being disembedded 
from the past and locality, and are at risk of instantiating a new 
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level of ‘traditionlessness.’ I would not contest the assertion, then, 
that a class fraction of the ’79 generation(s) is characterised by a 
‘tensionless’ surrender to new social and cultural logics; that much 
as the first generation of peasants who experienced the rigors of 
a ‘first modernisation’ which saw the advent of the factory system 
and saw themselves become a landless and de-cultured proletariat, 
so a ‘second modernisation’ has taken place (that began locally in 
1965 and ended in 1986), and which has seen the ’79 generation(s) 
enter a second phase of ‘traditionlessness’ where localities and 
psyches are ‘liberated’ from traditional industrial narratives and 
the traditions and disciplines and beliefs of the industrial era, so 
that the world for the ’79 generation(s) has been re-made insofar 
as they inhabit a ‘disorganised’ economy and a ‘disorganised’ 
symbolic order for which they have no preparation and little 
cultural ballast to ensure they maintain their course.
If younger generations face a qualitatively new economic and 
cultural situation, the changing role of women has been identified 
as fundamental (McCrone 2001) and I argue the dialectical 
position that while the social and cultural situation of women has 
changed dramatically since the nineteen-seventies, the idea that 
there has been a ‘‘liberation from the family’’ (Giddens 1973, 
p. 288) is simultaneously true and a myth. The number of female 
informants who could be described as freed from the rigors of 
raising children, for example, are statistically insignificant but it is 
true that women have increasingly become ‘liberated’ from the 
rigors (and supports) of forming a family and household with 
the men who father their children. A younger generation of 
women, then, are liberated from the traditional family but are 
still immersed in or weighed down by a host of conventional 
female roles and identities and disciplines. In this regard, mothers 
with young children remaining within the labour force has 
impacted localities insofar as there has been a drastic and defining 
loss of status suffered by ‘women’s work’ among women of 
the ’79 generation(s), which has led to the ‘defeminizing’ and 
deskilling of neighbourhoods and local space. 
I would speculate that the absence of any ‘female culture’ in 
our block of nine flats in Cardenden Road was integral to 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
236
accounting for the level of de-socialised neighbour relations 
thanks to women’s more or less coerced retreat from a traditional 
habitual occupation of and domination of the domestic/public 
boundary space; that an intergenerational ‘disappearing’ of a 
domestic-centred female culture has occurred but, as a result of 
my inability to access the chat and conversation of women, I am 
only able to guess at specifically female forms of pressures and 
processes via informant’s anecdotes; such as one informant’s 
common-law wife and mother of two grown daughters and soon-
to-be grandmother who, one day, when preparing food, had 
complained to him the recipe she was following required a litre of 
water. As related to me the exchange between my male informant 
and his wife was as follows:
Wife: How much is a litre?
Man: Jist use that plastic jug.
Wife: How dae ye mean like?
Man: The jug! That’ll tell ye.
Wife: How like?
Man: It’s got the measurements on the side!
Wife: What are ye talkin aboot?
Man: See they marks on the side e the jug? They tell ye a’ 
the different measurements.
Wife: Oh right! Is that what they’re fir? Ah never kent that!
When recalling this incident my male informant made a show of 
being incredulous that a mother could be so alienated from basic 
culinary competences, but did not offer any further comment or 
analysis. However, it was clear that his telling this anecdote was 
surrounded by an unstated moral evaluation of his common-law 
wife, and if we were to pass his anecdote through the sociological 
imagination, ‘his’ view was that this woman had been ‘un-done’ 
or ‘un-made’ by forces of modernisation. My own view is that it 
is clear that mothers in particular are subject to a range of 
objective social pressures that have come into alignment in such 
a way as to effect specifically female forms of deskilling, and 
that there is alienation from traditional female roles and a recent 
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alienation from a previous female ‘realm of meaning’ among the 
first post-conventional 1979 generation(s) whose members are 
interpolated by their new ‘marketised’ relationship to time and 
self, and which more or less coerces them into failing to reproduce 
the exigencies of child-centredness, the demands of domestic 
culture and the disciplines of family life. While this alignment of 
objective social forces (including a ‘female friendly’ post-manual 
occupational landscape) is often rightly celebrated as the real 
historical agent responsible for female liberation, not every 
woman is able to reach ‘escape velocity’ from their circumstances 
to take advantage of new economic and social conditions. 
One evening (23 August 2002) while drinking in one of the 
local pubs with a friend, we got chatting with the barmaid 
Margaret whom we could see was pregnant. Margaret told us she 
was pregnant by her current boyfriend with whom she was living 
and that the baby was due in November, and that she was to go 
for a screen tomorrow and her young son Ian “is all excited about 
it.” As business was slow and Margaret had time on her hands, 
she then asked us what we thought about the following scenario. 
Margaret told us she had a friend ‘Mary’ whose former boyfriend 
has two young children by two different women – one of whom 
is her friend Mary while the other woman lives in England with 
her child. Margaret then told us that Mary will not allow her 
ex-boyfriend to see his child; that “to his face” Mary denies the 
child is his but to the Child Support Agency (CSA) she names him 
as the father of the child. Margaret asked us if we think Mary’s 
ex-partner should pay maintenance for the child, and whether 
the CSA should ensure he pays maintenance, and then asked us 
whether we think her friend has the right to prevent her former 
partner from seeing his child. To this last question we said no, that 
it seemed a question of natural justice that a father sees his child. 
Margaret then asked us to consider whether because Mary’s 
ex-partner’s name was not on the child’s birth certificate this 
might be a problem for her friend persuading the CSA to pursue 
child maintenance from the father. 
As we pondered this question, Margaret revealed that she had 
no such friend Mary, that she was talking about herself, that while 
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expecting a baby by her current boyfriend, her son Ian was 
fathered by a former boyfriend, the boyfriend in the story who has 
one child in England and the other in Cardenden i.e. Margaret’s 
son Ian. Margaret came clean and informed us that she was 
chasing the CSA to get money from her ex-boyfriend and father 
of Ian, but that because she did not put his name on the birth 
certificate, getting any maintenance was proving difficult despite 
the fact she had given the CSA: “Everything except his National 
Insurance number. Ah gave them where he works, who for, his 
address etcetera but the CSA a few months back wrote back 
saying they couldn’t trace him and that was the end of it.” 
Margaret was angry that the father of her son paid no maintenance 
for his son. Talking further, she told us her own mother and father 
divorced when she was three years old.
While Margaret’s set of circumstances are clearly of her own 
making, they are also indicative of a wider predicament that may 
be described as a second female modernity specific to working-
class women, but a predicament faced by young women that an 
older generation of women are aware of. Among older female 
informants whom I interviewed, then, many touched upon the 
crisis affecting family life. Interviewing Rose Anderson (Carden 
Cresent) in June 1999 she reported a profound sense of foreboding, 
and when pressed to explain replied:
Rose: Things are definitely changin. People jist dinnae, ye ken...
When Ah look aboot me Ah think we need a change...Ken look 
at the trouble that’s gaun oan, ye didnae get that before!
Me: What trouble do ye mean?
Rose: Everythin! Ken it sounds silly, wee things...Bit 
families! Ah dinnae ken...somethin’s went wrong some 
place...something’s happenin tae oor country an Ah don’t 
know what.
Similar concerns about family life were raised by my wife Eva 
from the outset of fieldwork. While we were painting our flat 
before moving in she had suddenly asked me: “When are we 
getting divorced?’’ Asking what she meant by this, her reply was 
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that everyone in our block of flats was either divorced or 
separated, that she had been struck by the fact that ‘everyone’ 
we talked to was either divorced or separated. This drew my 
attention to the fact that households headed by divorced, 
separated or unmarried mothers and their children formed half of 
the households in our block of flats, and my awareness of the 
endemic reality of family breakdown increased throughout 
fieldwork as locals themselves identified absentee fathers and 
single mothers as a sign of the times. 
It was always with a little trepidation, despite being armed with 
the latest electoral register, when conducting door-to-door interviews 
that, having interviewed a woman on her doorstep, I asked if I could 
speak to her husband or partner as I quickly learned that asking 
to speak to a woman’s husband or partner may cause some embar-
rassment when she had to reply, “He’s no here any mair.” Likewise, 
whenever a child answered the door I quickly learned not to ask if 
their mum or dad was in but to simply ask if I could speak to their 
mum.58 As a result of these fieldwork experiences I made a point of 
keeping notes on matters of ‘the family’ and kinship relationships 
and individual case histories, and my practice was to freely write up 
all such information. While informants were often happy to ‘tell me 
everything’ not only about themselves but other families they knew 
intimately, the implicit sense of betrayal that would arise if I were to 
make public such ‘family business’ meant I freely collected this data 
but with no intention of publishing any of it. 
What I was struck by was what appeared to be the casual 
nature of sexual relationships, and the casual manner of conceiving 
and either having children or aborting unwanted pregnancies. 
Informants casually mentioning in conversation for example 
while shopping in Bowhill or when collecting their children from 
school about some local woman having had ‘another abortion’ 
means that, as well as an upsurge in freedom, there has been an 
upsurge in violence as a result of the ‘casualisation’ of male-female 
58 Similarly, teachers in the local schools confided in me that they have 
discontinued the practice of having pupils draw their family tree as a result of 
the difficult issues this would raise for many children. 
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relationships and the normalization of the “liquidation of the 
subject” (Adorno, in Bronner 1994, p. 180) via the practice of 
abortion, and the fact that casual gossip about a woman having 
an abortion in a playground happens at all shows the social 
practice of speaking also participates in this casualization, so that 
“knowledge, however vile, is frankly expressed” (Muir 1935, 
p. 117) whether in the public park by teenagers or the playground 
by mums. 
It seems safe to conclude that the ’79 generation is the first 
truly post-conventional generation insofar as it has been the first 
to practice what was once quaintly referred to as ‘free love,’ and 
is the first generation to practice or experience primary relation-
ships more or less always at risk of failing to exist as a result of 
the normalization of family breakdown thanks to ever-deeper 
capitulations to utilitarian evaluations of human beings as unborn 
human life and then teenage life are more or less fated to be drawn 
into the violent/liberating condition of ‘being modern’ and simul-
taneously liberated from tradition, only to be put at the mercy of 
objective depersonalizing forces.
Among ’45 generation members in particular, then, there is the 
perception not only of industrial or economic decline but a wider 
cultural decline which is viewed as tearing at the very fabric of life 
and so is profoundly disorienting. The idea of the ‘end of the family’ 
then acts as a cipher for informants’ concerns that previously 
untouched areas of human life, such as the family and the nature of 
parenthood, are being drawn into the dilemma of ‘modernisation’ 
and so in their own way they grasp the ‘crisis of the West’ and its 
signature ‘crisis of knowledge’ whereby convictions and beliefs and 
practices that were previously so fundamental that they did not 
need to be thought about, far less defended, are now ‘at issue’ and 
experienced as threatened with immanent privatization, if not 
obsolescence. I describe this condition as the radicalisation of the 
tension of ‘being modern’ and among the ’45 generation this is a 
cause of an unprecedented ‘cultural disorientation’ or lament 
because it signals the ending of a shared symbolic order. 
From a sociological perspective it is clear that the same 
objective forces that have ‘disorganised’ the free-market economy 
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(Lash and Urry 1987) and disembedded Christianity from 
the nineteen-sixties onwards (Brown 2001) are having a similar 
disorganising effect upon the family, so that it is among the 
1979 generation that the family is simultaneously liberated and 
privatised, so that Marx’s view of “the practical absence of the 
family among the proletarians” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1996, 
p. 31) becomes an empirical fact for many in the ’79 generation. 
Informants such as Rose are concerned about the ongoing and 
unforeseeable consequences for individuation the ‘post-family’ 
contexts of early life are having as a result of sexual relationships 
and practices reaching ‘escape velocity’ from conventional norms. 
From a sociological point of view, then, we can say that in the 
younger generations where ‘everything’ has reached its escape 
velocity from public or conventional regulation, ‘everything’ such 
as family life requires the ‘miracle’ of the personal commitment 
to convention in a post-conventional era to survive. 
Thus stated, it is relatively straightforward to anticipate various 
forms of conventional behaviour as being destined to decline, and 
from the nineteen-seventies onwards the sociological constant 
behind the massive intergenerational economic and social and 
cultural change is that one set of conventions has been quickly 
replaced by a new set of social determinisms, so that the ‘post-
Christian’ and ‘post-family’ individual is the new convention or 
socially determined lifestyle of choice, with the notion of the ‘free 
autonomous individual’ remaining just as strong and just as 
blatantly mythical among the post-industrial ’79 generation(s).59
An older generation of informants also raise concerns regarding 
what might be termed a sharp rise in ‘behavioural nihilism’ 
characterised by casual linguistic violence, drug use and pro- 
miscuous sexual relationships which they see coming in the wake 
of fractured biographies and family life. These may be seen as 
new conventions or social determinisms signaling a new typical 
‘individuation trajectory’ which severely handicaps or disempowers 
59 The 2011Census found that the most common type of household in Scotland 
at 35% (of 2.4 million households) was one adult living alone. See Release 2C. 
www.scotlandcensus.gov.uk. 
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informants such as Margaret from attaining any real autonomy 
or occupational mobility in the post-industrial market economy 
as she is a member of a generation and class fraction for whom 
the post-industrial ‘second modernity’ or second modernisation 
means suffering the double blow of deindustrialization and 
cultural disorganisation, which leaves them without the 
resources to master or successfully negotiate the socio-economic 
determinations that are operative in their lives. 
When to the absence of a ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger 1967) is 
added a tradition of low-income employment and a traditional 
low level of educational attainment, it becomes unremarkable for 
young men and women to become fathers or mothers without 
any thought or prospect of constituting a household or family 
unit for their child insofar as they are free from any normative 
symbolic disciplinations that might regulate and order their lives. 
Paradoxically, then, human sexuality and behaviour are anything 
but a purely private affair but are rather highly socially-determined 
illusions of choice or examples of a socially-determined ‘privatism’ 
that is the new conformism.
This social determination of behaviour and consciousness 
and freedom, then, interpolates individuation so that the most 
fundamental forms of sociation such as male-female relations 
are added to the list of candidates for ‘modernisation as 
liquidation,’ so that this class fraction of the ’79 generation are 
vitiated with the ‘crisis of belief’ or the ‘crisis of the West’ because 
‘everything’ in second modernity reaches escape velocity from 
convention and the materially and culturally poorer elements 
of this generation are more or less fated to painstakingly put 
their lives together by trial and error because their reason and 
freedom have become modernist and, lacking any kind of symbolic 
or economic ballast, are more or less left to fend for themselves 
and fabricate answers ex nihilo to exhausting predicaments such 
as what it is to be a human being, whether to marry or not, 
whether to have children or not, whether to believe in anything 
or not, and then how to practice via parenting behaviours their 
makeshift beliefs about self, family, children and questions of 
ultimate meaning.
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This generation, then, lives the trauma and triumph of ‘being 
modern’ with a new intensity and lives the demise of earlier 
answers to the predicament of ‘being modern’ (found in rationalism, 
secularism, materialism etcetera) because their existential and 
social condition demands answers to all of these questions 
because social convention no longer provides any answers. In this 
generation eighteenth-century Enlightenment rationalism comes 
to an end in a new and urgent manner because ‘pure reason’ or 
de-traditionalised reason (MacIntyre 1988) either gives no answers 
or gives prefabricated answers articulated for a different era, 
so that in this generational and class fraction an irrationalism 
reaches epidemic proportions and the dialectic and tension of 
‘being modern’ fails to be caught sight of.
Since 2008 more children in Scotland have been born outside 
of marriage than within and in light of the rapid rise in divorce 
since the late nineteen-forties and since 1970, it is clear that 
commitment to a primary family relationship stands a much better 
chance of enduring when this social practice is immersed in an 
objective cultural ethos and does not rely upon the ‘miracle’ of 
a free-standing choice of each individual grounded upon values. 
Primary family relationships that require daily effort to maintain 
are vulnerable to being put ‘at risk’ by changing social conditions, 
and the class fraction of the ’79 generation that is ‘free’ and ‘poor’ 
is simultaneously ‘liberated’ and ‘lost’ by the increasing absence 
of socially-sanctioned structures of commitment and kinship 
relations, and becomes a casualty in the ‘casualisation’ and 
privatization and disorganisation of culture and lose the structure 
of the family as a source of individuation to such an extent that 
the poorer elements of the working class are tacitly exempted 
from the expectation of reproducing traditional family life. 
If we take the much-discussed example of fatherhood and 
absent fathers, because this primary natural relationship is also a 
conventional social practice and institution, it is increasingly 
caught up in a social determination and increasingly required 
to become a stand-alone substantive value ‘in itself,’ simply to 
survive among the ‘canopy-less’ 1979 generation(s) and with 
predictable results i.e. widespread decline because the continued 
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existence of fatherhood among this generation is increasingly 
dependent upon that rarest of sociological creatures: an 
interpersonal relationship exercising a form of agency over a 
lifetime that runs counter to a series of social determinations.
If there is a crisis in the reproduction of family life, then, it is 
because there is the more fundamental reality of the advent of the 
freedom to be post-conventional and to live outwith conventional 
wisdoms. There is the widespread collapse of family life because 
kinship conventions in a post-conventional culture are fated to 
have to do their own work to survive upon what, sociologically 
speaking, is the worst possible basis: the free choice of the free 
individual, and among those least able to work the substantivist 
‘miracle’ of commitment to the conventional ‘value’ of family life 
in a post-conventional society. Reproducing realities such as 
family life and religion are more or less fated to decline because 
when Paul VI pronounced “the split between the Gospel and 
culture is without a doubt the drama of our time” (1975, p. 20), 
this split rests upon the same sociological predicament faced by 
the family which is similarly exposed to the full brunt of second 
modernisation with the result that the family realm is added to the 
list of items that have been ‘privatised,’ so that being a single 
mother or absent father is a new form of social determination and 
a new ‘post-conventional’ convention.60 
The older generations, then, have a sharp twofold conviction: 
firstly, in terms of material living standards they have never had it 
so good, while secondly, they enjoyed a far richer or ‘denser’ 
experience of locality than that available to the younger ’79 
generation, so that between the two generations, locality as a source 
60 I do not for one moment imagine illegitimacy was a ‘discovery’ of the 1979 
generation or imagine the ’79 generation as being somehow less ‘upright’ as the 
unpublished manuscripts of Corrie held in the National Library in Edinburgh 
are full of hints at more or less ‘anarchic’ family formations and ‘natural bairns’ 
i.e. children born outside of marriage. I also accept that previous generations 
may well have been alienated from much of the symbolic order just like 
a fraction of the ’79 generation(s). However, previous generations were 
disciplined in their behaviours by poverty and all of the exigencies that follow 
from not being a contracepting population. 
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and locus for meaning, intersubjectivity and belonging has declined 
to the extent that their reflection upon ‘locality as history’ includes 
reflecting upon empirical data such as local shops being fitted with 
metal shutters and video cameras being installed outside the local 
hotel, and their voicing their fears of being aggressed upon in their 
old age if they are in local public space after dark. I speculate that 
the vicious linguistic and textual data referred to in Chapter 1 
emerges from individuations occurring within a very particular set 
of social and cultural and economic conditions.
In an abstract manner we can say that young people being 
subject to the public realm as themselves for the first time involves 
a rit de passage where childhood days of play and freedom from 
self-consciousness when out in public are left behind, as the advent 
of self- consciousness brings awareness of one’s being-for-others 
and the first steps to grasping oneself objectively and particularly 
in relation to the free market in labour. While this truism can be 
said of any generation at any time, I propose that from adolescents 
of the post-industrial generation’s first interrogation by objectivity 
and their first experience of being tested by the public realm, and 
finding themselves lacking credible or imaginable futures to 
comport themselves towards and which act as ballast for their 
behaviours and decisions, they are at risk of being caught in a 
social determination that may seal their fate. Some in these teenage 
years have not learned to obscure the fact that this interrogation is 
happening and so they may be said to give themselves away or 
betray themselves cheaply, insofar as being in public without the 
protection of unself-consciousness or a trajectory into the future 
means it is experienced as an interrogation, and so they are led into 
risk behaviours that may or may not include petty vandalism or a 
range of antisocial behaviours.
We might describe such behaviours as mindless or the result of 
bad parenting but they may also be sourced in coming to realistic 
self-awareness, and their failure in social comportment may be the 
result of the meeting that takes place for the first time in their 
consciousness between their long history of failing to prepare a 
future for themselves and the dawning of awareness of the lifelong 
consequences of this lack of preparation. Ordinarily it is the 
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young teenagers from poorer or most ‘disorganised’ families who 
are most unable and most unprepared to contest this interrogation 
when in the public realm, and so it is the teenagers from these 
families who wander unsupervised on the streets and resort to 
‘risk behaviours’ as if answering back the symbolic violence 
involved in being confronted with the more or less clear sense of 
their objective lack of worth.
I would venture that in proportion to the number of times a 
sixteen year old will be asked the question what they will do after 
leaving school there are an equal number of ways of avoiding this 
question, so long as it remains futural and at the mercy of the 
disposition of the maturing teenager. However, immediately upon 
leaving school the context of this question changes, and it is forced 
upon awareness and existence whether the school leaver likes it or 
not. At this point there takes place an interrogation that cannot 
be avoided, because in the public realm of Western free-market 
societies and economies every young adult is required to submit 
evidence of his place within the occupational hierarchy and must 
give an account of his trajectory into the future of that society and 
economy. Those young people with a credible projection into the 
future will also have a history of preparing for this trajectory and 
their imagined future, whereas those who cannot answer this 
interrogation are continually made to register their lack of a future 
because, unable to resist the objective demand that they be of some 
social and employable use, they are continually interrogated. 
Faced with this continual interrogation, some are tempted to 
give away their failure for free, whether seeking the safety of 
numbers in a gang or the brinkmanship and bravado of a leader 
and ‘risk behaviours’ because they have nothing else to wager or 
resist this silent and unspoken interrogating experience as they 
register they are free of projective trajectories and resort 
to getting into trouble for the most trivial of reasons, thereby 
making public the ‘private’ drama they instantiate. The free 
market in labour, then, exacts a form of psychological obedience 
as it reads an individual’s rejection of the school system, for 
example, objectively by handing him its objective consequences 
and thereby forces upon those about to attempt to enter the job 
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market the fact that they fail to instantiate cultural capital in the 
post- occupational community employment market.
For Bourdieu, “the unequal distribution of linguistic capital…
is an aspect of the class system” (in Jenkins 1992, p. 154) and the 
young person’s use of language and manipulation of the symbolic 
order puts before him two choices or trajectories: firstly, the 
prison of conformism and conventions where social determination 
prevents the use of language because, perhaps coming from a 
family or level of educational attainment where language-use 
remains submerged in the ‘dictatorship of scarcity,’ the advent 
of a ‘free’ use of language does not come about so that there is 
a failure of freedom to take the second option, where the self 
opens onto the horizon of his autonomy thanks to an ‘affluent’ 
relation to language which becomes the means to an unknown 
and unsuspected individuation.
A teenager apprehending for the first time the absence of any 
credible means to imagine their autonomy by, and apprehending 
their fate as one of lifelong low-paid employment that their 
history of inattention or rebellion has sealed for them, is a 
source of individuation because this confrontation with their 
objectivity forces onto consciousness what they may have no 
desire to bring to their attention: their relationship to their use of 
freedom, and their history of decision-making and its fateful 
consequences. Insofar as this ‘terrible knowledge’ becomes a 
source of individuation it becomes reflexive and is taken up into 
intentional existence, where it teaches a new literacy or reading of 
the role and influence of others in their young lives as parents and 
friends and family members are ‘implicated’ or read in relation to 
this confrontation with their objectivity. When being stripped 
of all credible trajectories through social space becomes reflexive 
it is fated to imagine the future as more of the same, and this 
experience within any young consciousness must impact as a 
wound upon awareness and engender an experience of ‘pure 
being’ or ‘nothingness’ because, much like philosophical exercises 
of ‘pure reason’ that attempted to imagine substances or natures 
stripped of all accidental qualities so as to leave behind the ‘pure 
essence’ or nature of the thing, so the young adult without a 
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socially recognised trajectory is likewise stripped to his bare 
human being or ‘pure being,’ so that the arrival of post-industrial 
society is the sociological underpinning to a relentless structurally 
induced confrontation with ‘pure being’ or social invisibility 
among a class fraction of the ’79 generation.
In suggesting a process of individuation based upon this existen-
tial predicament, it seems reasonable to conclude that if there is a 
structured coming up against the experience of dasein as ‘pure 
being,’ the internalising of the experience of never being positively 
signified within the public symbolic order must eventually form 
some kind of structuration of dasein. If we ask what this structura-
tion will consist of, it will include as an integral part of itself the 
condition of never being signified or recognised; a condition which, 
by definition, will appear unthinkable because it is not verbally or 
conceptually registered insofar as it is stripped of social recognition, 
and the only discipline to match this description of reflection upon 
the experience of being-qua-being is metaphysics, so that we might 
conceptualise this condition as a metaphysical callous insofar as it 
emerges from the chronic condition of constantly ‘rubbing’ against 
‘pure being’ despite having clear social grounds. 
This unsignified ‘excess’ adverts to a part of youthful dasein 
(that may extend into adulthood) unable to be captured by the 
representational nets of language, so that integral to this condition 
is the related difficulty of ‘saying’ this condition via the social 
practice of speaking once we accept: “The structure of experience 
is just as social as is the structure of its outward objectification. 
The degree to which an experience is perceptible, distinct, and 
formulated is directly proportional to the degree to which it is 
socially oriented” (Volosinov 1986, p. 87). While the metaphysical 
callous is real and not a product of pure reason, this dasein is 
characterised by a ‘linguistic deficit’ insofar as the words do not 
exist to express this condition as the poverty of the language ‘at 
hand’ to express working-class dasein is so poor, precisely because 
language is a socialised medium and this aspect of ‘working-class’ 
dasein has remained unsaid. The ‘metaphysical callous’ then is 
more or less fated to be experienced as a purely private reality 
because it is socially invisible and even unthinkable.
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An adequate social ontology then challenges Hegel’s claim that 
to exist is to be recognised and Derrida’s (1976, p. 158) claim 
“there is nothing outside of the text,” and acknowledges that 
regardless of that which society has taken the trouble to classify 
and recognise in language, there are realities that remain real, 
however unrecognised. Also, the bearers of this objectively-
induced experience and metaphysical condition do not live this 
condition imaginatively or artistically or aesthetically, but are left 
to themselves to fend off the symbolic violence that says they are 
‘nothing,’ because society and language has not developed the 
categories to render what they are and to make it possible for 
them to constitute a ‘consciousness of their own’ upon their 
ownmost being, or understand the soteriological worth of their 
dasein. Society then simultaneously creates and negates this 
condition; makes it appear only to disappear its public or symbolic 
appearance by submerging it within the swamps of subjectivity 
and removing it from thought and representation, and thereby 
weakening its phenomenological reality insofar as the world is 
will and representation (Schopenhauer).
A busy society that has normalised the ‘total mobilisation’ of 
its energies and resources for economic productivity is unlikely to 
take the time and trouble to recognise and think about, far less 
celebrate, those daseins that are marginal to such concerns, and 
this structuring of perception is more or less guaranteed when the 
imagination is immersed in modernism. This cultural control of 
thinking and representation implies the lack of impetus to think 
working-class being insofar as this (and every other) historical 
dasein in the modernist imagination is more or less timetabled for 
‘dissolution.’ Berman’s (1983) description of a city’s inhabitants as 
not being allowed the time to grow fond of their buildings before 
they are torn down and replaced, can be applied to ‘secondary 
natures’ and every human dasein that is under the spell of a 
modernist hermeneutic that works to render unlikely the translation 
of these daseins into language, consciousness, culture, literature, 
philosophy and theology. A culture infected by modernism will 
fail to take the time to know and give itself representations of 
the selves and communities they are, and to the extent one’s 
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consciousness shares the modernist attitude one is unlikely to 
set oneself the task of thinking or loving a condition fated to 
disappear, or put in place a conceptualisation of what this dasein 
is capable of at the apex of its powers as part of a project of self-
appropriation. 
This modernist control of thinking and imagining is isomorphic 
with the modernist imagining of history, as found in the eighteenth 
century Scottish Enlightenment’s myth of progress and its unionist 
and ‘anti-Scottish’ agenda (Kidd 1993) insofar as it is from this 
point that Scottish dasein is not imaginatively lived as sovereign 
and a destiny, but as a stepping stone to another identity, so that the 
bearers of modernist consciousness are made into ‘tourists’ towards 
their own being and are deeply ambivalent about being themselves 
(so that the task for a fully contextual performance of self-
appropriation as individuals (Lonergan 1957, 1967; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992) or as a people (van den Bruck 2012) is to recognise 
and resist this coerced spectatorial relation to dasein and mitsein).
If we return to our teenager and ask from within the perspective 
of this young dasein what possibilities there are of finding one’s 
ownmost voice through language, we can say that even apparently 
‘mindless’ language-use which would indicate an unfeeling 
insensitivity to others is grounded in a deep internalization and 
sensitivity to the negative public evaluations of themselves which 
their lack of a credible trajectory into the future means they 
cannot resist; that their relationship to language reveals they know 
what they lack and so are fated to attempt ‘revenge,’ so that if the 
young vandal defaces the public realm about him it is because it 
has firstly ‘de-faced’ him, as it is here he comes face- to-face with 
his lack of worth and his anonymity and objective uselessness. His 
inability to resist despoiling virginal space by writing his name 
over and over again seems an attempt to rescue himself from the 
lifelong anonymity he suspects awaits him; his behaviour is 
mindful ‘mindlessness’ because his anonymity within the objective 
public realm individuates him and his dominated attempts at 
agency with his ‘useless’ dasein confronts being-qua-being and can 
not credibly resist in its own eyes this judgment because of his lack 
of any ‘private’ credentials of his own. 
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Today’s post-industrial working-class adolescent is by definition 
at risk of this individuation if he is unable to break, for example, 
from an older generation’s anti-learning ethos as he makes his way 
within the post-industrial occupational landscape. For whatever 
‘private’ reason, a boy who fails to imagine a future is objectively 
condemned to an existential condition characterised by always 
being at risk of being pinned back to experiencing himself in a very 
particular way because of his lack of a credible route either to the 
prefabricated realm of jobs, careers, markets and apprenticeships or 
the lack of resources to fashion one of his own making.
In the young person’s project of self-appropriation there will 
be the paradox that, integral to discovering and appropriating 
their ownmost voice will be the practice of introspection which 
will discover that their speaking routinely amounts to being a 
mouthpiece or cipher for the particular relations they are immersed 
in. In analyzing their first use of language outwith childhood 
and institutions such as the family and school, the confrontation 
between their freedom and their social determination takes place. 
While in school or at home the use of language is able to avoid the 
question of their use of freedom as it is immersed in their always-
already established identity as son or daughter or pupil, so that 
their use of language can easily remain conventional and, geared 
to the tasks of playing their ‘institutional’ role, language-use 
among peers is where they encounter this dialectic between 
freedom and determination so that when talking with their fellows 
alone as a group, their use of language can take its first steps in 
freeing itself of constraints insofar as the group is a space for 
freedom and invention where they are able to take their first steps 
outwith the ‘prison’ of their identity. 
However, even outside of the formal setting of school there is 
ordinarily the reproduction of a more or less clichéd relationship to 
language in the peer group where language is heavily policed by, for 
example, levelling practices should ‘big words’ be used so that 
accusations of getting ‘above oneself’ which amount to a symbolic 
breaking of ranks are avoided by policing one’s language. All such 
trespassings from ‘determined identity’ to ‘freedom’ are routinely 
prosecuted by youths when in groups, so that any individual 
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instantiating a new relationship to language, reading, writing or 
speaking is seen as putting at risk or re-negotiating their identity 
and membership of the group, and re-negotiating not only their 
class identity but asking questions of those who remain ‘behind’ in 
that identity and relationship to language and expression. 
Such adolescent psycho-dynamics are the consequences of the 
internalization of the hierarchized symbolic order wherein the free 
use of language is reserved for higher caste groups, and while the 
use made of language as an idiom of freedom is undoubtedly mini-
mal insofar as this potential idiom of freedom in practice often only 
becomes a new idiom of conformity, so that rather than speaking 
being the one practice where individuality emerges, intersubjective 
language-use is characterised as hackneyed and cliché-ridden and 
playing safe, language remains a standing provocation or opportu-
nity to develop their ownmost habitus in an original direction.
I privilege linguistic practices as disclosing a dialectic between 
‘determination’ and ‘freedom’ and with Willis (1977) I identify a 
class fraction whose relationship to language and meaning is 
conformed to their fixed place in the world thanks to a doxic 
obedience to an ‘industrial mirror’ that is internalised as children 
and adolescents; a habitus which is a breeding ground for a 
hackneyed ‘anti-learning’ attitude that gives itself no tasks because 
it only sees the fate of endless conformity and domination awaiting 
them. This unimaginative and constant self-understanding via the 
external authority of parents and teachers endlessly fuels their 
rebellion against conforming to rules and regulations, and makes 
them incapable of suspecting their rebellion is sealing their fate 
and sealing their being-in-the-world and their being-for-others. 
For some individuals their relationship to language really 
instantiates the alienated relationship to the realm of meaning 
they were always likely to have, while, phenomenologically, this 
‘free’ domination may be experienced as rebellion against authority, 
and if there is every appearance of rebellion and autonomy until 
the day they leave school, that day reveals their ‘authenticity’ or 
‘rebellion’ was only ever functional to sealing their fate of only 
ever having low caste positions of employment available to them. 
Language, then, is a privileged site where a dialectic between 
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social determination and freedom occurs and is also a privileged 
medium or window onto domination that has been taken up by 
freedom and choice.
3.3 A Politics of Identity
I suddenly encounter the total alienation of my person: 
I am something which I have not chosen to be.
Sartre 1966, p. 672
At the heart of our time spent living with antisocial neighbours 
was the problem of noise. The central complaint of neighbours 
was noise during the night and being deprived of one’s normal self 
through lack of sleep. To understand the problem, then, requires 
a turn to embodiment to evidence a particular quality of lived 
experience which grounded the change over time from mere 
annoyance to the construction of difference and intense animosity. 
An enforced sense of lacking agency led to an enforced choice 
between resignation or ‘arming’ oneself in preparation for a fight, 
so that frustration among neighbours seemed as much to do with 
having reached a multi-faceted impasse vis-à-vis objective social 
conditions and local Council bureaucracy and national building 
regulations regarding sound-proofing specifications, as much as 
the problem tenant herself. 
Informants were aware of the widespread nature of the problems 
of anti-social behaviour in many locations throughout de-industrial 
Fife. But if they read local newspapers and conclude: “It’s the same 
everywhere,” this does not alleviate an existential problem or 
prevent them calling problem neighbours “scum” and “parasites” 
and calling for their eviction. Such words clearly signal a ‘hardening’ 
of perception which had occurred over time and such ‘hardening’ 
is evidenced by the following quote from owner-occupier Helen 
who lived two blocks up from myself throughout my time at 
51 Cardenden Road and who was going through something very 
similar to myself, and who told me that: “Often Ah feel, Ah say tae 
masel, ‘Helen, you’re really hard, you’re getting really hard an 
the way yer thinkin, yer life.’ Ye ken what Ah mean?” As per the 
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above quote from Sartre, Helen’s testimony adverts to her sense of 
alienation from herself and becoming a different person as a result 
of living in a context characterised by conflict, and evidences how 
conflict acts as a source of experience and knowledge and a source 
of becoming and being which, just like working, cannot be known 
by ‘pure reason’ or speculation.
Given the behaviours of both tenants at number 57 mentioned 
previously, a silent unspoken antagonism had come into existence 
where eviction was the only remedy and in any eviction, whether 
the antisocial tenant leaves unnoticed by neighbours under cover 
of darkness, with only items of household furniture and black 
plastic bags left behind to be blown and scattered along a street, 
or whether it involves the dramatic event of defiant gestures with 
police and Council officials in attendance with neighbours at their 
windows watching every moment, a long series of experiences of 
dislocation and disruption for those involved will have preceded 
the day. The ‘event’ of eviction is constituted by what has gone 
before, such as practices of deliberate daily exclusion that had to 
be learned and subsequently freely practised by neighbours; the 
daily eviction from normal conversation and bringing unguarded 
friendliness to an end, as behaviour geared to negate a sense of 
belonging are learned and practiced and culminating in the day of 
action taken by the State and judiciary whose agents understand 
themselves as representing a force which “nobody beats.”
When neighbour relations become poisoned in this way there 
is also the inability to escape various knock-on effects as a result 
of living in the same block of nine flats, or sharing the same street 
or even the same village and amenities. Feeling unsafe when 
making one’s way to and fro meant neighbour relations were 
under pressure to be minimised due to the coerced practice of 
not tarrying in communal spaces when returning or leaving home. 
If under normal conditions, when hearing an upstairs neighbour 
coming out of their flat to go out one might tarry so as to let them 
descend, so that one has the opportunity for social interaction 
and to exchange pleasantries, such behaviours were avoided as 
the person coming down the stairs might well have been an 
unwelcome stranger and someone one did not wish to meet at all. 
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Such micro-behaviours were the result of a particular way of 
thinking about communal spaces and a particular imagining of 
space that involved the sharp distinction between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside,’ or between private and public space as safe and unsafe 
space. Such classifying of space resulted in the minimalisation of 
boundary ‘softening’ practices, such as neighbours fulfilling their 
obligations according to the stair cleaning rota at the same time 
as neighbours on another level, or leaving one’s door ajar or 
unattended so that domestic practices are opened to observation 
and comment by neighbours or visitors, and can become the 
occasion for social interaction.
This ‘feedback loop’ between one’s being-in-space and one’s 
being-for-others was further contextualised by locality and 
the symbiosis between these three relations that means there is 
a very intimate and affirming experience of ‘thick belonging’ 
under normal conditions. In our particular case, however, this 
triangulation resulted in what felt like an imprisonment, thanks to 
the inability to access different social situations that allowed some 
variation in social interaction and the playing out of different 
roles with different others to vary the experiencing of self solely 
by reference to the same limited range of social interactions with 
the same protagonists. Having to share the same social space 
with a problem tenant, always being liable to see them and be 
seen by them, having to do one’s shopping in the same shops, 
always being liable to pass each other on the same street or 
pavement, having one’s conversations with neighbours and friends 
and family overheard, continually ‘standing guard’ in one’s mind 
by having to anticipate and prepare oneself to face ‘the problem’ 
just when thinking about going outside or returning home when 
out, meant one problematic neighbour began to dominate other 
relationships. To communicate the lived experience of such a 
situation then is to render individuals frustrated at not being free 
of their circumstances, of being confined and defined by the daily 
battle with the same circumstances that are continually present 
and continually problematic.
Other evidence of other local lives that were similarly blighted 
by antisocial neighbours appeared in the local Fife Free Press 
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newspaper in an article with the headline ‘Pulled Air Pistol on 
Youth:’
A Cardenden man tortured by noisy youngsters flipped  
after one youth threw a snowball at him, a court heard  
this week. Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court was told how John 
Campbell (51) then collected an air pistol from his home 
and threatened to shoot one of his tormentors. Campbell, 
22 Whitehall Avenue, admitted that on December 6 he 
assaulted a 15-year-old boy, repeatedly presented an air 
pistol at his head and threatened to shoot him.
At first glance, threatening to shoot someone in the head for 
throwing a snowball is an over-reaction by any standards. However, 
insofar as such an ‘over-reaction’ is not a reaction to an event but 
to a history of more or less similar events, the emotional response 
to any particular event does not emerge ex nihilo but from a habitus 
that is ‘thickened’ as a result of an add-on ‘temporal’ effect that 
is sedimented within subjectivity. I would interpret the event 
adverted to above, then, as an example of ‘structure’ becoming 
‘event,’ insofar as it adverts to a history that preceded this incident. 
In order to communicate behaviour laden with historicity the 
resort to the word ‘flipped’ indicates the absence of an adequate 
vocabulary to represent the fact that emotions or emotional states 
are never simply the response to a particular situation, and so as 
not to fall into “the occasionalist fallacy” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992, p. 145) we must recognise that what has preceded the 
occasion explains the occasion; that responses to events are heavily 
interpolated by time from two directions. 
When faced with a situation for the first time, the emotional 
response that is available or ‘at hand’ if often ambivalent and 
certainly not a matter of habitus. Something that is new often has 
to be experienced several times for us to know how we should 
feel about it. Responding to a familiar situation over time, then, 
means we already know how we feel and so the appropriate 
emotional response that becomes immediately available and ready 
as one’s ‘spontaneous’ response in fact emerges from a history of 
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responding. What must also be factored into the emotional 
response of the moment is the weight or existential ‘density’ of the 
structured situation being responded to. For example, then, 
insofar as one is responding to a situation that has no end in sight, 
the moment being responded to is not unforeseen or unsuspected 
but is more accurately described as another incident in a history 
of similar incidents, and this means that included in the reality 
that is being responded to is one’s powerlessness and the history 
of one’s powerlessness to ‘do something’ about changing or 
resolving an ongoing set of circumstances. 
Hence, contained within responding to the moment is the 
weight of a history of having responded to a particular situation 
and an indefinite future of similar incidents and having to 
respond to such incidents, so that defining the moment and the 
self responding to the moment is the intentional grasp of a history 
that is past and a history that has yet to happen but which, by 
being anticipated, adds more weight to the burden of the moment 
thanks to this set of circumstances being taken up by intentionality, 
where it becomes reflexive and structures intentionality. Hemmed 
in by the past and the future, the moment’s emotional discharge 
is the product of these two pressures, so that in such instances, 
perhaps, individuals do not overreact but respond in a rational 
fashion to what is another mediation of their being at the mercy 
of events, of which there have been many and of which there will 
be many more to come.
As regards the ongoing situation referred to in the newspaper 
article, locals living in this street advised this problem stemmed 
from a family which had already been evicted from the neighbouring 
village of Kinglassie and had been re-housed by Fife Council; 
and that from this point onwards neighbour relations took a turn 
for the worse as antagonism towards the new family occurred, 
and trouble among erstwhile peaceable neighbours and their 
extended families also began, and which had ended in violence 
and hospitalisation, followed by the involvement of police and 
a court appearance and conviction and imprisonment and another 
broken family. When interviewing a committee member of the 
Neighbourhood Watch scheme which had been formed to deal 
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with the ‘problem family’ in Whitehall Drive, she prophetically 
warned of the likelihood of something similar to the incident 
reported in the local newspaper above:
They started hasslin Kenny. Noo they were oan dangerous 
grund there...cause if they git um wi a pint Ah mean he’ll kill 
them ken what Ah mean? They were hasslin him fir a while. 
Rhona [next door neighbour] says she wis feart tae gane oot 
the door or tae say onyhin. Noo that’s...so we says we’re 
stoppin it ye ken?61
In my interview with Eddie this particular neighbour dispute was 
mentioned, and in light of Eddie’s experience of working in a unit 
for young homeless people in Kirkcaldy who require emergency 
accommodation,62 I asked him for his views on the effectiveness 
of various Fife Council and voluntary sector initiatives to deal 
with the issue of antisocial tenants:
Whether they make any difference or no Ah don’t know 
because it’s a trend. It’s a trend fir a’ these young folk. Tae 
be rajes.63 There’s mair an mair e thum showin up a’ the 
time. Take Whitehall Avenue for example. Noo Whitehall 
Avenue’s always been a dead quiet place. An that guy 
Ronnie Snell… that family’s 64 moved in, and noo the police 
are up there two or three times every week. This is happenin 
a’ o’er. Some e them are total rajes.
61 Despite this rhetorical flourish signalling agency on the part of neighbours, 
Mr Campbell was evicted by Fife Council in September 2000. One might say he 
was punished for publicising his intolerable social/housing conditions which 
Fife Council were responsible for creating in the first place by housing an evicted 
family nearby. 
62 Eddie could only remember three men from Cardenden who had been referred 
to the homeless unit where he worked. One had been evicted for “drinkin,” 
another for “interferin wi bairns” and the other for “bein wild.” 
63 Slang term for young person(s) deemed to be more or less antisocial, wild or 
out-of-control. 
64 The family was subsequently re-housed again by Fife Council out of the village. 
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Living particular social relationships over time ‘fixes’ human 
being, so that we may say time has the power to change people, 
and there arises the paradox that the inability to overcome having 
to continually cope with particular relationships becomes habitual 
and routine and a matter of unconscious habit over time, resulting 
in a kind of temporal imprimatur upon dasein, which explains 
‘subjectless’ behaviour and the paradox of individuals who seem 
the most likely to mobilise upon the basis of the fundamental 
realities responsible for structuring their lives are in fact predisposed 
to ‘forgetting’ these social conditions, precisely because these 
issues become subject to routinisation and forgetting over time 
because they are the most real and most present. 
As we argued in Chapter 2, time exists twice so that the 
condition of being relentlessly subjected to time itself, over time, 
becomes determined by time and this relentless interpolation of 
human being by time is what transforms the blatantly antisocial 
into the normal, turns stupid behaviours one would never dream 
of practicing into normality and in the case of Helen, turns one 
into a person one doesn’t recognise. If we recall our analysis of 
Dauvit in Chapter 2 where I argued his ability to esteem himself 
was at the mercy of time, that one can credibly strike attitudes 
of indignation or incredulity to oneself and others when one’s 
poverty is an event or a recent happening and ponder one’s 
condition with a certain detachment, I argued the passage of time 
transforms all such responses into shame at one’s very being, and 
we see that the routine social determination of human being more 
or less forces the abandonment of distinctions between that which 
is ‘subjective’ and that which is ‘objective’ or extrinsic, because 
such lives are evidently determined by objective restraints so that 
whatever dispositions such individuals exhibit they can scarcely be 
described as personal as they are clear “submissions to necessity” 
(Bourdieu 1984, p. 376).
I would argue that in some individuals what becomes distinctive 
about them is the degree to which such submission has reached, 
and in this regard, when thinking about the incident referred to 
earlier concerning Charlene and her dogs, the more I observed 
Charlene the more I could never wander far from concluding she 
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was living a form of social determinism that had achieved 
something approaching ‘subjectlessness’ within her that had been 
brought about by the exigencies and disciplinations of deprivation 
and raising two daughters on her own. What also struck me was 
the challenge of representing behaviour that was not the young 
wilfulness evidenced by the second tenant at number 57 but was 
behaviour that had the quality of the absence of deliberative 
consciousness, so that to describe any behaviour of Charlene as 
“rude,” for example, would be to misrecognise it by implying 
deliberation, or that I was the object of Charlene’s intentional acts.
Instead, to adequately represent Charlene is to recognise a 
subjectless behaviour and consciousness insofar as she had become 
a ‘mouthpiece’ for her structures. These same characteristics were 
also something I recognised in the evicted tenant when on one 
occasion I asked her why she couldn’t understand the level of noise 
created by her playing loud music was unacceptable, and rather 
than giving an account of herself, she had shrugged her shoulders 
and lifted her two hands up in the air to communicate she had had 
enough and about-turned and left me standing holding the door. It 
was being on the receiving end of such ‘subjectless practice’ that 
provoked my conscientisation to the structuring effect of temporality 
and convinced me I would have to move out or she would have to 
be evicted, as I saw a depth of domination from which there could 
be no recovery until she became immersed in another set of relations 
and another experience of time brought about by some new reality 
in her life such as employment or parenthood.
In The Gift (1990) Marcel Mauss demonstrates how the 
practice of exchange implicates the parties involved into a system 
of reciprocity and that sociality is constituted upon this basis, 
so that the purpose of withholding reciprocity is to deconstruct 
the conditions for becoming a neighbour by aborting the moral 
imperative at the basis of gift-giving and being-with-others 
(mitsein). In a block of Fife Council flats, then, the denial of 
giving and receiving conversation and simple chatting produced 
ignorance of one’s neighbour and, over time, desensitises the 
individual to moral and social exigencies. In antisocial tenants 
this disposition has become defining and systematic to the extent 
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that it can legitimise behaviours such as that recalled to me when 
(10th January 2000) playing cards at The Auld Man’s Shelter card 
school and, chatting with a young local unemployed man, he 
informed the company that he leaves his vacuum cleaner on in 
his flat “sometimes for an hour just to annoy the old woman 
downstairs.”65 While I doubted the truth of his assertion it is 
revealing that it was not only said expecting to be believed but 
was felt unlikely to arouse disapproval. Even if a complete fiction, 
its mere utterance evidenced a level of regression and a subnormal 
‘politics of identity’ that is possible among neighbours and in 
which the repression of recognising there is a problem at all is 
an integral part of the problem itself. 
In terms of the issue of recognising the very existence of a 
problem, it is revealing that over the nineteen months I spent at 
51 Cardenden Road I never spoke about the problem with either 
tenant at number 57. During both phases the problem ‘dissolved’ 
into the day-to-day routine of minimalizing relatedness, leaving 
only the bare minimum of physical proximity, which was 
productive of a wider ethos of mere endurance of others which 
clearly impoverished the experience of social interaction, and 
created the paradox whereby the absence of social relations came 
to characterise the experience of social relations.
In the incident with the problem neighbour referred to above, 
any attempt to address the problem only triggered denial of the 
very existence of a problem as admitting to a problem would be 
to implicate or commit oneself to recognising and practicing 
reciprocity and their attendant moral and social responsibilities, 
the very things that must not be allowed to emerge as this leads 
more or less directly to being accountable and recognising the 
need for a change of behaviour. Instead of the free development of 
reciprocity, then, there is regression to a form of ‘autism’ or an 
65 Andy was over thirty years old and locals told me he has two young children 
by his ex-wife whom he sees each Sunday when his ex-wife drops them off for 
the day at his mother’s house; that he also has children with his current partner 
but that: “He hisnae worked in years cause the Child Support Agency wid make 
um contribute tae the maintenance e his bairns.”
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‘infantile’ consciousness that cannot face its own behaviours 
nor its interlocutors who challenge such behaviours, and which 
resorts to ‘magical’ responses such as: “The door’s locked and 
Ah dinnae have a key.” However, the real work which such 
‘magical consciousness’ does is to effect the disappearance of 
one’s neighbour and the consequences of one’s behaviours and 
thereby achieve the illusion of an immaculate relationship to one’s 
social context. Viewed from the perspective of the consciousness 
of the antisocial neighbour, when asked to turn music down this 
request falls like an arbitrary will-to-power by an unknown 
‘other’ and, in true existential style, provokes heartfelt resistance 
as if authenticity were at stake, with the result that an invincible 
alienation from reality occurs thanks to a politics of identity.
Bourdieu has remarked somewhere that every habitus is 
equally fatal, and as a rule we can say that as a result of what 
Adorno termed ‘identity thinking,’ identifying with one’s social 
position is perfectly normal and inevitable. If we also recognise 
the “role of feelings in indexing the true self” (Lutz 1988, p. 7) is 
often decisive in telling us who we are, and that the “role of 
culture in the experience of emotion is seen as secondary, even 
minimal” (Lutz 1988, p. 3), we can see that dominated individuals 
(and the socially dominant) easily make the mistake not only 
of identifying with their objective domination but, thanks to 
the exercise of freedom, make a reflexive project out of their 
domination with the result that they do not see themselves as 
being caught in a social determination to be overcome but imagine 
instead they are defending their ‘true self,’ so that there is a fine 
line separating the authenticity involved in the slave “choos[ing] 
himself on the ground of slavery” (Sartre 1966, p. 703) and the 
inauthenticity of imagining one’s being a slave is one’s true self to 
be defended against all-comers. 
Rather than becoming free of particular relations, then, there is 
an internment into and collusion in de-humanising relations as 
to truly admit one’s neighbours into one’s self-construct is to 
open oneself to being a self in relation to others. However, in a 
consciousness addicted to not cultivating these relationships 
and seeing a form of authenticity in this refusal of reciprocity, 
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becoming a neighbour can only appear as a form of capitulation 
to an oppressive other.
This eviction of the other within the consciousness of antisocial 
individuals via a refusal of representation, however, was not 
one-way traffic as among neighbours there was a refusal to 
call the problem neighbour by name, as if a form of ‘eviction 
from language’ to achieve distance in spite of spatial intimacy. 
Neighbours’ reification of the problem into the “neighbour from 
hell” was only a matter of time; an ‘othering’ or reification in 
thinking about the other expressed in the damning shorthand 
diagnoses that readily came to hand such as: “She’s rough as f**k. 
The hale family’s rough as f**k.”
If dasein and mitsein are integrally linked it is because existence 
is always co-existence, so that being a good neighbour is an 
integral part of locating and constructing the self and being 
recognised as an adult and competent human being. In a situation, 
therefore, where the law intervenes and declares any person unfit 
to be housed, a host of other declarations of failure are made 
public at this point. For example, then, because being a mother is 
an interpersonally maintained social identity, recognition or 
verification of such an identity may be withheld, so that when a 
mother is declared unfit to be housed this is simultaneously to be 
declared unfit to be a mother. Furthermore, because in a village 
context an individual relentlessly encounters the world in terms of 
how other locals view him or her, any tenant who is evicted has 
little resources to credibly combat local definitions of themselves. 
Of any individual who is evicted the question will be raised as to 
whether they possess the necessary wherewithal to qualify for the 
social identity of ‘mother,’ given that access to such identities is 
something that requires being able to ‘pay’ the admission price of 
conformity to social conventions and a number of competencies in 
order to belong to the imagined identity of ‘mother.’ 
Similarly, the same extrinsic competencies and conditions that 
have to be met for others to ascribe the identity of ‘mother’ to an 
individual apply to a woman being able to understand herself as a 
mother, because an individual requires ‘social permissions’ to 
internalise and identify with that identity.
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Subsequent to being evicted from 104 Cardenden Road a 
young single mother would arrive with her two young children 
every morning at eight o’clock to 57 Cardenden Road, so that I 
was able to see on a daily basis something of the lives of pre-
school children subject to parenting that was void of the deep 
practical resolve or the condition of being immersed into an 
imagined future that is the fundamental prerequisite for practicing 
the discipline of being family-centred and child-centred, and the 
creation and daily reproduction of a domestic realm. As if these 
conditions are not demanding enough under normal circumstances, 
when life is characterised by struggling alone in the absence of 
fathers and meaningful employment and meeting the pressures of 
day-to-day survival, the demands of family life are a mirror that 
reflects back one’s objectivity and a continual call to deconstruct 
prior learned behaviours and put in place new behaviours in 
accordance with the demands to decentre oneself and become 
child-centred, because a parent’s behaviours must be more than a 
cipher for wider socio-economic pressures and realities. Being a 
single mother, then, involves instantiating a dialectic between the 
two poles of social determination and freedom insofar as a mother 
simultaneously is defined by her material conditions but must also 
‘transcend’ them or not be mastered by them for the sake of 
creating an adequate environment for children. 
If we ask what are the prospects for a successful project of self-
appropriation when one’s energies are exhausted in coping with 
objective structural realities, it seems that insofar as there is a 
profound fatalism or acceptation of one’s objective life-chances, 
a kind of ‘defence mechanism’ that prevents any obedience to 
new and ‘higher’ demands and new and ‘higher’ behaviours seems 
inevitable; as if by refusing the development of self there is a 
‘psychological budget’ being adhered to, and the avoidance of 
cognitive dissonance and maintaining a psychological immediacy 
frees the individual of the burden of having to psychologically 
finance other possible or potential identities. It is here, then, that 
the social realm is reproduced within the psyche as it is precisely 
here where a symbolic revolution must take place in order to 
resist settling for the socially determined self that one already 
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is; it is precisely here where a dialectic of struggle between 
social determination and freedom is relinquished as a result of 
‘identitarian thinking’ that settles upon one’s true self being this 
social determination devoid of an impulse to transcend itself.
In my account of ‘living with difference,’ a particular set of 
housing conditions have not been described along the lines of 
differences that arise as a result of sharing the same space as 
one shares a street or where instances of difference are confined to 
a shared space that can be occupied at a time of one’s choosing, 
so that interaction with difference can be a ‘contemplative’ affair 
that more or less occurs at one’s discretion. What has been 
required is an account of difference as a contact sport, and a non-
contemplative experience of difference and conflict which seeps 
into one’s self so as to forcefully trample upon one’s possession 
of one’s self and one’s intimate spousal mitsein and relations with 
others, so that we may describe contemplative theories of 
‘difference’ and contemplative theories of pluralism as sublated 
forms of segregated housing conditions which afford detached 
and private relations to neighbours and purely contemplative 
accounts of difference. 
In my account of difference as conflict and a contact sport, the 
house is a site for a struggle over the exercise of sovereignty 
because housing conditions put schemes of perception of self, 
other and territory to the test, and thereby raises the question of 
sovereignty which under normal circumstances lies inert because 
there can be no normality unless the question of sovereignty is 
settled. Talk of the house as a site of sovereignty then is fated 
to be viewed as merely rhetorical until it is challenged by the 
advent of conflict. In this regard, history shows millions of people 
accommodating themselves to what historical hindsight imagines 
to have been ‘intolerable’ conditions. In breaking with established 
practices of accommodation, the advent of conflict is often what 
proves decisive in transforming accommodationist strategies 
into all-or-nothing battles over sovereignty. Where the condition 
of sharing sovereignty with others becomes intolerable, it can only 
be brought to a decisive end via an exclusive integralism that is 
no longer prepared to share sovereignty with an other, and so 
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I propose an analogy between the housing conditions described in 
this chapter and the wider historical and geo-political questions; 
an analogy between two periods of conscientisation fuelled by 
‘contact and conflict:’ one that occurred at a geo-political level 
between 1979-1997, and another that occurred at the micro-level 
of housing relations between August 1998–February 2000.
I argue that, as a rule, both the 1945 and 1979 generations lack 
the symbolic and intellectual resources to break with their 
collusion and collaboration in the coercive ideologies of powerful 
social classes, but that this aporia has come to an end thanks to 
a new ‘politics of identity’ and the awakening of the question of 
sovereignty as a result of the combined effects of the advent 
of affluence and political and economic events during the period 
1979-1997 which has liberated an inert historicity and long-inert 
possibilities for agency among the 1979 generation, thanks to 
the political and cultural defeat of prior accommodations 
throughout the ‘society of scarcity’ period. If the 1979 generations 
are objectively freed by the arrival of general affluence from the 
nineteen-eighties onwards, the ’45 generation were largely confined 
to ‘scarcity thinking’ and a symbolic accommodation in the form 
of a more or less coerced pooling or sharing of sovereignty with 
England, and the difference between the two generations is the 
difference between two conceptions of sovereignty and two 
different levels of freedom, which lead to two differing estimations 
as to what is realistic and two differing estimations of what should 
be done about the divergent electorates of Scotland and England 
from 1979–1997 and 2010–2015 and beyond. The same alignment 
or ‘fit’ between the personal, local, social and national that in the 
previous ’45 generation led to a British identity is re-cast in the 
post-1979 and ‘post-conflict’ era of affluence into the practice of 
exercising sovereignty that discards the zombie category of 
‘Britain’ as a relic from the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ era. 
Underlying the struggle between nationalism and unionism, 
then, is the struggle between two competing imaginings and 
practices of sovereignty, and in the next two chapters I will argue 
a range of social and cultural and economic forces for a sovereign 
Scottish State are in alignment as never before, so that among 
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the ’45 generation the following fivefold alignment or integralism 
held until recently:
1) Housing. As Council tenants, housing conditions were  
a site for dependency as they did not have the power  
to exercise agency or ‘sovereignty’ (ownership) over their 
housing conditions.
2) Locality. Locality was founded by the owners of the 
means of production, and as the children of the first 
in-migrating miners the ’45 generation do not have the 
symbolic resources to re-found and re-imagine locality.
3) Class. As a class they remain defined by economism and 
‘scarcity thinking’ and did not have the level of material 
development to secede from all-British solutions in their 
pursuit of a political project to challenge their domination 
within the free market.
4) Nation. As a people and nation they lacked the political 
difference from England to mobilise their historicity or  
geo-political positionality to begin a politics of identity, and 
exert the agency of securing a sovereign Scotland. 
5) Culture. The imagining, producing and consumption  
of ‘Scottish culture’ remained enthralled to scarcity-era  
all-British formats (‘folkism’/inferiorism). 
While among the ’79 generation(s) the following fivefold alignment 
or integralism is upon us:
1) Housing. As owner-occupiers freed from local authority 
control, the house has become a site for the imagining  
and practicing of agency and sovereignty, with a younger 
generation empowered to become intolerant of antisocial 
behaviour and who act to secure evictions.
2) Locality. A younger generation begins a new ‘imagining’ 
of locality free of industrialism and modernism.
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3) Class. As members of an affluent working class they  
keep faith with a post-1979 centre-left politics of class or 
redistribution.
4) Nation. As a people and nation they pursue a ‘post-
materialist’ politics of identity to bring an end to sharing 
sovereignty with England, and break with the ’45 generation’s 
collaborations and accommodations to dependency and will 
vote for independence on 18 September 2014.
5) Culture. A new affluence-based imagining and practicing 
of cultural agency emerges, which breaks with all-British 
cultural formats in the pursuit of developing the projects of 
a purely Scottish culture and modernity.
In coming to the above depiction and description of the ‘present 
as history,’ perhaps the key to remember is it emerges from using 
conflict as an essential part of data-constituting and data-
gathering. When daily life takes the form of contestation due to 
the fact of sharing the same housing-come-living space, this space 
becomes the site of the production of difference, leading to a ‘zero 
sum’ game that involves the process of eviction in an effort to 
exercise sovereignty vis-à-vis their homes and shared domestic 
spaces, so that the process of eviction is a politics of identity and 
a struggle against an other who is to be expelled from a particular 
territory. In this regard I posit an analogy between large-scale geo-
politics and the micro politics of eviction insofar as a particular 
housed dasein becomes reflexive and a principle of interpretation 
so that there occurs a structuring or ‘hardening’ of perception 
over time (and which ‘contemplative’ social ontologies and 
hermeneutics are incapable of suspecting – far less knowing), and 
which aligns its reading of its neighbour and its locality and its 
nationality; a localised class and housed-sensibility to antisocial 
practices of neighbours that is isomorphic with and aligns 
with wider social and geo-political practices of inequality in the 
multi-national State of the UK.
In a scene from the film Crash (2004) the character of police 
officer John Ryan confronts his younger partner, who has only 
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begun working as a policeman, with the words: “You think you 
know who you are? You have no idea.” These words are spoken 
in rebuke of the younger man who, through lack of experience, 
has judged Ryan’s actions as morally indefensible. The words are 
spoken to convey the idea that even intimate and unique realities 
such as who we are or who we become are in fact at the mercy 
of events and time, and that what we become in life is not 
something that is immaculate and immune from the many contexts 
our human being is immersed in. Likewise, with the passage of 
time the effects of social structure upon human being become 
‘secondary natures’ or ‘essences’ and insofar as the condition of 
being dominated is reflexive, it is perfectly capable of pursuing 
its own micro-politics of identity all the way to the bitter end of 
eviction thanks to the processes that transpire within the confines 
of a block of nine flats. 
In this micro social space, tenants ‘fix’ other tenants into an 
essence so that they are thereafter deemed essentially incapable of 
change because of what they are. ‘Giving up’ on one’s neighbour 
is comportment towards an essence based upon the well-founded 
judgment of the impossibility of an individual exercising agency, 
and is a judgement which produces fatalism or resignation and 
the judgment that such an individual can only be evicted. Only 
by ‘giving up’ on one’s neighbour as capable of agency does the 
ethnographer acquire the idiom of his informants and learns 
“to get used to it” (as per Charlene’s advice), and only by giving 
up does one reproduce their ‘being-there’ and reproduce their own 
history of having given up on the attempt at agency. In making 
essentialised judgements on one’s informants, then, one is becoming 
alike and finally learning that until one did so one was fated to 
remain a stranger to the sui generic structuration effected by time 
upon consciousness and behaviour and the essentialist politics of 
identity that follows.66
66 If I managed to accomplish Whitman’s advice quoted earlier, I did so despite 
myself and as a result of not being in control of the field or the data. 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
270
3.4 Overcoming Objectivism
Meaning, of course, is ethnographically problematic. It is not 
susceptible to objective description, but only to interpretation.
Cohen 1985, p. 98.
In asking to meet with a Fife Council representative, myself and 
Eva were breaking the ‘rule’ that states tenants should not 
presume to arrange a meeting in order to question their landlord 
or attempt to instantiate a non-dominated relationship to the 
condition of being dominated. In order for us to exercise agency, 
this required nothing less than a reversal of Fife Council’s housing 
allocations policy, and for our point of view to be more than 
a private attitude on our part would require Fife Council to 
cede authority to us and accept our interpretation of events and 
solutions i.e. either sound-proofing their properties or admitting 
their housing allocation procedures were at least partly responsible 
for tenants experiencing the problem of antisocial neighbours. 
For myself and Eva as Council tenants, then, not to instantiate a 
dominated relation to our being dominated required nothing less 
than the hopeless presumption that Fife Council housing policy 
would change because it did not happen to suit our ‘personal’ 
circumstances. Instead of any of this happening, of course, what 
did happen was what was fated to happen when the subordinate 
attempt to contest the established bureaucratic procedure of the 
dominant i.e. nothing.
Among local area office Fife Council employees I found a 
culture defined by an etiquette of euphemisation that was unable 
to recognise me as one of its tenants because it was unable to 
recognise the reality of my housing conditions insofar as it failed 
to recognise its responsibility for creating unacceptable living 
conditions, and break with the euphemisation practices deemed 
integral to public service culture and which disempowers 
locals and locality and effected a ‘dumbing down’ of tenants 
or ‘service users.’ Being on the receiving end of this bureaucratic 
‘managerialism’ meant it was we as Council tenants who 
were eventually coerced into becoming the ‘victims’ not only of 
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antisocial tenants but the policies of our local Council. This 
local authority culture and practice, then, is directly relevant to 
the phenomenology of ‘council housing’ as it impacts upon the 
experience of those tenants living such housing conditions.
If a fundamental principle of the ‘sociological imagination’ is 
that for something to be real it has to be intersubjectively agreed 
as being real, a problem I faced when trying to communicate our 
housing conditions was that it was a situation which was never 
forced to an openly shared or intersubjectively agreed representa-
tion of itself by informants or neighbours or the professionals 
involved. A major factor defining the phenomenological reality 
of my ‘neighbour dispute,’ then, was the ‘invisibility’ that sur-
rounded it. At a formal and official level it seemed to ‘disappear’ 
as a result of the ‘professionalisation’ of the problem by Fife 
Council insofar as the persons involved are reduced to the legal 
and contractual status of “tenant” in the name of bureaucratically 
defined objectivity. 
During the time of the second tenant at number 57, no formal 
complaint was made to the Council and, because the Council never 
enquired as to our views of the new tenant, it seemed as if the only 
level of existence available to this lived experience was the private 
realm; as if the only space available to register the reality of the 
problem was the ‘private body,’ as the other agencies involved 
‘privatised’ this reality into a bureaucratic world of professional 
discourse so that, thanks to the “splitting of subjectivity from objec-
tivity” (Taussig 1992, p. 96), to keep track of the lived experience 
of this reality meant resorting to the practice of ‘bodily reflexivity’ 
as a means of data-gathering and as an interpretive key for analys-
ing an aspect of subjective structuration that would never be ver-
bally evidenced, and so meant breaking with objectivism and the 
embrace of “the swamps of subjectivity” (Levi-Strauss).
Hence, just as with the ‘condition of reduction’ brought about 
by labouring discussed in Chapter 2, what I have described as 
‘housing conditions’ are not objective realities ‘out there’ that one 
will find in local authority housing officers’ reports or in the 
curriculum followed by Housing Studies students because they are 
not empirical realities that the casual passer-by can spectate and 
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describe and discuss. As a result of this caesura between ‘reality’ 
and ‘publicity’ there was a more or less coerced interiorisation of 
‘living conditions’ where intentionality and embodiment bore the 
full weight of reality, and consubstantial with this ‘invisibilisation’ 
and somatisation is the silence towards these realities by those 
intimately living these conditions. In this regard I was struck by 
the fact that informants seemed to have learned not to invest 
any great effort in discursively naming their reality, as if they 
had learned the fundamental impotence of language; as if the 
social conditions required for speaking were absent because to 
speak one’s reality via language was not just to say the same thing 
yet again, but was to deliberately invite an experience of cognitive 
dissonance insofar as it raised to intersubjective reality once 
again their failure to change their unchanged reality yet again. 
Paradoxically, then, the veracity of the Scholastic doctrine that 
language affords reality a more perfect medium of existence 
(O’Callaghan 2003) results in a refusal of language when the 
reality in question is simply too painful to mention.
When real social problems are not addressed by public 
institutions then living with the accumulating consequences of 
this unresolved reality over time is liable to engender a particular 
habitus over time among those affected. A particular reality, 
then, when it first ‘begins life’ is one thing but when time and 
powerlessness are added, this can enforce an alienated and even 
‘hysterical’ relation to this reality as a result of objectivity being 
systematically ‘privatised.’ What is clear is that a context where 
real social problems are not resolved engenders a context for 
that problem that is not characterised by free communication or 
the free use of language, and I would venture that neighbours’ 
inner psychic space was alienated from the free articulation of 
their experience because to ‘speak their situation’ was to trigger 
an entire temporal structure that weighed heavily upon their 
relation to language; as if in this inter-psychic realm there had 
developed a default position of avoiding anything that would 
trigger discourse upon the situation, so that their silence revealed 
the fact that their powerlessness through time informed their 
relationship to language. 
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If the public face one presents to others about one’s situation 
arises from the demands of maintaining a show of normality 
and avoiding conversation about it, the body can play no such 
language games and is fated to register and encode its world, so 
that embodiment becomes a sui generic site of reality as the body 
and psyche are the media par excellence that register and live the 
meaning of events and relations. In the case of one neighbour, 
then, the privatisation of her living conditions were medicalised in 
the form of an addiction to Prozac, while my wife’s answer came 
overnight in somatic form when she developed dozens of little 
yellow spots the length and breadth of her back and shoulders 
which exhibited a striking uniformity and perfect equal spacing, 
as if expressing a mathematical formula and which I took to be a 
remarkable somatic speech act ‘saying’ her living conditions.
This triangulation of housing, embodiment and the psyche 
reveals the fact that so intimate is the relation between the 
home and dasein that it is difficult to begin to think about this 
relationship which for most of us most of the time remains firmly 
in the background of our awareness. The home may be viewed as 
the first space or medium in which we come to awareness of 
ourselves and learn the fundamental truth that our existence is 
co-existence, as the space of the familial ‘little society’ is not 
simply that which conditions dasein and mitsein but rather the 
house and home is the medium within which and through which 
our dasein and mitsein come-into-being and maintain their being. 
The house and home is the existential space where relations 
and ‘deep selves’ are created and maintained; the place where 
social interaction first takes place and is nurtured and the place 
par excellence for experiencing privacy, tranquility, stability, 
convention, meaning and where there occurs the deep and remote 
preparation for the exigencies of adult life.
It is at home then that our ownmost selves come about, and 
something of this link between authenticity and the home 
is captured in the rhetorical expression, “What’s that when it’s 
at hame?” which locals use when asking someone to explain 
something or clarify what something means, as the presumption 
is that being ‘at home’ is where things are what they really are, 
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that when at home we remove masks and lay down our ‘extrinsic’ 
identities and all of the artificial role-playing associated with 
the world of work, as the home is where people are their real or 
true selves. As Corrie (1939, p. 30) put it: “In the pit he is a brute 
– only brutes could survive there – in the home, rough and all as 
he is, he is a man once more.” If domestic space humanizes it 
is because the home is surrounded by a cluster of meanings which 
associate the domestic with notions of authenticity and truth, 
while the public realm is associated with notions of affectation, 
appearance and inauthenticity. However, living amongst antisocial 
neighbours involved the deconstruction of naïve notions of 
autonomy, with the more or less coerced ‘revelation’ that dasein 
is never an island unto itself and this truth extends to the domestic 
realm where the myths of privacy and autonomy are most 
cherished.
The lack of control that one concedes in negotiation with the 
social world, then, is resented when ‘extorted’ in the intimacy of 
domestic life because it violates a cluster of symbolic meanings, 
and in adverse circumstances one is fated to begin to resent 
this fundamental human condition of existence as co-existence or 
relatedness, and to resent the fact that because all human living is 
at the mercy of its relations, one is always at the mercy of others 
to behave well in order to allow oneself to live well. Living the 
process of eviction, then, reveals how much we are invested in a 
normally unstated and unsaid code of dwelling which is naturalised 
to the extent that a theory of ‘correct dwelling,’ for example, is 
a redundant notion as the presupposition is that, because dwelling 
is defined in association with notions of goodness, to dwell at all 
is to dwell ‘correctly’ and it is impossible to dwell superficially or 
badly or inauthentically.
Over the course of our nineteen months as Fife Council tenants 
the house became the space, medium and conditione sine qua 
non for registering the illusion of privacy, the locus for the forceful 
ending of the illusion of autonomy insofar as these months 
involved a decentering process that more or less forced my 
thinking about the social conditioning of human dasein and 
mitsein to go back to the drawing board. Far from a space for an 
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oasis of privacy, the house became the medium par excellence that 
allowed ‘society’ to effortlessly find me ‘at home,’ and my housing 
conditions more or less coerced me into taking seriously the fact 
that there is a relationship between housing and individuation and 
sociation; that much like the being brought into being by doing 
manual labour discussed in Chapter 2, so housing conditions have 
the power to deconstruct dasein and familial mitsein, and re-make 
them in its image independently of the consciousness and will of 
those immersed in these conditions. Our nineteen months as Fife 
Council tenants taught me that ‘being dominated’ is a structural 
reality that has little to do with an individual’s personality or 
psychological make-up; that what there is to be communicated is 
the reality of people being lived by structures; a situation where 
dasein is ‘epiphenomenal’ to impersonal structure.
Over the course of nineteen months spent living at 51 Cardenden 
Road I came to this ‘extreme’ structuralist point of view as my 
response to my housing situation underwent the process of 
beginning with fighting to resistance, then to silent tolerance and 
then to subordination, and then surrender and finally flight. If my 
housing conditions forcibly taught me the unreality of any idea that 
I could privatise my living conditions these same conditions also 
taught me that not only data-collection but the interpretation of 
data is a contact sport, as they forcibly brought to awareness the 
realisation that any idea that I was conducting research as 
a delocalised academic was disingenuous bad-faith. Prior to this 
nineteen-month period of ‘rough wooing’ I had devoutly attempted 
to write and represent the field in a way that would be perceived by 
others as fair and objective, and I also found that this involved 
pretending to some imaginary future reader that I was following 
some kind of special sociological or anthropological method while 
in the field, and that it was this method which was responsible for 
my data and insights, while the truth was both my data and my 
analysis emerged far more from having lost control of the field and 
lost sight of where it might lead me.
Living with problematic neighbours was firstly a novelty and 
a surprise that soon became a source of more or less constant 
preoccupation which only came to an end when we resigned our 
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tenancy and moved out. It was because my experience of housing 
conditions for the first nineteen months of fieldwork was so 
problematic that the reality-constituting power of relationships 
became the focus of my attention, and I was coerced into 
understanding that something as ‘unreal’ as a relationship could 
be powerful enough to construct or deconstruct apparently 
substantive realities. From being immersed in the swamps of 
‘substantialist’ thinking I caught up with Marx’s characterisation 
of the human being as “the ensemble of the social relations” 
(cited in McLellan 1977, p. 157), and as I constructed a map of 
social actors and their social space and the relevance of housing 
conditions as a point of departure for understanding their 
structuring role for individuation and sociation, what I was 
deeply impressed by most of all was the reach of social relations’ 
determining of dasein and individuation.
Living with antisocial neighbours means the normally unmarked 
and unsaid relationship between self and space becomes an object 
of inquiry and conscientisation, to reveal the extent of how those 
affected experience embodiment and live their house and are lived 
by their house; how antisocial neighbours structure what we like 
to imagine are personal spaces. Neighbours’ complaints that: “Ye 
cannae relax! Yer hoose is no yer ain!” refer to the fact that we 
normally dwell in our bodies as we normally dwell in our houses 
so that our sense of self too is ‘housed’ in our bodies to the extent 
that, when such social spaces become problematised, there is a 
consequence for dasein and nothing can be taken for granted; that 
unless one controls one’s housing conditions one cannot even 
control one’s being oneself insofar as one’s dasein is opened up 
to the mercy of relations that have the power to deconstruct a 
once-solid sense of self. In the case of Eva developing a stress-
related outbreak of spots across her back, then, “her body provided 
an alternative standpoint from which to tell an unsanctioned 
story’’ (Farnsworth-Alvear 2000, p. 207), and in light of such data 
there is the need to develop an embodied reflexivity that takes 
the body as the privileged place for ‘fielding difference,’ where 
“bodies are physical field sites upon which the world inscribes 
itself” (Nast 1998, p. 95) due to the body being an involuntary site 
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of structuration or a site for the ‘inscription’ of social conditions 
due to the natural process of the bodily inscription of the world. 
Hence the salience of the attempt to use the experience of living in 
a situation of everyday near-conflict and confrontation as a:
Cultural and material context for understanding reflexivity 
not as a voluntaristic and leisured process of the mirror, 
initiated and/or controlled by a subject through mental 
exertion [but] as an embodied process wherein the body is 
itself a field for registering and negotiating difference.
(Nast 1998, p. 107).
Nast’s (1998, p. 405) focus upon the “ways in which places are 
experienced through the body, and how the body is experienced 
through places” is a useful model for thinking about living with 
antisocial neighbours, and breaking with objectivism to ‘save the 
data’ and significance of neighbours complaining: “Ah’m at the 
end e ma tether; Ma nerves are shot tae hell; Ah’m gonnae loss the 
heid; Ah cannae stand any mair e this. Ah’m gaun aff ma heid.” 
This discourse which draws upon embodied metaphors points to 
“the integration of mind/body experience” (Low in Csordas 1994, 
p. 145) and informants’ speech, which reflects their embodied 
experiences and challenges reflexivity to break with objectivism 
and cognitivist biases in favour of an embodied reflexivity that can 
capture the bio-psycho-social or mind-body-world integration 
that characterises informants’ experience. If Cohen (1978, p. 6) is 
correct that “one has to acquire the idiom of the locality, and then 
learn within it. The acquisition of the idiom is the starting point 
for investigation,” then, having shared in their housing conditions, 
I argue the many different relations constituting locals’ experience 
informs not only my ‘conversion’ to a structuralist standpoint and 
the practice of a non-objectivist ethnographic reflexivity, but also 
allows me to properly see what there is to be understood and how 
housing conditions condition not only embodiment but the range 
or extent of what there is that is embodied. 
This embodied reflexivity (Scheper-Hughes & Lock 1987; 
Jackson 1989; Stoller 1989; Nast & Pile 1998) emerges from 
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being more or less constrained to draw upon an embodied sense 
of being-there and living with indeterminacy over time and 
becoming one’s own informant in order to by-pass a context 
characterised by the refusal of discourse, and to access such 
intangibles as ‘bodily comportment’ and a context that more or 
less coerced me into realising that to omit the bodily realm would 
be to miss important data as the body is a sui generic evidencing 
realm of the consequences of living a particular set of relations 
and housing conditions that other research methods and 
‘contemplative epistemologies’ would entirely miss.
If a basic insight of structuralism is that particular relation-
ships bring particular realities into existence, then relationships 
characterised by conflict and contestation bring additional realities 
into being. When an exasperated neighbour says: “Nae wonder 
everybody wants their ain wee bungalow. Away somewhere. Peace 
an quiet,” they are expressing this ability of relationships to bring 
‘war’ or ‘peace,’ and is affirming it is the fact of sharing the same 
space, often due to a lack of sound proofing, as opposed to the 
person or lifestyle of a particular neighbour per se, that is the 
conditions for the possibility of conflict and strife. 
Insofar as neighbours are largely indifferent to what others do 
behind closed doors so long as this means being done in private, it 
is the fact of not being able to have privacy and having no control 
over hearing noise or witnessing certain behaviours that constitutes 
the problem; the inability to avoid ‘being related’ makes indifference 
impossible and sets the scene for the emergence and contestation of 
difference and the rationale behind the strategy of evicting others 
or ‘evicting’ oneself to another address. Living in a poorly sound-
proofed block of Fife Council flats beneath an antisocial tenant 
then meant the inability to privatise one’s relationships and living 
a certain being-for-others that was out of one’s control, and the 
inability to live on one’s own terms and at a time of one’s choosing, 
so that the constitution of one’s dasein and one’s being-for-others 
was experienced and known to be out of one’s control. 
The obvious escape from all of this coerced becoming such as 
moving house, however, is often unavailable to locals until they 
are re-housed by the Council normally after years of waiting. 
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Many locals who are either young or new to the housing waiting 
list ‘game’ see themselves at the bottom of the housing hierarchy 
and accept a tenancy in a flat while immediately putting themselves 
back onto the waiting list again, and specifying their desire for a 
semi-detached cottage or put an advert in a shop window in the 
areas of the village to where they would like to move advertising 
they would like to swap with another tenant. Such are the 
strategies of those without the financial resources to buy a house 
and buy themselves out of the problem of antisocial neighbours 
and buy themselves out of the ‘full constitution’ of the reality of 
antisocial neighbours.
To arrive at a full statement of this particular set of housing 
conditions is to understand how living them impacts upon other 
relations that are present such as kinship relations. Allowing these 
further mediating structures into the picture reveals how ‘problem 
neighbours’ are transformed into a total fact of living mediating 
the experiencing of the whole social structure. Ideally, then, a 
systematic structuralism would require not only a sensitivity to the 
many social forces at play in a particular situation but a multi-
faceted reflexivity (mind and body) in order to register these many 
forces. Hence, opening onto the embodied nature of reflexivity 
is only the beginning because the systematic nature of both 
structuration and the systematic nature of the reflexivity that 
must accompany it in the informant should be reproduced in the 
ethnographer also. Both must be systematically developed to 
include awareness of what further mediates and constitutes the 
experience of, for example, antisocial neighbours so that an 
adequate practice of reflexivity will give an account of all other 
mediating influences present. 
More concretely, then, my sharing in the same relations and 
difficulties of neighbours was further made possible by my family 
life insofar as this immersed me further into the construction 
and living of the reality of antisocial neighbours as having this 
reality mediated or co-constituted via one’s family heightened and 
revealed what was at stake. Fundamental, then, to this aspect of 
fieldwork and fundamental to my data-gathering and data-
interpreting was being married, as I was not simply an apprentice 
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ethnographer taking notes on antisocial behaviour but a husband 
and father, and these identities as much as any other identity 
constituted the field and its data. The condition of being 
married had implications for how the experience of antisocial 
neighbours was constituted and mediated via this interpersonal 
relationship, and also informed my practice of reflexivity insofar 
as ‘being married’ was a ‘structuring structure’ impacting upon 
how housing conditions were experienced due to its structuring 
the structuring structure of embodiment.
Being foreign in terms of class, national identity and culture 
and not having working-class dispositions, Eva was also more or 
less coerced or weaned from her established dasein or habitus 
and underwent a nineteen-month process of acculturation, thanks 
to having to face the fact that she had to face being disturbed 
by neighbours as a matter of routine; had to form a habitus in 
relation to the constant disruption and expectation of disruption. 
When analysing our relationship over the course of this period, 
the psycho–somatic reactions developed over time in response to 
noise levels or disturbing phenomenon eventually became stable 
and fixed as part of our own structuration and our reactions 
became highly determined over time until our reactions to events 
were not invented afresh in response to a passing tracasserie 
between neighbours, but were constituted and dominated by a 
history of reacting and a history of the lack of agency, so that the 
‘secondary nature’ that was triggered on any particular day by 
a particular disturbance was something that had taken months to 
construct; a history was triggered because a history of responding 
had formed into a psycho–physical reaction already constituted 
and available and waiting to be triggered by an event. 
Any particular response then to any particular event emerged 
from our institutionalisation within our mitsein condition of 
‘helplessness’ or the condition referred to as ‘being dominated,’ 
and when responses to a spouse or a neighbour are so heavily 
structured or determined, there is little freedom to respond to a 
fresh event simply as that event, because it triggers a highly 
structured response which bears a resemblance to the structure of 
hysteria found in psychoanalytic theory where the hysteric is 
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someone whose condition results from a traumatic event and who 
is unable to be free of his symptoms until he ‘integrates’ the 
original trauma into his psyche. Further, if Erikson is correct that 
the word ‘patient’ “denotes a state of being exposed to superior 
forces from within and without which cannot be overcome 
without energetic and redeeming help’’ (cited in Kakar 1996, 
pp. 147-48), then a particular set of social conditions could be 
described as traumatic where the trauma would not be an event 
that comes and goes but a structure that remains, and so there can 
be no moment of catharsis until the objective social conditions are 
brought to an end.
One of the challenges of ‘writing culture’ (Clifford and Marcus 
1986) for much of my fieldwork was how to make the data of 
antisocial neighbours interesting or sociologically significant. My 
‘sociological imagination’ at the outset of fieldwork was unable to 
see any such significance and so my initial reaction to my data was 
panic when faced with a younger generation whose “existence 
seems to take place on the brink of nonsense” (Charlesworth 
2000, p. 293). My initial reaction was of a doctoral student whose 
research project was slipping through his fingers, and being left 
with the task of trying to shore-up my data against descending to 
greater levels of trivia in light of a sixty-eight year old informant 
describing to me her support worker son’s new job consisted of 
“teachin young folk how tae use a knife an fork an that.” Unable 
to see anything of significance I felt condemned to play the role of 
recording the minutiae of a post-industrial dystopia and a post-
industrial generation so traumatised by the industrial era that it 
was entering a new era in need of attending State-sponsored 
courses to learn how to eat properly.
Upon reflection, however, I came to realise my panic had in fact 
far more to do with the personal nature of my data, and that it 
was to avoid disclosing what was happening within my family life 
that was the force behind my reluctance to write about antisocial 
neighbours or local housing conditions, even to the extent of 
being prepared to carry out the sham of omitting the dominating 
facts of the field as I had in fact experienced it. My predicament 
was how to write about what was happening while avoiding 
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disclosing the fact that I had fallen into the swamps of subjectivity 
(Lévi-Strauss). 
Living at 51 Cardenden Road made me confront my own 
unexamined assumptions as to what was ‘good’ and ‘bad’ research 
and what counted as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ data, and what I was forced 
to recognise was the extent to which my own structure of 
perception was dominated by socially dominant judgments as to 
what was to be considered ‘serious’ data and what was to be 
considered ‘trivial’ data of no serious import. Reflecting on my 
resistance to take my own field experience seriously as a source 
of data, I was compelled to recognise I had no ‘working-class 
consciousness of my own’ insofar as my own positivism insisted 
that, insofar as I was generating the data and I was one of the 
protagonists, this was the antithesis of sound research. If the 
question I kept turning over in my mind was what sociological 
good could come out of Cardenden, my answer was that, based 
upon much of the material available to be gathered, there was 
nothing of sociological worth; that in fact my data was farcical 
thanks to anti–social neighbours who seemed to be involved in the 
active pursuit of helplessness.
I also realised that pursuing such data seriously would mean I was 
not engaging in grounded theory or reflecting any empirical data but 
instead engaging in a form of auto-ethnography, and this was the 
beginning of my journey away from positivism and objectivism as 
my living conditions convinced me of three things: the importance 
of time in structuring structuration, the need for the practice of 
reflexivity in order to aim at explaining all relevant structurings’ 
impact on any one structure in order to fully explain any particular 
aspect of reality such as housing conditions and, finally, to not rest 
content with a turn to reflexivity but to develop an auto-ethnography 
in order to think the data beyond informants themselves.
Only thinking I was free to put the experience of antisocial 
neighbours behind me in the days after the first tenant left on 
7 December 1998 did I feel sufficient mental ‘distance’ from the 
problem for it to become a matter of reflection and words and 
part of my research. But for the second tenant arriving to number 
57 in January 2000, it is likely that I would never have seen the 
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impact of temporality upon lives, or the new reality of the house 
as a new site for the imagining and practicing of territorial 
sovereignty, and a ‘housed politics of identity’ which I now see as 
fundamental. While no tenant has any control over the particular 
building specifications that result in poor sound insulation 
allowing the transmission of noise through floors, and has no 
control over a Council’s housing allocations policy, so as a father 
and husband I could not choose the phenomenology of my 
living conditions nor control how the problem of antisocial 
neighbours appeared or presented itself. My personal details 
informed the constitution of the field and the data, so that there 
can be no one existential truth or one adequate representation of 
antisocial neighbours to make available because the structurations 
the researcher brings to bear are necessarily different for each 
researcher, because the data of the field is co-constructed by the 
field and the particular situation of the researcher. 
My journey from positivism to embodied reflexivity and auto-
ethnography may never have happened but for poor sound 
proofing in a block of flats. Similarly, important insights into how 
it is that it is our relationships that locate and fix us and generate 
much of the reality of our lives, would probably never have 
occurred to me with such force if I were not married, as 
to truly grasp the reality and reach of the structuring force of 
temporality and social structures I had to trace these forces to 
the most personal level and to do this I had to become my own 
informant if I was to escape the criticism of Jules Henry who saw 
“everywhere the human disciplines run away from the humanity 
of human beings’’ (in Bauman 1999, p. 140).
In seeing with some clarity the fact that data-gathering and the 
interpretation of that data is something of a contact sport, I also 
see with some clarity that there is a price to be paid: because 
contextualized dasein can never be caught in the representational 
nets of what Bourdieu terms the scholastic gaze, the only adequate 
methodology is a reflexive approach to oneself until one closes the 
gap between self and informant to the point of realizing one would 
be exactly alike if faced with the same realities. However, learning 
such truths requires the unlearning of certain illusions about oneself 
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one has been ‘lucky’ enough not to have been made to let go off; 
means the deconstruction of a euphemised relation to oneself and a 
thoroughly de-mythologised self-understanding and awareness of 
one’s position in the social hierarchy and the depth of one’s ongoing 
commitment to one’s internalization of one’s social position and 
its constitutive role in one’s individuation and sociation. Because 
understanding is not simply ‘taking a look’ it is not free, and a full 
awareness of my own conditioning and ressentiment, for example, 
was some of the price I had to pay if I was to understand; having to 
reproduce or having to reconstruct for oneself one’s own social 
structuration and being made to see its fatal hold upon oneself, as 
only when this is in place are we allowed to begin to understand 
and appreciate the same reality at work in others.67
I practice writing and representation, then, from the very 
bottom of the ‘slippery slope’ that began innocently enough by 
practicing reflexivity, but which has led me to the ‘pure subjectivism’ 
that haunts the positivist imagination; the non-scientific fate that 
awaits anyone who allows ‘subjective’ or private and idiosyncratic 
realities to become part of their data and methodology. What the 
‘positivist imagination’ fears is the end of any kind of verifiability 
or reproducibility of data and research findings, and insofar as 
this criticism is largely fair, a break with objectivism as an ideal of 
knowledge becomes necessary and inevitable. What also has to be 
broken free from is the notion that the empirical data in itself 
(whatever that might be) was able to appear to me in a pure or 
unmediated manner, as it was the objective conditions and events 
coupled with my own situatedness that forcibly brought unforeseen 
aspects of structuration into view, as well as forced me to abandon 
the fiction of the identity of ‘ethnographer’ and any simple notion 
of objectivity. 
67 In May 2013 the former tenant at 51 Cardenden Road moved back to the village 
and when we met I told her how shortly after moving into her old flat back in 
August 1998 I was asked by Fife Council to collect evidence against the upstairs 
tenant. At this, she told me how the police had raided number 57 looking for drugs 
“wi dugs an everythin.” Fifteen years later, I still had a mind to ask her why she 
hadn’t told me this when showing me her flat all those years ago.
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Having a family and being unable to escape my housing reality 
was what more or less forced the issue of antisocial neighbours 
into its full structuring potential. If I had been single or simply a 
‘researcher’ (whatever that might be) I could easily have elided 
much of the problem during the second phase where the worst of 
the problem occurred at the weekends, so that the issue of housing 
and antisocial neighbours may well have merited no more than a 
footnote or one or two anecdotes. A related point to make having 
broken with objectivism is that it would be vain to attempt a 
formula or Weberian ‘ideal type’ of working-class structuration 
that would have universal relevance, or would enable the social 
scientist to ‘calculate’ or assign inputs or values to each structuring 
structure identified upon an ‘ideal type’ working-class dasein, as 
the part played by any structuring relation changes over time, 
and may only becomes part of the whole at a given stage in the 
person’s life-cycle (such as marriage) or never become relevant, so 
that to look for a one-size-fits-all ‘structuration formula’ is to ask 
each researcher or field situation to be the same.
If the initial opening up to an embodied reflexivity was done in 
the hope that my conditions of learning would further approximate 
and reproduce informants’ conditions of learning and solve a 
problem of ‘data-gathering’ about an issue that was not freely 
discussed or accessible, the price to be paid was to be more or less 
coerced into abandoning objectivism, because the only way to 
know the extent of working-class structuration is to allow (or be 
coerced into allowing) it to happen to oneself, and not pretend 
one knows this structuration other than by imitating how locals 
themselves come to be their being. If our methods are to secure the 
data that is there and capture the story of human being and what 
happens to it under certain conditions, then a fully-contextualised 
and fully-socialised social ontology should govern our views on 
epistemology and what constitutes an adequate methodology. A 
turn to embodiment, then, also highlights the aporias of pursuing 
inquiry into ‘private spaces’ upon the basis of ‘purely private’ 
evidence, and it was because my data lay in these spaces and 
media that it was necessary for me to be coerced out of my 
contemplative objectivism.
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By drawing upon the nineteen months as a Fife Council tenant 
I have attempted to articulate the processual and structural logic 
of the structuration of human dasein and how it happens, and 
argued that such structuration is not only compatible with the 
exercise of agency but the situated exercise of reason. In Chapter 
5 I will develop the analysis begun here concerning a micro-
politics and how this same pattern occurs at a national and 
historic level, and explain how among the ’79 generation in 
particular this is relevant to explaining the rise of working-class 
nationalism. In preparation for this argument the next chapter 
deals with some of the generative themes of the ’45 generation and 
how these have influenced their responses to the recent historic 
political developments in Scotland, by turning in particular to the 
historicity of dasein and drawing upon material gathered while 
attending the local history group for two years. Having begun an 
analysis of the sui generic structuring effect of time, the next 
chapter then develops this theme by turning attention to the site 
par excellence that reveals the importance of the signification of 
temporality over the long durée i.e. the relationship to History 
and Nation.
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4
The ‘Present as History’  
& the Return of the 
Repressed
The appeal of independence remains – at bottom – 
what it was in the late 13th and early 14th centuries.
Kidd (2012, p. 9)
I see no point in reviving medieval kingdoms in order to actually 
make sure that we are all rather smaller on the world stage.
Ken Clarke, Conservative MP
BBC Question Time, 16 February 2012
4.1 The Local History Group
The place-name Cardenden consists of two parts where ‘den’ 
refers to the geological feature of a den or glade, typically 
consisting of a length of landscape hollowed out as a result of a 
retreating glacier cutting a groove through the landscape at the 
end of the Ice Age, with the local den having a small stream or 
burn called the Den Burn running through the village, and which 
separates the areas of Bowhill and Cardenden. The earliest 
reference to Carden comes from a royal charter of King William 
in 1165 referring to the granting of land to MacDuff “except for 
my forest of Carden” (Taylor and Markus 2006, p. 91). This 
twelfth-century reference describes the area of Carden as a royal 
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hunting ground with the lands of Carden (Cardone or Cardenni) 
forming part of the coastal parish and royal domain of Kinghorn 
until 1642, when these lands became part of Auchterderran parish 
which itself dates from the medieval sherrifdom of Fife and king 
David I’s (1124-1153) original “modernisation [of Scotland] by 
invitation” (Bartlett 1994, pp. 78-79), and his organisation of the 
Church into parishes and the creation of the parish of Auchterderran 
(Urechehem or ecclesia de Hurkyndorath or Hurhyndemuch or 
Ochtirdere) at this time. According to Taylor and Markus (2006) 
the earliest known reference to the parish church in Auchterderran 
is from a document written in Gaelic which records the gifting 
of the parish church to the community of monks living on the 
nearby island of St. Serf in Loch Leven, which was famed for 
its library and school of translation dating from before the 
twelfth-century (Ross 1958, p. 5).68 More generally, however, 
the lack of historical records from the late-medieval and early-
modern period is lamented. As McNeill-Houston (1924, p. 145) 
has written:
It is one of the sorrows of our Church that there is no 
record of those who served this cure from the time of St. 
Fothad, 1050, to the consecration of the Church by De 
Bernham in 1243, when, even then, no incumbent’s name is 
given. From this time on to 1452 all is silent again. 
Reference is made to the “parson” before the Reformation. 
His presence still persists through his title in the old but 
now disused lint mill, ‘Parson’s Mill,’ a little farm now 
bearing that name.
While historical records of the abbeys and monasteries of Fife 
detail a local coal industry flourishing from at least the twelfth 
century, the parish of Auchterderran’s largely agrarian character 
more or less survived intact until the late eighteenth century, at 
68 Gaelic was spoken in Fife in “the late thirteenth century, if not later” (Taylor 
& Markus 2006, p. 7).
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which time the parish minister wrote in the Old Statistical Account 
of 1791: “The pasture, including sown grass, comprehends four-
fifths of the parish” (cited in Taylor and Markus 2006, p. 92). 
This agrarian past of the local area is evidenced by the area of 
Bowhill within Cardenden being derived from the Scots words 
for ‘Cattle hill,’ while the street of Kirkshotts Terrace is a reference 
to the twelfth-century duty of villagers to practice archery at 
designated times of the year within the precincts of the local 
church, to ensure their readiness for military service at the time 
of the Wars of Independence when William Wallace (1270-1305) 
and king Robert the Bruce (1274-1329) secured Scotland’s 
independence from England.69 In the 19th century, however, a 
period of unprecedented industrialisation began with Cardenden 
becoming a ‘pit village’ from 1895 until 1965.
To explore locals’ historical consciousness and the historicity of 
dasein I joined the local history group during fieldwork, and so on 
19 January 1999 I walked the short distance to the Corrie Centre 
hoping to join the group. As I arrived well before the meeting was 
due to start, I took the opportunity to look around: to the right of 
the entrance was the largest room in the building which was 
familiar to me as it was the venue for a Mothers and Toddlers 
group which I had attended several times with my eldest daughter 
(just as I myself had attended the pre-school nursery in the same 
building in the late nineteen-sixties). To the left of the entrance 
was a space given to advertising the various user-groups of the 
Centre and a range of literature advertising upcoming events, such 
as a seminar the following Saturday in Kirkcaldy on the topic of 
Problem Neighbours. As I browsed through this literature 
members of the history group began to arrive. I introduced myself 
and expressed my interest in joining the group, at which Wull 
69 An example of locals’ consciousness of this iconic period in Scottish history 
came during the winter of 2010 when local authority road gritters were unable 
to clear the roads of snow and ice and residents had to make their way on foot 
to the shops, and as I made my way to the shops I struck up a conversation with 
Margaret Snell out walking her two terrier dogs, which she had named Wallace 
and Bruce.
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informed me there were in fact two groups, the afternoon group 
which met at one-thirty p.m. and the evening group which met at 
seven-fifteen, adding jokingly that if I was “interested in gossip” 
attending either group would be ideal.
As I had thought the local history group was an obvious place 
to do ethnography on locals’ historical consciousness some sixteen 
months after the 11 September 1997 referendum that established 
a mandate for the restoration of the Scottish parliament, and four 
months before the first elections to the new parliament, I hadn’t 
given any more thought to joining the group so when all the 
assembled members were sitting around a large table facing each 
other in one of the side rooms, I suddenly realised that, as I was 
not joining the group as just another local interested in local 
history but to do research, I suddenly felt unprepared as I realised 
I needed to gain the group’s permission to attend their meetings 
and switch from informal chatting as “Dauve Gilfillan’s laddie” 
and say something about my research. After my improvised 
summary of what my research was about and why I wanted to sit 
among them, one hard-of-hearing eighty-nine-year-old member 
turned to Mrs Doig (whom I learned made a point of sitting next 
to her octogenarian friend’s ‘good ear’) to ask her to explain what 
I had just said. “He’s here tae study us Jenny!” replied Mrs Doig 
looking straight at me.
With no-one objecting to me joining the group I very quickly 
felt at home and enjoyed attending every Tuesday evening, and 
soon learned that both history groups had met every week since 
1989 despite the groups being originally established as a one-off 
course only meant to run for ten weeks. Both groups were 
organised by the Workers Educational Association (WEA)70 and 
came about as a result of the interest in local history generated by 
the Corrie Festival held in the village in 1986 to commemorate 
the opening of the Corrie Centre in 1985. Over those ten years 
the groups had produced texts on Cardenden in the shape 
of pictorial booklets, calendars and a five volume series of 
70 The WEA was founded in 1903 and was part of the movement for independent 
working-class education. 
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reminiscences begun in 1989, and through this ‘memory work’ the 
groups enjoyed a certain contemporeity and status in the village as 
a result of their calendars being much in demand as Christmas 
presents, and their five volumes of local history having been 
well received.
While I attended a few of the afternoon group meetings it was 
the evening group that I attended regularly for over two years, and 
from the beginning I enjoyed the group as it was a site that was 
free of any frustrating search for ‘something,’ as the members 
were able to draw upon an abundance of material via their 
collective backward glance to the past. There was a relaxed and 
informal atmosphere among the group and if I was a novel 
presence thanks to my continual note-taking throughout meetings, 
being a local and the only young person to have joined the group 
helped members feel comfortable, as to judge by the comments 
passed and the views expressed throughout the two years, I am 
confident members kept very little from me.
At any particular evening meeting the average turnout was 
about ten or twelve members who were all in their sixties 
or seventies, with the WEA tutor (Roisin Nesbitt) taking the 
initiative by proposing a subject-matter for discussion and 
regularly providing reading material. Some of the topics covered 
included the history of St. Andrews, the East Neuk of Fife and 
Abbot’s House in Dunfermline, and because of the informality 
of the group and the freedom it gave itself to range over any 
period of history and set their own agenda, and the absence of 
anything resembling a curriculum, it was after the tutor had read 
one or two pages of text aloud that the group would begin 
chatting about a particular topic that was related or, sometimes 
unrelated to the text. Hence, when after a reading a particular 
topic emerged such as suicide, for example, members would 
thematise the topic by recounting stories about who in the village 
had killed themselves, so that the group eventually proceeded 
to list known cases to each other, and then divulge or speculate 
upon the reasons for particular incidents so that a conversation 
could range from local men caught avoiding conscription at 
the time of the Great War of 1914-1918, to the more recent case 
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of a young soldier from the village killing himself after a tour of 
duty in Kosovo.71 
This procedure of giving free reign to local knowledge meant 
these discussions were an invaluable means of accessing and 
appreciating local knowledge, so that the members were as much 
sources of information about daily events in the village as of 
information of historical interest thanks to their habit of chatting 
about any significant happening, such as a death or burial that 
had occurred in the village since the previous meeting. Regular 
topics of conversation were any items of interest raised at the 
Community Council meeting (thanks to Annie Laird’s attendance), 
or incidents where the police had been called to in the village. 
Having remarked on one occasion to the group that they 
seemed to know everything going on in the village, one member 
immediately retorted by asking me: “Dae ye ken there’s seven 
paedophiles in the village?” At my incredulous reaction, a 
discussion then ensued for half an hour of the individuals 
(including names and addresses) living in the village who had been 
convicted of paedophilia or sexual abuse of children, which was 
followed by a discussion of other local instances of sexual 
perversion that had become public knowledge among the members.
In 1986 when the history groups first began, the members 
undertook research such as going to Kirkcaldy public library to 
access the records from the first census of 1841, and copying 
information about Cardenden and bringing it back to the group 
meetings to stimulate discussion and to build up an archive that 
was kept in a cupboard in the room where the group met. At this 
time the group were also instrumental in helping to preserve the 
site of the medieval ruin of Carden Tower72 and marking the spot 
in the wood where the last duel in Scotland was fought in 1826, 
as well as mounting a plaque to commemorate the local landmark 
71 A former province of the former state of Yugoslavia which declared its 
independence as a sovereign nation-state on 17 February 2008. 
72 For this work the group was awarded second prize in a UK-wide conservation 
competition, with their plaque hanging on a wall in the room where the meetings 
take place. 
293
t h e  ‘ p r e s e n t  a s  h i s t o ry ’  &  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  r e p r e s s e d
known simply as The Big Tree that had been felled in 1933 as 
a result of road improvements.73 
As the years have passed, however, such research and 
conservation activity has more or less come to an end, and what 
remains is a group of friends who meet together to chat about 
days gone by and enjoy an experience of community and 
conviviality. To achieve this, the normal focus of attention was 
memories associated with their lived experience of Cardenden and 
Scotland and further afield during the industrial era when 
Cardenden was a pit village i.e. from the 1920s until the 1960s, 
and from listening to their weekly discussions it clearly emerged 
that a primary experience for members was a previous material 
poverty and, as a direct consequence, a deeply internalised sense 
of belonging to the first working-class generation to have known 
a level of affluence and material security unknown to their parents 
and grandparents. As one member (Nan Pearson) described the 
lifelong material struggles of her neighbours:
She wis that mingin she sold her soap coupons in the shop. And 
she hid twelve bairns. Ah mind ma sister wis a rent collector, 
collectin wages. An one day Ah saw him, Jimmy Ritchie, sittin 
in the scullery wi a hammer breakin his plaster after his broken 
leg tae get back tae his work earnin money. Mrs Gardner she 
hid sixteen bairns and she stayed in a single end.
Similarly, Mrs Doig recalled to the group her grandmother, born 
in 1873, and the start of her working life:
She went tae work in the Leslie mill fae six in the morning 
til six at night at ten years auld. Prinlaws mill in Leslie.74 A 
flax mill, for the manufacture e linen. When she was twelve 
she did it full time. Before it was wane day at school, the 
73 The Community Council (established in 1978) intended to commemorate this 
tree by planting another tree in what was a derelict space until 2002, when it was 
made into a Community Garden.
74 A village about seven miles to the north-east of Cardenden. 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
294
next at the mill. The system e half-timers wisnae abolished 
’til 1936. A jute mill is the dirtiest place on earth.
Another member (Anne Mead) recalled local events such as the 
annual ‘School Treat:’
All the children made their way to their school about lunch-
time on the Saturday in July. The local bands, pipes and 
drums and brass, turned out to lead the procession. The 
children from Denend School waited patiently at the Sweet 
Shop at the foot of Station Road and joined in the procession 
as it passed by, then on to the Goth75 to collect St. Ninian’s 
school and Auchterderran School pupils. From there the 
procession went right up to Woodend Park (the one just 
below the Golf Club)...The streets were lined with mums 
and dads, brothers and sisters, and aunties and uncles all 
cheering as the children marched past waving wee flags and 
balloons.
The quote from Anne above evokes the conspicuous enjoyment 
and consumption of local spectacles, and if we focus upon the 
words “all cheering’’ and think about cheering as a social practice, 
there is a sense of ‘effervescence’ (Durkheim) and a local society 
recognising and celebrating itself, as to cheer involves the idea of 
something that is present in abundance, a spectacle in which 
nothing is lacking and a belonging to locality and the present 
where an abundance of children also evidences that this village 
and this belonging to locality is set to endure thanks to its pipe 
bands, its schools and streets where the generations come together 
in annual rituals, games and parades. There is an evocation of 
abundant life and an abundant local population and families with 
aunts and uncles and the extended family present to locality; 
75 There are a number of pubs in Fife in former coalmining villages and towns 
named ‘The Goth’ as a result of the importation of the Gothenburg public house 
system from Sweden, where the profits of local licensed premises were retained 
in the local community to fund local projects. 
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a non-contracepting population and place where locality is inter-
familial and free of privatism and villagers’ individuation and 
sociation was localised so that time is spent locally, so that on 
any particular day everyone was in the village for all-village 
gatherings and practices, as this is the era before the mass 
consumption of motor cars and private mobility. 1945 generation 
informants’ recollections indicate the rich presence of the past, 
and this effortless ability to recall a substantive past makes the 
local history group possible. As already highlighted, however, the 
descriptions of the ‘present as history’ among the ’45 generation 
seems fated to be narrated in terms of decline.
Hugh: When the pit and Co-Op shut, a’ the wee things, a’ 
the pictures shut. You go up Bowhill noo an it’s always like 
it’s half shut. You had movement e people all the time.
Nan: When you had the pictures, when the pictures came 
oot and you were drivin you had to go like a snail because 
they never walked on the pavement, they were on the road.
Other ‘wee things’ adding to the texture of village life included the 
display of wedding cakes during the week prior to the day of a 
wedding in the bakery window, and practices relating to death:
When a death occurred in the village, intimations were 
posted throughout on a black and white card approx. 9” by 
5” giving all information as to time and place of the funeral.
Until the late nineteen-seventies a notice board stood outside the 
entrance to Cardenden library and the Registry Office in Cardenden 
Road,76 and on this board and other sites such as telegraph poles 
around the village, locals were literally ‘kept posted’ of local 
births, deaths and marriages so that the reproduction of locality 
and locals in the pre-internet era was a daily spectacle. Hence, on 
the day of the burial of a local notable at this time such as the 
76 The building which housed the library and registry has since been demolished 
and the space today is taken up by a large private residence. 
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local GP Dr. Cranston or parish priest Fr. Smith,77 the centre of 
the village would come to a standstill as local police cordoned off 
the roads to traffic to allow the funeral procession of hundreds of 
locals to make its way to the cemetery. Throughout this period the 
spectacle of death and the practice of mourning was a public and 
local affair. Today, however, as a result of the local cemetery 
becoming full, the spectacle of death has increasingly become a 
private familial affair that takes place outwith the village five miles 
away in the crematorium in Kirkcaldy. Previously, then, “all 
funerals were to the cemetery – there was no crematorium in those 
days” (Local History Group, vol. 2, pp. 17-18) and the spectacle 
of death and locality coming together to practice solidarity with 
the bereaved was a constituent part of village life, which only 
required the short walk to the cemetery and attendance at a grave-
side ceremony in contrast to having to make a journey of some 
miles outside of the village.
Until the nineteen-eighties, then, death was a local and public 
affair and integral to learning what it meant to belong to a locality. 
While residents who have already purchased their burial plot will 
be buried in the village, the ongoing failure to make long-term 
provision for local burials is a scandal for many residents who 
complain bitterly at Fife Council’s failure at local planning; a 
failure that continually makes itself present each time a local is 
buried outwith the village and is not accorded the local burial they 
wanted for themselves. The intensely meaningful and intensely 
local spectacle of death, then, has been expropriated and relocated 
outwith the village, and the disappearance of this meaningful 
social practice from the life of the village was an ongoing source 
of resentment and complaints from history group members.
As mentioned, the group members exhibited an expertise in local 
knowledge and what may be described as an expertise in belonging 
to the village. When a particular story was about to be related to 
the group and a particular protagonist was unknown to any of the 
77 Both men were well-known and long-term residents within the village, in contrast 
to the doctors of today who live elsewhere and who normally have no non-work 
presence to the village, while the parish priest since 2009 is a Polish national. 
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members, for example, the anecdote was put on hold until he or she 
was normally identified via kinship or address, after which the story 
could proceed. This work of remembering and identifying individuals 
via recourse to a long gone time and space was itself a performance 
or enactment of knowledge, and the evidencing of the reach and 
reality of kin-based and locality-based knowledge that constituted 
the group dynamic and kept it going over the twelve years by the 
time I joined. Members’ reminiscing was person-oriented, event-
centred and overwhelmingly biographical and local, but certainly 
not parochial (in the pejorative sense), as the great motif of all of 
their lives and the subject to which they returned again and again 
was their working lives and the Second World War of 1939-1945, 
and as in the following testimony of Bien Bernard, how the two 
were combined in their lives:
See me, Ah started tae fire fae Ah wis five year old. Ah 
remember the very first word ‘strike.’ Ah wis soon tae learn 
what it wis a’ aboot because Ah hid an achin’ belly. Noo if 
ma belly wis achin’ fir the want e grub what like wis ma 
parents? Bit there’s the thing. Ah listened tae pit talk a’ ma 
life, at the fireside, Ah could smell the pit afore Ah went doon 
it...an’ a lived wi it, it wis in ma blood. Ah lived wi’ it. Ye ken 
Ah wis oot in the Mediterranean in 1942 on HMS Brocklesbury 
durin’ the war an’ Ah wis still spittin’ black, Ah wis still 
spittin’ black. We hid fower scabs in this village, an’ they’ll be 
scabs tae the day they die, an’ they’ll always be remembered 
as scabs, they’ll be scabs. An’ when ye come intae the village 
here one time up at the Jamphlers there at the gable end wi’ 
the eleven scabs, the 1926 strike, their names wis on there; 
they were there fae 1926; they were there fir thirty year.
While in the main their anecdotal and person-centred ‘memory 
work’ only briefly and infrequently reached the level of discussing 
the history of ideas, the question of the meaning of the past was 
invariably never far from their discourse about events which were 
pregnant with politics and history. This emphasis upon individual 
memoirs but from a shared era and shared locality, touches upon 
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Halbwach’s investigation of collective memory which in the view 
of Connerton (1989, p. 37) was the first to demonstrate that “the 
idea of an individual memory, absolutely separate from social 
memory, is an abstraction almost devoid of meaning.” The group, 
then, studied local history in the manner it established communitas 
among themselves i.e. upon the basis of shared memories of 
locality as opposed to cultivating a shared interest in studying 
history per se, so that integral to the group’s practice was recalling 
the details of people, places and incidents from their past, whether 
funny, sad, tragic, remarkable or quotidian.
Members’ identification with the experience of locality as indus-
trial occupational community was not an insular affair as Cardenden 
like many towns and villages throughout central west Fife and 
central Scotland were creatures of ‘primitive industrialisation.’ 
From Ireland and the West of Scotland and the Lothians, many 
miners and their families settled in the late nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth century within the Fife coalfields. This industrial era 
also had its accompanying culture or ‘sacred canopy’ that struc-
tured members’ discourse on post-industrialisation which identified 
the high watermark of locality with the industrial coalmining era, 
in particular 1895–1965, and listening to the experiences inform-
ants remembered was to form the impression that they belonged to 
a time so imbued with community that it produced near-identical 
interests due to the highly homogenous reality of the single- 
occupational community, and a level of community which, when 
remembered within the group up to seventy years later for some 
members, reproduced again this experience of communitas despite 
the fact that the objective conditions that made this communitas 
possible no longer existed in the post-industrial era.
Reflecting upon this ability of the group to make communitas 
exist twice and reconstitute this ‘thick togetherness,’ I often said 
to the group that I doubted whether locals from my generation 
in fifty years time would have enough material and memories in 
common to be able to come together and reminisce for twelve 
years about the Cardenden of the 1980s and 1990s, as I was often 
moved by members’ ability to make an unknown past come 
suddenly alive and present to me as I sat listening among them. 
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Today it is difficult to appreciate the Cardenden of a population 
of over ten thousand residents, and its dozens of clubs and 
societies and branches of national and international associations 
which characterised village life at a time when “You had 
movement of people all the time’’ (Hugh). When Buchan (1994, p. 
11) recalls Dr. Rorie resigning from the twenty-two positions he 
held on various local committees upon leaving Cardenden in 
1905, we catch a glimpse of a ‘thick’ local civic culture, and the 
density of the experience of locality that was a matter of opening 
one’s eyes to see the spectacle that was physically there to be seen 
and which is impossible to reproduce today.
As a result of being accepted into the group, however, something 
else that became clear to me was that the group members were part 
of a generation that was living through a series of ‘endings:’ the end 
of locality as occupational community, the end of the industrial era, 
the political end of Britain among the Scottish working class, and 
the ending of a level of cultural cohesiveness characteristic of a pre-
affluent era and a pre-privatised working class that had not yet 
undergone embourgeoisement (Zweig 1961). This older generation 
was witnessing the ‘privatisation’ or pluralisation of a once-shared 
symbolic order, and insofar as the group’s recollections focussed 
upon the era prior to the arrival of affluence to the working classes 
from the nineteen-seventies, their ability to educate me about my 
own past was something I found new and intriguing, to the extent 
of making me reluctant to break with the spell they cast over me. 
Such a break, however resisted, was inevitable as the members 
emphatically and unself-consciously revealed to me their alienation 
from the present-day in general and the historic event of the 
restoration of the Scottish parliament in particular.
4.2 The Political Consciousness of the 1945 Generation
Ah’ll no be voting.
Hugh Young (77)
Retired Miner
19th April 1999
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At the second meeting I attended (3 February 1999) the tutor 
Roisin began by reading a paper entitled A Brief History of St 
Andrews which she had downloaded from the internet and 78 
which culminated in the destruction of the great twelfth-century 
cathedral of St. Andrews, and the advent of the sixteenth-century 
Protestant revolt in the ecclesial centre of Scotland.79 As the tutor 
narrated what for myself was a familiar tale, I waited with my 
notebook and pen ready to record locals’ views on this epochal 
event in Scottish history, confident that an explicit engagement 
with the long durée of Scottish history, and an engagement with 
fundamental questions of identity and belief and ‘being in history’ 
were about to fall into my lap. As I waited for Roisin to finish 
reading I looked around: a long-established group of friends 
ensconced in their regular comfortable chairs in pleasant and 
familiar surroundings, and a young and enthusiastic history tutor 
narrating their national history, and it occurred to me that even at 
this early stage of fieldwork my research might hinge upon the 
discussion to follow, some ten weeks before the first elections to 
the new Scots parliament in May 1999, and how fortunate I was; 
that of all the possible research topics and of all the possible 
ethnographic sites available to me, I had chosen the right topic 
and at the right time, and felt that the data I was about to gather 
would share in the significance of the moment. After Roisin 
finished reading I recorded the following exchange:
Wull: What’s a Culdee church?
Roisin: Ma friend Sharon’s a pagan. She’s gonnae get 
married in a field. She says that’s the true Scottish religion.
78 The material used in the group was normally downloaded from the internet 
by Roisin at home and photocopied for the group. Roisin advised this practice 
was due to the WEA wanting to avoid any possible legal problems regarding 
photocopying copyrighted material. 
79 In the summer of 1999 I listened to an interview with Richard Demarco on 
Radio Scotland, which included details of his initiative to restore St. Andrews 
cathedral to its former glory as a “new national symbol for the new Scotland.’’
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Jim: Ma brither wis an atheist. And what aboot a’ these 
nations that worship totem poles?
Hugh: Where does Roman Catholicism come fae? Does it 
come fae the Romans?
Wull: God only knows.
Moira: Ah dinnae ken.
From the above exchange it is clear that no revealing discussion 
occurred, and no engagement with the meaning of Scottish history 
fell into my lap. Indeed, far from gathering data reflecting a 
generation’s historical consciousness, what I learned was that this 
exchange was typical of the history group meetings as a whole, 
and firmly put onto my horizon the task of trying to understand 
why a local history group failed to discuss both the history of their 
nation and the history they were living through.
If such were my initial attempts at conducting an ethnography 
of ‘working-class nationalism,’ my first reaction was that I had 
made a blunder to have imagined such a thing as working-class 
nationalism existed, and so the meeting was a salutary lesson as it 
was clear that I had imagined my informants as I wanted them to 
be and not as they were. Insofar as it seemed clear that there was 
no political dialectic left in this generation, my intention was to 
make my excuses and leave the group as it was hardly an appropriate 
space for research on working-class nationalism. In the event, 
however, I continued attending the group as a valuable source of 
background material so that, having tempered my great expectations, 
I wasn’t surprised when at the meeting immediately after the first 
elections to the new Holyrood parliament on 5 May 1999, the only 
comment on this reversal of two hundred and ninety-two years of 
Scottish history was: “Ye can argue aboot politics till yer blue in the 
face and ye’ll never get anywhere” (Jim Russell). 
This ‘comical’ show of indifference to the new parliament, 
which was greeted with a show of approval from members, was 
consubstantial with other indifferences, bordering on hostility, 
such as that shown to the new millennium of 2000, and so I began 
to suspect there was a ressentiment against history insofar as each 
historic event seemed to open a window upon informants’ 
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indifference-come-hostility. Hence, regarding a recent spate of job 
losses in Fife in the spring of 1999 which was widely reported in 
the media, there occurred the following rare exchange that 
touched on the new Scots parliament:
Annie: Ye jist wonder how many joabs’ll be left once it 
[the parliament] gets gaun.
Jim: Ah’ll tell ye, a hunder an twenty nine joabs.80 That’s 
how much. See when they get somethin, what dae they dae? 
They go and build a big posh buildin. An look at the money 
bein spent on a temporary building. A temporary building! 
That’s sick.
Moira: Ah jist switch aff when it comes tae politics.
Annie: Me an a’.
Jim: Bit we cannae solve our problems wi the parliament 
we’ve got the noo! Where’s a’ this money gonnae come fae?
Me: Where do you think it has come from, this new 
parliament and nationalism?
Jim: What started it all was that film Braveheart.81 And 
what did that prove? That Scotsmen couldnae agree wi 
theirsels! This Scottish parliament is jist anither talkin shop. 
What else can it be?
Nan: Ah dinnae hink there’ll be many SNP aboot here. 
Ah’ve ayeways voted Liberal.
Hugh: Ah’ve voted Labour a’ ma life. A monkey could stand 
an Ah’d vote for it.82
The above comments were very much representative of the 
discourse I heard and recorded during two years of meetings and 
80 The number of members elected to the Holyrood parliament. 
81 A film directed by and starring Mel Gibson about the Scottish Wars of 
Independence and the historical figure of William Wallace (1270-1305) which 
premiered in Stirling in 1995, and which has since passed into the popular 
national consciousness in Scotland. 
82 By this phrase Hugh means that such is his devotion to voting Labour that 
even if the Labour candidate in an election was a monkey he would vote for the 
monkey, rather than vote for another candidate from another party.
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while I quickly learned to expect it, I was still capable of being 
surprised by their level of estrangement from the times they were 
living through, or their level of being ‘out of history’ (Craig 1996). 
At the history group meeting on 19 April 1999 that was just a few 
days before the first election to the new parliament, for example, 
I informed the group that as part of my research I intended to 
conduct door-to-door interviews to ask people what they thought 
of the new parliament. At this, Roisin (whose husband was a 
policeman) hurriedly advised me: “If ye dinnae hae permission 
and folk complained ye could get done fir breach e the peace!” 
and in the exchange of views that followed Hugh emphatically 
announced: “Ah’ll no be voting!” with Annie advising she too 
would not be voting in the election to the new parliament. In light 
of the hostility of the group towards the new constitutional 
settlement and what seemed like their boycott of Scottish history, 
and the fact that they were always prepared to make clear and 
unequivocal statements to this effect, an obvious question was 
what this said about their twelve-year study of local history.
The group members were born in the 1920s and 1930s and 
belonged to a generation that experienced the historic high-water 
mark of the domination of politics by class interests, and the 
experience of locality as occupational community. All members 
exhibited a default unionist nostalgia for the status quo ante, and 
throughout the two years I attended, I garnered not a single 
instance of even pro-‘home-rule’ sentiment, far less nationalism. 
If the content of members’ discourse on constitutional matters 
was largely settled, something else that was settled was their 
manner of expression, along with the relevance of Bernstein’s 
(1971) description of language codes, and how the working class’s 
relationship to language as ‘restricted’ as opposed to ‘open.’ Many 
of the exchanges I noted were forms of rhetoric that emerged from 
a very specific habitus that was operationalised ‘without thinking;’ 
as if such was their settled habit of self-expression that it seemed 
their use of language had fallen into cliché and was no longer 
capable of being open to new realities, so that what was sayable 
was only that which was firmly held and had been arrived at long 
ago, so that any expression of any opinion was rhetoric and liable 
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to an exaggerated degree of decisiveness. Certainly the verbal 
exchanges showed a predilection for one-liners, and a linguistic 
habitus or relation to language that did not encourage long pauses 
or long sentences but what may be described as a defining ‘in and 
out’ use of language, where talking is not practiced in order to 
explore something even in a group devoted to talking for twelve 
years, but is more akin to a ‘smash and grab’ functionalism. While 
members were free to talk about any subject they chose and for as 
long as they pleased, there was a characteristic hurriedness to the 
contributions and a hurriedness to contribute one’s piece when the 
opportunity presented itself and before the group’s attention 
moved on; almost as if their use of language betrayed an insecure 
relationship to the realm of meaning, with this latter being none 
of their business, so that there was no question of a leisurely, 
unhurried use of language and time to explore and engage in 
an intersubjective process which could allow the significance of 
unprecedented historic and political events and new opinions 
to emerge.
In the brief exchange quoted previously concerning the new 
parliament, for example, we see that both what informants have 
to say and the manner in which they say it are settled matters of 
habit; that their expression of hostility is sure of itself and ready-
to-hand, and what it is sure of is that the return of Scottish history 
is unwelcome and easily dismissed but for the expensiveness 
of it all. These ’45 generation members, then, are not in the 
business of imagining a break from the constitutional status quo 
and so are alienated from the movement of contemporary Scottish 
history and indeed resent the return of Scottish history, so that 
a hermeneutic of resentment is developed to ‘read’ events within 
and outwith Scotland.
The first election campaign for the new Holyrood parliament 
coincided with the NATO bombardment of the former Yugoslavia 
and the Kosovo crisis, and the daily reporting of alleged ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ that was being practiced by the Yugoslavian armed 
forces and provoked among group members their view that ethnic 
conflict is inevitable because people are what they are and their 
defining ‘whatness,’ whether conceived in terms of ethnicity, 
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religion or nationality, cannot be changed and is real enough to 
have inspired Jim to ask “How do you change human nature?” 
after a discussion that came after the following exchange:
Jim:83 The British flag as such is steeped in blood.84 In 
Palestine they shot Arabs left right and centre. The Middle 
East has been fighting since the Bible days. Ah think it’ll get 
worse here in this country. All these ethnic folk comin in an 
eventually they’ll take over. There’ll be war between them an 
the whites. In aboot twenty five years we’ll be the foreigners.
Annie: We’re the foreigners already. Look at a’ the hooses in 
Cardenden an Bowhill, they’re a’ owned by other folk.
Nan: What are we needin tae split this country fir?
If I am correct in presuming that Nan, as a self-confessed lifelong 
Liberal voter, was referring to the splitting of Scotland and 
England as a result of the creation of the Scottish parliament, it is 
interesting insofar as it reveals how the advent of the Scottish 
parliament was viewed as adventitious, as if it had emerged ‘from 
nowhere’ for Scots with a British national identity or for those 
whose Scottish identity played no part in their politics. While the 
new Scottish parliament had clearly emerged to deal with a long-
standing sense of a democratic deficit since at least 1979, I do not 
believe Nan was engaged in bad-faith but rather her one-nation 
British unionism was sufficiently structuring her perception to 
‘disappear’ from her view the political difference between Scotland 
and England. More generally, I argue that this sense of Britishness 
is integrated with the 1945 generation’s experience of the 
high-point of locality as community, is highly integrated with an 
enduring and defining connection with the idea and the practice 
of a convincing Britishness thanks to the Second World War. 
83 Jim had served in the British armed forces during the Second World War and 
it was common knowledge among the group members that he never talked of his 
war-time experiences.
84 During fieldwork I heard the Union Jack flag referred to as the Butcher’s Apron 
by nationalists among the younger ’79 generation. 
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In addition to this high-point of Britishness is the creation of 
the Welfare State which remains the high-point of British politics 
for the ’45 generation, and which is deeply defining of their self-
understanding and deeply consequential for their constitutional 
politics. Hence, because there is a doxic organisation of their 
consciousness upon a British basis, even eighteen years of 
Conservative Party minority rule in Scotland between 1979 and 
1997 is not enough to alter their views or dissuade Hugh from 
voting for a “Labour monkey.” My ’45 generation informants, 
then, made a show of freely presenting themselves as impermeable 
to the constitutional arguments that have dominated Scottish 
politics for a generation, and their indifference-come-hostility 
towards the nationalist triumph of 1999 was by no means 
restricted to local history group informants as a number of elderly 
locals, especially women, were angry and upset at the restoration 
of the Scottish parliament, and were clear that the return of 
Scottish nationalism represented the defeat of their deeply held 
‘unionist’ views and sense of British identity. Indeed, such was 
their antipathy that a number of would-be informants could not 
bring themselves to talk to me about the creation of the parliament 
and preferred to slam their door shut after I informed them on 
their doorstep of my research interest.
During the first weeks of interviewing such sentiments were not 
uncommon and, just as with my initial encounter with the local 
history group, they left me at a loss as to how to make sense of 
this data. What became clear was that I needed to move beyond 
my preoccupation with politics and history and realise that my 
informants’ sense of having nothing to say or contribute about 
unfolding historical and political events was something which 
merited inquiry in its own right. As I reconciled myself to the loss 
of my imaginary construct of ‘working-class nationalism,’ I 
started to take note of the choicest expressions of indifference or 
hostility to events such as the State opening of the first session of 
the Scottish parliament which took place on 1 July 1999, and 
began to search for ethnographic value in encounters which 
occurred when beginning interviewing locals such as seventy-plus 
year old retired coalminer Bert Lister (Woodend Park, 11 July 
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1999,) who after I had introduced myself and my research project 
of locals’ thoughts on the establishment of the Scottish parliament, 
and ten days after “the most important political event in three 
hundred years,”85 and who while eloquent on “that f***in 
bastard Winston Churchill’’ and his decision in 1921 to “send in 
the tanks against the Scottish miners,” told me that as far as the 
new Scottish parliament was concerned: “Naw, Ah’m past a’ that. 
Ah’m past a’ that.”
Many would-be informants, then, clearly had no sense of the 
new parliament being ‘theirs’ or the result of semantic or political 
struggle on their part, and they were not about to represent 
themselves as having harboured a desire for Home Rule all along 
now that it had arrived, and the question they firmly put on my 
agenda was how was it that the Scots had just created a parliament 
thanks to thirty years of constitutional agitation and yet my 
informants were more or less hostile to the whole affair?
As already stated, the continued existence of a British identity 
among older residents has freed them from any need to engage 
with the constitutional politics that has gradually emerged among 
the central belt working class since the famous nationalist victory 
in Hamilton in 1967.86 Informants’ hostility-come-indifference to 
contemporary developments and events was not wilful, but had 
‘real presence’ and depth because it emerges from early and 
primary identity-formation that has lang syne become doxic 
or unexamined so that, while sourced in a set of political and 
material and cultural circumstances that have largely disappeared, 
has been taken up by freedom and become autonomous as 
a ‘politics of identity’ from its conditions of emergence. 
I also propose that the absence of the politicisation of their 
‘inert’ Scottish identity is isomorphic with their limited politicisa-
tion of class. My elderly informants’ political identity then is 
based upon the two co-ordinates of nation and class i.e. being 
85 Scottish Television’s political pundit Bernard Ponsonby advertising the 
television programme Vote 99: Scotland Decides, aired 22 April 1999. 
86 The Hamilton by-election of 2 November 1967 when the SNP’s Winnie Ewing 
won with 46.1 % of the vote. 
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British and being working class, an integralism which, while in the 
aftermath of World War two was responsible for new and lauda-
ble achievements such as the Welfare State, today results in a 
political inertia and a certain alienation from the ‘present as his-
tory.’ Because the ’45 generation had such a strong experience of 
locality and class cohesion and an enduring sense of belonging 
and communitas through their British identity, they neither 
then nor now feel any need to politicise their Scottish identity 
as they still identify with a period when belonging to locality as 
occupational community and the imagined community of the 
nation was unproblematic, colonial and even imperial and trium-
phalist.87 Something of the ‘density’ of being British is indicated in 
one elderly informant’s remembering (Local History Group vol. 4, 
p. 25):
There were many traditional customs in the local community 
which have disappeared completely and others which are 
rarely seen nowadays. One that comes to mind from my 
youth was the flying of a flag, usually the Union Jack, on a 
house chimney which was to signify that there was a young 
man in the house about to be married. The flag was usually 
erected by one of his workmates and the custom was to 
reward the person who had scaled the rooftops, secretly and 
generally at night, with a bottle of whisky.
Among my elderly informants class is permitted to be politicised 
to the ‘reasonable’ extent of adherence to the Labour Party, 
and their Scottish national identity is permitted to be politicised to 
the ‘reasonable’ extent of decrying ‘Thatcher’ and ‘England’ on 
occasion, but the further politicisation of these identities as in 
87 I remember my paternal Uncle John (1932-2008) posing to us children the 
trick question: “If ye wernae British and ye could pick any nationality in the 
world, which wane would ye be?” In this scenario the not-so-clever child’s 
imagination roams over the world trying to decide which country is second-best 
after Britain, while the clever child is the one who realises the terms of the 
question mean he or she is not British, and so is free to answer “British.” 
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the socialist demand for a redistribution of wealth or the further 
politicisation of Scottish national identity as in the call for the 
exercise of national sovereignty via independence is judged 
beyond what is practical or prudent. I also suggest that attempting 
to uncover why my informants felt it presumptuous to politicise 
class and (Scottish) national identity is isomorphic with their 
refusal to politicise history and their reluctance to freely engage 
with Scottish history because the free discussion of the long durée 
and historic geo-political relations between classes and nations 
would require a break with or a loosening or subversion of the 
doxic organisation of their consciousness, and a real engagement 
with the new events and the new developments they are living 
through. 
Socialised in the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ era and born into the 
British Empire, their inability to break with their internalisation of 
what might be termed their ‘scarcity British subject imagination’ 
is the heart of the matter,88 and in this regard an analogy may be 
drawn between British unionism and the liberal imagination 
insofar as, just as the liberal accords no place for religion in public 
life, so the national question for these working-class unionists is 
something to be privatised and play a very limited and inoffensive 
role in political and public life.
If human being is deeply historicised and socialised so that it is 
simultaneously in-history, in-society and in-nature, the expression 
and recognition of this integral contextualisation of human being 
or dasein is kept under control insofar as ‘being Scottish’ is policed 
among those who must ‘budget’ their human being, who must 
exercise a ‘psychological prudence’ so as not to indulge in 
‘luxurious’ or deluxe models of integralism that are imagined to 
be outwith their material and symbolic means. What working-
class unionism also evidences then is the controlling of reason, 
thinking and speaking and politics via processes of socialisation 
among this generation as they stand guard against ‘expensive’ 
self-understandings as much as expensive buildings (Hugh), and 
88 “What happens if they faa oan their arse? Dae ye beg tae go back?’’ Mr. Davie 
(New Carden Farm, South Cottage) on the prospect of independence.
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so such a socialised consciousness must keep within a dominated 
estimation of reason and human being.
We may say then that even prior to affluence and Zweig’s 
(1961) embourgeoisement thesis, the working class were already 
bourgeois insofar as they had internalised and practiced the 
privatisation of their dasein or ‘being Scottish’ as per the quietist 
Scottish middle classes. We may also say that Scotland until 1999 
remained ruled by unionist elites who managed every institution 
in the land and dominated every official or mainstream imagining 
of Scotland, and both the middle and working classes were 
thoroughly offended by the idea of practicing Scottish sovereignty 
and founding the project of modernity upon a purely Scottish 
basis. This ‘privatisation’ of Scottish identity and embarrassment-
come-hostility towards the return of Scotland from its repressed 
existence may be viewed as the signature ‘success’ of the liberal 
peace which is likewise embarrassed-come-hostile towards any 
moves to a Scottish integralism or holism in politics, education, 
public life or within dasein itself because, fundamentally, the 
liberal imagination and its middle- and working-class bearers are 
embarrassed-come-hostile to thinking human being outwith the 
discipline required to retain either their social hegemony or social 
subordination, and so remain incapable of ‘painting’ Scottish 
dasein with a full palette of colours even in conditions of affluence. 
In the next section I will argue a previous eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment narration of ‘being modern’ which justified stripping 
the altars of human being to the bare minimum of being functional 
to the reproduction of market society and the political submergence 
of ‘Scotland,’ has filtered down to the non-elites and made every 
other Scot more or less ignorant of their history and illiterate 
and uninterested in the question of their own sovereignty and 
self-understanding and self-interest; and that a new and older 
understanding of ‘being modern’ is at hand, and which is reversing 
this unionist modernity and thereby resurrecting the project of a 
Scottish modernity upon the basis of a new Scottish sovereignty.
However, returning from the abstract realm of ideas, is it fair to 
describe elderly informants’ views as evidence of, for example, 
domination? In this regard I concede without equivocation that an 
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equally reasonable interpretation of my elderly informants is that 
their views reflect a perfectly acceptable desire to retain their British 
identity. However, I also argue that in the practice of interpretation, 
context is king or is sovereign. Interpretation is not a contemplative 
or philosophical affair but a contextual social practice that must 
take its cue from objective structures and events so that interpreta-
tion in the realm of politics is a ‘contact sport.’ My interpretation 
of a dominated unionist psyche makes no pretence at being 
objective in any philosophical sense. Rather, my interpretation is 
immersed in the same context it wishes to interpret and must be 
judged according to that context. I make no claim that a British 
identity is unreasonable or that a non-nationalist point of view is 
unreasonable per se (whatever that might be) but because interpre-
tation is not a spectator sport I make the claim that such views at 
this point in time and in this place collude in the reproduction of 
the constitutional status quo and, in the context of the long event 
of 1979-1997 and 2010-2015, is ‘guilty’ of interpretive quietism 
and subordination. My position is this is evidence of working-class 
consciousness being interpolated by the liberal imagination which 
wishes to privatise class just as it wishes to privatises the national 
question, just as it wishes to privatise the question of sovereignty 
and religion and the meaning of history, until we arrive at Schmitt’s 
(2005) position and conclude that it wishes to remove the question 
of human being from politics and public life.
Such is what I believe is a fully-contextualised interpretation. In 
direct contrast, however, if one were to consider a decontextualized 
interpretation done in accordance with ‘pure reason,’ one could 
plausibly argue, for example, that far from being dominated my 
informants are so confident and their sense of and possession of 
their Scottish national identity is so secure that they feel little need 
to constitute their politics by this identity, so that the notion that 
one’s ‘authenticity’ as a people and nation is at stake insofar as one 
refuses to politicise this national identity is quite non-sensical, wilful 
and far-fetched.
Faced with such dialectically opposed interpretations of the 
same data, my view is that as soon as one steps into the real 
historical context of Scotland today, all purely contemplative or 
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leisurely interpretations fail because the historicity of human being 
or ‘being in history’ is not a private reality to be contemplated 
or cultivated at one’s leisure as one sees fit because the periods 
1979-1997 and 2010-2015, for example, do not allow for a 
contemplative or leisurely relation to Scottish national identity, 
because the period 1979-1997 and 18 september 2014 sees the 
Scots being more or less coerced by the force of events to chose, 
for once and for all, whether Scotland or Britain is to be the 
organising basis for their lives. The resurrection of this constitutional 
decision as to who is sovereign in this land is today unavoidable, 
and has been more or less forced upon many ‘unionist’ Scots who 
would much rather that such fundamental questions be privatised 
again as soon as possible, and indicates the Scots’ context of ‘being 
in history’ and at the mercy of relations, so that the Scots did not 
take up nationalism as the conclusion of a timeless theoretical 
debate but from a context of geo-political weakness that was 
revealed in the periods 1979-1997 and 2010-2015.
With no need to peer into anyone’s soul and pronounce upon 
their authenticity, then, non-nationalist opinions because of the 
extrinsic historical context evidence a double domination: (1) the 
acceptance of Scottish political subordination to England and (2) a 
dominated consciousness insofar as a dominated relation to the de 
facto acceptance of geo-political subordination denies to itself a 
clear grasp of the extrinsic contextual truth about itself. If from 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) we learn that society exists twice 
i.e. objectively ‘out there’ and intersubjectively within consciousness, 
then my ‘unionist’ informants’ domination exists twice i.e. geo-
politically and insofar as the straightforward recognition of their 
accepting their national subordination is denied at the level of 
consciousness. This double subordination which dominates elderly 
locals’ political horizon is not confined of course to a few members 
of a local history group, as from the field interviews in 1999 and 
again in 2014, it is clear there exists a generation whose members 
are antithetical to any meaningful engagement in the current 
political developments, so that the ethnographer of Cardenden 
1999 or 2014 would misrepresent the facts if he were to write “we 
are all nationalists now, to some degree or another” (McCrone 
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1998, p. ix). It seems more accurate rather to recognise it is in fact 
a profound consequence of ten generations of symbolic and material 
domination, and as something utterly predictable among the ’45 
generation working class so that the idea we are all nationalists now 
is unsociological insofar as it postulates an immaculate relation to 
history or a dasein free of history.
I do not think it reasonable to hold the view that unionism 
(Seawright and Curtice 1995) among the Scottish working class in 
1999 or 2014 is free of complicity in geo-political (national) and 
class subordination. Indeed, unionism appears today as the ‘cipher 
of choice’ among the dominated (elderly or young) and a form of 
contextual false consciousness. However, what I interpret as a 
dominated relation to ‘being in history’ is not confined to the 
political realm or the question of sovereignty as, while fieldwork 
offered opportunities to record how locals view the long durée, 
what emerged instead was the opportunity to record an antipathy 
towards unwelcome ‘events’ such as the new millennium, which 
served to highlight a population who do not ‘do meaning’ insofar 
as they opened a window onto hostility towards engaging with 
the meaning of history and ‘substantive events.’ For example, 
then, early on during fieldwork the following item appeared 
(November 27, 1998) in the Fife Free Press newspaper:
Ideas Wanted to Mark 2000 by Cardenden and Kinglassie 
Community Council. To request info. call community 
council secretary Mr. D. Taylor 7 Kinglassie Rd. Woodend.
Three months later at the history group meeting of 2nd March 1999, 
a letter from the Community Council which had been sent to every 
user-group of the Corrie Centre was read to the history group 
giving details of a meeting to be held on 16th March to solicit 
ideas about how the village would mark the beginning of the 
third (Christian) millennium. After the letter was read aloud to 
the members, the response was far from enthusiastic. “An excuse 
tae spend money!” was how one member responded, and which 
sparked further comments about ‘millennium hype’ that members 
deemed prevalent in the media, and likewise during another brief 
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exchange regarding the millennium at another meeting, one 
informant could opine without the least self-consciousness: “Well 
Ah hope there’s somethin bloody decent oan the telly.”89
While resistance to media manipulation is undoubtedly to be 
welcomed, what is also operative here is a context of communication 
where the ‘realm of meaning’ is a thoroughly ‘private’ and individual 
affair, with the result that any group or public context is felt to be 
an inappropriate space to divulge one’s ‘personal’ views, so that the 
ethnographer is in the dark as to the very existence of any such 
views. As with the non-discussion of historical events such as the 
Reformation in St. Andrews described earlier, the advent of the new 
millennium acted to reveal informants’ well-honed relationship to 
the realm of meaning and their indifference-come-hostility to the 
constitutional debate which was consubstantial with their alienation 
from any discussion as to whether members participated in any 
meta-narrative concerning history. I was struck by what appeared 
to me as their highly-determined lack of relation to the realm of 
meaning, so that the signification of History and events was fated 
to be left to the media or the idiosyncrasies of the individual and 
locals’ discourse as a rule was not tempted by events to reach 
‘escape velocity’ from quotidian discourse, with the result that it is 
not simply that internalised ‘rules of linguistic engagement’ prevented 
substantive discussion of the meaning of the millennium but an 
underlying tight control exercised over language, thought and 
imagination was always at work. 
The apparent failure of baptised Christians and church-goers to 
articulate a ‘freely available’ Christian interpretation of history 
raises the further question as to whether this inability to mobilise 
their Christian identity is consubstantial with their refusal or 
inability to mobilise their class and national (Scottish) identities. 
89 If there was a poverty of ‘millennium meaning’ there were also idiosyncratic 
assertions of meaning at the millennium Hogmanay, such as one sixty-seven-
year-old retired miner telling the assembled company: “Ah’m delighted tae see 
this day [1 January 2000] cause no male member of the race has ever reached 
sixty–seven year auld;” by which he meant he was the first male member of his 
family to reach sixty-seven years old.
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It seems that beyond or deeper than these ‘identities’ is an all-
powerful social determination or perhaps deeper cultural ethos 
that is at work which forbids their Christianity from structuring 
their use of language in public and their self-representations even 
among themselves; a strict or integral privatism or internalised 
liberal censor that does not ‘do meaning’ or does not ‘do history’ 
and does not ‘do God,’ so that to deploy their Christian identity in 
order to ‘read’ the millennium would be to break from their integral 
privatism that strictly polices the expression of their human being 
and all its identities, whether ‘being Christian’ or ‘being working 
class’ or ‘being Scottish’ or ‘being in history.’
If interpretation is a contact sport and context is everything, then 
the rush of events and the unforeseen context of 1 July 1999 (and 
even more so 18 September 2014) also mean unforeseen judgments, 
such that there is among the 1945 generation a fourfold domination 
insofar as the four identities or structurations of dasein of class, 
nation, religion and historicity are not freely mobilised at this point, 
so that future writers in an independent Scotland are more or less 
fated to judge the action or inaction of those living through the 
events of today as evidence of a fourfold subordination. In the event 
of independence after 2014, the generation that refuses to constitute 
itself upon the fourfold basis of religion, class, nation and history 
will be taken as evidence of an integral subordination where a 
free integralism was contextually or historically called for, and 
such a conclusion will form part of a more general argument 
that the working class collude in their subordination and are 
ashamed of being or practicing themselves beyond the limits set 
for them by privatism. As a corollary of this interpretation, it seems 
clear that a return of the repressed in a younger working-class 
(and middle-class) generation must coincide with the overthrow 
of privatism.
As with the structuring reality of poor sound insulation being 
the necessary condition for mediating and constituting the reality 
of antisocial neighbours, so the creation of the Scottish parliament 
and the 18 September 2014 referendum are conditions that reveal 
a normally unseen and unsuspected aspect of an older generation’s 
mental structuration by more or less forcing their privatism 
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to ‘show itself’ in public. Whether it is housing conditions charac-
terised by poor sound insulation, and the political union 
of Scotland and England or the creation of the Scottish parlia-
ment, each reality does not possess its meaning or adequate 
interpretation within itself or in a manner that is immune to its 
context. Because each is a fundamental structuring reality, each is 
able to disappear from social actors’ consciousness while setting 
the parameters for contests over the meaning and interpretation of 
events, to the extent that this basic background structuring role 
is not revealed until some exceptional circumstance occurs to 
highlight their presence. Because the creation of the Scottish 
parliament was a unique historic event, the local history group 
provided a unique ethnographic opportunity to elicit the depth of 
indifference-come-hostility towards Scottish history that had been 
reached by the ’45 generation and, to my mind, so accustomed 
had they become to the absence of Scottish history, and so accus-
tomed had they become to their own acceptance of this state 
of affairs, that not only were they taken by surprise by its 
re-emergence but resented the sudden advent of their immanent 
politico-cultural obsolescence.
Generally speaking, the constitutional debate in Scotland has 
been ongoing since the 1979 referendum so that expressions 
of ‘alienation’ from set-piece events such as the creation of the 
parliament in 1999 meant my informants’ long-invisible ‘condition 
of domination’ was turned into a spectacle to be seen, and revealed 
their long-undisturbed indifference-come-hostility to ‘being in his-
tory’ and how this structuring force has produced deeply domi-
nated consciousnesses that are unable to respond to events. Events, 
then, not only reveal domination or make domination show itself 
but cumulatively add to this domination, so that if the Thatcher/
Major period revealed the domination of the 1945 working-class 
generation thanks to their constitutional quiescence, by the time of 
‘events’ such as 1999 or 2014, what was once an understandable 
reluctance to respond to events by ‘unconstitutional’ means has 
become an invincible reluctance to respond at all. 
Events, then, but also the profound symbolic failure to either 
imagine a new unionism or a new engagement with ‘the present as 
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history’ to free themselves of their indifference-come-hostility to 
1 July 1999 or 18 September 2014 or to align themselves with a 
younger generation’s response to being ruled by England (Thatcher, 
Major and Cameron) via the politicisation of Scottish national 
identity, reveals the dominated condition of the older generation 
and allowed me to see how locals’ relationship to history and the 
nation is a cipher for their class and cultural condition.
Integral to the historicity of human being or ‘being in history’ is 
not being free to decide the terms of engagement or the criteria by 
which actions are judged; that not only is the condition of being 
dominated not an immaculate condition ‘in itself,’ but is at the 
mercy of events mediated and constituted by geo-political contexts 
and events that are not of one’s choosing or timing. Hence, when 
I argue in the coming sections for the emergence from domination 
among the ’79 generation, it will not be upon claiming a miracu-
lous ‘free’ relation to reality but rather a qualitative shift in the 
recognition of reality that allows a qualitative shift in response to 
that recognition in comparison to the more dominated relation 
to ‘being working class and Scottish’ that prevails in the ’45 
generation. If some members of the ’45 generation practice a 
‘thick’ hostility to unfolding political events, it is not because of 
a peculiar generational inability to participate in history but 
because participating in the ‘present as history’ is difficult for 
them as the meaning of the present is the defeat of an historic long 
durée which the ’45 generation identify with, and the ending of 
a symbolic ordering of space and time (Scotland and its history) 
which the next section identifies as responsible for how it is that 
an older generation have gone from participating in unthinking 
hegemony to being the unthinking ‘enemy’ within a Scotland on 
the cusp of independence.
4.3 Liberalism, Protestantism, Unionism & Modernism: 
the Four Horses of Hostility to History & Holism
When first announcing to the members of the afternoon group 
my research concerned politics and present-day Cardenden as 
opposed to the history of Cardenden, the afternoon group tutor 
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(Anne Mead), a 1945 history graduate from St Andrew’s University 
told me:
Oh we’re no interested in politics and religion! Two things. 
And that goes back to nineteen eighty-six. And we were all 
retired then. We didn’t talk about that as that was too much 
trouble and division.
I immediately interpreted these words of Anne as evidence of the 
long history of sectarian strife in Scotland since the Protestant 
revolt in 1560, and the long history of intra-Protestant strife and 
its ongoing toxic legacy of division among Christians which my 
elderly working-class informants were as familiar with as they 
were familiar with life itself, so that in their weekly meetings it 
may be said they reproduced miniature versions of the wider 
Scottish public sphere thanks to their avoidance of politics and 
religion. Clearly, however, this doxic fact of life which, while it 
responds to liberal sensibilities and embarrassment at ‘public’ 
discussion of what should be a strictly private affair so as to keep 
‘the liberal peace,’ is something of a problem for a history group 
insofar as politics and religion are integral to history.
As I became aware of informants’ studied avoidance of 
issues which seemed to cry out for attention, I began to realise 
that they were the hermeneutical heirs of the Rev. Houston in 
their practice of the study of history, and any talk of a ‘symbolic 
poverty’ among my Protestant pensioners was wide of the mark 
because, for all of their denials, they were in fact immersed in their 
own ‘politics of identity’ and politics of knowledge and recognition. 
The advent of ‘home rule,’ then, was a provocation that opened 
a window onto the “large cultural systems” (Anderson, in Bhabha 
1990, p. 1) which elderly informants had internalised and identify 
with; a Liberal-Protestant-British-Modernist doxic organisation of 
consciousness and identity which, if it once signalled belonging to 
an empire upon which the sun never set, is today seen as evidence 
of a condition of symbolic subordination that the nationalist 
project not only brings to an end but more or less declares to have 
been a long mistake and wrong turning point. 
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The fact was that their participation in a certain hegemonic 
consciousness was coming to an end, and they were unable to 
bring themselves to recognise the ‘present as defeat,’ and integral 
to their defeat was a defeated relationship to their defeat insofar 
as informants preferred to effortlessly produce signs of indifference 
or hostility to politics instead of bring themselves to a clear 
statement of themselves as that would be to objectify themselves 
and break from their long enjoyment of ‘being British,’ integral to 
which was never having to acknowledge that integral to this 
identity was the existence of rivals over whom they had militarily 
prevailed. As noted previously, the former soldier Jim had said: 
“The British flag as such is steeped in blood.”
Reflecting upon the fact that whenever the subject of politics or 
the constitution arose, there occurred a sudden lack of generosity 
and the evaporation of the normal bonhomie and good humour, 
it seems that to even recognise and admit the defeat of Britain was 
to admit to having long enjoyed success over rival nations, so that 
at the heart of the flight from historical reflexivity among elderly 
history group members was the following existential dilemma: 
insofar as they were reflexive, this felt akin to drinking from a 
poisoned chalice as it meant having to recognise the loss of the 
exercise of symbolic, constitutional, political and civil hegemony 
in Scotland i.e. they could not face up to their prior hegemony 
because that would have been to publicly admit among themselves 
that the defeat they were feeling was upon them was something 
they had made many other native populations feel. 
Members of the local history group, then, were unable to 
participate in the spirit of 1 July 1999 because they were unable to 
perceive the present as other than decline thanks to their deeply 
personal British and unionist assumptions which structure their 
perception and which are part and parcel of a fides implicita and a 
once successful integration of economy, locality and (British) 
nationality, so that insofar as this integralism becomes a thing of the 
past thanks to the successful rise of a younger and rival integralism 
in the shape of Scottish nationalism, the present can not be theirs.
Such were informants’ fears of conflict at the prospect of 
Scottish independence that even attempting substantive discussion 
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of independence proved futile, as not only history group members 
but many locals proved incapable of allowing it to emerge as a 
theme in itself without it being immediately surrounded by issues 
such as Irish nationalism, ongoing events in Kosovo, the evils of 
ethnic cleansing or ‘Protestant’ bigotry. 
Back in 1999, then, the question of independence remained 
trapped in historicity and social and cultural conditions and an 
apprehensive intentional horizon, and this is what explains the 
remarkable fact that within the cosy confines of a local history 
group, a group of pensioners who met regularly in a local centre 
named after a local miner-turned-author who wrote of the strug-
gle of their mothers and fathers during the Great Depression, and 
whose existence as a group is the result of a Workers Educational 
Association initiative, remain devout ‘liberals’ who practice an 
integral privatism and are convinced that politics and religion are 
taboo subjects beyond discussion. In order to explain this strange 
state of affairs the proposal of Anderson (in Bhabha 1990, p. 1) 
is suggestive:
What I am proposing is that Nationalism has to be under-
stood, by aligning it not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with large cultural systems that preceded it, 
out of which – as well as against which – it came into being.
If the advent of the modern era entails the two-part conundrum 
of (1) being modern and (2) remaining a ‘community’ (people or 
nation), the ideology which modernity has had to overcome in 
Scotland is any which, insofar as it put its shoulder to the task of 
imagining a ‘modern community,’ has imagined the public or civic 
order in which sovereignty lies outwith the nation and its people, 
and in which the constitutional question of the relation between 
nation and state has been successfully resolved in such a state of 
affairs, and in this regard the term ‘civil society’ has simultaneously 
been liberalism’s great achievement and a toxic fiction.
If the socialist answer of internationalism to the problem of 
‘being a people’ and ‘being modern’ came to an end with the Great 
War of 1914–18 and again with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
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and if the political Right’s answer to the conundrum of ‘being 
modern’ and ‘being community’ came to an end in Europe with 
fascism in the nineteen-forties, the Scottish nationalist imaginary 
has to succeed where liberalism, socialism and fascism have 
failed, so that the nationalist task of constructing a post-liberal 
modernity resolves itself into whether another modern form of 
human community can be built from the ruins of fascist Statism, 
socialist internationalism and bourgeois liberalism. In this regard, 
1945 generation members voiced concerns about opening the 
Pandora’s box of Scottish history, and this concern is a blood 
relative of the eighteenth-century liberal and unionist constitutional 
settlement which sought to prevent the return of a previous era’s 
geo-political organisation of politics and modernity upon the 
sovereign Scottish nation.
Neo-unionism’s concern to retain the liberal settlement into the 
twenty-first century seems regressive in light of the fact that, with 
the advent of relative affluence to working-class populations and 
the present already being described as post-secular (Habermas et al. 
2010) and Scotland’s ‘pre-modern future’ being characterised by 
Mulholland (2011, p. 206) as “neo-medieval self-reflexiveness,” the 
future of the past in a post-affluent stateless nation like Scotland 
is more or less fated to loom ever-larger because a sociological 
consequence of affluence is the rejection of the symbolic patrimony 
associated with the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ (Beck) as found in 
‘scarcity era’ liberalism (Oroussoff 1993) among social groups that 
have been suppressed by these imaginaries. Affluence fuels being-in-
history escaping the confines of the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ period 
of the modern era, and in this return of the repressed the first 
casualty will be the liberal settlement and the modernist myth about 
modernity as a great historical caesura, thanks to the advent of 
a more balanced and holistic view of human being and a more 
relaxed view of the tension of ‘being modern’ and a post-secular 
and post-liberal public sphere.
If there is to be a ‘return of the repressed’ in this new era of 
‘affluent modernity’ then, a re-evaluation of the Christian legacy 
(Zizek 2000) and Protestantism in particular will be integral as 
the latter has been the ‘large cultural system’ that has played 
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a crucial role in imagining Scotland in a non-sovereign manner, 
and which largely owed its success in Scotland to the prior success 
of Protestantism in England and England’s military might. Only 
such long durée perspectives explain comments by the Grand 
Secretary of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland (Jack Ramsay) 
who, when replying to the question what would happen if 
Scotland were to end its political union with England, said: “The 
Orange Order would become a paramilitary force…a spy behind 
enemy lines…It obviously implies a recourse to arms” (Sunday 
Herald, 8 July 2001).
If within the Scottish Protestant imagination the union with 
Protestant England has traditionally been seen as a political 
necessity to safeguard its position as the established Church, the 
fact that various Scottish Catholic prelates publicly favour 
independence and that since 2005 the Catholic Church has the 
largest number of practicing members than any other church in 
Scotland for the first time since the Reformation period (Brierley 
2011), it seems that Ramsay cannot be accused of ‘false consciousness’ 
as to what is at stake.
If the Catholic nationalist understanding of Scottish history 
is summed up by a writer such as Scott-Moncrieff (1956), the 
notion that the Protestant reformation of 1560 was more or less 
disastrous for Scotland’s modernity and sovereignty is a view 
shared by many historians such as Peter Hume Brown for whom: 
“1560-1603-1707- these three dates are connected by the strictest 
law of cause and effect. Without the Reformation the Union of the 
Crowns would have been impossible, the Union of the Parliaments 
unthinkable” (cited in MacColla 1967, p. 192). Similarly, in 
explaining why Scotland’s nobility voted for political union with 
England, historian Tom Devine (1999, p. 12) has described how 
the Scottish Protestant church’s initial opposition to union with 
England was ‘bought off’ by the Presbyterians being guaranteed a 
position of power in the new State that was about to be created:
Basic to their successful strategy was the elimination of  
the threat posed by the Kirk…By an Act of Security of the 
Church of Scotland of November 1706 the historic rights of 
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the church and the Presbyterian system of government were 
guaranteed as a basic condition of union. 
Of course, whether such historic actions are regarded as shameful 
and unprecedented acts of betrayal, or are to be lauded as great 
progressive strides is a matter of interpretation, but what can be 
agreed is that the dominated over time can be more or less coerced 
into accepting what previously was unacceptable, and the sin of 
‘high treason’ can be subsequently covered over by the powerful 
with the myth of progress so that, while the exiled James Stuart in 
his Declaration to the Scots Nation promised to restore Scotland’s 
independence and its parliament and end Scotland’s union with 
England (Devine 1999, p. 17), perhaps more powerful than the 
‘empirical’ military defeat of the Jacobite cause in eighteenth-
century Scotland was the symbolic victory in the realm of meaning, 
and the myth of the inevitability of the defeat of the Stuart cause at 
the hands of the Hanoverians in order to secure material progress. 
Insofar as this became the myth that socially made it (Lévi-Strauss), 
O’Ciardha (cited in Zimmermann 2003, pp. 5-6) has put the matter 
neatly: “Hindsight is the worst enemy of Jacobitism.”
If the weight of evidence is that Scottish Protestantism has 
always been more aligned with securing Britishness rather than 
imagining Scotland’s independence, this geo-political coherence was 
not mirrored by any doctrinal coherence as for generations the 
fundamental ecclesiology of the new dominant religion in Scotland 
was far from settled. “In the 130 years following 1560 the reformed 
Church of Scotland went through periods of Presbyterian and 
episcopal church government. Not until 1690 was the Kirk finally 
settled as Presbyterian” (Macdonald 2010, p. 89), and if we add 
that a return to ‘rule by bishops’ in the Church of Scotland and 
the threat of Anglican domination was only removed in 1706, when 
the English Crown guaranteed Presbyterian government for the 
Church of Scotland to secure the Church of Scotland’s acquiescence 
to political union with England in 1707 as per the quote from 
Devine, we see that from 1560-1843 (and even after that) the 
notion that the Protestant revolt of 1560 led to an empowered laity 
or a democratic way of ‘being church’ is another myth of progress 
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as Christianity in Scotland’s ‘national Kirk’ has been more or less 
dominated by ecclesial sectarianism and self-inflicted secularisation 
if we add Macleod’s (2010, pp. 25-6) observation:
The Act of Patronage of 1712 deprived the Church of her 
independence in the most crucial area of all, the election of 
her ministers, and invested in ‘heritors’ (usually landlords) 
the right to present ministers to vacant charges, regardless 
of the wishes of congregations. The results were disastrous 
and long-lasting…Control of the Church passed, as Hugh 
Miller bitingly remarked, to ‘Scotland’s acres.’ Patronage 
replaced episcopacy as the way to secularize the church, and 
as the years went by, the lairds took full advantage, giving 
preferment to men who would serve their own social and 
political interests.
The historical events referred to above allow the reader to make 
sense of many pages of Houston’s (1924) parish history discussed 
in Chapter 1, which are otherwise inexplicably devoted to narrating 
the details of heritors and their control or ‘period of guardianship’ 
over the local parish church. What we are inadvertently allowed 
to see is that the Church of Scotland at a parochial level has not 
been allowed to be an otherworldly call to transcendence situated 
in the midst of secular society, thanks to the corruption of Scottish 
Protestantism by secular powers, and in terms of imagining a 
sovereign Scotland, given the sudden and massive decline in Church 
of Scotland membership since the nineteen-sixties and nineteen-
seventies (Brown 2001), and the rise of Scottish nationalism from 
the same period, it seems Scottish nationalism has come into being 
against Scottish Protestantism which was foundational for giving 
the new fledgling British state the ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger 1967) it 
needed to cover the opportunism of its instigators.
If the great failure of medieval Catholicism was its attempt to 
subjugate the secular to the sacred as per various forms of Catholic 
integrism or supernaturalism/fideism, which the Franciscan reform 
set about over-coming via Scotus’s reconfiguring the Catholic 
imagination by his opening to the theonomic value of ‘secondary 
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natures,’ the sixteenth century project of the new Protestant 
religion also had to grapple with the conundrum of ‘being modern’ 
and ‘being Christian,’ and the role of secondary natures. However, 
from the outset of the Protestant revolution a template was laid 
down that allowed for a purely fictive solution to the tension of 
maintaining holism under modern conditions by creating a new 
imaginary in which the need to achieve a synthesis between the 
natural and secular with the supernatural (once the original policy 
of liquidating corrupt ‘secondary natures’ as of no theonomic 
value was discarded) became over time a purely private affair, and 
where the task of aligning Church and State more or less 
disappeared. Subsequently, of course, when such ad hoc half-
measures were not deemed sufficiently modern and radical, simply 
liquidating the tension altogether between the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ 
as in Marxism and aggressive forms of rationalism and secularism, 
were added to the long line of historic failures to return to the task 
which twelfth-century Franciscans had begun (and which Francis 
I is attempting to re-align the Church with once again).
If Protestantism, then, bequeathed to secular liberalism an 
original ‘signature embarrassment’ at Catholic holism and 
Catholicism’s theologically-sanctioned embrace of the secular and 
the secular embrace of the sacred, if the current ‘present as history’ 
is to be post-liberal it must also be post-secular if it is to embrace 
holism because a twenty-first century return to an integral vision 
of dasein is more or less fated to take the earlier Catholic period, 
that not only embraced holism but invented it, as a historic 
reference point. A key component in this configuration of a new 
Scottish symbolic order, then, will be the view that affluence 
does not mean the symbolic order reaching ‘escape velocity’ 
from the ‘material base’ but rather the symbolic order being 
properly and integrally aligned with the material base, and seeing 
its impact upon ownmost dasein in a holistic way that is free of 
supernaturalistic Catholicism, tensionless Protestantism, liberalism 
and modernism. This is a ‘task of freedom’ that has been released 
by affluence among the working class (and the already affluent 
middle class) who are liberated by literacy and free to reproduce 
their symbolic subordination or secede from each of these 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
326
symbolic-system ‘errors.’ A new generation is more or less fated to 
erect a superstructure of its own and instantiate its ownmost 
relation to the still ‘determining’ material base.
In this regard, the advent of affluence from the 1970s and the 
post-industrialisation of the 1980s are the sociological keys that 
have ‘disorganised’ or unlocked Pandora’s box. The return of the 
repressed and the de-privatisation of culture and the meaning of 
the long durée that is being discussed in the public realm thanks 
to Scottish nationalism and the 2014 Referendum, has broken the 
‘sacred canopy’ of Britain, Protestantism and modernism; has 
broken the ideological backbone used to imagine the political 
construct of the UK among younger and older generations. 
If the success of the Protestant revolution in both Scotland and 
England is the obvious basis for the historic and ongoing alignment 
of Protestantism and political unionism in both countries, and is 
a psychological and cultural continuum dating from the eighteenth 
century (Greenfeld 1992), a founding ‘Protestant integralism’ 
which integrated the local parish with the wider national self-
understanding and culminated in the founding of the new state 
of Britain, then it is the lack of religious or cultural secularisation 
among the history group members that makes them impermeable 
to the ‘spell’ of nationalism, and it is because local history group 
informants remain immersed in these traditional long durée 
symbolic structures that have been able to resist the shift to the 
reclaiming of Scottish sovereignty movement and the depoliticisation 
of their Protestant identity insofar as they have also resisted the 
de-protestantisation of Scotland since the 1960s (Brown 2001).
If the current state of the symbolic order is ‘disorganised’ it is 
also an unprecedented opportunity. If a new Scottish state requires 
a new symbolic order or imaginary, what should that new order 
or constitution be? If previous alignments between the religious 
and the constitutional such as that of the integral Protestant 
Ramsay are more or less obsolete, what new alignments between 
the sovereign nation-state and the Christian legacy are possible 
today? What ‘narrative of redemption’ or ‘sacred canopy’ can be 
wrested at this time from Scotland’s history? In an a priori sense 
we can say that what is required is a synthesis that is fully modern 
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yet resists the temptation to abandon an ancient worldview and 
more or less fall into nihilism. While these are some of the divisive 
and contentious questions that will be addressed in any future 
written Scottish constitution, present-day concerns about conflict 
between religious organisations in an independent Scotland were 
expressed by informants, and are a window upon “a limited area 
of transparency on the otherwise opaque surface of regular 
uneventful social life (Turner 1957, p. 93).
As already highlighted, when the word ‘religion’ is uttered in 
Cardenden its semantic context means it is often a euphemism for 
the long durée struggle between Catholicism and the various 
Protestant churches for control over Scotland and how it is to be 
imagined, and so remains a delicate subject ‘in mixed company’ 
that is routinely avoided as a topic of conversation to keep the 
liberal peace. Thanks to the unresolved past which weighs upon 
Scottish mitsein, there was little likelihood of any discussion among 
the local history group members of the Reformation in Cardenden 
despite volume 2 of the Auchterderran of Yesteryear series adverting 
to the destruction of the residence of the Catholic clergy in 
Auchterderran at this time, nor any discussion of local history as 
revealed in the Second Statistical Account by Rev. Andrew Murray, 
minister at Auchterderran referring to the Catholic Emancipation 
Act of 1829 which lifted a number of anti-Catholic laws in 1832:
About fifty years ago, we persecuted the papists and burnt 
their chapels; now our enmity has ceased, and Catholics are 
admitted and have a right to the privileges possessed by 
Presbyterian and Episcopalian fellow-subjects (cited in 
Houston 1924, p. 427).
However, in one-to-one conversations with locals there was the 
frank admission of this problem, and in a lengthy interview with 
a young non-Catholic married couple in Carden Castle Park 
(Mr and Mrs Paterson, 5th October 1999), both expressed fears 
of anti-Catholic bigotry in an independent Scotland: 
The boys that work aside me, if it wis total independence 
the way they talk they would start ethnic cleansin. It wid 
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start aff wi foreigners and wance they’d got rid e a’ thame 
it’d start. Ye’d have Scotland right doon the middle. Ye’d 
end up wi, dependin oan what religion took o’er, ye’d end 
up wi the ither wanes either getting forced up the way tae 
the Highlands or doon the way tae England.
When non-Catholic locals express fears about Protestant bigotry in 
the event of Scotland becoming independent, one has to conclude 
that the Catholic and Protestant violence in Northern Ireland that 
has been daily televised into Scottish homes since the late nineteen-
sixties with the Catholic Civil Rights movement’s contestation of 
sectarian practices in Northern Ireland, and the violent ‘return of 
history’ from 1969-1997 that occurred in Ireland in the form of 
the Provisional IRA after the Northern Ireland riots of 1969 until 
the IRA ceasefire in 1997, all of this has provoked fear and appre-
hension among many working-class Scots. Hence, I recall after 
discussing the work opportunities for construction workers in 
Ireland with two bricklayers in the No. 1 Goth, the conversation 
turned to Irish politics and one of the bricklayers remarked: “God 
made Catholics. The Armalite made them equal.”90 Similar con-
cerns over sectarianism were also voiced by Ian Rankin in a Sunday 
Times newspaper article (3 October 1999) where he characterised 
his upbringing in Cardenden as follows:
I was brought up surrounded by bigotry and segregation, 
yet barely noticed it, my own myopia compounded by the 
fact that the society I lived in seemed to accept the condition.
When conducting my door-to-door interviews in the aftermath 
of the establishment of the Scottish parliament, the presence of 
Ireland within the consciousness of some locals acted as a conduit 
for their fears for what might happen in Scotland:
Me: In the elections to the parliament did ye bother voting?
90 The Armalite was the firearm associated with the armed struggle of the IRA 
for a united Ireland. I have since traced this bricklayer’s expression to Gerry 
Adams’s Before The Dawn (1996) where it featured as a Catholic nationalist 
slogan in Belfast.
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Heather: Naw Ah didnae.
Me: You had problems with it in the first place?
Heather: Well aye cause Ah’ve never thought that it was 
such a guid idea tae divide a wee island like this. Well we’re 
bad enough o’er in Ireland bit tae start dividin us a’ up, 
where’s it a’ gonnae stop? 
Heather Stewart
Carden Castle Avenue
Me: Do you think the new Scottish parliament is a good 
idea or a bad idea?
Rachel: Ah think it’s a bad idea.
Me: Did ye bother voting in the elections fir the parliament?
Rachel: Aye Ah voted.
Me: D’ye mind if Ah ask how ye voted?
Rachel: Ah voted against it...Ma husband’s English, Ah’m 
Scottish, and Ah would almost say I’m sure that within 
aboot twenty-five years we’ll be another Northern Ireland.
Me: You think so?
Rachel: Yes.
Rachel Sims
Carden Castle Avenue
The above extracts from interviews reveal the conviction that 
there can be no ‘return of Scotland’ without a ‘return of the 
repressed,’ and that for many what has successfully been repressed 
until now are pre-liberal struggles between Christian denominations. 
Interviewing residents upon their doorsteps I found that, without 
fail, when any particular individual expressed this fear of a return 
of repressed antagonisms, it was expressed as if it was something 
uppermost in their thoughts, and it was never suggested to me 
by any informant that an independent Scotland would see the 
outbreak of a repressed ‘class war’ or an outbreak of anti-English 
sentiment. Always, informants’ imagining of violence was internal 
to Scotland and centred around the spectre of the politicisation of 
religion in the shape of the sectarianism of Northern Ireland. In 
this regard Gallagher (2013) has argued that the present moment 
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in Scotland is ripe for recognising the extent to which the weight 
of the past lies heavily upon social interaction within the liberal 
public sphere in Scotland, and that it would be to practice social 
analysis as Protestant pensioners practice local history not to 
advert to a fear of deep rivalries lying beneath the liberal surface. 
In this regard the question of anti-Catholicism was an ongoing 
debate in the media throughout fieldwork thanks to the Catholic 
composer James Macmillan’s speech to the Edinburgh Festival in 
2000 in which he castigated Protestantism’s effects upon Scottish 
culture91 and which resulted in the edited collection Scotland’s 
Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland (2000).92 
Also, in 2011 there occurred a number of high-profile incidents 
of anti-Catholic bigotry where the Catholic manager, players 
and high-profile supporters of Celtic football club, as well as a 
member of the Scottish parliament (Patricia Godman), were sent 
bullets and parcel bombs, so that in 2011 the Scottish parliament 
passed the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening 
Communications Bill which aimed to criminalise expressions 
of anti-Catholic sectarianism.
If anti-Catholic sectarianism remains part of life for some parts 
of Scotland, it is also true that recent historic events signal the fact 
that ‘large cultural systems’ are changing in a profound manner. 
The sight of former IRA members such as Sinn Fein’s Martin 
McGuiness, for example, becoming the Minister for Education 
in the new devolved government of Northern Ireland, was a 
spectacular victory of working-class nationalism in Ireland, and 
such peaceful developments were directly relevant to my own 
91 The castigation of Protestantism for its alleged disastrous effects upon the 
Scottish psyche, culture, politics and religion used to be something of a past-time 
among non-Catholic intellectuals and artists prior to the de-Protestantisation of 
Scotland since the 1960s. One thinks of figures such as Edwin Muir, Neil Gunn, 
Hugh McDiarmid, Sorley MacLean, George Mackay Brown and Fionn MacColla 
(1967, 1975). 
92 In February 2001 fears of Protestant bigotry among Catholic politicians were 
sufficient to force the cancellation of a visit by the Irish Taoiseach to a Catholic 
shrine in Carfin in Lanarkshire to commemorate the victims of the Irish Famine 
of 1845. 
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ethnographic context insofar as informants back in 1999 imagined 
Ireland might be a sign of things to come should Scotland become 
independent: “We’ll end up jist like Ireland” (Anne Penman, 
Muirtonhill) as one informant put it, so that at that point in time 
Northern Ireland clearly inhibited the development of nationalism 
in Scotland, despite the historic changes that were occurring.93
An ethnography of working-class nationalism in Scotland has a 
highly comparable context in Northern Ireland, where another 
working-class nationalism has emerged since the nineteen-sixties to 
contest the British state. While both Scottish and Welsh nationalists 
contest the idea and practice of Britain, it is in the armed struggle 
in Ireland where a working-class nationalist consciousness and 
armed practice has taken its most radical form. Much like Banquo’s 
ghost, the contestation of the British state from the standpoint 
of class, nationality, religion, culture and history as found in the 
struggle of Sinn Fein94 and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) until 
recent years haunted the imagining of Scottish nationalism, and 
it was no accident that the Labour Secretary of State for Scotland 
Tom Johnston (1941-45) chose to characterise the Scottish 
nationalism of his day as “a sort of Sinn Fein movement” (Lynch 
1992, p. 436) to persuade the prime minister of the day (Winston 
Churchill) to concede him special latitude when Secretary of 
State for Scotland. Interviewing locals on the cusp of the 2014 
Referendum, however, and after fifteen years of peace in Northern 
Ireland, news reports of bombings and violent clashes between 
Republicans and Loyalists have quickly faded from people’s minds.
In terms of the question of the relationship between Scottish 
Protestantism’s auld alliance with British national identity, it is 
clear that these once near-identical identities are in the process of 
93 During the doctoral period of my fieldwork there occurred the first meeting of 
the North-South Irish Council (13 December 1999), where the Irish cabinet met 
with the Northern Ireland Assembly members; the first meeting of the Irish–
British Council (16 December 1999), and the first public handshake between 
Sinn Fein representatives and the British Prime Minister (Tony Blair). 
94 A predominantly working-class political party, in contrast to the more moderate 
and middle-class nationalist Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP).
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being loosened from each other, and for some elements within 
Protestantism such as the Orange Order this is a betrayal of 
Scottish Protestantism’s legacy. However, if the relationship 
between religion and the State is fated to remain a divisive 
issue and if the Orange Order poisons parts of Scotland and 
aspects of Scottish culture, I argue that something of importance 
for Scottish dasein and the nationalist project is attempting 
to emerge and must be allowed to freely develop despite some 
toxic false-starts. Despite the fact that the rapid and ongoing 
de-Protestantisation of Scotland from the nineteen-sixties in 
particular is well-established (Brown 2001; Voas 2006; Brierley 
2011), so that anti-Catholic organisations such as the Orange 
Order appear fated to die out with the death of its ’45 generation 
members, something of ontological worth fuels anti-Catholic 
bigotry in Scotland i.e. the desire to remain integral and the 
resolve to resist the liberal settlement wherein “only citizens 
committed to religious beliefs are required to split up their 
identities, as it were, into their public and private elements” 
(Habermas, in Mendieta 2005, p. 332). 
The liberal establishment, then, wishes to institutionalise the 
modernist desire to rid the State’s constitution of the religious 
ghosts of the past and is seen in the comedian Billy Connolly’s 
anecdote about flying from Scotland to Belfast and the passengers 
upon arrival being advised to turn their watches back three 
hundred years so as to adjust to local time, a reference to the 
supposed ‘failure’ of the local population to privatise their religion 
and secularise their politics so as to keep to mainland British time. 
The joke, however, seems to be on Connolly and all those multi-
national states who keep modernist time as it is they who suffer 
‘false consciousness’ insofar as they believe the liberal settlement 
is a permanent solution, and not the makeshift ‘scarcity era’ fix 
that is more or less destined to come to an end in the era of 
affluent modernity.
I would argue that what must be resisted is the temptation 
to apply the usual liberal balm if a new understanding of ‘being 
modern’ is to emerge, because liberalism is a failed solution 
to how the Scots will resolve the tension of being modern. I also 
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propose that no matter how toxic, examples of Catholic or 
Protestant or secularist integralism afford the opportunity to 
break with modernist assumptions because they model the 
re-imagining of how the cultural/symbolic and the socio-economic 
order might yet relate to each other in an original synthesis 
in an independent Scotland. After 18 September 2014 it may 
well be that the present moment offers the opportunity to 
escape a ‘disciplinary liberalism’ and to renew both culture and 
consciousness: to unlearn Catholic supernaturalism and Protestant 
liberalism and modernism, and to re-learn how to be modern and 
have children that understand the names of their mountains 
(Macdonald 2009). 
4.4 1979 Generation Catholic Historical Reflexivity
Honorius, bishop, servant of the servants of God, to his dearest 
son in Christ Alexander, illustrious king of Scots, and his 
successors for ever. Considering the reverence and devotion 
towards the Roman church which we know you and your 
predecessors to have had from times long past, we most strictly 
forbid that it be permitted to anyone… to publish a sentence of 
interdict or excommunication in the kingdom of Scotland, 
because the Scottish church is subject to the apostolic see as a 
special daughter, with no intermediary. 
Bull of Pope Honorious III, Filia Specialis (1218)
Cited in Souvenir Mass book of vistit of Pope John Paul II,
Glasgow 1st June 1982.
During doctoral fieldwork (1998-2001) and during 2013 I carried 
out a number of interviews with local Catholics and Protestants 
to find out whether their Christianity impacted in any way upon 
their understanding of Scotland and its history and the question of 
sovereignty. In conducting these interviews I was very much aware 
of the social context of Christianity in Scotland is one of declining 
church attendance. For example, between 2005 and 2010 the 
Church of Scotland’s membership declined by 25% and by 2015 
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it is estimated to decline by a further 31% to 283, 912 members 
(Brierley 2011, p. 3). However, the 2011 census reported that 
some 1.7 million Scots (32% of the population) identified with the 
Church of Scotland and such findings are reflected in my fieldwork 
where, while I have had discussions with men in their forties 
about religion and their experience of religious education in 
Cardenden’s local non-denominational Auchterderran Secondary 
school (which closed in 1987), and while some were married in 
the local Presbyterian church, I personally have never known a 
friend or acquaintance of my generation who was a member of 
any Protestant congregation, and I am struck by the conclusion 
that, if ‘being Protestant’ involves coming together liturgically 
with others, I have never actually known anyone from Cardenden 
who was a Protestant.
If there is evidence of a more or less precipitous decline in 
Protestantism, a similar fate has befallen the local Catholic 
population. Up until the nineteen-seventies the Catholic church in 
Scotland was thriving, and being a Catholic in Scotland was very 
much a working-class affair (McCrone 1992) so that in a former pit 
village such as Cardenden, one is liable at any Sunday Mass to see 
Celtic football shirts worn, and a parish priest from a central belt 
working-class locality telling jokes on the altar about the difficulties 
faced by Jesus trying to cure working-class cripples on social 
security benefits.95 Indeed, one might say that Catholicism is the 
95 At Christmas midnight Mass in 2001 the parish priest told the following joke 
to his congregation from the altar. An Irish cripple went into a pub and asked the 
barman for a pint of Guinness. Taking a sip of his Guiness, he had a look around 
and then asked the barman: “Is that Jesus o’er there?” The barman said “Aye,” 
so the Irishman said to the barman, “Gie him a pint e Guinness.” Next, a lame 
Scotsman came into the pub and ordered a pint of Special. Taking a sip of his 
drink, he too had a look around the pub and then asked the barman: “Is that 
Jesus o’er there?” When the barman gave the same reply as before the Scotsman 
also said to the barman, “Gie him a pint e Special.” Having finished his drinks, 
Jesus walked over to the Irishman and stretching out his arm said: “Rise up my 
son and walk!” –at which the Irishman was healed and danced a jig in delight. 
Jesus then walked over to the Scotsman and raised his hand, but before he could 
say a word the Scotsman said: “That’s far enough Jesus. Ah’m on invalidity.” 
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most working-class religion in Scotland. While the 2011 census 
reported that since the 2001 census the number of Catholics in 
Scotland has remained the same with 800,000 Scots or 16% of the 
population identifying themselves as Catholic,96 this figure masks 
real numerical decline. At the beginning of doctoral fieldwork the 
Catholic population of Cardenden stood at 750 according to the 
Catholic Directory for the Archdiocese of St Andrews and 
Edinburgh (2000), and according to the 2012 edition, the local 
Catholic population has declined to 400, and in May 2014 only 
two children from the local Catholic school made their First Holy 
Communion and the following Sunday, of the thirty-one candidates 
for the sacrament of Confirmation from three adjacent parishes, 
19 candidates or 61% were Polish, so that while there has been a 
massive decline in native Catholics the large influx of migrant Poles 
have kept Catholic numbers ‘artificially’ constant.
Throughout doctoral fieldwork I attended the local Catholic 
parish’s prayer group that met weekly in a member’s home (Josie 
O’Kane) and, interestingly, I found that in contrast to the local his-
tory group, views upon Scottish history were far more developed, 
and their views on Scottish history and its alignment with their 
faith was a very conscious affair. I recall from one meeting a discus-
sion on the Stone of Destiny which in 1997 had been returned to 
Scotland, leading to two members of the group to recall for my 
benefit the story of Scotland’s crown jewels; of how the Scottish 
sceptre was made in Italy and gifted by pope Alexander VI to 
James IV in the fifteenth-century, while Scotland’s Sword of State 
was a gift from pope Julius II to James IV, and how the Scottish 
crown jewels were the oldest in the British Isles and had lay hidden 
for many years to prevent the English ruler Oliver Cromwell melt-
ing them down as he had the English Crown jewels. 
As with previous occasions when informants had educated me 
in what was my own history, I expressed my great interest and 
96 According to the findings of the organisation Christian Research there are 
more Catholics attending Sunday Mass in Scotland since 2005 than there 
are Protestants attending Church of Scotland services for the first time since the 
Protestant Reformation of 1560. http://www.christian-research.org/ 
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confessed my ignorance of these events, and this encouraged 
my two female informants to recall how although the Crown 
jewels were rediscovered by Walter Scott in 1818 they made no 
appearance in the coronation of Elizabeth II at Westminster 
abbey (England) in 1953, and when the newly-crowned queen 
travelled north to Scotland to be presented with Scotland’s 
Honours in Edinburgh, at no point did she wear the Scottish 
Crown or hold the sceptre. However, by far the greatest insult to 
Scotland for my two female informants was that the queen did not 
wear her royal robes but ordinary clothes. 
This small group of Catholics, then, evidenced a knowledge 
and reading of Scottish history very different to that of the local 
history group, and this was no doubt in no small measure due to 
not a few of the members of the prayer group being highly 
educated as, in addition to housewives and tradesmen, the group 
included a retired doctor, a school teacher and two university 
students. The group members rejected the ‘invented’ traditions of 
a ‘Celtic Church’ as found in the Rev. Houston and were clear that 
their tradition was that of the two local saints (Ss. Ninian and 
Fothad) who were the first missionaries that had brought the 
Christian faith “straight from Rome’’ as one retired doctor and 
group member (Bernie Cranston) said. 
Within the consciousness of this group, then, their imagining 
of their relationship to the past encompasses the longue durée 
stretching from the first evangelisation of Scotland in the fourth 
century onwards to the present-day eve of independence, and this 
relates to another feature which struck me as I sat among these 
educated Catholics, which was that they talked of the history of 
Scotland in a manner that clearly indicated that it was their 
history and that they held the keys to its proper interpretation. 
In contrast to the insecurities of Protestantism in Scotland 
discussed in Chapter 1, which must discover a navel for itself 
somewhere in Scotland’s Catholic past, the Scottish Catholic 
imagination welcomes the return of the repressed, whereas the 
Scottish Presbyterian imagination as evidenced by Houston’s 
cleansing of his imagining of much of Fife’s Catholic identity and 
history, is more or less coerced into finding a way to heal its 
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relationship to the formative Catholic period of Scotland if it is to 
embrace and participate in the return of the repressed.
A few days prior to the inaugural Holyrood elections in 1999 
the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Scotland issued a pastoral 
letter entitled Make The Cross Count which was read at Sunday 
Mass on 2 May 1999 throughout Scotland. This was widely 
perceived as pro-nationalist and pro-SNP due to its endorsing 
three of the SNP’s policies on student grants, nuclear weapons and 
Catholic education, and came six months after a speech in Brussels 
by Cardinal Winning (1925-2001) in which he welcomed the 
likelihood of independence in the near future, and characterised 
Scottish nationalism as mature, democratic and progressive. More 
relevant, however, is that the local Catholics I spoke to agreed 
with the pro-SNP interpretation put on the bishops’ address and 
there is evidence of a shift to a nationalist position among Scottish 
Catholics. Nairn (2000) has also pointed to the significance of 
Catholics shifting their allegiance from the unionist Labour Party 
to the nationalist SNP, a change which he describes as “‘Class’ was 
being transmuted into ‘Nation’ before our eyes” (2000, p. 196). 
Similarly, the 2011 Scottish Election Study (SES 2011) found 
that for the first time ever Catholics voted for the SNP (43%) in 
greater numbers than they voted for the Labour Party (36%), and 
more generally it is perhaps hardly surprising that Scottish 
Catholics today, overwhelmingly of post-Famine Irish descent, 
move to support Scottish independence given the track record of 
political nationalism and anti-British sentiment among the 
descendants of Irish Catholic immigrants (see McCrone & Rosie 
in Boyle & Lynch 1998, pp. 67-94; Gallagher 2013; Kehoe 2013). 
As the historian Tom Devine reminds us: “The Catholic Irish in 
Scotland campaigned vigorously for a restoration of an Irish 
parliament” (1999, p. 490). 97
97 I recall one occasion in 2012 when taking my children to school I spotted Mrs 
McCutcheon who was chaperoning one of her grandchildren to “the Irish 
school” as I heard her say i.e. the local Catholic school; an expression which 
reveals the perception of an older generation who equated Catholicism with an 
immigrant Irish population. 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
338
Aside from these macro intergenerational shifts in Catholic 
voting behaviour, evidence of the political consequences of the 
Catholic view of Scottish history (Schmitt 1996) came when 
interviewing the pass keeper of St. Ninian’s church (Chum W.) 
about his views on the Scottish parliament. When I asked Chum 
for his views on the new parliament he began laughing, and 
I asked why he laughed:
Well, isn’t it funny? They think they have a parliament. It’s 
fitting that a puppet parliament should be sat in the General 
Assembly building of the Church of Scotland. One makes it 
obvious it has no idea how to be a real nation and the other 
has no idea how to be a real church. They’ve nae idea of 
power and nae idea of government. It’s a farce.
This testimony seems to point emphatically to the conclusion 
that Chum is a Catholic in the sense identified by Carl Schmitt 
(1996) that insists there is among Catholic populations an analogy 
between the exercise of authority or sovereignty by the Church 
and the exercise of authority or sovereignty by a people or nation; 
that just as the Church exercises authority that it can not devolve 
to any other institution (State, Nation or Parliament for example), 
so a nation exercises sovereignty and cannot pool or cede or share 
this sovereignty with another nation. In the ‘Catholic opinion’ of 
Chum, then, 1 July 1999 does not deliver sovereignty to Edinburgh 
or the Scottish people and he laughs at ‘Protestant Scots’ whom he 
characterises by the inability to imagine and demand sovereignty 
and who can settle for the exercise of the mere appearance of 
Scottish sovereignty.
If I were to interpret Chum’s words beyond what he actually 
said, I would propose he is saying that Scottish Protestants make 
excellent Britons but second rate Scots; that both history and the 
present-day provide evidence that Protestants are not very good at 
being Scottish when it comes down to deciding between ‘being 
Scottish’ and ‘being British:’ that if the political form of Scottish 
Catholicism is the exercise of sovereignty, the political form of 
Scottish Protestantism is unionism and that Protestant Scots are 
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divided in their identities because of their defining Protestant 
ecclesiology which eschews the exercise of sovereignty because it is 
agonistic about its divine foundation as an ecclesial community, 
and this ecclesiastical ambivalence is reproduced in the Protestant 
population vis-à-vis the question of the Scottish sovereignty, and so 
Protestants are divided in how they imagine their being together as 
a nation and divided in their interpretations of their history, and 
divided in their vision of how to imagine and organise their future.
In making this argument I, of course, freely admit that Chum 
himself made no such claims, and am equally confident that Chum 
had no knowledge of the ‘social contract’ theory of sovereignty 
found in Duns Scotus (Harris 1994; Wolter 2001) which was 
enshrined in the famous Declaration of Arbroath of 1320. However, 
what struck me about the testimony of Chum was that it was 
delivered in a deliberative and emphatic fashion. Chum identifies the 
location of sovereignty as the heart of the matter, and he scoffs at the 
‘puppet show’ of 1 July 1999 because the categories organising his 
perception of where sovereignty lies is his Catholic view that 
sovereignty, whether that exercised by the State or the sovereignty 
exercised by the Nation or the sovereignty exercised by the Church 
cannot be borrowed or loaned from another ‘more sovereign’ 
authority. Chum is not making a philosophical or theological or 
‘contemplative’ argument from ‘pure reason’ that there is some 
intrinsic connection between Protestantism and unionism but is 
making an empirical observation that the nationalism of 1 July 1999 
is not real nationalism but a typically Scottish Protestant affair, 
because it involves the same refusal of sovereignty at a political level 
which Protestantism in Scotland refuses itself at the ecclesiological 
level. I July 1999 then reproduces this Protestant tradition of 
‘Scotland as puppet show,’ as both the unionist political parties and 
self-styled national church have come to a deal with English power 
and reproduced their ambivalence vis-à-vis sovereignty, and 
reproduced their political subordination all over again.98
98 Having conducted a number of interviews with local Catholics (and Church of 
Scotland members) in early 2013 for a paper delivered to the annual BSA 
conference, my data clearly evidences that there is no single ‘Catholic view’ 
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As already indicated, at the time of my doctoral research the 
ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland was a significant 
development, and when walking through the village it was interesting 
that graffiti in support of the Irish Republican Army or the loyalist 
equivalent was physically fading, as if indicating sectarianism was 
also a fading reality. Similarly, the drastic decline of any numerically 
significant kind of religious practice among a largely once-Protestant 
population is another important development insofar as the decline 
of Protestantism is viewed as a condition for the re-politicisation of 
Scottish national identity in a pro-independence direction which is 
free of anti-Catholic sentiment. In this regard it is safe to say that 
integral to the Scottish Catholic imagination is a consciousness of 
having been systematically excluded and oppressed and marginalised 
over generations by “Knoxian barbarism,” so that integral to their 
imagining empowerment is the decline of that ‘large cultural system’ 
that presided over their subordination (Ross 1959; Goldie 1991, 
pp. 35-45; Durkan 1994). 
When interviewing a local convert to Catholicism and now a 
priest within the archdiocese in his late thirties who was raised within 
the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, I noted how he casually referred 
to the influence and legacy of Protestantism in Scottish history and 
society as “a force of darkness,” as if this was a common-sense truism 
among Catholics. When I asked how his views squared with the fact 
that he had, at least nominally, been a Protestant, his reply was: 
“I was brought up to nothing,” implying a trajectory and biography 
whereby the conflict and contestation of four centuries can be 
resolved via the exercise of late-modern freedom. However, while his 
quip about the Protestant legacy was announced as a truism available 
to one and all, it is of course not an interpretation that is available to 
one and all, but only to someone rich in symbolic capital and with 
degrees from St. Andrews and Oxford and not those who are unable 
to casually and confidently engage in long durée matters.
If there is a movement towards nationalism among Catholics 
I do not mean to suggest any kind of equivalence between Scottish 
regarding what Schmitt termed the political form of Roman Catholicism. Also, 
there is no one view of Scottish history among Catholics who are divided 
according to generation, class and level of education. See Gilfillan (forthcoming). 
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Catholicism and political nationalism. If it is clear that Chum 
draws upon his Catholic scheme of perception in support of 
independence, this is not to imply every Catholic holds his views 
as it is also abundantly clear that the unionist Labour Party 
commands support among working and middle-class Catholics, 
and there is little doubt that a perception of Protestant bigotry has 
kept the political unionism of Catholics alive and well. My view, 
however, is that a positive identification with being British is 
increasingly rare among Catholics of the ’79 generation(s) as 
I found no positive identification with being British but a certain 
anti-British tradition despite their tradition of electoral support 
for the unionist Labour Party. Catholic informants told me about 
their practice of rushing to switch off the television every night at 
the end of the day’s broadcasting rather than listen to the British 
national anthem, so that it seems clear that their de facto political 
unionism is no substantive value ‘in itself’ and is artificially kept 
alive by a long-standing contestation of Protestant bigotry, so that 
as soon as the latter is perceived to end, so will the former.99
4.5 The Historical Consciousness  
of the 1979 Generation(s)
In light of the fact that the 2011 census found that only 16% of 
the Scottish population are Catholic, their historical consciousness 
is unlikely to be decisive in the 2014 independence referendum. 
That role belongs to the historical consciousness of the 32% 
of Scots who identify with the Church of Scotland, and the 37% 
of Scots of no religious affiliation. If an older working-class 
generation’s constitutional views are more or less settled and 
even impervious to the democratic deficit of 1979-1997 and the 
current 2010-2015 period of not only unrepresentative but anti-
representative government, among a younger generation these 
99 One 35 year-old Catholic informant told me of how his history teacher at 
St. John’s (Perth) advised pupils, when choosing which questions to answer in 
history exams, to ‘play safe’ and avoid answering questions that might excite the 
anti-Catholic prejudices of the marker.
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
342
years have seen the politicisation of Scottish national identity due 
to English Conservative leaders’ dismantling of what remained of 
a fides implicita in all things British that a younger generation 
inherited from their parental ’45 generation. However, while 
I have characterised the return of Scottish history as a ‘spectre’ 
within the consciousness of some older locals, it is important to 
balance this representation by adverting to their clear paradoxical 
awareness that they felt themselves akin to a “people without 
history” (Worsley 1982) as a result of the formal education they 
received. Their comments on Scottish history during meetings 
amounted to remarking upon its total absence from their 
education, so that I found unanimous agreement that the history 
they were taught at school contained “nothing about Scotland,” 
with the following exchange being typical:
Adam: It’s one thing Ah regret when Ah was at school, Ah 
never learned a thing about this village.
Anne: We never learned a thing about Scotland when we 
were at school. Even at school we never ever done anything 
but English history.
Adam: It’s something that didnae bother me then but it does 
now. We were taught about England but never Scotland. 
And never the history of Fife.
What I found was that both the ’45 and ’79 generations share in 
a lament for a knowledge that the education system failed to 
provide them, and this critique of the education they received was 
said as a matter-of-fact; that nobody taught local or national 
history or culture was not a contentious claim but the common 
experience that nobody ever contradicted. As historian Michael 
Lynch (1992, p. xv) confirms: “Scotland, until the introduction of 
the Standard Grade syllabus in 1990, was one of the few countries 
in Europe where a nation’s own history was not a compulsory 
part of the history curriculum in its schools.” Despite the older 
generation’s clear awareness of this, however, I never witnessed 
any discussion of the possible reasons for the absence of Scottish 
history from the school curriculum. If there is an obvious irony 
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where the ’45 generation laments the absence of Scottish history 
while simultaneously exhibiting an absence from ‘the present as 
history,’ it seems likely that the one is related to or is isomorphic 
with the other. Among younger generation informants, however, 
the demand to know the reasons for the absence of Scottish 
history, as well as speculation as to the motives behind its absence, 
was something which did come through loud and clear as a theme. 
As a concrete point of reference for my argument that among the 
1979 generation a politics of identity and a politics of knowledge 
is being constituted via Scottish nationality and the rejection of 
‘Britain’ as an organising category of experience, identity, politics 
and territory, I reproduce the following testimony from Peter, a 
thirty-nine year-old Fife Council bricklayer whom I interviewed 
on his doorstep. 
It’s a’ mair or less persecution. Ah think we’ve been kept  
at that level [lowers palm towards ground] a’ the time. Ye 
wernae tellt anythin’ aboot Scottish history because it could 
have caused trouble. An a’ they fitba matches wi Scotland 
an England in the seventies it wid ha been even bigger 
bloodbaths cause it’d jist be like the English comin up tae 
Culloden or Stirlin Bridge an a’ that f***in cairry oan a’ 
rolled intae wane. That’s a lot e the reason why they never 
tellt ye f**k all e it tae. Ah mean that thing in the paper the 
day aboot learnin bairns Scottish history; 100 when we were 
at the school, that’d be what, 1972, wane e the teachers101 
we got he wis SNP. He used tae turn roond tae ye an say 
right then, when wis the battle e Hastings? An every c**t 
says 1066. Right then; when wis the battle e Culloden? Nae 
c**t kent. So he’d tell ye. So fir a hail week when we got 
Modern Studies he wis tell’n us aboot Scottish history until 
wane day he come in an says eh ‘Right, Ah’ve been gien a 
100 A front-page Sunday Mail newspaper article (24 October, 1999) highlighting 
the lack of knowledge among Scots of their own history. 
101 At a Hogmanay party in 2012 I learned that the Auchterderran Junior high 
school teacher referred to here was Brian Hill. 
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ticken off.’ He’d been pu’d up by the heidmaister who said 
‘You’re no here tae learn bairns, you’re here tae learn them 
what the O level’s aboot, no what’s happenin roond aboot 
them.’ And this is a’ comin tae light noo, twenty year doon 
the f***in line. Bit Ah mean really, we should ken mair 
aboot what’s happenin. Then again if ye gane doon the 
street and say tae some e they boys, ‘Eh, aye, dae ye ken 
aboot this happened up in the Highlands five hunder year 
ago?’ ‘Oh f**k off we’re no interested in that.’ There’s a 
certain time when, if ye dinnae get learned it at school 
there’s a big period in between until you come tae yer senses 
an say well really Ah should be payin attention tae that, an 
Ah should be takin mair tae dae wi that. But there’s that 
space in between when yer mair likely, mair f***in like half 
e they c***s doon there smashin bus shelters an pissin the 
drink against a wa’ or gaun fae this pub tae that pub, ye 
ken? Bit there’ll come a time when a lot e they boys sittin 
doon there’ll be sayin ‘Ya c**t Ah wonder what happened?’ 
What sticks in yer mind when ye were at the skill? It’s 1066, 
King Harold getting the f**kin arrow in his ee, that big 
tapestry f**kin thing, Guy Fawkes f**kin settin fire tae the 
… tryin tae think e something that happened in Scotland at 
that same f**kin time an ye widnae ken.
If one were to change a few details in the above testimony it would 
be indistinguishable from the discourse of formerly colonised 
peoples reflecting upon the education system put in place by their 
colonial masters, so that we might interpret the above as a lucid 
critique not simply of Scottish education as the central institution 
in the reproduction of a disabling ignorance of history, but a 
wholesale betrayal of a nation and a critique of the failures of 
powerful elites who established and maintained this educational 
status quo ante. However, what I want to highlight is the sheer 
availability of Peter’s analysis to himself. The above quote is the 
last three minutes of a ninety-minute interview and I propose that 
the key to Peter’s interpretive lucidity, in contrast to the silence of 
the Rev. Houston, for example, lies in the fact that his reading 
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of Scottish education is informed by his class position so that, 
leaving aside the question of ‘empirical’ accuracy, he is lucid in his 
critique of an education system that produced a ‘people without 
memory’ because he is ‘doing class analysis’ by drawing upon 
his internalisation of social structure which not only structures 
his perception but structures what comes into his horizon i.e. 
structures his field of perception and what counts as significant 
knowledge. 
We may say that Peter can read so much history using one basic 
interpretive key because so much of the history of schooling and 
education in a stateless nation is taken up by the work of 
repressing history, so that he is lucid because his mental structures 
of perception are structured by the structure of history which is 
itself structured by the reproduction of the geo-politics of stateless 
nationhood. Having grasped this basic interpretive key, then, 
allows the members of the stateless nation to narrate historic 
events and incidents ad libitum because, whatever particular field 
is under consideration, the same structure or pattern is reproduced 
and the same interpretive horizon is able to read it as a matter of 
habitus. Finally, because his mental life is conformed to this truth 
there is a characteristic ‘libidinal’ enjoyment and catharsis in 
identifying instances of this isomorphism, and a characteristic 
‘libidinal expression’ that emerges from this habitual reading and 
which is a characteristic of working-class men’s use of language.
Peter can read history effortlessly or ad libitum because he 
knows via habitus in a pre-conceptual manner that the social 
structure at any time reproduces itself over the course of history 
and events, and the sheer availability of his analysis is his clue to 
the ethnographer why the survival and victory of a historic long 
durée, long marginalised and apparently defeated for three 
centuries, does not evidence an incredibly resistant oral tradition. 
He is also advising the error of the modernist fiction that ‘all 
that is solid melts into air’ because the Scottish managerial 
class has always throughout its time in charge ‘stood down’ the 
historic patrimony of Scotland and has faithfully failed to exercise 
leadership and lead the nation’s secession from Britain, so that 
Peter is castigating the Scottish bourgeoisie for its perfect 
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modernism insofar as throughout its history this class could 
always be relied upon to leave all of the ‘nonsense’ of history 
firmly behind and nowhere in the education system. What is also 
nicely revealed is that the contestation of the meaning of historic 
events such as 1 July 1999 reproduces the same contestation that 
much of Scottish history is constituted by, so that the ethnographer 
of ‘the present as history’ cannot propose ‘objectivity’ or a “view 
from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) but more history; more of the same 
dialectically opposed paradigms re-joining battle. As Bourdieu 
(in Faubion 1995, p. 34) explains:
The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and 
collective practices – more history – in accordance with the 
schemes generated by history. It ensures the active presence 
of past experiences, which...tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ 
of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than 
all formal rules and explicit norms. This system of dispositions 
– a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future 
by reactivation in similarly structured practices... is the 
principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism 
sees in social practices without being able to account for it.
Peter in his testimony, then, is also explaining how the liberal estab-
lishment can accommodate itself to 1 July 1999 because a devolved 
Scottish parliament does not challenge the social structure, so that 
subordinates such as Peter can be allowed to signify history and the 
nation according to their ownmost contextualised dasein and the 
Scottish middle classes can once again exchange exercising no cul-
tural leadership of the nation (unlike every other national bourgeoi-
sie) for their continued social dominance which remains intact. In 
contrast to the Rev. Houston’s ‘petrifaction via power,’ Peter is 
made articulate by his subordination, and is free to recognise the 
empirical facts just as Houston is compelled by his ‘disciplinary 
liberalism’ to remain silent on the cut and thrust of Scottish history 
while Peter speaks out. This contrast is a clue that reveals the 
repression that results within the liberal consciousness conformed 
to reproducing social structure, a conformism that cannot recognise 
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and celebrate the meaning of 1 July 1999; and why only the con-
sciousness not tied to reproducing the social structure can recognise 
and celebrate the cut and thrust of history and historic events. 
1 July 1999, then, can simultaneously signify the symbolic 
reversal of four centuries of Scottish history and the castigation of 
each elite-yet-subordinate generation throughout that history for 
their failure to politicise their historicity or being-in-history, as 
well as signify no change whatever of the social structure which 
remains intact, so that 1 July 1999 for ’45 generation unionists is 
an expensive duplication of resources and for ’79 generation 
nationalists is a great leap forward for an emergent sovereignty 
and escape from three centuries of self-colonisation, semi-
modernisation and semi-sovereignty. Insofar as Peter’s hermeneutic 
or manner of reading history is a matter of habitus and is shared 
with previous working class generations, something new has 
re-invigorated this hermeneutic with new hope as it has become 
electorally significant; as if what has finally been thrown off by the 
’79 generation is a de-politicised hermeneutic of hopelessness 
thanks to the ending of the suffocating ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger 
1967) of Protestantism and unionism.
A final observation regarding Peter is that he is affirming the 
basic principle that interpretation is a social practice that may 
usefully be described as a ‘contact sport,’ insofar as there is an 
isomorphism between the geo-political analysis of nationalism 
and class analysis, so that if one should choose not to interpret 
Scottish history at this time as a long cultural and geo-political 
struggle for control over Scotland, such a view at this time would 
almost certainly be consubstantial with a refusal to interpret the 
social realm and its history as a long struggle between social 
classes, so that one may predict with some confidence that anyone 
who interprets Scottish history via the recognition of geo-political 
conflict would also be likely to read the social realm via the 
recognition of inter-class struggle. If this seems a sane interpretive 
principle given the national or geo-political realm and the social 
realm are ruled over by the same elites, so that it would be a flight 
from reality to view the history of society and the history of the 
nation as not shaped by the same interests, what clearly requires 
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an explanation is why the working-class’s imagining of socialism 
and Home Rule has been so unsuccessful for over a century and 
has been so successfully subordinated to the imagining of Britain. 
The fact of Peter’s lucidity, then, is sourced in his breaking from 
a ‘double domination’ at a class and a national level which allows 
him a clear view, and allows us a clear view of how political union 
with England is unlikely to survive the critique of a contextual 
class analysis insofar as a younger generation critiques the 
’45 generation’s discourse on Scottish history and Scottish culture 
due to the latter’s consciousness being ‘doubly dominated’ as a 
result of a British identity preventing a ‘proper’ interpretation of 
society and nation and history and the present moment. 
When attending the funeral of a retired miner (Mr McLean) 
during fieldwork at which some of his Bowhill Burns’ Club friends 
and members of the local history group were present, the marked 
cultural difference between the generations was evident in the 
dated genuflexions to Burns in the oration, which felt symbolic of 
an understanding of ‘being Scottish’ and ‘being working class’ that 
is obsolete among the ’79 generation, so that this scene acted as 
a metaphor for the death of a certain idea of Scottish culture held 
by previous working-class generations. In this regard, the local 
institutions from the Bowhill Burns Club (founded 1912), the 
Mining Archives and Masonic lodge are of a time and culture that 
the younger generation have already abandoned. Likewise, their 
benign bemusement towards what Chapman (1978) has called 
‘the Gaelic vision’ in Scottish culture as evidenced in their more or 
less incomprehension at the annual televised Mod, for example. 
Likewise, at Hogmanay parties and brief exchanges regarding 
‘Scottish culture,’ ’45 generation members view televised Scottish 
country dancing as their idea of Scottish culture, while their sons 
and daughters laugh and are clear this is not their culture. Again, 
when passing among ourselves a collection of Fife poetry in Scots 
at one of the history group meetings, I often had to ask for a 
translation of the Scots words used in the poems, and the older 
members were incredulous at my Anglicisation and loss of culture 
and why I could not understand what for them was my language. 
All of this signals the younger generation’s task of imagining their 
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selves and localities free of industrialism and obsolete cultural 
forms is already a task that defines them.
I propose that if increasing numbers of working-class individuals 
are free to instantiate reflexive projects thanks to deep literacy and 
affluence, then charting the ‘present as history’ will involve charting 
the release of three reflexivities: a Catholic reflexive project, a 
Protestant reflexive project and a non-Christian or pre-Christian 
reflexive project that will each seek to construct a new symbolic 
order in their image. If each of the three options available to the ’79 
generations are likely to unite in important aspects such as the 
embrace of the ‘return of the repressed’ and a post-liberal vision of 
Scottish dasein and mitsein, perhaps a common ‘purely natural’ 
reflexive historical consciousness will prove decisive. 
What all can agree upon is that historically-informed dasein is 
being released from its traditional confines, and integral to the 
modernisation of the symbolic order in Scotland today is not simply 
the notion of a liberation from the past but a release of historicity 
or ‘being in history’ from traditional answers and more or less 
coerced accommodations made throughout the ‘dictatorship of 
scarcity’ period which lasted until the nineteen-eighties. What will 
prove decisive is whether a ‘purely natural’ direction of travel and 
pre-religious estimation of Scottish contextual dasein and mitsein 
can be found. While it seems likely that the modernist interpretation 
of ‘being modern’ is fated to wish to see ‘modernisation as 
privatisation/liquidation’ continue, it will be rejected in light of its 
historic alignment with the subjugation of history and integralism 
and the national question. A new ‘purely natural’ ’79 generation 
position then will take as its departure point the rejection of the 
liberal settlement and the modernist experiment of Great Britain 
which seem more or less fated to be viewed as examples of ‘scarcity 
thinking’ and ‘scarcity praxis.’
4.6 The Post-Affluent Ending of the Modernist 
Experiment of Britain
Informants’ perception remains fixed upon realities and 
relationships and deep symbolic divisions that the Scottish liberal 
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and modernist imagination and public realm is reluctant to 
recognise. However, recognising such divisions is fundamental to 
recognising the desire not to live by bread alone and to face the 
challenge of ‘being modern,’ which involves being a people rather 
than merely a population. I will argue that this desire to be 
symbolically united, something which the liberal imagination can 
neither recognise nor rectify, also helps us to understand informants’ 
fear of the return of something which union with England has 
successfully repressed; that underneath the eighteenth-century 
construct of Great Britain lies an essential ‘medieval’ reality that 
has not only survived but lies ready and waiting to ‘take over.’ 
Crucially, however, what makes such intimations command 
our attention and forbids us from dismissing them is the fact that 
something else to be explained and another something which 
modernist and liberal understandings of modernity fail to explain, 
is why it is that after three centuries there is still no British nation 
in sight; why it is that the symbolic patrimony that the first post-
industrial and post-affluent generation mobilises in order to 
imagine and constitute its politico-historical consciousness by is 
a species of what the modernist Lenin might have described as 
‘medieval particularism,’ and its resurrection of a twelfth-century 
project of political freedom and return to a more Catholic and 
holistic conception of dasein and mitsein (Chapter 8).
If we are to get closer to an explanation of the ‘present as 
history’ we require an understanding of modernity that is stripped 
of the hackneyed fictions concerning dasein/mitsein and the nation 
that liberalism/modernism likes to tell itself; a new understanding 
that recognises, but does not reduce ourselves to, the pressures and 
conditions modernity undoubtedly brings about; a more mature 
understanding of modernity characterised by living with a series 
of tensions, rather than the superficial and tired idea of having to 
choose between binary oppositions. In making sense of the fearful 
apprehensions of locals we cannot rid ourselves of this issue by 
conveniently imagining they are living three hundred years in the 
past for some reason; rather, we must overcome a fiction that we 
have been telling ourselves for three hundred years, and that in 
contrast to the purely imaginary cleansing of the present of all 
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traces of the past, the social ontology of liberalism has always had 
little purchase upon fully-contextualised human experience; that 
the past is not only not past but none of the ‘big questions’ – such 
as what historical consciousness is possible in Scotland today, and 
what kind of community is possible, and which constitutional 
form should the community (nation) take, and how are we to be 
modern and constitute a community among ourselves and what 
‘narrative of redemption’ is possible for Scottish mitsein today – 
ever found a satisfactory answer in the eighteenth-century geo-
political settlement. The great questions of meaning which liberal 
unionism imagined it had successfully answered or organised 
all now return, as ‘to restore a medieval kingdom’ is to turn back 
time and is the time to raise these fundamental questions and 
de-privatise or re-nationalise the realm of meaning and take it 
out of the cold storage in which it has lay since 1707.
From the nineteenth century social theorists such as Saint-
Simon clearly saw that the very timbre of human being in free-
market industrial societies was being forcibly brought into 
alignment with economic function as Western societies underwent 
‘total mobilisation’ in the search for economic growth and material 
wealth, and while this remains just as true today as in the 
nineteenth-century, a crucial difference between the pre-affluent 
era and the post-affluent era is that in the former period modernity 
was conceived as the great event and condition in which ‘all that is 
solid melts into air,’ so that the modern era was imagined to 
be qualitatively different from all previous eras, and the new 
‘laws of motion’ of capitalism fundamentally separated free-
market societies from all previous social formations and historical 
periods. In the affluent era, however, the manner in which ‘being 
modern’ is imagined has changed insofar as the reality of the past 
is no longer thought to be dissolved but liberated as never before, 
so that ‘affluent modernity’ releases the original twelfth-century 
invention of modernity in its original integral or ‘ontological 
fullness’ which the ‘scarcity period’ of modernity denied itself. 
This liberation of the past, coming in the wake of general 
affluence since the nineteen-seventies (Galbraith 1969), inaugurates 
nothing less than a revolution in the symbolic order. Insofar as the 
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liberal imagination or, perhaps better, the ‘scarcity imagination’ 
that had more or less successfully privatised Religion, History and 
the Nation sees all such questions flooding back into the post-
secular (Habermas 2010) Scottish public sphere, this represents 
the death-knell for those ‘scarcity-era’ rationalist philosophies 
of the eighteenth-century that had confidently imagined religion 
and the task of reconciling the territorial and the historical in 
religious myths of salvation as more or less over with the arrival 
of the modern era. The nightmare scenario for the modernist 
imagination, then, is that it itself has been modernised because all 
such views that imagined questions of historical and ultimate 
meaning were epiphenomenal window dressing to ‘being modern’ 
or ‘human being,’ are themselves regressive and obsolete ‘scarcity 
era’ thinking that refuses to think human being and history with a 
full palette, and so have become relics from another era.
If eighteenth and nineteenth-century political economists were 
caught up in ‘scarcity-period thinking’ because they had no idea 
that affluence was around the corner (Polanyi 2001), so we can 
say that many conceptions of modernity had no idea that Tradition 
and History were set to reach ‘escape velocity’ and be released 
as never before precisely in those societies which were first to 
imagine that Tradition and History and the questions and tensions 
first sighted in twelfth-century thought and culture could be 
liquidated. Paradoxically, this classical liberal mindset has been 
rendered obsolete by the very affluence that the free-market 
economy generated, and which liberalism paid so much homage 
to (von Mises 2012). In this regard, Jacques Maritain has written 
somewhere of great truths being held captive by great errors, and 
we might apply this observation to modernist understandings of 
modernity as, while no-one could fault modernists’ wanting to be 
equal to the signs of the times and to have consciousness ‘catch up’ 
or aligned with contemporary socio-economic conditions, we 
cannot follow them by cleansing our consciousness and lives of the 
problematics and concerns of the pre-modern era as if they were 
of no further relevance or help in the task of ‘being modern.’ If the 
modernist imagination, then, is something of a ‘ghost train’ whose 
only remaining passengers who still keep the faith and who still 
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believe they are heading towards the future are septuagenarian 
Marxists and Secular Society members, those who have alighted 
from the modernist error can still acknowledge that modernism’s 
great founding insight was the sometimes heroic effort to turn to 
the purely social or the purely ‘secular’ and cleanse it of all super- 
naturalism. Indeed, as an ethnographer of the working class, I feel 
close to the modernist error as who cannot read the early Marx and 
fail to marvel at the effort that is underway, and who cannot but 
admire the many nineteenth-century modernists who, like the 
twelfth-century originators of the modern era, wanted to turn to the 
world and succeed where the twelfth-century had ultimately failed?
The modernist rejection of the wisdom of the pre-modern era 
is all the more incredible in Scotland today because the unresolved 
inherited tensions transmitted from its history are precisely 
what must be resolved on 18 September 2014 and thereafter, and 
which can not be repressed any longer, and the recently released 
desire for a symbolic order that can form the new basis for an 
independent Scotland can only be built upon adequate answers to 
these foundational questions. In coming to these answers, then, 
what must be avoided is the error committed by modernists as 
they began the same task of fitting themselves with a new symbolic 
order for the modern era, which was to imagine the modern era 
would privatise or abolish the Christian legacy and the need for a 
sacred canopy by conveniently imagining such needs and tasks 
and tensions had been privatised or liquidated by modernity. 
Modernism’s campaign of forgetting Scottish sovereignty and 
Scottish integralism stands revealed as a fiction that imagined 
it had privatised or liquidated a set of historical problems that 
dawned around the twelfth century, which concerned the invention 
of the social contract theory of government and the discovery of 
the categories of Nature and History and the (Christian) task of 
integrating the secular and the sacred. In preparation, then, for 
a second era of Scottish independence, it is imperative that ‘the 
Scottish mind’ is cleansed of the metaphysics that lies at the root 
of the modernist misunderstanding of the modern era in the sense 
of modernist given by Ardener (in Overing 1985, pp. 46-69) as the 
belief in “a once and for all break with the past.”
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That apprehension regarding sectarian prejudice is alive and 
well in the experience of a younger generation is evidence that 
engagement with questions of identity and a new resolution to 
Scotland’s troubled history are also alive and well, so that to 
retreat into the ready and waiting clichés of the liberal imagination 
would be to repeat the errors from which we are trying to emerge, 
and to ‘betray’ the data insofar as these local concerns reflect a 
post-liberal and late-modern concern to reopen history and 
de-privatise the ‘realm of meaning’ and address the question of 
what should be the fundamental ‘depth presuppositions’ that may 
be shared among Scots and act as the basis for national life. The 
2014 Referendum is the opportunity, then, to ask what ‘deep 
imagination’ might be agreed upon if we are to share a territory 
which has been the subject of struggle by rival traditions and 
erroneous or inadequate imaginings, and a way forward is the 
post-liberal solution of rejecting the privatisation myth regarding 
the separation of ‘personal’ beliefs from one’s public office, and its 
blood-relative of secularism that wishes the privatisation of 
religion and imagines the modern era has forever resolved 
questions of ultimate meaning by ‘liquidating’ such concerns. The 
liberal-come-secular settlement then is a charter for ‘bad faith’ 
where only agnostics and atheists can participate in public life 
with integrity, so that insofar as a nation adopted the liberal myth 
as a solution because of never-ending strife, the time is now to 
discard this fig leaf which must always be threatened by the return 
of the repressed.
While confident that the data supports the thesis that there is 
an emergent break with the modernist settlement or ‘experiment’ 
of Britain, to pursue the further argument that this is a conscious 
break with abstract ideas such as modernism, secularism or 
liberalism, and that this is integral to a younger working- 
class generation’s breaking from their condition of symbolic 
subordination, would be to repeat the mistake made at the 
beginning of fieldwork vis-à-vis an older generation as it would 
be to imagine a younger generation through my own prejudices 
and categories of perception, rather than sticking to what the 
ethnographic facts allow for. I do not imagine, then, for one 
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moment that the lucidity of Peter quoted earlier is the norm 
among the ’79 generation, and the proposition that there is 
an emergent project of imagining Scotland free of modernist 
assumptions is abstract and might yet be still-born, even among 
younger generations in light of the ongoing reality of symbolic 
domination. The very ability to appropriate the condition of 
working-class historicity or being-in-history and to practice a 
fully-contextual use of freedom depends upon one’s simultaneous 
immersion within and freedom from this condition (thanks to 
its existing twice or in two realms), and upon one’s immersion in 
and understanding of Scottish history and the long durée because 
this is the timescale and this is the semantic material at play in 
imagining an independent Scotland. 
I argue that integral to the working class wishing to achieve a 
‘consciousness of its own’ is its desire to imagine a sovereign 
Scottish State of their own, and to make that State in the image of 
their ownmost dasein, so that their nationalism is an integral part 
of the process of their recognition of and liberation from symbolic 
domination, while articulating their own theory of being modern 
is dependent upon their thinking of their being-in-history and the 
recuperation and recapitulation of long suppressed historical 
exigencies. In contrast to Nairn’s description of nationalism as 
“the elites inviting the masses into history” (1981, p. 340), then, 
I propose Scottish nationalism is more accurately described as 
the release and resumption of twelfth-century exigencies and 
symbolic resources among a younger generation, and if we are “to 
separate the quite spurious ‘national’ and ‘natural’ justifications 
and explanations of nationalism, from the genuine, time and 
context-bound roots of it” (Gellner 1964, p. 151), this requires we 
abandon modernist and liberal understandings of ‘being Scottish’ 
and ‘being modern’ if they are to catch up with and adequately 
represent ‘the present as history.’
Insofar as Nairn is correct to characterise nationalism as the 
elites inviting the masses into history, this explains why nationalism 
failed to happen in Scotland until the nineteen-seventies. According 
to Gellner (1964) and Nairn (1981), nationalism is the reaction to 
the arrival of modernity and uneven development which acts to 
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generate ‘catch up’ modernisation via nationalism, with the latter 
based upon the invention and mobilisation of a proto-national 
culture by local intelligentsias. However, when industrialisation 
or uneven development arrived to Scotland, a British and modernist 
imagination was already in place among its elite, as was the 
modernist assumption that union with England meant Scotland’s 
early modern programme of becoming modern on its own 
sovereign terms had been ‘liquidated’ for ever, and this prevented 
Scotland from becoming nationalist in the nineteenth-century. 
Insofar as the original task of gaining Scottish independence was 
itself sourced in the original twelfth-century turning to immanence 
across Europe, and exemplified in the project of articulating a new 
vision of the relations between the sacred and ‘secondary natures’ 
or immanence and transcendence (Negri and Hardt 2000, 
pp. 70-74), the modernist consciousness is only overcome to the 
extent that it is apprehended that twenty-first century Scottish 
nationalism is not simply about re-establishing political 
independence but retrieving an original programme of moder- 
nisation that disappeared with Scotland’s political independence. 
The success of the Reformation in Scotland meant the overthrow 
of the Catholic and Scottish project of articulating the soteriological 
value of secondary natures, while its blood relatives of modernism 
and liberalism liquidated or privatised such ‘quaint’ old-fashioned 
concerns. The success of these errors, then, came at the price 
of liquidating Scottish independence and reducing modernisation 
and progress to the exigencies of homo economicus and arresting 
the development of Scottish culture through such notorious 
State-sponsored violence as the Statutes of Iona of 1609, while a 
host of historic identities and localities were taken ‘out of history’ 
(Craig 1996).
To secure this status quo, then, a foundational modernist ‘sell 
out’ of an original Catholic integralism has been reproduced by 
every generation of managers in Scotland since the eighteenth-
century and so, if theorists of ‘subaltern nationalism’ describe local 
elites replacing the colonists at the top of the social hierarchy and 
using the spell of nationalism to convince the masses there is more 
at stake than reproducing a hierarchical social structure in which 
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they will remain at the bottom, none of this understanding of 
nationalism as being a form of ‘false consciousness’ was necessary 
in Scotland because from the point of view of the bourgeoisie, who 
were already in their managerial places, they had nothing to gain 
and everything to lose by becoming nationalists and ending the 
experiment of Great Britain and tearing up the liberal peace; they 
were already too modernist and already too symbolically 
de-territorialised and de-nationalised to reopen the Pandora’s box 
of history. Being good assimilated North British Protestants, they 
had no symbolic material with which to ignite any nationalist fires 
within themselves, far less the lower orders, so that their cultural 
assimilation to England on the cusp of industrialisation in 1832 
was more or less complete. As the local Protestant minister (in 
Houston 1924, p. 417) wrote at this time:
Those who are partial to the old dialect may think the 
language has changed for the worse, but fashion and our 
schools, and our close intercourse with England are 
transmuting us every year, every month, to the general 
standard of the empire.
Nationalism has been the great ballast peoples have mobilised to 
counteract the trauma of the advent of industrialisation in each 
European national context, and signalled the resilience of nations 
and peoples to become modern on their own sovereign terms and 
refusal to become modern on any other nation’s terms, so that by 
the end of the First World War in 1918 the nation-state had 
replaced the myriad variations of the multi-national State that had 
existed in Europe as the new norm. In this prolonged period of 
upheaval, each nation’s ‘third estate’ or bourgeoisie mobilised in 
order to practice sovereignty within their territory, and this 
political and social and cultural mobilisation saved them from 
believing, far less implementing, the excesses of modernist 
rhetoric, so that modernisation in practice if not in ideology 
meant the modernisation of medieval structures and localities and 
identities despite ‘year zero’ modernist rhetoric concerning the 
liquidation of the past and the advent of the new industrial age. 
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The Scottish middle classes, however, did not mobilise to exert 
control over a sovereign Scottish modernity but took instead to 
theorising everyone else’s sovereignty by producing a universalist 
theory of modernity in the likes of Hume, Ferguson and Smith, so 
that beneath the sophisticated modernism that rejected every 
vestige of ‘period costume’ such as language, religion, history, 
tradition and parliament etcetera lay the fundamental fact of 
Scotland’s suicide insofar as these Enlightenment figures theorised 
a more perfect liquidation of the past than any other European 
bourgeoisies ever dared imagine, far less practice.
In his instructive journey from Marxist internationalism to 
advocating Scottish nationalism, Tom Nairn has journeyed from 
being a Hume-like Enlightenment figure and typical zealous 
‘modernist Scot,’ to his current position of arguing the reason why 
Scotland and England are half-modernised nations is because both 
languish in “British backwardness” (Nairn 1994, p. 62), or a 
constitutional arrangement that prohibits the full constitution of 
modernity in both countries. Nairn, then, has caught up with ‘the 
people’ and the facts as they have emerged since Hamilton 1967, 
and in the process has imagined or aligned modernity upon 
a purely Scottish basis. The modernist view of liquidating 
Tradition and History in order to be fully modern is the ‘sacred 
canopy’ (Berger 1967) and meta-narrative or long durée meaning 
which modernists give themselves and has long fuelled the 
‘immaculate anthropology’ and the embarrassment at integralism 
of many educated individuals, convinced they had escaped from 
the holism and the tasks that result from embracing being in 
nature, history, territory and the question of transcendence. This 
modernist imaginary, however, has itself been liquidated and is at 
an end in an objective and sociological sense, although in many 
biographies it undoubtedly has a lifetime ahead of it.
Like Nairn I understand nationalism as functional to advancing 
a particular practice and view of modernity, but an older and 
original vision of modernity that I propose as an understanding of 
the modern era that meets the needs of today’s post-affluent 
generations and the challenge of understanding the ‘present as 
history.’ A proper or integral or sovereign Scottish modernity has 
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lost ground not only as a result of union with England but as a 
result of the ultimate failure of the original project of modernity 
in twelfth-century Scotland that I will detail further in Chapter 8. 
If the signature of ‘being modern’ is maintaining a tension between 
the view sub specie aeternitatus and a turning to the contingent 
and always-changing social and economic conditions characteristic 
of the free-market economy and society, the signature error to 
resist is a superstitious capitulation to the new that dissolves 
the very tension of ‘being modern.’ More concretely, if becoming 
a working class is part of the trauma and truth of ‘becoming 
modern,’ the mistake of modernists is not allowing this trauma 
and truth to fully or integrally register and impact all of dasein. 
All ‘materialist’ anthropologies are more or less in alliance with 
the modernist error which renounces any pretence whatsoever 
at continuity with a fuller self-definition of human being that 
transcends the onset of the industrial era. A more adequate view 
of modernity is the release of historicity and human being from 
the confines of the medieval era and the ‘dictatorship of scarcity,’ 
rather than imagining a decisive break with the past and the 
liquidation of fundamental aspects of dasein. Whereas modernists 
like Nairn are embarrassed and out of their depth at the return of 
the fancy dress or period costume of twelfth-century particularism, 
this lifting of repression must be embraced, so that instead of 
drawing our understanding of modernity from the usual suspects 
of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, Scottish 
nationalism ought to align with the modernity first caught sight 
of in twelfth-century Europe, which sought to escape from the 
‘dictatorship of supernaturalism’ and which has only been released 
as a popular possibility thanks to the arrival of affluence and the 
escape from the ‘dictatorship of scarcity.’
In light of the ‘miracle’ of affluence that has been worked in 
our midst, our estimation of the possibilities available to working-
class dasein and mitsein must be re-thought, and integral to this is 
to re-think the long durée symbolic order. If a post-affluent 
generation identifies a symbolic poverty among the ’45 generation 
as evidence of a condition of subordination, this can not be 
explained exclusively by the complex process of an agrarian 
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population having had to become a landless proletariat. Beneath 
the self-serving reductionist rhetoric of Marx concerning the 
miserabilism and penury of the workers under capitalism, and 
claims of religion being opium and the working class having no 
country and having no family life and the worker having nothing 
to lose but his chains, Weber (1989) saw that an event prior to 
industrialisation was responsible for subsequent materialist 
philosophies to emerge i.e. the Protestant Reformation, and this 
is why Weber argued that Presbyterian Scotland evidenced an 
elective affinity with the rise of monochromatic or non-integral 
reductionist anthropologies such as homo economicus. When in 
1790 the local Presbyterian minister (Houston 1924, p. 411) 
answered the Old Statistical Account inquiry whether “your 
people [have] any holy-days for recreation or merry-making?”, 
his reply that: “Just one in the year, called Handsel Monday, and 
even the manner in which this is employed shows the sober-
mindedness of the people,” evidences modernity as ‘iron cage’ and 
the condition of disenchantment was already in place among the 
local population. Likewise, another glimpse of the local advent 
of Weber’s iron cage comes from the Rev. Dr. Murray’s response 
(Houston 1924, p. 411) from 1790 in reply to the inquiry: “What 
sports have your people?”
Scarcely any after they are grown up. Amongst the infinite 
advantages of Reformation, this seems to have been one 
disadvantage attending it that, owing to the gloomy rigour of 
some of the leading actors, mirth and sport and cheerfulness 
were decried amongst a people already by nature rather 
phlegmatic. Since that, mirth and vice have in their 
apprehension been confounded together…so that the people 
must either dance by themselves or let it alone.
If late twentieth-century affluence ended the material ‘dictatorship 
of scarcity,’ then twenty-first century nationalism must escape 
metaphysical forms of miserabilism if it is to imagine and paint 
Scottish dasein with a full palette of colour. Weber’s (1989) thesis 
concerning the symbolic (Protestant) basis for the arrival of the 
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New Man of homo economicus is a warning that the realm of 
culture exerts its own causality, and insofar as Scottish nationalism 
envisages the overthrow of symbolic complexes such as a 
disenchanted Protestantism or a purely secular homo economicus, 
it must put in their place a symbolic order that embraces and 
systematically develops those ‘secondary natures’ and those 
fundamental aspects of dasein that have been systematically 
marginalised because failure to do so opens the door to the same 
errors to slip into the new era of independence. 
For example, then, when Nairn argues that nationalism is a 
better modernising force than unionism, we must be careful not to 
replicate the argument of earlier generations of Protestants and 
unionists who sacrificed Scottish independence, culture, politics 
and history for the sake of what they imagined ‘being modern’ 
to be i.e. the progress of the Protestant Reformation and, then, 
purely secular definitions as found in the Enlightenment and then 
the anthropology of homo economicus that served the rising com-
mercial classes (Douglas and Ney 1998). Each of these historical 
‘ideal types’ of the Protestant, the Enlightenment intellectual and 
the Entrepreneur did not have symbolic systems that brought 
enough ballast to enable their pursuit of ‘being modern’ avoid 
them ‘selling out’ inter alia their national sovereignty. I propose, 
then, that only the constant alignment with the original Catholic 
holistic conception of modernity and dasein gives sufficient ballast 
against the force of the new and the temptation to slip from being 
modern to being modernist.
Talk of a late-modern restoration of a twelfth-century patrimony 
must undoubtedly baffle many pro-independence voters insofar 
as they fail to see that the political sovereignty they seek for 
Scotland is only a fraction of the possibilities being released in late 
modernity, and insofar as they fail to see that to renovate the 
Scottish symbolic order they must go back to that period when 
integralism or the value of ‘secondary natures’ was first invented 
in the twelfth-century articulation of a purely natural beatitude 
that is proportionate to human nature and another beatitude that 
was super-natural or above nature (Chapter 8). I propose that in 
signifying the ‘present as history’ in this way, we avoid the idea that 
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by rejecting three centuries of unionism we are thereby clearing the 
way to begin ‘from scratch’ and avoid an even-more cleansed 
modernist dasein that is once again characterised by caesura, 
liquidation and rupture from the past. Faced with the vertigo of the 
new, the sane choice is to embrace both the ‘tasks of freedom’ and 
that thick or ‘heavy historicity’ that gives ballast to the project 
of reversing four centuries of the Reformation/Enlightenment/
Modernist paradigm in order to resurrect the revolutionary 
developments in twelfth century society and thinking which wished 
to renovate the relations between the new society developing at 
this time and begin the free and full development of ‘secondary 
natures’ and to follow wherever this development leads. 
4.7 Re-imagining the Kingdom of Fife
In light of the fact that both ’45 and ’79 generation informants 
recognise they have been subject to the systematic neglect of Scottish 
history and culture as a result of the decisions of educational 
policymakers throughout the twentieth century, there is an 
abundance of ‘material’ available to anyone with a determination 
to politicise this ‘educational deficit.’ An article which appeared in 
The Scotsman newspaper (4 February 1999) reported the Scottish 
Consultative Council on the Curriculum’s recommendation that 
more Scottish history and culture be taught in schools, as part of a 
drive to give lessons a greater “Scottish flavour.” However, in the 
opinion of one member of the original review group (Robbie 
Robertson), the Council’s findings were supressed with the result 
that fifteen of the eighteen members of the Council had written an 
open letter deploring the suppression of their report which had 
advised that 86% of people questioned wanted a “fairly or very 
well pronounced” Scottish theme to education, with Mr Robertson 
quoted as saying the revised report was less radical and took too 
narrow a view of culture, adding: “The Scottish people have been 
conned.” In light of the fact that when asked to comment the then 
SNP education spokesman Nicola Sturgeon was quoted as saying: 
“It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the report has been 
watered down,” it is clear that these skirmishes represent the return 
363
t h e  ‘ p r e s e n t  a s  h i s t o ry ’  &  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  r e p r e s s e d
of the repressed and announce a new era of the ‘politics of 
knowledge’ or the politicisation of knowledge within education has 
arrived, and integral to this return of the repressed will be the 
re-imagining of Scotland and its historic localities and regional 
identities that have more or less lay artistically and aesthetically 
‘inert’ throughout the modernist period of suppression.102
As was narrated by the tutor Roisin at the history group 
meeting of 3 February 1999, the region of Fife emerged in tandem 
with the emergence and history of the nation, so that like the 
nation this particular regional identity and history has suffered 
decline at the hands of a liberal or modernist social ontology, and 
the loss of national independence and the re-location of Scots’ 
imaginations and their political sovereignty to London (England). 
In this respect, the medieval Kingdom of Fife is an example of the 
decline of sub-national identities insofar as they became locations 
for delocalisation, and the delocalising or deprovincialisation of 
the imagination of local populations in the name of modernisation; 
the disembedding or misalignment of locals and their locales, 
which has resulted in the decline and disappearance of ‘regional 
consciousness’ within regional populations, with sub-national 
identities effecting a weak structuring of perception, identity 
and culture (Glen and Hubbard 2008, pp. xiii-xv). 
Beginning with the Protestant Reformation of 1560 and 
culminating in the union of Crowns in 1603 and union of 
Parliaments in 1707, the cultural importance enjoyed by locations 
such as St. Andrews and Dunfermline declined and came to an end 
as a result of this relocation of power, prestige and patronage 
outwith the nation, with the result that representations of Fife 
have become reduced to either a tourist attraction insofar as its 
coastal areas managed to escape the trauma of industrialism, 
or has become a symbolically inert non-space insofar as its 
hinterland experienced the full impact of the industrial era and 
102 To address the long-standing absence of Scottish history and culture from the 
curriculum in Scottish schools, the SNP administration from August 2014 have 
developed the new optional subject Scottish Studies which schools may offer 
their pupils. 
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now suffers deindustrialization. In terms of the Fife imaginary, 
then, inhabitants’ symbolisation of Fife remains stuck between 
the end of coalmining and a post-industrial identity that is yet 
to emerge, and insofar as these two representations exhaust 
the ‘mirrors’ Fifers have to recognise their provinciality by, the 
imagining of Fife outwith those locations which have retained 
something of their historicity and something of their hold upon 
the imagination of their inhabitants echoes James V’s description 
of Fife as “a beggar’s mantle with a fringe of gold.”
Wightman (in Hassan and Ilett 2011, p. 196) has described the 
Lanarkshire parish of Carluke as a locale in which “there is no 
institutional memory; there is no governance; there is no body with 
any real power,” and as with the Fun Day discussed in Chapter 1 
where only the attempt at community makes present the normal 
failure of communitas, so it is only the attempt to constitute an 
interest in locality and its history that reveals how in post-industrial 
locales such as Cardenden inhabitants can remark: “Nuthin 
ever happens in Fife” (Hugh Young) as if nothing has been said, 
because regionality does not exist as a medium of its inhabitants’ 
imagination and does not mediate meaning or structure per- 
ception, so that ‘being provincial’ is a medium or mediation of 
meaninglessness and another source of the ‘nothing’ discussed 
in Chapter 1. Insofar as the consciousness of the inhabitants of 
regions have ‘opted out’ of their regional contexts, a regional 
consciousness has become a private affair and these localities and 
regions and their populations have seceded from the tensions of 
being modern (as opposed to have become modern) as a result 
of not having the categories to resist a global cosmopolitanism, so 
that ‘regionality’ has little reality left in the tenth generation since 
the Act of Union, and fails to act as a bridge to a deeper historical 
consciousness and a more holistic conception and practice of the 
tension between the metropolitan and the provincial.
Why this matters today is because the absence of regional 
identity means the absence of a source to model a post-industrial 
vision or trajectory for their localities and, paradoxically, it is the 
’45 generation which is least engaged with nationalism that is 
most able to speak of their locality and regionality in a substantive 
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manner because of the richness of the many local relationships 
characteristic of the occupational community and which were 
repeated throughout Fife.103 The younger generation is unable to 
draw upon this dense experience of local identity as they are 
the generation that has experienced deindustrialization and the 
‘thinning’ of locality. While both experiences of locality across 
the generations share the same fate of being articulated by 
external structural forces, in the ’45 generation such forces 
actively ‘thickened’ locality, while among the ’79 generation the 
same forces during the nineteen-eighties in particular acted to dis-
organise or thin-out the experience of locality as ‘occupational 
community.’ Today, then, a younger generation is confronted with 
the question whether ‘cultural forces’ are able to constitute a 
regional identity by resurrecting Fife as part of its social ontology 
and part of a renewed imaginary, so that a Fife identity or ‘regional 
consciousness’ becomes integral to re-territorialising freedom 
and sovereignty and modernity.
The unprecedented opportunities afforded by affluence means 
opportunities to resurrect suppressed regional identities. In 
October 1998, for example, the first all-Fife radio station Kingdom 
FM began broadcasting to a Fife audience and soon became the 
most popular radio station in Fife, and I propose that this 
mobilisation of regional identity is a blood-relative of the task 
of re-imagining locality after the industrial era and re-imagining 
Scotland after the era of union,104 and that a range of realities 
and identities after a Yes vote on 18 September 2014 are more 
or less set for a period of re-imagining, and integral to this will 
be recuperating much of the medieval cultural patrimony that 
103 When the Royal Commission under Lord Wheatley outlined the reform of 
local government in Scotland in September 1969, it proposed the end of Fife as 
a political and administrative unit of regional government. However, a campaign 
to ‘save Fife’ succeeded in 1971 when the Heath government’s White Paper 
included Fife as one of the proposed regions of local government. 
104 An example of 1979 generation re-imagining of Fife that owes nothing to the 
industrial era and borrows from Tolkein and blends the mythical, musical and 
nonsensical would be Gloryhammer’s symphonic rock album Tales From the 
Kingdom of Fife (2013).
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throughout the years of hegemonic Protestantism, modernism 
and unionism was either physically destroyed or imaginatively 
neglected. If the unionist period saw a revolutionary historical 
and imaginary break with the medieval and early-modern period, 
the current late-modern nationalist present is more or less 
coerced into inaugurating a similar revolutionary break with the 
Protestant/unionist/modernist/liberal period in favour of returning 
to the Catholic era to break with the modernist fiction of being 
able to break from the past, because it is this earlier period which 
first sighted a break from supernaturalism and universalism was 
necessary to arrive at the value of particularism and a proper 
estimation of the value of ‘secondary natures’ which acts as 
a bulwark against the myth of ‘liquidating’ being.
What is set to emerge, then, is the antithesis of the imagined 
future proposed by Mill’s Considerations on Representative 
Government (1861, p. 300) where we find the liberal argument 
that, insofar as small European nations become independent from 
larger nations, the fate that awaited the freshly-independent 
native would be the freedom to “to sulk on his own rocks, the 
half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental 
orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of 
the world.” Mill’s rhetoric nicely illustrates how the modernist 
imagines the relationship between place and time under the 
conditions of modernity, and while no-one would contest the 
movement of modernity often acts to disembed populations from 
their places, Mill fails to articulate any kind of dialectic between 
the local or provincial and the metropolitan, so that his imagining 
of modernity fails to suspect that belonging to localities establishes 
their inhabitants’ relation to the historic long durée, and their 
belonging to localities and provinces establishes a central tension 
of the condition of ‘being modern’ which is the tension between 
the urban centre and the provinces. Mill’s casual symbolic violence 
upon non-metropolitan populations also acts as a pure cipher for 
power and capital insofar as it consecrates the view that, when 
any location is deprived of the movement and attention of capital 
it is more or less fated to cease to have significance even to its 
inhabitants. 
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If we recall Alastair Gray’s memorable point that a place’s 
inhabitants must live their imaginatively as well as physically, a 
place’s inhabitants’ imaginative and psychological manner of 
living in their locality is impoverished by the liberal imagination 
by definition, as the liberal imagination does not relate to locality 
in a deep manner because it does not relate to the long durée via 
locality or provinciality in a deep and ‘thick’ manner. More 
concretely, then, if authors bring this sensibility to their fictional 
representations of locality or provincial life, these locations can 
only appear as places of little significance and of no aesthetic or 
literary worth. Finally, having divested localities of any real 
relation to the long durée, such authors are also more or less 
coerced into imagining locals too as having no real or imagined 
relationship to history, and any such relation which locals feel 
they have must be ‘backward’ and of marginal interest.
As the earlier quotes from Adam, Annie and Peter highlight, 
the suppression of national history in Scottish education is 
consubstantial with the absence or suppression of regional history, 
so that if Scotland has long been a largely ‘unimagined community’ 
(Anderson 1983), then the provincial or regional identity of Fife 
has been similarly unimagined and has lain inert and remained 
largely latent as a source of identity. Even more difficult, then, than 
achieving national political independence may be the provincial 
and local task of imagining these sub-national identities free of 
modernist assumptions and outwith the ‘mirror of production’ 
characteristic of the industrial era.
When interviewing one resident (Ena Herd, Orebank Road) on 
her views of the new Scottish parliament, at one point she reflected:
Actually, what Ah’m talking tae ye aboot, you’re talkin tae 
a 56 year auld woman that is gien ye her view on life in 
1999 before the millennium. So this is bound tae be, can go 
somewhere in what you’re daen.
Ena adverts to two aspects of herself which are her being-in-
society and her being-in-history, and this raises the question as 
to whether it is more accurate to describe late-modern social 
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actors as dominated by the return of history and the return of the 
repressed, or whether it is more accurate to advert to a dislocation 
from historicity or the end of ‘being in history’ thanks to social 
forces creating more and more privatised self-understandings 
that are more and more divorced from long durée communal 
frameworks. My own dialectical view is that both points of view 
are true, and that to pose the question whether a collective 
working-class dasein is finally capable of being released, only to 
be deconstructed and privatised, is to misrecognise the structuralist 
constraints that inform the exercise of freedom and reflexivity. 
The view that late-moderns are in possession of reflexive 
selves that allows them to free themselves from a traditional 
identification with such ‘accidents of birth’ as class and national 
identity betrays the class-provenance of such views, and I propose 
that the predicament-come-opportunities faced by the ’79 genera-
tions directly contradicts ‘contemplative’ and decontextualized 
assertions which are consubstantial with other fashionable asser-
tions, such as the narrative meaning which nations give themselves 
are largely mythical. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), 
for example, the short kilt is a nineteenth-century invention and is 
not traditional Scottish dress, so that nationalist movements are 
often based upon spurious history. According to this point of view 
national identities are much like the meanings late-moderns give 
to their individual biographies i.e. are fictions that are fated to be 
‘deconstructed’ by the exercise of reflexivity.
As a rule I would contend that social theorists who fail to 
include in their understanding of reflexivity the structuring impact 
of class, nation and history are fated to produce representations 
that are more or less enthralled to the theorist’s ‘privatism.’ If we 
take the example of Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) mentioned, we 
are invited to imagine the (Scottish) nationalist as prone to being 
duped into irrational loyalties, as if the nation is a reality to be 
identified with and remain defined by because the flag-waving 
nationalist lacks the symbolic capital to develop a middle-class 
historian’s kind of reflexivity; as if the working class are the last 
class able to appropriate the post-substance identity paradigm and 
so are judged yet to reach ‘high-modern reflexivity,’ and so remain 
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fated to order their political mobilisation via obsolete communal 
categories, and are eternally condemned in the contemplative 
bourgeois imagination to play ‘catch-up’ to the realities and 
practices already enjoyed by the bourgeoisie. I would argue that 
despite the rise of individualism working-class dasein remains 
structurally constituted and determined by ‘the mirror of 
production’ and tied to its positionality within the hierarchical 
social structure, as well as tied to and defined by its ‘being in 
history’ and its ‘being national.’ However, in terms of consciousness, 
there is the possibility of producing a symbolic break with a 
historic long durée paradigm at the level of imagining via a 
usage of literacy (Hoggart 1957) and reflexivity in a post-British 
generation and a ‘making of history’ that embraces integralism 
and that is free of modernism.
Like nations, the reality of social classes is held together by 
their relations with other classes so that the ‘class system’ consists 
of the enduring hierarchical nature of the social structure while 
the transitory details of the empirical make-up of the occupational 
landscape changes. Similarly, the exercise of reflexivity and 
freedom is determined not by the conclusions arrived at by ‘pure 
reason’ as it contemplates ‘society,’ but by living in the space one 
occupies in social space and living that space’s relations to the 
other positions in social space that are occupied by other social 
actors. The notion of the embourgeoisement of affluent workers, 
then, is of course true in its trivial sense of meaning an increase in 
privatism and individualism etcetera, but a fiction insofar as it 
is a structural impossibility for the working class to instantiate 
a middle-class relation to the social order because this would 
require the working class to experience their relation to the social 
structure the same way as the middle-class experiences its relation 
to the social whole, and in the absence of a social class below 
them to constitute the bourgeois relation by, there can be no 
reproduction of the middle-class experience, and therefore no 
embourgeoisement of the working class in this sense. If while 
interviewing an abject working-class female tells me she votes 
Liberal Democrat and describes herself to me as being middle 
class, such self-representations are fictions that do not change 
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her position in the social hierarchy, nor make her the possessor of 
the experiences and habitus and consciousness of a real middle-
class person.
Importantly, then, dispensing with the fiction of embourgeoise-
ment allows into view the proposition that the high-modern 
exercise of class-based reflexivity involves an unprecedented deep-
ening of class-based dasein and a deepening of being Scottish 
and being-in-history. This late-modern affluence-led project of 
reflexivity is very different from Riesman’s (1961) analysis of the 
lonely crowd in which there is a privatised relation between 
structure and knowledge, in favour of recognising the free devel-
opment of the homology between the two. As ever, the modernist 
representation of ‘the present as history’ fails as it presents the 
false understanding of being-in-the-world as either being ‘mired in 
the past’ or facing the future as a tabula rasa as the result of the 
liquidation of any historical ballast; and explaining the firework 
display of 1 July 1999 by resorting to the ‘period costume’ 
metaphor, where social actors ‘dress up’ their actions in the false 
consciousness of historical fancy dress – the usual metaphors by 
which the modernist imagination misrecognises the contemporary 
and its inability to think at a level that is equal to the times being 
lived through, as liberalism itself fails to suspect it is an example 
of what may be described as theoretical ‘period costume’ as 
its obsolete modernist parentage cannot integrate the person-in-
society and the person-in-history and the person-in-territory.
Having sat with locals in Bowhill Park on many Thursday 
evenings during the summer months listening to the local pipe 
band practising and with many band members wearing the tartan, 
and conscious of the history group’s collection of black and white 
photographs of local pipe bands often including their forebears 
playing in Moscow at the invitation of the former Soviet Union, 
this evidencing that national and class realities have worked hand 
in hand in the activities of the Friends of the Soviet Union societies 
that proliferated in Fife after 1917, for example, also evidences 
that Hobsbawm & Ranger’s (1983) critique of tartanry, which 
they imagine capable of deconstructing Scottish nationalism, 
involves misrecognitions piling upon misrecognitions. The idea 
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that being part of an impromptu audience watching one of the 
local pipe bands practice is supposed to strike the ethnographer 
as ‘invented tradition’ and a kind of false consciousness, is in 
fact convincing evidence of the failure of academic objectivism 
as a route to verstehen. If one can not, then, settle for indulging 
in objectivist critiques of the many errors of particular historians 
such as the Rev. Houston, it is far better to recognise that 
objectivism itself is a form of ‘false consciousness’ insofar as it 
imagines the alleged recent coinage of tartanry and the short kilt 
are relevant to underpinning Scottish nationalism. 
More seriously for the historian, the analysis that suggests locals’ 
appropriation of national identity and national dress is ‘fake’ is the 
real impostor as the objectivist understanding of authenticity or 
tradition is evidence of naivety regarding the nature of social and 
historical reality and how history is made. This naïve faith of 
academics as to the powers of objectivism is evidence of having little 
grasp of how people, whether a medieval peasantry or a post-
industrial proletariat, make their history. Pace Karl Deutsch’s 
remark that a nation is “a group of persons united by a common 
error about their ancestry” (1969, p. 3), systematically getting one’s 
history ‘wrong’ in this academic objectivist sense is the glaring clue 
as to the post-objectivist or interpretive nature of historicity or 
history-making, and that historical error is pressed into the service 
of ‘history making’ and the historical work of reproducing and 
contesting hegemony and legitimacy in hearts and minds.
While no student of Scottish historiography can fail to be 
sympathetic to a ‘social constructionist’ position given the long 
history of historians’ interpretation of history being revealed with 
hindsight to be immersed in and therefore more or less a cipher for 
the prevailing beliefs, the point is not to rest content with 
‘objectively’ pointing to the fake nature of it all but to learn 
what Bourdieu (1977, pp. 1-71) terms “the objective limitations 
of objectivism,” as at any time in any history the issue is one of 
identifying the relevant and contested relationships that social 
actors are engaged in reproducing or contesting, and these forces 
are routinely the same old forces of class, nation and religious 
identity so that the same old “period costume’’ is always in fashion. 
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When Nairn argues (1997, p. 184) that: “Modern patriotism has 
no natural persona in Scotland. Our old clothes are romantic rags, 
yet – embarrassingly, inexplicably – none of the new uniforms 
seem to fit either,” it seems a backward glance in the constituting 
of Scottish nationalism is inevitable because it is in the past that 
we lived in ‘community’ as opposed to our current experience of 
living in a ‘mass society,’ but Nairn fails to conceive of historicity 
as integral to dasein and mitsein, so that nationalism is not a 
species of ‘false consciousness’ but a particularly effective way of 
addressing and solving in its confused way the specifically modern 
dilemma of how to imagine community in the open society, and 
this is why “the rhetoric of nostalgia” (Herzfeld 1997, p. 111) is 
deemed part of the DNA of nationalism, and why it has proven 
itself to be the cipher of choice for those who “desire to become a 
people rather than a population” (Geertz 1993, p. 237).
I propose that the modernist reading of history-making and 
peoples’ historicity fails to realise that the actors involved are 
‘in history’ and are more or less fated to ‘dress up’105 their present-
day ‘history making’ in dated period costume because the ‘modern’ 
costume (whatever that might be) worn to address the present-as-
history doesn’t quite fit because what is to be expressed at any 
particular time of historic importance is the present moment’s 
deep historicity and immersion in the past. If social actors dress-up 
structural realities in ‘period costume’ it is because structural 
realities are historical realities and the person-in-society is also 
the person-in-history, so that for intellectuals such as Hobsbawm 
and Ranger to persist in objectivism is to persist in their failure 
to understand they reproduce the intellectualist misrecognition of 
real historical dasein, and impute to their insights a deconstructive 
power they can never possess. 
What historian of Scotland after 1979-1997 and 2010-2015 
could fail to realise that for anyone to imagine Scottish nationalism 
is a form of fake ‘period costume’ is guilty of falling into what 
105 While Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) claim the kilt is a ninettenth-century 
invention, historian Michael Lynch affirms that: “A cult of ‘tartanry’ at the royal 
court briefly flowered in the 1680s” (1992, p. 299). 
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Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 144n) calls the 
“occasionalist fallacy,” and is also manifestly failing to take the 
first steps in appropriating the ‘historical imagination’ as the plain 
fact is the period 1979-1997 or 2010-2015 is not simply the 
empirical event of 1979-1997 or 2010-2015 that comes and goes, 
but the latest instance of a long durée set of geo-political 
relationships that date from 1707 at least, so that this period of 
nineteen and five years are just the latest iterations of similar 
periods going back to the medieval period and the relations 
between Scotland and England practiced then. 
Instead of taking aim at nationalism with the usual objectivist 
point-scoring that never hits its target because it fundamentally 
misrecognises what there is to aim at, social theory that is open to 
being-in-history should measure itself by its capacity to articulate 
the fullest statement of the historicity of human being that 
is emergent at this time. Is social theory capable of this deep 
recognition, or will it reproduce the long modernist flight from 
the real? Far from being discarded via the alleged disembedding 
effects of affluence or individualism, these forces in fact help 
these collective or group identities of class and nation within the 
’79 generation to emerge and further condition the reflexive 
project of (working class) nationalism, which is a blood-relative 
of the general emergence at the superstructural level of the 
underlying structures of contesting classes, nations, ethnicities 
and histories that have always been present and that have always 
been in need of repression. 
With the post-colonial order and the end of universalist 
Enlightenment trajectories and the emergence of plural moderni-
ties, a plurality which appears as an epidemic of ‘medieval par-
ticularism’ in the modernist imagination, the modernist timetable 
of history is torn up and so the modernist imagination within 
social theory should be brought to an end insofar as social forces 
liberate historicity and tradition from their historic and traditional 
confines in the era of ‘scarcity modernity’ and ‘scarcity thinking.’ 
In Chapter 8 where I attempt to outline an integral sociology, I 
will propose that we are witnessing an unprecedented emergence 
of the real in all its historicity and density, and to find his or her 
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bearings the social theorist, just as the social actor participating in 
this drama, is caught up in this process and is more or less coerced 
into asking himself whether his presuppositions allow him to 
recognise what is emerging or disappear it from view.
If much of the interpretive confusion surrounding articulating 
‘the present as history’ stems from the great modernist illusion 
regarding having to choose between the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 
1989) thesis or the release of history thesis that I am proposing, 
another source of confusion is whether advanced Western societies 
are becoming ‘classless’ societies, or whether social class is as real 
as ever thanks to social theorists after the fall of Communism and 
the triumph of the neoliberal world order after 1989 having 
finally given up any hope that anything can be done to change 
the class-based nature of free-market societies. If the modernist 
consciousness is fated to see the end of history and the end of the 
class system in every twitch, it is because such beliefs are ciphers 
of the middle-class habitus.
Given the rise in material affluence since the nineteen-seventies 
the ’79 generations are able to become free behaviourally as well 
as ideologically from traditional working-class symbolic systems 
and certain traditional identities instantiated by the ’45 generation. 
However, this freedom from prior conventions does not mean 
freedom from historicity or the social structure per se or what 
Baudrillard (1975) terms ‘the mirror of production,’ so that rather 
than the dissolution of the isomorphism between objective social 
position and subjective mental structuration, there is greater 
freedom than ever before to recognise the deep homology between 
mental and social structure upon their own terms, as opposed to 
having this homology and this relation to history pre-packaged by 
another class or generation. What is released is working class 
being in all its suppressed and unimagined temporality, historicity, 
sociality, locality and provinciality, so that a proper understanding 
of the present involves the need for a sociology that is capable of 
recognising the release of integralism or all of the colours of 
human dasein, and a ‘springtime of structure’ that is emerging 
into the cultural realm free from mystifications and a taking 
charge, for good or ill, of signification and a new symbolic order.
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I propose, then, that a Scottish contextualisation of the 
‘reflexive modernisation’ process associated with Beck and 
Giddens (1994) means the rise of the affluent society coupled 
with a freedom from modernist thinking equates to a ‘high 
modern’ age characterised by a return to an older project of 
modernity. After the firework display of 1 July 1999, and with no 
need to wait for May 2007 or May 2011 or 18 September 2014, 
modernists have been more or less coerced into conceding some 
kind of return of the repressed and a fuller conception of 
dasein and mitsein, and the exercise of political sovereignty is 
fundamental to solving the problem of how a nation and a people 
organises their being-in-the-modern-world. However, this coerced 
recognition is fated to lapse back into modernist misrecognition of 
the present insofar as 1 July 1999, or sometime after 18 September 
2014, simply means instead of being modernist on English terms 
Scotland is free to pursue being modernist on purely Scottish 
terms. The new Scottish imaginary that I am articulating, then, 
argues against such a half-hearted understanding of the constitution 
of the Scottish nationalist project, as the point of recalling the 
Scottish parliament and regaining sovereignty is to not make the 
same mistakes that the British modernist project made but to 
recuperate a far older holistic understanding of ‘being modern’ 
and ‘being Scottish.’ 
If what is possible is a vision of working class being or a 
holistic materialism free from modernist prejudices, what must be 
affirmed in the same breath is that freedom reveals as never before 
the cultural poverty of the working class, and their vulnerability 
to every kind of interpolation due to their symbolic domination. 
Having argued the emergence of a new integral ‘dialectic of class’ 
is possible, I also recognise that now that a series of forces has 
meant the working class can begin to systematically appropriate 
or reject every aspect of Tradition and turn their attention towards 
erecting a new symbolic order, far from finally emerging and 
constituting itself via this long-awaited task we see that much of 
the working class are not fit for this purpose. Paradoxically, only 
now in the era of affluence do we see the extent of the working 
class’s incapacitation precisely because it is freer than ever before 
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to manifest its capacities but also its incapacities. What is routinely 
revealed is not a pent-up ambition finally liberated but a profound 
lesson in the effects of domination.
When interviewing in Carden Castle Avenue (26 April 2014) 
I had the following conversation with a woman in her late-sixties, 
after I had asked her how she would vote in the upcoming 
referendum and she had said she would vote ‘no:’
Mrs. Clemiston: Ah’m happy with the way things are really.
Me: But you won’t be happy with this Tory government?
Mrs. Clemiston: Oh no, Ah’m no happy wi that!
Me: Are you happy with Scotland voting for policies and parties 
at elections and getting the opposite of what they vote fir?
Mrs. Clemiston: Ah ken what you mean.
Me: … and having an unrepresentative system of government?
Mrs Clemiston: Well no, Ah’m no happy wi that.
Me: So why are you at your doorstep sayin yer happy wi 
how things are?
Mrs. Clemiston: Well, Ah don’t know really.
In the same street I chatted with women who simply told me: “No, 
Ah’m no interested” and “Ah dinnae really ken anything about it, 
so Ah dinnae ken,” and so the conversation ended. Similarly, 
I chatted with many locals who alighted on a particular material or 
monetary issue and who did not engage with ‘the bigger pictiure,’ 
such as an elderly man whose wife is disabled and who wanted to 
chat at great length about how there was no information regarding 
what would happen to the UK government’s Motability Scheme 
(i.e. would he still get a free car) in the event of independence. From 
my door-to-door conversations I have a wealth of data that could 
easily serve the argument that my characterisations of dasein 
involving being national or being-in-history are insignificant when 
compared with the argument that informants are more or less 
solely motivated by material or economic values. 
In spite of this counter-evidence I argue the ’79 generations are 
being structurally coerced by deindustrialization, history and 
political events to take up a series of challenges which reveals the 
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poverty of prior generations because deindustrialization and 
the collapse of ideological universalisms requires that working 
class to imagine itself free of economism and the industrial era 
which was too poor to uncover what cannot now be concealed 
i.e. the inability to articulate and imagine its own self, far less its 
ability to compete against other hegemonic producers of culture. 
Via their parents the ’79 generation are heirs to localities and a 
culture betraying a prior material scarcity, and the enduring 
structural facts of life mean most may not catch sight of the 
trajectory I have laid out but remain prone to living some form of 
‘dependency consciousness,’ or a kind of nihilism kept fresh by a 
never-ending supply of ressentiment that might be viewed as the 
‘cipher of choice’ of the working-class habitus, so that a class 
fraction of this generation will not develop the freedoms their 
generation has ‘objectively’ inherited.
While arguing that a long-delayed critique of modernism 
among the younger generations is underway, I concede not only 
the fragility of this project but that it is far from being free of rival 
and competing interpretations and representations. I recognise the 
ease with which one could argue that, rather than a sighting of 
an original twelfth-century project, there is instead an ongoing 
‘Americanisation’ of Scotland’s youth and a flight from history 
and historicity; or that what is emerging is a form of nihilism and 
a more radical break with the past than even most modernists 
would be comfortable with; an emergent globalised identity 
among the millennium generation i.e. those born from the mid-
1980s, given their unprecedented importation and consumption 
of world culture and who have come to political consciousness 
with no memory of there not having been a Scottish parliament. 
I recognise, then, that out of such data one could easily argue 
that ‘Scotland’ has returned too late, and that while structural 
requirements are in place to allow a project of retrieving and 
developing a long suppressed historical narrative, the same forces 
that gave birth to such a project have already rendered such 
a project nostalgic, backward and impossible. 
While conceding a plurality of interpretations, then, I identify 
an emergent conception of ‘being modern’ that historically failed 
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and that was subsequently lost sight of, and yet is fresh from 
having overturned much of the imagining of Scotland throughout 
most of the modern era. If we are all nationalists today (McCrone 
1998, p. ix) it is because we are all ‘medievalists’ today because 
socio-economic forces have liberated a collective historicity and 
dissolved the modernist fancy dress costume that is too small for 
our needs. What is happening is not a ‘retrieval’ of the Middle 
Ages but an emergence of the present in all its historicity, and the 
task of the ethnographer is to interpret the emergent historicity of 
the present freely and systematically. Ironically, if we can agree 
“all that is solid melts into air’’ it is on the understanding that 
what is melting is the long campaign of repression and forgetting 
that was modernism.
Something else that can be agreed upon is that to be modern is 
to be reflexive about being modern, and the view that the modern 
era was a caesura from the past is the first casualty of this 
reflexivity. Thanks to affluence and deep literacy and driven by the 
long event of 1979-1997 and now 2010-2015, a more adequate 
description of the reflexivity of the ’79 generation(s) is that there 
is a simultaneous release of sociality and historicity that is so far-
reaching that only the twelfth-century advent of modernity can act 
as a precedent. To the query why just go back to the twelfth-
century and not the tenth or eighth century or the pre-Christian 
era, I answer that prior to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
there had yet to ocurr the first turning to the natural and social 
worlds; there had yet to occur the invention of the mundane 
secular realm as distinct from the supernatural, and there had yet 
to occur the invention of natura pura or purely natural (and purely 
social) realities that were to be studied and known in their own 
right, and in this transcendence of supernaturalism an integral 
conception of dasein (and understanding of modernity) that was 
innocent of any desire to reduce or liquidate or privatise its full 
expression and exploration first emerged. This is why in looking 
for a non-reductive and post-materialist symbolic order that paints 
human being with a full palette of colour, this ’79 generation turns 
to the twelfth century in the twenty-first century for ballast as it 
articulates its ownmost ontology and ownmost tasks. 
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Advocating the resurrection of the twelfth-century Catholic 
advent of modernity is to argue that the only basis for an inclusive 
modernity is one where each discussant subscribes to a holistic 
understanding of the purely natural-historical-social realm (and 
not that one becomes a believing Catholic). Upon the basis of such 
a common ground, the dynamic view of human dasein as 
articulated by the atheist Sartre (1966), for example, is compatible 
with the Catholic mind’s understanding of human dasein and 
agreement upon this dynamism can act as the basis for a new 
imaginary in an independent Scotland. To be properly modern 
and to have a properly inclusive understanding of being modern is 
to have a proper tension between Man and his historical and 
social context, and to recognise this tension means refusing the 
errors that either cannot recognise these tensions, such as 
supernaturalism or militant secularism which each in their own 
manner seek to liquidate. The philosophical anthropology of 
nationalism then will consist of disallowing any metaphysical 
presuppositions that in terms of the natural-social-historical 
realm effectively destroys this tension by claiming to know in an 
a priori manner the potentialities and intelligibilities possible 
for ‘secondary natures,’ such as typically found in ‘pure reason’ 
positions (naturalism and supernaturalism) that claim to already 
know the nature and fate of contingent secondary natures.
Attending the local history group for over two years provided a 
privileged insight into an important point in time among a particular 
generation, and it is to the history group that I owe much of my 
grasp of the historical context of Cardenden; of the something that 
Cardenden was, and that afforded me an insight into the rich 
texture of local life that Cardenden once had for its residents. 
Perhaps it was meditating upon the distinctive ‘density’ of the older 
generation that helped me to identify the ‘dense’ tasks faced by a 
younger generation. Rapid social change produces a sharp awareness 
of separation or distance from the past among those who have lived 
through such change, and such a process is behind the opening 
words of the first Local History Group booklet: “Now, more than 
ever before, people are becoming aware of their heritage, especially 
those who have emigrated. Many did not realise they had a heritage 
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until they had left the home shores behind them” (Local History 
Group vol. 1, np). Whether leaving native shores or coalmines and 
the experience of locality as ‘occupational community’ behind, the 
sharp sense of distance or separation as a result of deindustrialization 
has produced a powerful incentive among locals for discovering 
they have a history and a heritage, and in this regard I often noted 
the members’ ability to frame the present as ‘merely current’ 
through the sheer longevity of their presence to Cardenden by 
evoking their early lives. As Ball (in Shields 1999, p. 78) has it: “A 
critique of the everyday can be generated only by a kind of 
alienation effect, insofar as it is put into contact with its own radical 
other, such as an eradicated past.”
Reflecting upon the history group members, I propose that such 
is the isomorphism between mental structure and social structure 
that a strong identification with a passed conjunction of locality 
and self-identity means the members know Cardenden as they 
know or imagine themselves, and organise time and locality as they 
organise their self-knowledge: like the village they have had their 
youth and maturity when the village was still a substantive 
industrial coalmining ‘something,’ and they took their identities 
from this industrial period of the village, so that now in their 
dotage the post-industrial present of the village is marginal to their 
identity. Finally, as a direct result of political and cultural change 
from the nineteen-eighties, their identity has become petrified, 
resulting in the absence of categories to construct an engagement 
with the present political events so that their identity and experience 
of locality is simultaneously a paradigm and a prison because the 
categories which history gave them by which to have meaningful 
identities, a subsequent history has taken away and made obsolete. 
Looking at the old photographs from past local events hanging 
on the walls in Bowhill Centre such as an annual dance or any 
communal celebration, the once ubiquitous Union flag bunting 
has long gone, and in proportion to the disappearance of the 
acceptability of the Union flag the Saltire has grown in popularity 
as a decorative feature to any social or civic occasion. The ’45 
generation’s Cardenden and Britain have been ‘retired’ by history 
and so they experience the present not as the unfolding or 
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development of their identity but as its rejection or repudiation, 
because according to their generational identity 1 July 1999, far 
less 18 September 2014, was never supposed to happen, and so 
they constitute themselves as a local history group in their 
retirement and cast a ‘backward glance’ at a ‘heritage’ that is gone. 
What is gone is not simply locality as occupational community but 
their imagining of Scotland and their lifelong and committed 
participation in Britain, and it is because of this resilient British 
identity that among older informants there is both a hostility to 
the new Scottish parliament and independence, as well as a 
lament regarding the ‘educational deficit’ they experienced. This 
de-alignment of class and nation and their quietist acceptance of 
the disappearance of Scotland at the political level even when free 
of a prior economic necessity to which this generation learned to 
appeal in order to justify its acceptance of domination, means they 
only take the first steps in the project of reflexive self-consciousness, 
as even in retirement when financially comfortable a ‘discourse of 
poverty’ is mobilised to justify their inability to imagine a post-
materialist reflexive look over history or the future.
In this regard the lucidity of Peter referred to previously 
highlights the defining tasks and the defining differences between 
the ’45 and ’79 generations. However, given the ‘alienating’ 
educational system informants of both generations allude to as a 
matter of course, popular or non-consecrated imaginings that break 
with dominant assumptions can only be successful ‘against all the 
odds,’ yet Peter illustrates this conscious break from modernist 
symbolic domination is happening. We may say the working class’s 
acceptation of modernism was always the result of their lack of 
symbolic capital, and their long immersion in an imagining of 
‘being in history’ that was divested of some of the primary colours 
of human being (Douglas and Ney 1997), so that even among the 
’45 generation their modernism was a more or less enforced and 
involuntary affair exacted in conditions of material and symbolic 
scarcity. The ’45 generation’s fides implicita in their unionist British 
paradigm has come to an end in their children and in articulating 
the ‘present as history,’ the task of constituting and understanding 
this intergenerational change is fundamental. Because of their 
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generation-specific structuration the history group members pursue 
their caesura and are complacent in this. Because of the release of 
history and the return of the repressed, one can describe them as the 
last unionist and modernist generation and describe their meetings 
as taking place in the shadow of the Minervan owl of nationalism 
which they dismiss and which dismisses them, even as it accords 
them their final historical significance.
As of April 2001 the afternoon history group had effectively 
ended due to “a lack of numbers” and because people were get-
ting too old and were not being replaced. Only the evening group 
survives, although without a tutor since April 2001. I last visited 
the group in June 2011 at which time the only surviving member 
of the group from the time of my doctoral research was John. The 
’45 generation stand as a permanent critique of any future natu-
ralisation of independence and it is important to state ‘for the 
record’ the caesura that 1 July 1999 was in the consciousness of 
the local history group members as they are the end product of ten 
generations of a depoliticised national identity that will never be 
repeated as of 1 July 1999. 
On this day, after three centuries of the modernist experiment of 
Britain the medieval kingdom of Scotland proved too strong to 
suppress itself any longer, and while the desire for Scottish 
independence and the restoration of its parliament is an old affair, 
what is new is not so much the politicisation of the nation but the 
social class that has politicised the nation. If eighteenth-century 
middle-class Scots went along with being North Britons, it was 
the nineteenth-century rise of the working class that ensured this 
identity was only a stop-gap or flag of convenience that came to an 
end with the advent of literacy and affluence. The victory of a late-
medieval or early-modern template has had to wait for affluent 
conditions to liberate the working class and to allow them to flex 
their ‘being in history’ and overcome the modernist and British 
mind-set among themselves. In this process, the ‘event’ of 1979-
1997 was crucial and a more detailed examination of this pivotal 
period and its aftermath is the subject of the next chapter which 
argues the unfinished project of a free Scottish modernity is the 
driving force of contemporary Scottish politics and history.
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A Scottish Modernity
The Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on March 25,
1707, is hereby reconvened.
Winnie Ewing SNP MSP
12 May 1999
Ironmill Bay, 1 July 1999
The morning of 1 July 1999 began as usual with the few miles 
drive to Kirkcaldy for the eight o’clock team brief at Pathhead 
wastewater treatment works. Our orders for the day from our 
superintendent (Ivor Cox) was to renew the worn scrapers in two 
final settlement tanks in Ironmill Bay treatment works some 
fifteen miles along the Fife coast beside the Firth of Forth estuary. 
At the team brief we were advised we would have to clean the 
bell-mouth in each of the two tanks as there had been problems 
with poor-quality water going over the weir and into the river 
Forth, making East of Scotland Water authority liable to what is 
termed an ‘instant fail’ and a fine of five thousand pounds; an 
amount which increased substantially with every subsequent fail. 
At this time I was working with Paul Diamond and Adam Sharp 
in the ‘pool squad’, which was a two or three-man team assigned 
those longer repair and maintenance jobs the choke squads or 
those men with a regular route did not have time to do. 
When we arrived at Ironmill Bay some half an hour or so later, 
we unpacked our waterproofs, tools, ropes and the cutting 
equipment we would need before we would stop for our nine 
o’clock tea break. As we were readying our gear we were joined by 
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Bill Allan who was responsible for the day to day running of the 
plant, and Paul quizzed him about the details of the inner diffusion 
drum and the valves which controlled the inflow to the two tanks 
we were to work in, while Adam and myself began measuring out 
the cuts needed for the dozen or so replacement scrapers for each 
tank before heading to the van for our cup of tea while Paul, once 
satisfied with the layout of the plant, joined myself and Adam and 
Bill headed off to resume his morning duties.
After our break we got to work. While both tanks had been 
emptied the day before and the sunshine had dried the walls and 
floors, Paul gave each immobilised rotating arm a high-pressure 
blast of water to remove the remaining in-grained scum, before we 
began handling them and removing the worn scrapers. As each of 
the scrapers was individually fixed to the arm, I began removing 
each of the scrapers with a spanner so that Adam could have room 
to take measurements and begin cutting the new replacement 
scrapers from the one-inch thick sheets of hard blue plastic to size. 
Meanwhile, Paul busied himself cleaning each of the two bellmouths 
at the centre of each tank and clearing the debris that had become 
stuck thanks to having fallen into the tank over the years. 
As we each settled to our tasks we soon worked up a sweat as 
a result of the heat and no breeze reaching to the bottom of the 
tanks. It was a beautiful summer day with a clear blue sky and we 
were happy to be working outside in the sunshine. Twelve o’clock 
came round quickly and we began thinking about finishing the 
particular tasks we were doing before getting cleaned up and 
taking our dinner break. As we downed tools I walked off to find 
Bill to ask where I could wash before eating, and returning ten 
minutes later, Paul and Adam were already eating their pieces and 
drinking their tea in the van. As I went to the open side-door of 
the van and reached in and put my bag onto the back seat, Adam 
put the radio on and we listened to a live broadcast covering the 
State opening of the new Holyrood parliament in Edinburgh, and 
the excited radio presenter telling his listeners that the Royal Air 
Force Red Arrows display team and the Concorde aeroplane were 
about to fly over Edinburgh, and was encouraging listeners to 
look skywards to see the fly-by. 
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I ran and climbed onto a bridge that stretched across one of the 
tanks to take in the view over the Firth of Forth and the road and 
rail bridges, and looked up and saw Concorde. I suddenly felt 
connected to the gathering across the water in Edinburgh to 
mark the opening of the parliament and the beginning of a new 
constitutional era. After a minute or so I returned to the van, and 
we listened as the radio presenter described the details of the 
day, such as the parade of the one hundred and twenty nine 
politicians of the Holyrood parliament and their families processing 
up the Royal Mile, accompanied by school children from every 
constituency in the land. Paul informed us that Geordie Malcolm 
from Leven was the only East of Scotland Water employee he 
knew of who was in Edinburgh to be part of this historic day. 106
As a result of 1 July 1999 Scotland was rescued from the 
no-man’s land in which it had languished for nearly three 
centuries, and this day saw the resurrection of Scotland from its 
political suicide after two hundred and ninety-two years of liberal 
modernism which fancied that history was on its side and which 
had confidently left behind the younger ‘medieval’ solution to the 
question of the nation’s being-in-the-world where the nation 
was sovereign, in favour of the modernist pax Brittanica and its 
pseudo-modernisation of human dasein as homo economicus. 
Thanks to 1 July 1999, then, Scotland was not simply turning a 
page in its history or turning back a page or two so much as 
tearing out several chapters of its story as long errors. Prior to 
this day Scotland had long ceased to exist as a political reality so 
that the idea of ‘Scottish society,’ for example, far less its reality, 
had been problematic as Scotland had been confined to a kind of 
half-life or merely intentional existence. Thanks to 1 July 1999, 
however, Scotland not only became real again but became the 
heart and organising principle of political life and the basis for the 
exercise of power as a result of a decisive defeat for the modernist 
imagination’s organisation of geo-political space, territory, and 
history. What had been largely intentional became real, public and 
106 Tragically, Paul died suddenly at the age of 47 on 26 June 2010. 
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sovereign, and in the scramble among headline writers to express 
‘the present as history’ The Herald newspaper (7th May 1999) 
captured the power of nationalism to inaugurate a new public 
realm and constitutional era: “Died 1707 … Born 1999.”
1 July 1999 was both an historic day and just another work-
day, and the relationship between mundane class realities and 
‘historic days’ such as 1 July 1999 was a central research interest 
in light of research findings that has found that, “Support for 
a Scottish parliament has been higher in working-class than in 
middle-class groups in every survey that has ever asked the 
question” (Brown et al. 1996, p. 153). However, while it seemed 
clear that some kind of relationship existed between class and 
nationalism, how national identity existed and was experienced, 
imagined and practiced outwith politics and ‘special’ contexts 
such as elections was not so clear. To explore this question, then, 
I take as a starting point a scene from fieldwork four months 
after the creation of the new parliament, a game of football 
played on 13 November 1999 between Scotland and England 
to decide which of the two teams would qualify for the Euro 
2000 finals.
5.1 Integralism: Nature, Nurture & Nation
An hour before the start of the game I made the short walk to the 
Railway Tavern pub on Cardenden Road on what was a warm 
and sunny day. As I entered the pub I stood in the doorway to 
the lounge bar, allowing my eyes time to adjust to the dark 
smoke-filled interior as the curtains had been drawn to block out 
direct sunlight. I was immediately struck by a noisy and colourful 
and crowded scene: national regalia and bunting were displayed 
everywhere; flags, saltires and lion rampants hung on walls and 
the ceiling, with faces painted white and blue and most of the 
crowd with football scarves draped over their necks and wearing 
hats and replica football shirts. Along with this visual spectacle 
came a constant noise from the large group of local men (and a 
few women) crowded inside. The noise came from an incessant 
exchange of banter and anecdotes going on; shouted greetings and 
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conversations, orders for rounds of drinks being arranged in loud 
voices and a relentless cacophony of conversations and news, 
stories and anecdotes and ‘one-liners’ being told and enjoyed by 
anyone within earshot. 
After a few moments I was able to make out my hosts sitting 
along the wall on the right-hand side who motioned to me to join 
them, and as I squeezed into the gap opened for me Dauve asked 
what I wanted to drink, and then shouted to one of our company 
being served at the small lounge bar halfway along the left-hand 
side: ‘Billy! Two mair pints!’ while pointing at me in explanation. 
Perhaps to anticipate my asking why he ordered more than I asked 
for, Dauve explained: “Ye need tae order two roonds at wance. It’s 
f***in mental gettin a roond in.” Buying multiple rounds of 
drinks seemed to be the done thing to avoid having to waste time 
queuing at the bar as most of the small tables were rapidly, if not 
already, full of pints of beer and lager and spirits, thanks to the 
constant stream of individuals carrying trays of drinks and picking 
their way carefully to and from the bar to their table. On the far 
wall was what was soon to be the centre of everyone’s attention 
– a ‘giant screen’ television on which football pundits were airing 
their views. Amid the noise and movement, an individual would 
suddenly stand up and begin to sing. Being instantly recognised, 
the song would be taken up by one and all and anecdotes being 
told were put on hold mid-sentence as the chant was taken up 
until it ended and the anecdote could be resumed.
After saluting everyone in the company I listened to Vickie, 
a thirty-five year old mother-of-three describing how earlier in the 
day she had telephoned her English brother-in-law and played 
the national anthem of Scotland down the telephone. After 
pulling this ‘stunt,’ she told us her brother-in-law had matter-of-
factly asked if Vickie wanted to speak with her sister, before 
she concluded: “He never even mentioned it! Imagine daen that 
o’er the phone and he never even mentioned it. Of course, he’s 
English.” Next, I chatted with Drew, a joiner with Fife Council, 
who was speculating as to the probable identity of a local who 
had appeared in one of Ian Rankin’s novels. Drew informed me 
the fictional character had sang REM’s song Losing My Religion 
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in the same lounge in which we were sitting, and he felt confident 
the individual Rankin was referring to had to be Stevie King. 
Next, Drew absent-mindedly remarked to the company: ‘‘I see 
Leena Zavaroni left millions when she died there.’’ Thinking the 
conversation had taken a serious tone I asked: ‘‘Is that right? 
I never heard that.’’ This allowed Drew to deliver his punchline: 
‘‘Aye, apparently she left a few million in dinner vouchers.’’ 107
As the focus of the day was the long durée contest between 
Scotland and the ‘auld enemy’ (England) it was only a matter 
of time before the conversation turned to politics and so, after 
Drew came Dave, a local father of two in his mid-thirties who 
informed the company he had been working in England the 
previous week and, affecting an upper-class English accent for the 
company, informed us how he had “been gettin it all week…Oh 
the Jocks this and the Jocks that.”108 Dave then described to the 
company how he had established common Labour-voting ground 
with his English colleagues as a means of minimising the difference 
of national identity in the run-up to the play-off game between 
the two countries, before adding: “Aye, we’ll see how they f****n 
like it when we a’ vote SNP.” Dave’s final comment sparked more 
comments from the company which were brought to a conclusion 
by a thirty-six-year-old warehouse worker: “The English are 
no happy unless they’re oppressin somebody”– a comment said 
without fear of contradiction and which signalled a shared 
horizon of meaning which I found operative in other contexts, 
such as the workplace where I was able to note many casual and 
incidental incidents such as the following where East of Scotland 
Water workers began talking about the construction of a new 
wastewater treatment plant in Leven which was a hundred yards 
or so from where one of the men lived.
Gary: Aye ye’ll be getting disturbed wi a’ the noise.
Dauve: Ye’ll get a reduction in yer poll tax.
107 The joke referred to a once-popular singer who suffered from anorexia 
nervosa and had died the previous month. 
108 The expression ‘Jock’ is a colloquial term for a Scotsman.
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Ivor: Ah’ll be oot there wi ma binoculars seein what’s 
goin oan.
Rory: Jist like that English c**t in Kinghorn. Always phonin 
tae say ‘Ye can smell it fae here.’
Dauve: Jist in the place. Jist in the toon an they’re takin 
it o’er.
Ivor: Aye, ye get that.
As the two football teams prepared to walk onto the pitch all 
attention was directed to the television screen and events being 
transmitted live from Hampden Park in Glasgow, and with the 
volume of the television now tuned up so everyone could hear, an 
already excited crowd was fed fresh stimulus for shouted comment 
and adrenalinised analysis, and an already excited atmosphere 
began to reach fever pitch, so that when the Scottish national 
anthem was being sung by the players and spectators in Glasgow 
it was being sung ‘to the rafters’ by everyone in The Tavern in 
Cardenden.109
At half-time the company discussed who was playing well and 
reviewed the highlights of the game with each one giving their 
opinion. Reflecting on the discussion it is clear that one of the 
reasons that football is so popular is because it is a rare example 
of a ‘meritocracy in action’ in the sense that it is a competitive 
social activity whose outcome is not ‘socially determined.’ Each 
team faces the same set of material or empirical conditions and 
their shared task is to co-operate with their team mates to change 
that empirical reality to their advantage, and engineer a situation 
that is to their advantage. The idea then is that football is a rare 
example of an individual and a group’s agency being unhindered 
by inherited social disadvantage because the starting point and 
rules of the game are the same for everyone, which is why football 
109 The national anthem of England is the British national anthem God Save the 
Queen because Britain and England are largely synonymous, and when the 
British/English naional anthem was being booed by the Scots in Glasgow it was 
being booed by everyone in The Tavern. For the non-Scottish observer then there 
is the strange scene of people booing their own national anthem. 
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was once famously described by the coalminer turned footballer 
and manager Bill Shankley (1913-1981) as the only practical 
example of socialism. 
A more concrete source of football’s popularity is enjoyment at 
the skill on display and enjoying how a player’s consciousness and 
practice displays an awareness that is more complex than the 
binary opposites of absence and presence insofar as his awareness 
and practiced are characterised by what might be as much as 
by what is and what is not; by the possibilities in the present that 
his footballing skill might provoke or ‘make real.’ The creative 
footballer’s perception and practice, then, is always dominated by 
being able to see before his opponent something that is not yet 
empirically given, by seeing what can possibly happen, so that the 
creative and ‘dangerous’ football player is the one who shows the 
audience who stare blankly at a particular situation something 
emerge ‘from nothing’ before their eyes thanks to the action of the 
player on the ball. The gifted footballer is simultaneously immersed 
in empirical reality yet transcends or frees himself and his team 
and the spectators from the merely real or empirically given.
Such was an enjoyable afternoon that was full of humour, 
verbal improvisation, bawdy sensualism and relentless improvised 
ad libs performed ad libitum. If I had hoped to observe a per-
formance of ‘national identity’ as habitus I was not disappointed, 
as the day acted as a shibboleth of identity and belonging. What 
I found remarkable was the relentless energy and emotion; the 
at-hand availability and intensity of emotions which seemed to 
involve the ‘total mobilisation’ of dasein and mitsein in order 
to produce a total immersion in each moment of the game. From 
the gestures and language and emotion it was plain locals ‘are 
Scottish’ in an embodied manner, and they relished these occasions 
as opportunities for the practice of communitas and locality. 
In this regard an example of a practice of dasein ‘at-play’ is the 
blatant constructions of ‘difference’ via deliberately hapless 
reifications and essentialisations of particular locals and localities 
within the village, so that at such gatherings locals regularly 
excoriate those from Dundonald as “mountain men” (because it 
is held to sit highest in the village) who are made the subject of 
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songs titled Feed Dundonald sung to the tune of the Band Aid 
charity song Feed the World, with more cultural bricolage seen in 
adapting Elvis Presley’s song Heartbreak Hotel to the characters 
and events in the local Central Hotel pub, and the alcohol-fuelled 
one-liners such as one wit when in The Caspian take away 
(re-christened The Taliban by locals) who, after quietly waiting his 
turn to be asked his order by the immigrant employee, asks for 
“a single hard on and a bottle e chips, please’’ so that he and the 
other queuing locals can enjoy the employee’s confusion and the 
outbreak of hilarity.
As a first step in an analysis of the day’s events then, if we take 
the view that “[t]he nation is primarily a psychological or symbolic 
concept; in Mackenzie’s words ‘is not merely a statement of fact; 
it is a state of feeling” (cited in McCrone 1992, p. 204), it seems 
that uncovering the heart or the social ontology of ‘working-class 
nationalism’ requires answering the question as to what are the 
social conditions of this passion, or what is the idiom or the means 
of acquisition of this passion? In answering this question I begin 
by observing that locals constitute and perform their locality and 
nationality through the idioms of kinship, residency and, 
importantly for working-class men, “life as a physical existence” 
(Connerton 1989, p. 101) i.e. through the idiom of manual work 
and propose that this nationalised dasein is a performance of and 
extension of the ‘condition of reduction’ discussed in Chapter 2 
or ‘embodied social being,’ as the ‘structure of feeling’ present on 
this particular day is something I have witnessed many times 
before among manual workers. While the nation is being imagined 
and constructed, membership of the national group is a matter 
of feeling via a class-based habitus and performing in all of their 
sensual, visceral and bawdy idiom, practices of identification.
Throughout the afternoon a repertoire of non-verbal embodied 
gestures and paralinguistic communication and expression was 
on display, along with the use of the vernacular Scots which made 
for a ‘community of embodiment’ characterised by all manner 
of spontaneity and exuberance, including one individual jumping 
onto a table and exhibiting his ‘manhood’ all the better to perform 
his shouted insult at a televised ‘other’ on a screen. 
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If there was a kind of spectacle that football is able to put on 
view, there was also an obvious libidinal and stylised aspect to much 
of their behaviour so that the afternoon was a cathartic experience 
due to the release of libidinal energies, and there seemed to be what 
one might describe as the alignment or triangulation of id, identity 
and ideology as behaviours are drawn from the embodied integra-
tion of being-social and being-historical and being-national which 
meant they could have a fuller experience of their human being. On 
this day, throughout the nation the same processes whereby an inte-
gration of id, identity and ideology was effected, meant each local 
congregation was reproducing and celebrating their own locality 
and their own integration with the nation and in light of such 
empirical data, what is required of social theory is an emphasis upon 
the body as a locus of meaning, and in this regard Connerton’s view 
on how bodily practices are able to bear meaning is useful:
[I]ncorporating practices depend for their particular 
mnemonic effect on two distinctive features: their mode of 
existence and their mode of acquisition. They do not exist 
‘objectively’, independently of their being performed. And 
they are acquired in such a way as not to require explicit 
reflection on their performance (1989, p. 102).
Similarly, reviewing the history of hermeneutics within the social 
sciences Connerton (1989, p. 101) notes:
[T]he communication of meaning…could in principle 
include the body in its domain but did so in practice only 
peripherally. The object-domain of hermeneutics was defined 
in terms of what was taken to be the distinctive feature of 
the human species, first consciousness and later language. 
When the defining feature was taken to be consciousness...
the life of human beings, as a historical life, is understood  
as a life reported on and narrated, not life as a physical 
existence [italics mine]. When the defining feature of the 
human species was seen as language…bodily practices are 
acknowledged, but in an etherealised form.
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Much like Chatterjee’s (1993) conception of the sourcing of 
(Indian) nationalism within a particular human interiority i.e. 
the (Indian) ‘self’ which was the one hinterland the colonising 
British were unable to penetrate, and so could become a resource 
the nationalist could mobilise as an uncontaminated source 
of Indianness, so in my identifying the social ontology of Scottish 
working-class nationalism in the relationship between the being 
brought about by labour and a subsequent mobilisation of this 
dasein and mitsein in the direction of political nationalism, 
I propose the following dialectical position: starting by explicitly 
denying the existence of a subject or subjectivity free from 
capitalist penetration, I deny a Scottish self or subjectivity 
untouched by capitalist relations having any place in any con- 
ceptualisation of locals because they are thoroughly penetrated by 
capitalist relations and the cash economy, so there is no Scottish 
subjectivity ‘out of history’ (Craig 1996) which nationalism can 
mobilise or which the ethnographer can imagine in order to arrive 
at a ‘native point of view’ or non-social sourcing of nationalism. 
However, precisely because of this deep historicisation of dasein, 
there does emerge over time a secondary nature or working-class 
‘hinterland’ sourced in the life of labour that does indeed become 
an inaccessible sourcing of a Scottish nationalism that is not the 
civic nationalism of the SNP leadership and which is not sourced 
in bourgeois fictions such as civic society. 
By this ‘secondary hinterland’ I mean to indicate an element of 
working-class dasein that is not national or local or provincial and 
yet very much included in any real instance of this ‘secondary 
hinterland’ is belonging to real geographical locations; that 
integrated to working-class dasein is ‘being local’ which is brought 
about by belonging over generations to localities such as Lochgelly, 
Kinglassie, Cowdenbeath, Ballingry, Lochore and Kelty etcetera 
and which has its own density. I propose, then, that working- 
class nationalism be viewed as a form of embodied meaning 
whose medium of acquisition is that of manual labour so that 
the mobilisation of national identity is the politicisation of a 
particular kind of human being, a performance of embodied 
(social) being, so that informants perform their being national via 
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their embodiment, and their visceral nationality is sourced in their 
embodied class habitus which is itself emergent from a particular 
physical existence and its ability to produce a likeness of itself in 
the being and the performance of being national.
Because the day allowed an intense performance of solidarity, 
sociality and locality, The Tavern was a space where individuals 
can be themselves and a place where their Scots language and their 
gestures and mannerisms are not out of place, so that the day 
revealed what might be termed the deep ‘hinterland’ of working-
class dasein. Such set-piece occasions are enjoyable because they 
are occasions of integral expression and affirmation which 
informants routinely advise is denied them in the post-trade union 
workplace and in post-Thatcherite New Labour politics and the 
middle class dominated public sphere. If this interpretation of 
the structuration of emotion on display is not entirely incorrect, 
the psychological work that visceral nationality accomplishes 
is the pleasure of being integral, and the catharsis effected by 
being national and its signature embodied practices is to restore 
the imagined and experienced caesura between self and stratified 
society, to heal or restore the imagined and experienced caesura 
between the nation-state and subjectivity when mobilised and 
deployed as a politics.
In terms of locating the social foundation of working-class 
nationalism, then, I do not locate it in any ideological or doctrinal 
proposition of reason or knowledge, nor in any extrinsic event or 
‘trigger’ but in something more real and primitive and natural i.e. 
in the social ontology that emerges from the life of labour. Men 
draw upon their lives as physical existence for their performance 
or enactment of being Scottish, and so an object of research is to 
understand how the ‘condition of reduction’ is able to act as 
a template that is able to inform the constitution and expression 
of belonging and identification with the nation, and how this 
works in practice. Kellas (in Harvie 1998, p. 19) has observed 
that “working-class nationalism is generally related to culture and 
football,” and in the pre-devolution era before 1999 this idea was 
repeated in the romantic notion that the massed football supporters 
at the national football stadium of Hampden Park acted as a kind 
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of surrogate national assembly. While I am sympathetic to 
dismissing such notions out of hand, it does usefully recognise the 
idea that national identity must be a matter of performance and 
must be practiced. 
In localities across Scotland and among men in particular, the 
prevalence of football within male society and sociality means it 
often mediates local and national identity. Young boys’ experience 
of belonging to a particular sub-locality within Cardenden, for 
example, is ‘performed’ via annual aestival football tournaments 
such as the Johnny Thomson tournament held every September 
for youngsters from each area of the village, so that when per-
forming national identity or performing their belonging to locality 
as men, from a socio-ontological point of view they are not doing 
anything different so that local, provincial and national identities 
always already feel part of or integrated with the ‘worked self.’
The key to understanding how locals are their national identity, 
then, is understanding the socialised body as the medium through 
which all these identities must pass if they are to appear at all 
within the working-class psyche and its field of perception, so that 
to appear at all is to already have a certain ontological kinship 
with other phenomena which appear and which are similarly 
constituted and expressed. Just as the ‘worked self’ is able to 
inform non-working life, so ‘the nation’ has a promiscuous ability 
to be itself in other realities, and this is what makes it possible 
for the working-class habitus to make connections between what, 
at least formally, are separate and autonomous realities i.e. 
the objective and extrinsic nation and the workers’ sense of self, 
and what subsequently makes it possible to politicise this ‘being 
national’ and speak of a working-class nationalism. The net 
result then is the conclusion that the being of ‘being working 
class’ mediates the being of ‘being Scottish’ insofar as the former 
involves an affective matrix which reads the current moment and 
the long durée; life as physical existence becomes habitus and a 
template which is taken up by freedom and choice and reason and 
the wider culture to inform intentional life and thereby model the 
experiencing and the meaning of ‘being national,’ and provide a 
‘libidinal vocabulary’ to express the nation. 
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The ‘unionist’ and the ‘nationalist,’ then, share the same dasein 
with the only difference that the unionist lives through 1979-1997 
and 2010-2015 and still accepts Scotland’s union with England, 
while the nationalist lives through 1979-1997 and 2010-2015 but 
applies his established class-based structure of perception to the 
nation and to his reading of politics and history, and politicises 
history in favour of independence. Because the class condition 
mediates national identity, locals are able to change their 
politics or party allegiance from the unionist Labour Party to the 
nationalist SNP without this requiring any great transformation of 
their being or consciousness i.e. without any great renovation 
of their already in-place ‘structures of meaning’ because nothing 
about dasein has to change.
From the frenetic scenes and behaviour seen on that afternoon 
in the Tavern, it is plain locals on such occasions come alive to a 
preferred but normally unavailable experience of themselves; as 
if in a televised confrontation with some ‘other’ what is required 
and what becomes possible is their favoured subjectivity and 
favoured experience of locality, so that such occasions highlight 
the decentred nature of identity, and such conspicuous displays of 
identity were attractive and enjoyable because, unlike the Fun Day 
discussed in Chapter 1, they provided locals with the opportunity 
to celebrate their integral selves; their gendered, localised, classed, 
and embodied nationalised selves. In this regard the importance 
of locality comes into its own as it is the possession of a locality 
that means by definition one is able to practice belonging as one’s 
locality is both a passport to belonging to the nation and the 
certificate that legitimises one’s sharing in the national identity. 
The notion that the nation “must be imagined by its members - in 
order to exist” (Eriksen in Olwig & Hastrup 1997, p. 106) is well-
established, but such localised events not only set the stage for an 
imaginative coming together of the nation but enact and express 
a dasein and mitsein that is already constituted and integrated 
with the nation, so that locality is always also nationality, just as 
dasein is always already mitsein.
If as a general principle anyone’s sense of belonging to his 
or her particular natal place is not something ‘in itself’ but is 
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inter-localitively constituted, this being-in-space is not only a 
means of learning how to practice belonging to locality but is a 
medium through which an intersubjectively constituted imagining 
of the nation occurs, such as when the fan travels to his team’s 
away fixtures every season in the company of other fans. As a 
general position we can also say that the class condition ‘makes 
sense of’ or mediates being national while being careful to say 
class does not constitute the nation or national identity ex nihilo. 
If locals are members of a social class they are also members of a 
people and the Scottish nation, and it is the ability of each identity 
to be a cipher for each other that means the unsubstantial or under- 
determined nation is made substantial and is intersubjectively 
‘quickened’ by a thousand other identities, and this allows the 
nation to be promiscuously real and ‘at home’ in the most diverse 
circumstances. 
While the nation pre-dates the rise of class society, the identity 
and reality of being working class mediates the identity of ‘being 
Scottish’ or gives it its salt, as being working class involves an affec-
tive structure which ‘flavours’ both the current moment and the 
historic long durée; alters the flavour of being and experiencing 
‘being national’ as well as providing a libidinal or kinaesthetic 
‘vocabulary’ to express this reality and identity during set-piece 
occasions. What gives nationalism its existential purchase upon 
members of the nation then is not the doctrine that the nation and 
the state shall be congruent, as this useful distillation of what nation-
alism ‘believes’ is not real enough nor does it possess the power to 
structure subjectivity or produce a ‘structure of feeling’ via the align-
ment or triangulation of nature, nurture and nation. Rather, the 
ability of a class-based habitus to make the nation into a cipher for 
its energies and insights and grievances is the key to its reality.
In coming to understand the politicisation of fully-contextualised 
dasein what must be avoided is any suggestion that for this 
politicisation to happen there is required a particular point of 
view on a particular issue in order to perform or enact nationality. 
What is to be avoided is any suggestion that locals require a 
consciousness of Scottish history, for example, in order to ‘trigger’ 
their national identity or to construct their visceral nationality by, 
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as such a historical consciousness is not the ‘bloodless’ basis for 
this politicisation of national identity as in this cerebral case 
‘being national’ would never amount to much among the working 
class, as the world of meaning that the student of history inhabits 
is not the idiom of mediation of national identity for the average 
working-class person.
When asking from whence comes the force of national identity 
if not from reason, knowledge or extrinsic events such as something 
as episodic as a football match, I propose the substantiality and 
vitality of nationalism emerges from the strength and vitality of 
social ontology, with the important qualification that if the nation 
can be a cipher for class-based realities, the symbolic quality of the 
nation does not mean it is a tabula rasa or blank page upon which 
each class and each man can write or project their private fantasies. 
It is clear that the football match both brought about the full 
subjectivity of locals and allowed for the expression of an already 
constituted dasein and mitsein and allowed their total immersion 
in the moment on the basis of their ownmost dasein, so that it was 
not simply that the locals in the Tavern identify themselves with 
their team’s cause but that this practice of ‘identifying-with’ is 
instantly available to them as part of their emotional habitus, so 
that their observation of the events unfolding on the pitch was 
anything but passive as it was an activity based upon an already 
constituted immediacy reacting to a series of events on a football 
field. Once we assume the quality of immediacy of their relentless 
identifications with each kick of the ball is the acting out of an 
already learned immediacy and an already learned responding to 
the moment, it is a small step to conclude this responding draws 
upon the prior disciplining and training of affectivity and the 
disciplining of attention to the moment that is learned outwith such 
set-piece occasions in their mundane lives, such as in the workplace 
for example.
Much of my argument concerning the ontology of historicity 
and what might be termed the ‘sociality’ of nationality is con- 
cerned to emphasise the structural ‘objectivity’ of the nation and 
the structural objectivity of its history that cannot be imagined or 
manipulated at will. The nation is real because it is able to satisfy 
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a desire for self-recognition that is continually being reproduced 
in the daily reproduction of locals’ embodied habitus, which is 
characterised by the ability to produce a ‘likeness of itself’ and 
a connection to the nation. This inter-ciphering between the 
class-based social ontology that comes about via labouring, for 
example, and national identity is what makes a working-class 
nationalism possible and pleasurable. If we take the prescient 
remark of Herzfeld (1997, p. 19) that: “In constructing ideologies 
of national identity, it is the task of nationalist movements to 
present and appeal to...a culturally and politically powerful model 
of the self,” we can say that to the extent that any form 
of nationalism (such as the respectable civic nationalism of the 
SNP) that does not mimic or make appeal to this class mediation 
is fated to be unsuccessful among the working class.
In this conception of the phenomenological ground of (working 
class) nationalism it is a politicised social ontology that cannot be 
easily recognised, far less mobilised and manipulated by liberal 
elites for their political ends. Because of its grounding upon an 
existence-led self that is sourced in the physical life of manual 
labour and the iso-morphisms it constitutes in the psyche of this 
subordinate class, this manual sourcing of nationalism means it 
may be described as a ‘politics of being’ involving a highly aligned 
and structured ontology characterised by a decentred openness to 
time, history, locality, society and physical work which mobilises 
to have Nation and State congruent, but without any need to 
resort either to ‘blood and soil’ ideology or to bourgeois forms 
such as the ‘civic nationalism’ of the SNP leadership.
This existence-led decentred dasein also means national identity 
is never a private possession to be enjoyed ‘outside of history’ 
or cultivated at one’s leisure. The events of 1979-1997 and 2010-
2015, then, do not allow for a contemplative or unhurried private 
relation to Scottish national identity because during these periods 
the Scots are more or less forced to choose whether Britain or 
Scotland is to be the organising category of their history, politics, 
culture and imagination. It was not any prolonged intellectual 
contemplation of the merits and drawbacks of political union with 
another nation that is responsible for Scottish nationalism, then, 
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but the exasperating and ‘never-ending’ fact that Scots vote one 
way and the English vote another way, so that the defining 
experience of politics for those generations born since nineteen-
sixty and who came to political and historical consciousness 
during and after the nineteen-eighties was that politics was 
mediated through two nations and two electorates fundamentally 
at odds with each other. In contrast to unionist claims about 
Scotland and England being ‘better together,’ the lived experience 
of political union has been that it is not fit for purpose from 
the point of view of Scottish democracy. It was the difference 
of political ideology, then, that made the relation of political 
union problematic during the years 1979-1997 and again during 
2010-2015, a political or ideological difference that was more 
or less based upon class-based differences in political choices 
made at the ballot box and in this concrete context, to make 
politics meaningful again has meant firstly imagining and then 
re-constituting the political playing field upon a purely Scottish 
basis. In these circumstances, then, the nation became a class issue 
and so Scottish nationalism became a politics of class and Scottish 
nationalism became the pursuit of a class-based ‘politics of being’ 
all the way to an independent Scotland should the Scots vote ‘yes’ 
on 18 September 2014.
If this is the social and ontological and historical grounding of 
the working class’s desiring and achieving political independence, 
the expression ‘politics of being’ adverts to the fact that much 
more is involved than simply a new constitutional arrangement 
insofar as the expression of history, locality and nationality are 
being imagined and practiced free from the old modernist 
‘inferiorism’ (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989) and tired industrial 
narratives; that a younger ‘medieval’ patrimony is being mobilised 
to the horror of unionist modernists for whom this ‘return of the 
repressed’ signals the end of the hegemony of a cosmopolitan 
liberal elite over the imagining of the nation, so that the liberal 
cosmopolitan elite sense in this ‘fundamentalist’ integralist politics 
of class and nation a threat to their privileges and the end of their 
long ‘suppression of being.’
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5.2 Interpretive Sociology, Interpreting Scotland
On the cusp of 18th September 2014 there can be no doubt 
that the task of interpreting Scotland is being undertaken by 
unprecedented numbers, and on an unprecedented scale across 
every media format across the length and breadth of Scotland and 
further afield. As a preface, then, to interpreting my interview data 
it may be helpful to recap some earlier observations and re-state 
the hermeneutic or the ‘rules of interpretation’ that I follow. As 
a generalisation, the standpoint I take is generally known as 
interpretive sociology or a position that is often described as a post-
objectivist or qualitative way of doing sociology. The basic principle 
of interpretivism is that in trying to understand the meaning of 
something, it is the particular social context of a text or discourse 
or a practice or an event that settles the question of its meaning i.e. 
not only does context decide meaning but decides the range of 
competent interpretations that can be reasonably considered. 
In any concrete situation, then, social actors bring to their 
social interaction schemes of perception that are used to read or 
interpret a situation or behaviour, and the task of the interpretive 
sociologist is to discover what schemes of interpretation ‘natives’ 
bring to bear on situations. For example, then, if we think back to 
the exchange between sewer men cited in the previous section, 
an Englishman who might easily and reasonably be judged or 
interpreted as doing a good deed on behalf of his neighbours 
by telephoning in order to report foul smells from a wastewater 
treatment plant in the hope that something be done, we see that 
he is instead interpreted according to an established code that is 
imposed upon his behaviour; that it is not as a result of his actions 
that he becomes interpreted as a ‘white colonist’ (Jedrej and 
Nuttall 1996) but rather it is his English accent or being English 
that triggers his behaviours becoming interpreted by a latent 
structure of perception that is operative among the workers i.e. 
their Scottish nationality and its historicity, and so the English 
man as he is ‘in himself,’ and other perfectly reasonable 
interpretations of his actions disappear, and instead are effortlessly 
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or ‘without thinking’ made to appear in accordance with an 
already established interpretive frame, where they become another 
instance in a long series of instances of an imagined historic 
English ‘essence’ with a track record of colonisation of foreign 
lands and usurpation of natives and their localities.
Another example of how different schemes of perception lead 
to very different interpretations of the same set of empirically 
given data came towards the end of doctoral fieldwork (Friday 
8 December 2000), when myself and my family attended the 
Christmas pantomime The Hunchback of Notre Dame at the 
Bowhill Centre. The pantomime was an enjoyable family show 
and played to a packed hall with the pantomime villain being 
particularly memorable as the children quickly learned to hiss and 
boo his every entrance and exit. In perfect contrast was the virtuous 
and poor street-seller Esmeralda whom the villain blackmailed 
into marrying him, thereby thwarting the happiness of the hero 
Quasimodo who had fallen in love with the beautiful Esmeralda. 
The pantomime was an all-ticket event and a great success, and the 
audience were youngsters of primary school age who participated 
enthusiastically throughout by singing along with the actors to pop 
songs that were cleverly inserted into the storyline so that, by the 
time of the final scene, a hundred or so youngsters were out of their 
seats dancing and singing at the front of the stage along with the 
cast to the song Reach for the Sky by the pop group S Club Seven.
While aimed at children, however, there was also something for 
the ethnographer of nationalism out for an evening’s entertain-
ment to see; the unconscious performance of history and national-
ity as the priest character of Notre Dame cathedral was played in 
a caricatured asexual or effeminate manner, with exaggerated 
Irish accent and unfailing hysterical mannerisms and opinions. 
As a concoction of enthusiasm, naivety, stupidity and internalised 
inferiority, this pantomime character was an instantly recognisa-
ble Anglo-Scottish construction of the ‘Daft Paddy’ for those audi-
ence members whose ‘scheme of perception’ is aware of this trope 
from the English/Scottish literary tradition. 
However, if the role of the fool or court jester was assigned 
to Ireland, the role of ‘family pet’ within the British ‘family of 
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nations’ was played by the only animal character in the cast, a 
crocodile named Jock (i.e. Jock the Croc), whose role it was to 
provide comic relief. While the hero, heroine and villain were 
established as de facto ‘English’ thanks to their accents, it was 
some minutes into the pantomime upon realising the actor playing 
Jock the Croc was playing his part in a Glaswegian accent that I 
understood the stage was set for a performance of Kravitz’s (1997) 
“subaltern Scot,” and Zizek’s (2000) reading of the Jar Jar 
character from George Lucas’s film The Phantom Menace (1999), 
where the de-humanisation or de-personalisation of a national 
group is symbolically realised via ‘animalisation.’ A Christmas 
pantomime, then, suddenly became an allegory of England and its 
geo-political relationships with the Celtic fringe (Hechter 1975), 
with the latter reduced to providing comic relief while the 
responsibilities for the ‘serious’ matter of plot and narrative 
became an exclusively English affair.
Having spoken to the proud creator of the production110 I have 
no doubt she would be very offended by what I am sure she would 
see as my wilful, perverse and incompetent interpretation. Also, 
when I put my interpretation to my Spanish wife Eva later that 
evening, it was clear she simply did not see the sense of my 
interpretation of the show. In defending my interpretation, then, 
I concede from the outset that it breaks with the author’s intentions 
and the actors’ interpretations of their roles, as well as with the 
audience’s interpretation of the pantomime. If my interpretation is 
‘wilful and incompetent’ it is because a scheme of perception I am 
able to bring to the pantomime places it into a context that 
the author did not share, and a context that fundamentally 
changes its meaning. My interpretation or reading of the ‘text’ is 
also indifferent to any desire to raise to consciousness that which 
is unconscious in the author, as I am happy to concede the 
‘subaltern Celt’ motif did not objectively exist in the text, nor does 
it exist in the consciousness or unconsciousness of the author, 
actors or audience. 
110 Margaret Gary at M & M Theatrical Productions (Ayr). 
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My hermeneutical procedure, then, is to remove the data from the 
context of their creator’s consciousness and their Christmas con-
sumption, and re-locate it to a context or ‘structure of perception’ 
they were never intended for, and this new context is a context for 
judgment and interpretation outwith the control or ken of the author 
or audience i.e. the objective social ‘realm of meaning’ where the 
interpretation and truth of words and actions are judged in the public 
sphere where meaning is decided, and it is in relation to this sphere 
that the work of interpretation is settled, rather than in the privacy of 
the artistic or aesthetic or festive consciousness and context. 
Interpretation, then, can be something of an ethical dilemma 
for the ethnographer as it can be an ‘unjust’ and offensive affair 
that is happy to dismiss the interpretations of an author or social 
actor, and in the following section I will demonstrate this offensive 
hermeneutic at work when interpreting some interview data and 
scenes from fieldwork.
While a unionist hegemony has come to an end in Scotland, 
1 July 1999 is not the Independence Day the nationalist seeks and 
an essentially British ‘social mindscape’ (Zerubavel 1997) remains 
pervasive among many. Despite the power of nationalism to renew 
or make reality, 1 July 1999 also served to highlight the ‘business as 
usual’ dispositions of many locals, and provide empirical evidence 
that would put to rest any suggestion that 1 July 1999 involved the 
renovation of mental structures or any change in the symbolic 
order, with only 60% of the Scottish electorate voting in the 
September 1997 Referendum held to prove the ‘settled will’ of the 
people for a Scottish parliament. As an illustration of the confusion 
as to where national identity lies after 1 July 1999 and how it enters 
into everyday life, I recall an afternoon spent in The Auld Man’s 
Shelter pub in December 2001 where, as usual on a Sunday at that 
time, there was a quiz in the early afternoon after the card school 
finished. On this occasion the card school put a team in for the quiz, 
and not long into the quiz came the question: “What was the name 
of the first foreign manager to win the F.A. cup?”111 
111 The Foootball Association cup is an annual football competition in which 
every English football league team is entitled to participate. 
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After a few seconds it was clear that there was some confusion 
among the teams as to what was meant by the word ‘foreign.’ The 
first request for clarification came from a member of the card 
school who asked: “Does that include Scottish managers?” At 
this, the compère showed annoyance, and replied by defining 
foreign as “non-British.” After another few seconds, from another 
table someone asked whether an Irishman was to be considered as 
being British or a foreigner for the purpose of answering the 
question. At this, the guidance given was someone from the 
Republic of Ireland was to be considered a foreigner. This 
anecdote indicates the break-up of a shared ‘realm of meaning’ as 
a result of the ending of the cultural and political hegemony of 
Britain within the Scottish imagination since 1 July 1999, and this 
is a development that also means the end of interpretations of 
Scotland that can pretend to be objective.
My first examples of dialectically opposed interpretations of 
the same data, as a result of the social actors involved possessing 
different schemes of perception, come from two English men 
living in the Bowhill area of the village who illustrate how national 
identity heavily structures or even ‘imprisons’ perception and 
interpretation. As usual, my opening question was to ask each 
informant their views on the new Scottish parliament: 
Mr Tims: They’re a bunch e bloody hypocrites, that’s what 
they are.
Me: What do you mean? Your wife is worried it could 
become another Northern Ireland in twenty-five years.
Mr Tims: Oh Ah’ve said that all along!
Me: Do you think it’s divisive this Scottish parliament?
Mr Tims: Of course it is! Of course it is! It’ll be another 
Northern Ireland, bound to be! You’ve only to hear them 
talking in the parliament, Scottish nationalists talkin, Ah 
mean they’ve only one idea! Ah mean they’ve got peace in 
Northern Ireland which is a good thing, they’ve got a sort 
of peace in Northern Ireland but at what expense? The 
governments said oh we’ll never negotiate with the IRA 
when they’ve got guns and now they’re invitin them into 
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parliament; give them an office which again is gonna cost 
the tax payer millions of pounds over a few years… And 
what will they do? They’ll invite all their pals an sit an 
discuss it all in our parliament.
Me: Where did this parliament come from? Who wanted it 
and why?
Mr Tims: It’s these pressure groups, that’s why.
Me: Do you think it’s not so much people that are wanting 
it but that the political chattering classes for whatever 
reason...
Mr Tims: They’re just a talkin shop and it’ll just run itself 
into the ground, of course it will. That’s the unfortunate part 
about it, it’s gonnae cost…the cost of building this parliament.
Me: You’re wife said to me you’re an Englishman.
Mr Tims: Aye.
Me: Do you feel as if because this parliament has been 
created that somehow it has put you in an uncomfortable 
position?
Mr Tims: No it doesnae, but as I say my family will see it. 
And Ah mean you only have to go up round about where 
the SNP are really...shall we say...got the swing, up round 
the north east coast area, that type e thing, to see all the 
anti-English slogans that are already there.
Me: In the elections to the Scottish parliament did you 
bother voting?
Mr Tims: Oh I voted!
Me: Who did you vote for because all of the parties were 
more or less in favour of the parliament so you’d be stuck 
wouldn’t you?
Mr Tims: I was in a way.
Me: Who did ye vote for?
Mr Tims: The Conservatives.
Me: Was that the lesser of the evils?
Mr Tims: Of course it was. Of course it was. No doubt at 
all about that. Ah mean Ah’ve lived up here now for fifty 
odd years...Ah’ve no complaints about the people about 
here, Ah mean I get on well with them all… and they get on 
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well with me. Ah’ve no complaints about them. An that’s 
been goin on for fifty odd years.
Me: So why do you think it’s come about just now? Ah 
mean is there somethin different from before?
Mr Tims: Oh aye, it’s come about cause the nationalists 
have spent a tremendous amount of money. And they’ve 
brought in people… the likes of this clown that they’ve got...
Me: Salmond?
Mr Tims: No. That actor boy who doesn’t live in the country.
Me: Sean Connery?
Mr Tims: Aye! People of that calibre walkin in. That’s why 
they’ve gained so much. Ah mean I was a representative for 
the union, for the management of the coal board. And we 
used to go to Labour Party conferences and that because the 
union were part of Labour sort of thing like ye ken.
Me: Were you in the coalmines?
Mr Tims: Ah started at Comrie and then Ah came here. Ah 
was a chief engineer at Seafield Colliery in Kirkcaldy until  
I retired. Bit Ah mean Ah saw what went on at those 
conferences...An it’s even worse now under this Blair 
because he’s dictatin now in the Labour party.
Me: Aye he’s got them on a tight leash.
Mr Tims: Ah’ll tell ye somethin. I seen the same thing when 
I was a youngster. That’s how it started in Germany. The 
very same thing! A wee bit here an a wee bit there. And then 
they started all these youth things, got the youth on their 
side. Exactly what Blair’s doin. Now that’s how it all started 
in Germany. And ye ken what happened in the end.
Next door to Mr Tims lived another English man in his forties and 
owner of a small local business whom I asked his views on the 
new Scots parliament:
John: Personally, it doesn’t really affect us in any way 
whatsoever. Having a Scottish parliament is rather like 
joining a trade union, it’s just somebody else to tell us what 
to do… so basically...I think it really has no effect whatsoever 
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on me personally bit Ah feel for a lot of people yes it could 
do because it’s somebody else to tell them what to do.
Me: Why do you think it is we have this parliament now? 
Is there anything in particular we can point to?
John: I think the Scots are a funny race. Very strange race. 
We’ll bleet and bleet and bleet about something, we’ll want 
it and want it and want it and when we’ve got it we’ll totally 
ignore it.
Me: That is a bit of a paradox.
John: That’s what the Scots are like. You know once they’ve 
got something oh that’s it we’ve got it now we can forget 
about it. Let’s face it, I don’t think the parliament will be 
used, respected, referred to, as much as everyone thought it 
was going to be.
Me: Why will an initial enthusiasm die?
John: I think the Scots as a nation are quite an aggressive 
mob and want to fight for something all the time. They’ve 
got to be fighting. Scots love being underdogs. They like 
being oh way down there. They like to be able to fight and 
struggle and, of course, ma dad did it and ma grandfather 
did it, and it all happened in years gone by and so the only 
way to beat the system is tae fight! And oh, the Scottish 
parliament that’s a great idea! Ah’ll fight for that!
Me: So you think it’s like some collective chip on the shoulder?
John: Yeah Ah think there’s an inferiority complex 
through the nation personally anyway. Having been born in 
England, lived most of my life in Scotland, some of ma life 
in England, Ah’ve been all round the counties in England  
so Ah’ve actually seen the way certain parts of England treat 
themselves, you know, and Scots have definitely got this 
inferiority complex. They’ve got this attitude of being an 
underdog. Ah think the English tend to look forward more, 
the Scots live in the past. The English tend to go forward.
Me: Where has this parliament come from?
John: The idea of the Scottish parliament is very good. We 
had the Tory government for nearly twenty years, you 
know, and for the Scots…this was a very good idea to have 
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their Labour, their own personal government you know 
doing things for them. That’s fine. At the end of the day it 
can’t be nothing more than a huge expense to us all. Really.
Me: So you think it was a disenchantment with the Thatcher 
years an that the Labour Party had to be seen to be doing 
something?
John: Yeah. Ah think that’s how the Scottish parliament 
came to be. It’s just in case the Conservatives got in again. 
And it would be the Labour stronghold which central 
Scotland is and always will be. It’s the usual joke, if an ape 
was standing for Labour he’d be voted in. It’s a traditional 
vote, it was wanting to be represented which Ah don’t think 
a lot of Scots felt they were being represented for many 
many years of Conservative government.
Me: What of the future?
John: Ah think the Scottish parliament is going to be a fairly 
weak affair in the future. It’s gonnae be a fairly spineless 
body. It’s not gonnae have the representation people thought 
it would have. Especially if it finds it has to raise taxes in 
order to survive. It’s gonnae cost an awful lot of money this 
and its got to come from somewhere. It’s only ten percent  
of people that are Scottish and really that’s an awful lot of 
money that has to come from each individual person to 
support the very expensive parliament.
Me: Do you think if people realise their parliament is only 
a talkin shop they are gonnae want more powers or do you 
think it will end up a glorified council? 
John: The Scottish parliament won’t exist. It’ll be got rid off 
as soon as Conservatives run the Scottish parliament.
Me: Do you think they will get rid of it?
John: If Labour runs England, if it swaps round, nobody in 
central Scotland will want the Scottish parliament; they’ll 
want rid of it. Ah really think that’s the whole cause of it in 
the first place.
Me: In the elections to the Scottish parliament did ye bother 
voting, did ye think it was worthwhile?
John: I did yes. I voted Conservative.
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I have reproduced these lengthy extracts from these two interviews 
to evidence the rather innocuous proposition that social actors 
bring schemes of perception to bear upon their interpretations 
of events, but also to draw the ‘offensive’ conclusion that it is 
clear that these two informants being English Conservative 
voters is not unrelated to their ‘wilful, capricious and incompetent’ 
interpretations of 1 July 1999. While the first informant has lived 
in Scotland for more than fifty years and is clearly integrated into 
Cardenden, it is also clear that he is not at all integrated and never 
will be integrated, and is more or less fated to never know he is 
not integrated, nor know his estrangement from a proper or 
competent interpretation of 1 July 1999, and I would speculate 
that perhaps part of the reason for his shrill views is his anger at 
having been more or less forcibly made to suspect that his view 
that he is integrated into Scotland is a self-serving fiction. 
Speculation aside, clearly Mr Tims interprets events in Scotland 
1999 in the light of his generational lived experience, and in this 
regard he is an example of how following one’s ‘native point of 
view’ outwith one’s native context can be a recipe for interpretive 
incompetence or hermeneutical error insofar as his ‘lived experience’ 
does not in fact illuminate the data, but traps the social actor into 
inept interpretations. The structure of perception or the light this 
informant uses to illuminate the data in fact obscures the meaning 
of the data from his view because, in the absence of a shared 
historicity or access to the shared cultural background out of which 
1 July 1999 has emerged, Mr. Tims interprets events in an ‘infantile’ 
fashion, or as they appear to him as a ‘foreigner.’
Likewise, Mr. Tims’s neighbour’s interpretation evidences the 
distorting effects that an English historicity or identity has upon 
his perception of Scotland 1999, so that his having an English 
point of view (“It’s only ten per cent of people that are Scottish”) 
makes him unable to participate in the meaningfulness of 1 July 
1999 and so, again, 1 July 1999 is freed to be interpreted 
according to private caprice, despite his astute observations as 
regards the Scottish parliament being created to prevent a repeat 
of the Tory minority rule of 1979-1997. The impoverishment 
of interpretation that results, then, is not the result of having 
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a view from nowhere (Nagel 1986) or having no historical 
baggage or identity but rather from having a view from elsewhere 
or having the ‘wrong’ kind of historical baggage that leads to 
de-contextualised and therefore incompetent interpretations.112
5.3 Saved by England: Doxic Subordination  
and Its Interpretations
If the meaning of 1 July 1999 is in the eye of the interpreter, 
this does not mean that all interpretations are equal. Also, 
even when the ‘interpreters of Scotland’ share in the context and 
bring fully-contextualised ‘schemes of perception’ to the work of 
interpretation, reaching a consensus is often agonistic to say the 
least, and reaching agreement upon highly-charged judgments and 
interpretations such as domination, subordination or equality in 
relation to the history of Scottish-English geo-political relationships 
seems fated to be caught in endless disagreement insofar as one 
man’s ‘insufferable subordination’ is another man’s ‘best of both 
worlds.’ In this regard, the following excerpt from an interview 
with Ryan Wilson (Woodend Park) who was in his early thirties 
and who was the only informant to mention the word ‘unionism’ 
in all of my interviews, gives a useful illustration of the dialectically 
opposed interpretations of Scotland operative today. 
Ah’m no fir nationalism or that. Ah’m pretty much up fir the 
unionism eh? They’re watchin Braveheart an a’ that shite eh 
an they think aye that’s the way tae go. Naebody’s interested 
in it eh? It’s jist eh...go wi the flow eh? What’s in the papers, 
112 If perhaps the inability to recognise they are in Scotland and not ‘greater 
England’ is the animating principle, this need not be the humourless affair of the 
two informants cited above. The only other Englishman living in Cardenden that 
I interviewed (Stephen Robins, 24 Orebank Road), while evidencing the same 
interpretive incompetence or whimsy, did so not without humour: “Ah voted 
once in ma entire life so far and that was for Screaming Lord Sutch, Monster 
Raving Looney party when Ah stayed in England. The one day working week, 
that’d do me fine. And free national drink. At that time that was his policy.”
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what’s oan the telly eh? Ken, they’ll go wi that. Ah think 
everybody wants it [independence] bit it’s fir the rang 
reasons eh? Ken what Ah mean? They jist want it fir the 
sake e it. Ah dinnae see any reasons fir it. Ah dinnae see any 
point in it. We’re jist a wee country, eh?
What is striking about Ryan’s discourse is that it is a litany of 
‘knowledge claims’ and, as with our earlier analysis of Peter in 
Chapter 4, if we take Ryan at his word he has an abundant supply 
of knowledge that is readily available to him and which he deploys 
easily and spontaneously. Also, like a good Heideggerian, Ryan 
rejects the inauthenticity of ‘the they’ as, unlike everyone else, he 
knows and defends the truth. So certain is Ryan of his inter- 
pretation that he has no need of evidence to support his claims, so 
that there is a doxic organisation of his political consciousness 
that is impervious to counter-evidence because ‘they’ are immersed 
in false consciousness. In light of the lack of evidence and Ryan’s 
certitude, it is clear that habitus or an already established ‘scheme 
of perception and interpretation’ is making the world in its 
image to such an extent that Ryan is oblivious to the fact that he 
is interpreting and selecting among different views, so that we 
may say his political views are immersed in naturalism. Scotland 
is “jist a wee country” and not being equal in size to big countries 
means being weak and vulnerable, and one’s small size becomes 
a natural source of regret. 
According to this scheme of perception, retaining the political 
union with England is a ‘blood relative’ of recognising the objective 
facts of nature that are ‘out there’ and that can not be changed, so 
that unionism becomes a truth of natural science because the land-
mass of Scotland is a fact of nature that cannot be changed. Union 
with England, then, is a natural and eternal necessity as Nature 
itself is Ryan’s evidence, and nature has decided the question of 
how Scotland organises its being-in-the-world. Just as a monkey 
with a red Labour rosette will secure Hugh’s vote, so a thousand 
years of democratic deficit and domination as a result of union 
with England are not only to be endured but are to be preferred to 
a relapse to Scotland’s natural state.
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Ryan, then, is more unionist than professional unionists and 
politicians such as David Cameron and Alastair Darling who 
concede that an independent Scotland is economically viable, and 
it is clear that there can be no counter-evidence or events that 
could challenge his reading of the data. In his own estimation, 
Ryan is a realist and he erects his politics upon recognising the 
‘facts of life’ will not change and his recognition of the facts 
empowers him to see through any un-natural media hype which 
has corrupted ‘everybody,’ while his own political analysis is 
perfectly conformed to objective reality, so that there can be 
no room for debate or discussion of options or possibilities as 
Ryan’s views are not interpretations but objective reflections of 
the way reality really is. What is revealing is that Ryan does not 
argue that Scotland could survive as an independent country 
but is well-served by being part of the UK, because this is the clue 
that what in fact lies behind Brian’s unionism is not any kind of 
economic analysis but something that does not make an appearance 
in his discourse. Another clue that an unexamined scheme of 
perception is in charge of Ryan’s discourse is the claim that 
everyone’s pro-independence views are sourced in the media and 
a film released three years previously, rather than nineteen years 
of unrepresentative government with no democratic legitimacy. 
Ryan’s resort to ‘magical’ thinking is the clue that reveals the 
lengths he will go to rather than examine his scheme of perception 
which is doxic or beyond discussion.
What, then, prompts this infantile resort to magic? To answer 
this question I begin by noting an interesting feature of Ryan’s 
thinking is the work of repression that it accomplishes; the 
work of holding back and holding firm against all the reasons 
‘everyone’ except Ryan has found to at least question the wisdom 
of continuing Scotland’s political union with England. What is 
interesting is the constant act of will required to maintain his 
discursive certainty when all about him have lost theirs. It seems, 
then, that the social ontology that is the ground of ‘the unionism’ 
is a magical frame of perception or doxic subordination that 
reads the geo-political ‘facts’ in the image of this subordination, 
and so imagines Scotland’s economic inadequacy where there is 
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none. This doxic subordination, then, is responsible for the 
‘metaphysical’ belief that the nation needs something added to 
it from outwith itself to become sufficient. On this interpretation, 
unionism among the working classes is the conviction that 
Scotland as it is is not good enough, and once this despairing 
view is learned and internalised, it is taken up by freedom 
and becomes an autonomous scheme of perception so that any 
proposal that the nation make its own way in the world as an 
independent nation is spontaneously deemed irrational, so that 
unionism is a disguised theory of salvation where England saves 
Scotland from itself.
The psychological reality that underpins Ryan’s unionism, 
then, is internalised inferiority that stems from a class position 
that is unable to break from itself, despite being more or less 
coerced to do so by the events of 1979-1997 and the advent 
of affluence since the nineteen-seventies. Within this unionist 
informant’s imagination, the mobilisation of any symbolic material 
to attempt to end the union would amount to a flight from reality 
and a hopelessly romantic mystification of the hard facts about 
Scotland and ‘being Scottish.’ Having described in Chapters 2 and 
3 an intentional horizon confined by a financial and social 
precariousness, it is inevitable that among the dominated there is 
a more or less coerced ‘metaphysical’ quality to their surrender 
before empirical facts, and insofar as one ‘worships’ reality there 
is an imagined swift punishment meted out to any ambition that 
commits the sin of being unrealistic. If I have singled out Ryan, his 
views in this respect were certainly not unrepresentative as the 
question of the financial and economic feasibility of Scottish 
independence was a decisive objection to independence for many 
informants, and appeal to ‘the facts’ of Scottish-English relations 
was a consistent theme during interviewing. From Orebank 
Road, then, I reproduce two views (Mr Hindley & Mr Bowson) 
expressing doubts about the financial feasibility of independence:
Well Ah know people’s campaigned a lot and Ah wanted  
to see it myself, Ah wanted to see Scotland make its own 
decisions but you know you don’t go over the top because 
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money’s got to be found for this. Ah mean this’ll change 
everyone’s mind and they’ll want it reversing like a lot of 
African countries want it reversin because they can’t find  
the capital. At the moment Ah think we cannae really  
live withoot England. Ah honestly think that a’ big business 
really comes through England Ah believe. Ah know we’ve 
oil an a’ that bit…nah! Ah think a’ the big business runs 
through England, and we have tae live that way. Ah really 
think that’s the case.
And:
Me: If we did have enough money d’ ye think independence 
could be a guid idea?
Mr Bowson: Aye, cause there is ither wee countries in Europe 
that show us the way, if we could follow. People are faired Ah 
think. Better the Devil ye ken. Scared. People are scared. It’s 
a’right fir Sean Connery an a’ the likes e that sayin aye come 
oan let’s dae it. He could get oot any time he likes. Bit fir the 
ordinary guy on the street it’s no as easy as that.
Similar concerns were raised when chatting with a couple to 
arrange an interview, and as we sat we listened to the BBC evening 
news programme Reporting Scotland covering a visit of the 
then (4 February 1999) leader of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(Paddy Ashdown) to Aberdeen, followed by a report on a speech 
in Glasgow by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair criticising 
Scottish nationalism. Alongside the Prime Minister was Donald 
Dewar and both men were shown on the news bulletin unveiling 
a billboard poster warning against the dangers of “Divorce,” in 
reference to the separation of Scotland from England. At this, the 
couple began an exchange critical of Scottish independence. “We 
want oor pensions…” the woman told me, before adding: “Ah’m 
a’ fir mair say in oor ain affairs bit Ah’m no fir this total…” Before 
she could finish, however, her husband interjected: “What aboot 
defence? What aboot some Arab rogue eejit? Whose gonnae pay 
fir it a’?” 
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In light of these concerns, nationalists and unionists wage an 
information war in the media to structure how the electorate 
perceives Scotland’s economic prospects and, famously, the 
Scottish National Party in 1972 launched an electoral campaign 
with the slogan: ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ in light of the discovery of oil 
in the North Sea, and this was to prove successful in both general 
elections held in 1974 because the discovery of oil gave credibility 
to the feasibility of independence. With Ryan in mind, we might 
say that despite Scotland’s unalterable landmass, Nature had 
compensated Scotland in the shape of natural resources in its 
territorial waters so that alongside Ryan’s naturalisation of 
unionism, the nationalists too can naturalise the political choice 
for independence and claim Nature itself as an ally.
The question of the affordability of an independent Scotland 
throws into relief informants’ relationship to knowledge and 
information which is very much ‘out of practice’ and not free, as 
informants do not read books and economic reports and come 
to knowledge and a decision upon that basis. Rather, their 
relationship to knowledge is so dominated that they rely upon 
the media and their habitus to make up for the ‘information 
deficit’ they feel and which they are complicit in. Instead of 
accessing official figures contained in a GERS (2012) report on the 
performance of the Scottish economy, for example, informants 
resort to their dominated habitus which often acts as a cipher for 
a ‘superstitious’ economism, where an alleged Scottish ‘poverty’ 
vis-à-vis England trumps all other considerations when thinking 
about the best constitutional settlement for Scotland. 
This free reduction of themselves to homo economicus and 
their free reproduction of their dominated relationship to the 
realm of knowledge opens a window upon subordination or the 
condition of symbolic domination, as it was ample proof that my 
informants were much more a proletariat than a people, so that in 
contrast to Nairn’s (1981) account of the rise of Scottish 
nationalism being due to British economic decline, at no time did 
any informant suggest to me that Scotland was materially poorer 
than England because of the union. By far the clear majority 
judgment was that England is the richer country and Scotland can 
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only benefit from union, and so the reason why the conviction 
that national identity or “Braveheart an a’ that shite’’ can not 
contest economic reality is so strong is because it borrows or 
partakes in the strength of habitus. In terms of interpreting the 
fact of this consensus as evidence that informants’ inferiorism is 
the basis for their economism, I begin from the basic position that 
this consensus is evidence of social determination at work. While 
a post-materialist ‘politics of identity’ and a more holistic dasein 
can generate a symbolic structure that is sufficiently real to 
produce the “ninety minute nationalism” (Jim Sillars) of football 
supporters, it is not real enough to generate the real nationalism 
of independence, which for many informants is a politicisation of 
national identity too far.
One instance of this inferiorism-come-economism that I came 
across during the first election campaign to the Holyrood 
parliament was when interviewing in Whitehall Drive (29 April 
1999), and I began talking politics with a man and wife as, not 
for the first time during interviewing, I was invited to stay and 
have my tea at the end of conducting an interview. Both 
were lifelong Labour voters and had never voted for any other 
political party, and both told me they had no desire for Scottish 
independence, although both had voted ‘Yes’ in the September 
1997 Referendum. As we sat we watched a news report on English 
attitudes to Scottish devolution and we listened to an interview 
with an ‘ex-pat’ from Dunfermline living in England who declared 
himself against setting up the Scottish parliament, which was 
followed by the views of some pupils from an English public 
school who were shown discussing Scottish Home Rule. Like the 
ex-pat from Fife, the pupils were also against Scotland having a 
parliament, with one pupil saying: “Scotland still needs England 
to support it.” As the young boy continued to air his views I sat 
wondering if my informants would be tempted to react, and as if 
on cue the woman informant pointedly remarked: “Of course ye 
could change yer mind.” 
I did not ask her what she meant by her remark as I knew exactly 
what she meant, and did not want to embarrass her as 
I was now a guest in her home about to be given a meal. It was clear 
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from her tone of voice that her comment was not light-hearted or 
an invitation to begin a conversation. Clearly the public schoolboy 
giving his opinion had provoked a reaction within her because we 
had both just seen the anti-independence views she had just finished 
defending in our interview being in collusion or alignment in 
producing the precocious conceit of an English schoolboy. When 
placed in this new context, her views were suddenly ripped from her 
habitus and placed in their geo-political objectivity, and thanks to 
this re-contextualisation, the same views suddenly went from being 
justifiable to being embarrassing.
This woman, who had no post-16 education, had undoubtedly 
thought about Scotland’s constitutional crisis over the 1979-1997 
period and was firmly against independence, yet it seemed as if the 
results of her reflection dissolved in seconds thanks not simply to 
them being the same as what any English schoolboy knows about 
Scotland i.e. that Scotland cannot survive without England’s 
charity, but because her views colluded and played their part in 
sustaining this English schoolboy’s perception of Scotland. When 
placed in this English context, my informant’s views changed 
for her from being reasonable to being in collusion with an 
insufferable arrogance. Because the English schoolboy’s views 
were based on nothing but his participation in a wider English 
cultural knowledge, his very innocence was able to dissolve or 
deconstruct my informant’s unionism because the confident 
schoolboy revealed her views were not confidently held at all but 
were based upon the reality of her lack of self-confidence that 
suddenly became externalised for both of us to see; as if having 
subordinated herself to a fourteen-year-old boy and colluding in 
her subordination were not enough, her subordination had 
escaped its private individual existence and had suddenly become 
public and made a spectacle of itself. 
My informant’s economism then was trumped by her shame 
insofar as the schoolboy revealed to the observing ethnographer the 
woman’s ‘freely-chosen’ subordination. Precisely because the boy 
knew nothing of political economy, his judgment emerged from his 
nation’s exercise of hegemony; a hegemony that can produce such 
doxic views in its pre-pubescent youth. The English boy’s ‘violent’ 
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objectification of the woman’s views dissolved the pretence that the 
woman’s views had anything to do with ‘political economy’ or 
factual knowledge. The boy, then, put the woman’s views and her 
herself ‘in her place’ and she was shamed; a boy had revealed her 
‘objective’ being-for-others and had humiliated her opinions in 
front of the ethnographer who had just wasted his time by recording 
them – opinions that were now devalued, prompting her to 
recognise this by conceding: ‘Of course, ye could change yer mind.’
On the question of whether Scotland could afford to be 
independent, the boy revealed that the truth of this question is not 
a transcendent reality ‘out there,’ but a judgement about Scotland 
that is freely available to any English schoolboy. While a judgment 
or interpretation is not to be rejected because it happens to 
aggrandize the conceit of a schoolboy, I propose that the schoolboy 
handed this woman a glimpse of her objectivity and subordination, 
and my evidence is the fact that my elderly informant did not 
dismiss the boy out of hand but was clearly embarrassed, so that 
her shame was the clue that revealed her symbolic domination, 
and the basis for my interpretation that her unionism and 
economism are masks worn by this normally hidden condition 
that, just below the surface, knows it has no business or judgment 
in this matter. The dissolution of ‘firmly-held views’ shows how 
easily a new social context or interlocutor can prize such views 
from ourselves, and how our views are often not really ours at all 
but are rather masks worn by our position in a hierarchy.
Underpinning the de facto unionism of Mr Bowson quoted 
earlier is the familiar economism where the perception of economic 
realities structures the perception of politics because the former 
necessitates the exercise of political restraint. If, as a class, they 
can not afford the experiment of socialism, it seems that as 
a people they can not afford the experiment of independence, 
and so there is a flight to ‘scarcity era thinking’ so that locals’ 
pronouncements upon economic matters have less to do with 
economics than a dominated imagination sourced in their long 
durée adaptation to material inequalities and long durée inequalities 
of representational or cultural power between classes and nations; 
an habitual ‘scheme of perception’ which combines symbolic 
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inferiority with material domination which spontaneously shapes 
or constructs the economic ‘facts’ into a likeness to its dominated 
perception. Economism then is a cipher of inferiorism, or a species 
of magical thinking among the socially and culturally dominated.
Interestingly, fourteen years later in 2013, I met this woman 
again and she told me that in the 2011 election she had voted for 
the SNP for the first time in her life, and when I met her again in 
July 2014 she told me that although worried about her pension 
under independence, she was thinking about voting ‘yes’ in the 
2014 referendum. 
Although I have no direct empirical evidence, I propose that 
just as subordination is silent and invisible and does not normally 
give direct representations of itself, so the beginning of breaking 
with subordination is silent and unspoken, and therefore very dif-
ficult to evidence. However, I propose the principle that more or 
less integral to working-class people being in favour of independ-
ence is the desire to recognise and break with subordination, 
whereas more or less integral to working-class people being 
against independence is the decision to keep on not doing anything 
more than recognising subordination as a fact of life. In proposing 
this generalisation I emphasise that I am not making a philosophi-
cal argument that people who vote ‘no’ on 18 September 2014 are 
happy to reproduce their subordination or are risk-averse while 
nationalists are more authentic. Rather, I am making the highly 
context-specific claim that insofar as an elderly working-class 
woman decides to vote ‘yes’ she evidences she wishes to break with 
her own long acceptance of subordination.
Despite an obvious economism among the poor, however, 
what must be adverted to is the clear desire for independence that 
is thwarted due to perceived economic realities, so that there is 
an unmistakable tension between what is culturally desirable and 
what is economically affordable, and I argue that the balance 
of power in the relationship between a risk-averse ‘scarcity era 
economism’ and an integral ‘politics of identity’ is shifting across 
the ’45 and ’79 generations. Although each generation provides 
evidence that the economic facts of life translate into a constitutional 
caution or gradualism, across the ’45 and ’79 generations the 
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strain involved in accepting the tension involved in culture and 
identity pointing one way while economic concerns point in 
another has increased markedly, to the extent of a mounting 
pressure for a post-materialist politics and the realignment of 
culture and politics upon a purely Scottish basis. What is clear 
to nationalist and unionist alike is that a new legitimacy and 
mobilisation of “all things Scottish’’ has occurred, so that there is 
an increasing psychological tension in Scottish popular culture, 
and Scottish culture and unionism in Scotland are increasingly 
pulling in different directions.
My informants are not economists and never will be, and so if 
they judge that Scotland can only benefit economically from union 
with England, this judgment is fated to be an example of fides 
implicita that takes this signification of the economy of Scotland 
on trust because ordinarily this will not be an informed personal 
judgment. Because of what might be termed the ‘fog of war’ and 
the resultant information deficit on this crucial point, this crucial 
question is fated to be handed over to the media and socially 
constituted experts but, again, which expert judgment one believes 
becomes a social practice and must ordinarily become caught up 
again in non-economic social determinisms. The fact is it would 
be exceptional if any housewife, postman, sewage operative, 
taxi driver, shop assistant, bricklayer, nurse, warehouse worker, 
labourer, care assistant or joiner took the trouble to personally 
verify whether or not his or her material standard of living would 
be significantly altered if Scotland became independent. 
Those with no non-vocational education are often at the mercy 
of the social forces at work that either favour the reproduction or 
the overturning of the traditional dominant perception of the 
Anglo-Scottish relation which has been inherited from the 
‘dictatorship of scarcity’ period, and which holds that Scotland is 
too poor to survive as an independent sovereign state. Being in a 
position to understand the economics of independence presupposes 
having the exceptional agency to act independently and take the 
initiative to find out a series of facts. Also, in proportion to anyone 
having such resources to make competent and complex economic 
judgment, the less likely they would be pre-disposed to frame this 
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issue in static ‘yes’ or ‘no’ terms, as this way of understanding the 
issue as wagering the fate of a nation upon a bookkeeping exercise 
is indicative of rigid and unsophisticated thinking.
The imagining of unionism by Ryan is dominated by 
economism and naturalism and is highly unlikely in a highly 
educated consciousness. Among the working class it is those 
who recognise within themselves more colours than the mono-
chromism of ‘scarcity thinking’ who are least likely to turn to a 
unionism characterised by economism, as they are least likely to 
view themselves exclusively through the ‘mirror of production’ 
(Baudrillard) and hang their constitutional politics upon the 
outcome of a bookkeeping exercise. Among the dominated, 
however, there is always an ear for peddlers of ‘scarcity thinking’ 
as it calls to something of their ownmost dasein as there is a clear 
isomorphism or ‘fit’ between consciousness and politics, because 
this fundamental obedience dominates their everyday thinking and 
their everyday experience of reality. Both unionism and national-
ism then are able to find strength within working-class dasein with 
the former appealing to and replicating a laissez faire accommoda-
tion to and acceptance of subordination, and the latter represent-
ing a class-based desire to recognise and put an end to such 
accommodations to and acceptations of subordination. The heart 
of the matter is how the symbolic level is lived among the domi-
nated; how a condition of symbolic domination becomes aligned 
with political unionism or mobilised to resist this condition.
The truism that a class or a nation may desire socialism or 
independence but material necessity means such projects are 
unrealistic, is a familiar quandary to any working-class generation. 
However, the cultural sphere of the ’45 generation included a 
strong British identity and British culture that meant ‘Scotland’ as 
a medium of culture, politics and the imagination played far less 
of a part in constituting the cultural sphere and symbolic order, 
and therefore less of a place in the disjuncture between the 
desirable and the possible. Among the ’79 generation, however, 
the balance of power has changed thanks to the arrival of the 
affluent society and the cultural ‘revolution’ of the nineteen-
seventies, so that when coupled with the long event of 1979-1997, 
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a political programme is constituted via the cultural level which 
has increasingly jettisoned Britain as an organising category of 
the imagination. Affluence then has fuelled an escape from the 
dominance of economics over culture, and as affluence releases 
the cultural level to become stronger and no longer merely 
epiphenomenal to economic structure, a far greater recognition 
of symbolic domination at the cultural level is possible, so that 
today there is a tension between structure and culture in younger 
generations which was not there before. Finally, in this new 
context, unionism is increasingly stripped of its cultural content 
or legitimacy and is only imaginable by reference to an alleged 
relative material ‘poverty’ vis-à-vis England. 
Hence, while among the ’45 generation there is the clear victory 
for the view that economic reality determines the rationality of 
political unionism, even ’45 generation informants cite fears over 
the economy as the only barrier to the Scottish independence they 
otherwise would prefer. If money, then, is the only imaginable rea-
son left to tolerate the union, it seems logical that the arrival of 
affluence can only result in the problematising of the union among 
a generation that is able to afford a post-materialist politics and 
who are affluent enough to imagine and pursue a post-materialist 
politics of national identity. Also, of course, if the only credible 
reason imaginable for political union with England is an increase in 
material prosperity, the logic of unionism seems to imply the union 
must come to an end when, and it can only be a matter of time for 
the unionist, political union with England produces the affluence 
unionists claim the union provides and they claim they seek.
However, as the name of the Better Together campaign launched 
in 2012 to persuade Scots to vote against independence in 
September 2014 implies, the rationale for union with England 
would remain if it did not deliver the material benefits its advocates 
say it delivers, because ‘being together’ is deemed better as a matter 
of principle i.e. regardless of political difference or economic 
performance, so that union with England becomes ‘philosophical’ 
or even an ethical imperative in the sense of being an intrinsic good. 
For this unionism, then, resistance to independence is akin to a 
political faith position that is not susceptible to being challenged or 
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brought to an end in light of poor economic performance or 
inconvenient political truths such as the democratic deficit that 
results from being ‘together’ with England for better or for worse. 
If once upon a time unionism imagined it had the movement of 
history on its side, neo-unionism has had to become metaphysical 
in order to by-pass the realms of culture and politics and history 
and economy that are increasingly becoming aligned with 
independence, and the fundamental reason for this is the ongoing 
absence of an identifiable British nation and culture to pull 
Scotland and England together. This is why unionist political 
parties are more or less coerced into cultivating a perception of 
Scotland’s relative economic poverty vis-à-vis England to prevent 
Scots voting for independence, so that if the Better Together 
campaign is obliged to search for a post-materialist rationale for 
unionism, much of its leader’s (Alistair Darling) career was 
dedicated to sowing the seeds of doubt concerning Scotland’s 
ability to afford political independence.
As part of the Labour Party’s Holyrood general election 
campaign in 1999, for example, Alistair Darling in his capacity as 
Secretary of State for Social Security claimed at a press conference 
(24 April 1999) that was carried by both evening news programmes 
in Scotland that there would be a two hundred million pounds 
National Insurance contribution deficit should Scotland become 
independent, and given the quote earlier from a lifelong Labour 
voter (“We want oor pensions!”), this New Labour message that 
the Scots cannot afford independence, and that an independent 
Scotland would mean pensions of less than the £67 per week 
under New Labour in 1999, aligns with a dominated imagining 
of the economy among Labour Party voters insofar as housewives 
and pensioners construct their unionism via recourse to an 
economism based upon a dominated or dependent relation to 
the realm of knowledge.
Interestingly, when we inquire into who imagines unionism, the 
case for unionism is almost exclusively made by professional 
politicians and rich individuals who have been successful in 
business, and the weeks and months prior to the first election to 
the new Scottish parliament supplied a steady flow of revealing 
425
a  s c o t t i s h  m o d e r n i t y
speeches and newspaper editorials and articles such as the 
following, which appeared in The Scotsman newspaper entitled 
‘Gloves off as Holyrood Campaign Launched:’
The Prime Minister will open the election campaign today 
with a passionate defence of the Union…in a speech at 
Strathclyde University today….He will claim that the 
Holyrood election will be a battle between social justice and 
separatism…Mr Brown…has already made a series of 
speeches and published a pamphlet.
The article went on to quote the Prime Minister (Tony Blair):
I will be emphasising that there is also a choice, if you like, 
between social justice versus separatism…Ultimately, politics 
is about more than identities. It is also about ideals, and that 
is why in the coming months, the principled politics of social 
justice will overcome the narrow politics of identity.
Commenting upon this speech, Murray Ritchie of The Herald 
newspaper observed that the Prime Minister had argued that 
Labour’s delivery of devolution had safeguarded the distinctive-
ness of Scotland’s civic institutions, so that the Prime Minister 
could conclude: “The Nationalists can no longer argue Scottish 
nationhood is under threat.” This unionist rhetoric fails to reco- 
gnise that Home Rule has not resolved the ‘democratic deficit’ of 
1979-1997 (and 2010-2015), and reveals unionism’s signature 
weakness which is its integral alienation from or mis-alignment 
with integral reality i.e. not only its inability to respond to and 
solve a series of problems but that the union itself is the cause 
of a democratic deficit and the discrediting of democracy and 
participation in politics; is mis-aligned with Scottish culture to 
such an extent that it is simply aligned against the very movement 
of history. All of these realities unionism is unable to publicly 
recognise because to do so is to publicly recognise there is only 
one solution. While it is abundantly clear in light of the almost 
daily breaking of ranks of Labour Party members to publicly join 
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the ‘Yes’ Campaign, and the fact that many traditional Labour 
voters voted for the SNP in 2007 and 2011, that Labour politi-
cians understand the weakness of unionism and the appeal of 
independence and that the continued existence of the UK puts 
Scottish democracy at risk, it is because unionism cannot recog-
nise and resolve these integral problems that the signature weak-
ness in New Labour unionism is that it proposes to solve a 
problem that doesn’t exist in the hope that it will appear to solve 
a problem that does exist. For example, then, proponents of 
unionism such as Gordon Brown and Douglas Alexander in their 
pamphlet New Scotland New Britain (1999, p. 18) argue: “With 
the creation of a Scottish Parliament, no longer can it be claimed 
that Scottish nationhood or its civic institutions are at risk” and 
that (1999, pp. 11 & 47):
It is therefore a serious mistake to portray it as some sort  
of half way house, a mid-point between the status quo and 
separatism… the real battle in Scotland in May 1999 will 
now be between those who put the politics of social justice 
first, and those who practice the politics of national identity 
above and before anything else.
Despite the fact that the multi-national state came to an end in 
1918 with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, New 
Labour unionism imagines not only that Scotland and England are 
‘better together’ but that the multi-national state of Britain is a 
template for what might be called a ‘global unionism.’ In the 
speech of the Prime Minister delivered at Strathclyde university he 
called for Scots to back his vision of a new Scotland in a multi-
cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-national union with England, 
while for Brown and Alexander (1999, p. 31): “Our opportunity 
is to forge probably the first successful multicultural multi-ethnic 
and multinational country.” The new unionism of what used to be 
called New Labour, then, is not presented as a matter of political 
expediency or securing the future of the United Kingdom, but as 
the only and best means of securing nothing less than the advance 
of modernity and history, as Brown and Alexander argue the 
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future of modernity in Scotland will be threatened should it 
become independent; that modern economies operate beyond the 
confines of “the sheltered national economics of the past” (1999, 
p. 47) and so, by definition, if not by performance, any nationalist 
political party is guilty of resisting the movement of history and 
the process of globalisation and dragging Scotland ‘backwards.’ 
Once the imagining of Scotland, then, is safely returned to its 
modernist moorings, Brown, Alexander and Blair conceive it to 
be their New Labour modernising duty to urge Scots not only 
to stick with union with England but to prepare for a new era 
of global modernity; for yet another modernist experiment of a 
globalised Britain, rather than turn the clock back and attempt the 
nationalist route of a purely Scottish modernity.
I propose that this ‘new unionism’ involves the systematic 
misrecognition of reality insofar as re-heating the treadmills of 
unionism and presenting multi-culturalism and multi-national 
internationalism to the Scottish working class as the New World 
Order is more chewing upon the old eighteenth-century modernist 
cud; the usual liberal fantasy sourced in the usual elite and 
privileged relationship to social conditions, and clear evidence 
that what escapes New Labour’s imagination and policies is that 
its misrecognition of working-class Scottish dasein is contributing 
to the nationalist dialectic in Scotland and that if Scotland moves 
from devolution to independence after 2014 it will not be due 
to a ‘slippery slope’ but the same class and nation-based realities 
of difference and conflict that remain real but deliberately 
misrecognised by the unionist political imagination.
However, if this utopian liberal middle-class fantasy is too rich 
for working-class voters more responsive to economism, the 
familiar resort to the eternal fact of Scottish poverty is never 
far away from unionism’s imagining of Scotland, so that just as 
the Conservative Party had insisted prior to the devolution 
referendum of 1997 that Scotland could ill-afford devolution 
in monetary terms, both the old materialist unionism of the 
Conservative Party and the new multi-cultural ‘better together’ 
unionism of the Labour Party combat Scottish nationalism by 
appealing to ‘economic realities,’ and in their political discourse 
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construct rationality in terms of homo economicus which, 
unsurprisingly, integrates with ‘Big Business’ whose interests were 
routinely represented in the print media as threatened by the risk 
of independence. Hence, with the then Secretary of State for 
Scotland Helen Liddle described the SNP as an “anti-business 
party” (Liddell 1999), there was little surprise to read a Scotland 
on Sunday newspaper article entitled Big Business in Secret Bid 
to Save Union: Key Figures in Commerce and Industry line up to 
Oppose Independent Scotland informing readers: “A secret 
summit to plan a ‘Save the Union’ campaign featuring leading 
figures from the Scottish business community will take place this 
week. The talks will centre on…business fears about independence.”
On 9 April 1999 there appeared in The Scotsman newspaper 
an article entitled ‘Economists Back Independence’ which reported 
on a study by the David Hume Institute which claimed that 
independence would be better for Scotland from an economic 
standpoint. The Report on the Economic Aspects of Independence 
argued partial sovereignty to Scotland would lead to political 
instability in the UK which “will not help economic policy.” In 
response, Donald Dewar, the soon-to-be first First Minister in the 
new Scots parliament, raised doubts as to the integrity of the 
report saying: “It has been produced for the election and that is 
for sure,” while Jim Wallace, then leader of the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats and soon-to-be deputy First Minister, was quoted 
as describing the report as “nonsense” adding: “Going for 
independence would be particularly damaging to the Scottish 
economy because of the uncertainty it would create.” 
While such views may be likened to advocating a policy of 
starvation because of the inevitable expense involved in buying 
food, the revealing truth that is being repeated time and again is the 
risk-averse nature of unionism, and the appeal to the Scottish 
people to be afraid to take risks and to be afraid to break from a 
dominated relation to their geo-political subordination (Gilfillan 
2009). The unionist message seems to be that it is not in the best 
economic interests of the working class to break from their political 
subordination. Interestingly, an editorial from The Scotsman 
newspaper commenting on the David Hume Institute report 
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provided a rare example of imagining a non-monetary basis for 
unionism in the run up to the first election to the Scottish parliament:
Independence is possible, especially within the union of 
Europe. But is it desirable to end a Union which has served 
the purposes of both Scotland and England and resulted in so 
much miscegenation and cross-cultural enrichment that only 
a deranged anthropologist would dare distinguish between 
ethnic – as opposed to native – Scots and ethnic English?…
Scots, so proud of Hume and the other scions of the 
Enlightenment, voted for devolution, not separation, and the 
think-tank named after him would do well to remember it.
In the run-up to the May 1999 election it was widely felt that 
Scotland’s union with England was in danger of coming to an end, 
so that unionists were forced to put down their heaviest anchors 
to weather the nationalist storm, and what is revealing in the 
above editorial is its raising the spectre of a Scottish ethnicity and 
its invocation of ‘unionist saints’ to protect the constitutional 
status quo in its hour of peril, and the bizarre description of the 
Scots as “so proud of Hume” and the editor calling upon the Scots 
to return to the faith of their eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
fathers to ward off the threat of independence. 
This invocation of the Enlightenment is a revealing window 
upon the long durée ‘scheme of perception’ that is used to interpret 
Scotland’s history and the present moment, and is a rare sighting 
of modernism having to rouse itself from its hegemonic slumber 
and arrive at a conception of itself beyond economism. What is 
usefully revealed is how it is assumed that the 1707 union with 
England is still seen as progressive despite the fact it is anti-
democratic and results in a democratic deficit and unrepresentative 
governments; as if progress is somehow the result of union with 
England and could not have happened without union with 
England. Unionism, then, is a more or less thoroughly materialist 
theory of national development that has been more or less coerced 
into becoming a ‘metaphysical’ theory that inspires loyalty in the 
face of its political and democratic failure, and this having to 
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become a ‘faith position’ in its own way evidences how empty the 
unionist cupboard is, and how threadbare are the rags (or period 
costume) it wears today.
Another example of how the symbolic material that unionism is 
able to draw upon to appeal to the popular imagination is at an all 
time low is the appeal to anthropologists to do their duty and 
defend the Enlightenment, the union and Reason itself from the 
spectre of an alleged ethnic difference between the Scots and the 
English. This foray into anthropological theory is made despite 
the fact that anthropologists argue “the degree of an individual’s 
ethnicity is a structural matter” (Williams 1989, p. 415), so 
that an anthropologist may well argue in light of differences of 
income, social status, job satisfaction, deprivation, crime, 
educational attainment, physical and mental health, life expectancy, 
cultural capital, social mobility, housing conditions and various 
opportunities throughout the life-trajectory (Harding 1995; 
Reid 1998) that it would hardly be ‘deranged’ to propose that 
such thick-layered difference within and between nations might 
be classified as approaching ‘ethnic’ difference. 
The editorial’s argument of course is that centuries of inter-
breeding means there is a biological impediment to claiming any 
ethnic differences between the Scots and the English, and so 
independence has no biological or ethnic basis. This adventitious 
resort to biology is revealing for its ‘anything but class’ and 
‘anything but democratic deficit’ strategy. Having dispatched the 
claim of biological or genetic differences between the Scots and the 
English, the editorial spends all of its time nicely avoiding the very 
real differences that the period 1979-1997 revealed to exist 
between Scotland and England. 
Finally, as a parenthesis, it is worth noting that it is 
anthropologists who have taught us that the invocation of the 
spectre of the ‘primitive’ (Kuper 1988), as well as the denial 
of ethnic difference and the refusal to recognise political and 
cultural differences, is an established practice of misrepresentation 
of elites who invent liberalism in order to have subordinates 
misrecognise social and cultural injustices and grievances (Tibi, 
in Hutchinson and Smith 1996, pp. 174-179). Williams (1989), for 
431
a  s c o t t i s h  m o d e r n i t y
example, argues that in many political contexts the hegemonic 
ethnic-come-class grouping always seeks to mystify itself and 
obscure its social make-up, and spread a liberal fog that is a ‘flight 
from particularity’ and social context wherever it is able to do so. 
This political strategy of mis-recognising reality so as to better 
ensure the status quo also de-legitimizes any attempt by a rival 
class-and-ethnic group to gain power on the basis of mobilising 
and recognising class and ethnic realities as ‘backward’ i.e. those 
in control of the public realm wage a campaign against realist 
classification systems. 
I would argue that a case could be made for the proposition 
that the concept of ethnicity is preferable to the concept of social 
class given the often sterile economistic connotations associated 
with the latter term, and its inability to suggest multi-layered non-
economic differences. In this regard Ronald Cohen’s (1978, 
p. 394) argument that “ethnicity may be of such positive value to 
members that lack of stratification and possible incorporation 
with loss of identity can produce counter-movements to revive and 
reverse the cultural distinctiveness being lost,” is relevant to the 
situation in Scotland under Margaret Thatcher, John Major and 
now David Cameron as it was to prevent a cultural distinctiveness 
from being lost and to prevent incorporation into England’s 
neoliberal project that the Scottish working class produced a 
counter-movement to revive boundaries via their politicisation of 
nationality, in which a series of historical insights and inequalities 
and grievances were released from the liberal settlement and their 
modernist invisibility, to be mobilised in the current creation of a 
post-liberal future. This brings into view the fact that informants’ 
perception has its own unique historicity and density, so that 
many use the Thatcher period as a key to open and read British 
history and conclude the English upper classes and the assimilated 
middle classes have always been in control of the British state 
and always will be, so the only rational theory and practice of 
development is to secede from this straight-jacket by voting ‘yes’ 
in 1979, 1997 and 2014.
In explaining how the semantic sea-change from hegemonic 
unionism to being on the eve of the 2014 Independence Referendum 
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has came about, the crucial element is the fusion or alignment 
between class and nation. If we consider the year-long miners’ 
strike of 1984-1985 in a former pit village such as Cardenden, 
there occurred something approaching the contestation of the 
State at the everyday level as a result of miners and their families, 
neighbours, friends and localities being drawn into the many 
issues raised by this year-long event. Practices of picketing, 
monitoring movements of coal, monitoring fellow-miners’ 
observance of the strike, organising food kitchens, rallies, trade 
union activities and fundraising events that were touched on in 
Chapter 1, formed part of an everyday resistance to what was 
gradually perceived to be an anti-trade union and anti-miner and 
anti-working-class English government, not to mention the 
struggles against the forces of law and order (police and media) 
deployed to enforce and defend government policy. At the time 
of doctoral fieldwork, many families were still marked by the 
strike of 1984-1985 and I recall one former miner telling me that 
only at having reached sixty-five years old and receiving his state 
pension in 1997 was he able to replace his household furniture 
because of the level of debt incurred as a consequence of the 
strike that had ended twelve years earlier.
If the effects of the 1984-1985 strike were long-lasting for 
this individual and many others, the same can be said of the poll 
tax which was introduced in Scotland on 1 April 1988, despite 
the Conservative Party suffering its worst general election result in 
Scotland since 1910 the year before, and which saw a third of 
Scots from the outset refusing to pay a tax that was introduced to 
appease predominantly middle-class home owners faced with 
increased local authority property rates to raise revenue to pay for 
local government services. Significantly for the future direction of 
the politicisation of young working-class people, the poll tax 
meant thousands of ’79 generation members having lives that 
included a long drawn-out game of ‘cat and mouse’ between them 
and their Labour-controlled local authorities and sheriff officers 
hired to pursue unpaid taxes. Among young single working-class 
people living in the parental home there was widespread civil 
disobedience, so that for many this campaign of non-payment was 
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the intergenerational ‘handover’ of their parents’ 1984-1985 fight, 
and the psychological continuation of a level of politicisation that, 
again, reached the everyday level of young people’s lives. 
As a result of such events it became more or less impossible not 
to politicise nationality among the working class, and insofar as 
this happened this period saw the end of constituting politics and 
responding to events purely upon a class basis, and at this point 
voting for the Labour Party became ‘disorganised’ and problematic 
for many, as this was to respond to the ‘signs of the times’ upon 
an all-British basis and to pool their resentments and sovereignty 
with an English working class which had failed to resist Thatcher. 
This mobilisation upon a more integral basis meant a ‘post-class’ 
or ‘more than class’ mobilisation as a people upon the basis of 
historicity and nationality, so that in the period 1984-1989 the 
British State lost much of its legitimacy among the younger 
generation and a consensus was reached that identified the British 
State as the problem by the end of the nineteen-eighties.
The Scottish miners and working class had mobilised against 
Thatcher via local, class and occupational identities and this 
mobilisation not only failed but failed publicly and incontestably. 
Thatcher took on the working class and won handsomely and 
publicly, so working-class Scots’ political mobilisation after their 
defeat in the nineteen-eighties was re-structured upon a clear 
grasp of their geo-political weakness and upon the basis of 
recognising their defining structural realities and relations. The 
Thatcherite revolution which discarded the post-War consensus 
politics meant governing from a position of strength, so that a 
retaliatory ‘politics of weakness’ became necessary, and integral 
to this new politics was breaking with the 1945 generation 
post-War consensus politics of their parents and mobilisation 
outwith the parameters of Britain and the Labour Party. Working-
class nationalism, then, involved drawing upon hitherto non-
politicised reserves of difference that were of no interest to their 
unionist political representatives; a politics that because it 
emerged from a class with a sharp appreciation of its condition of 
domination was thereby clear-sighted about what had to change 
to end its subordination – a politics constituted upon the free 
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articulation of their geo-political subordination and that wanted 
a political party and political representatives who recognised this 
domination and promised to put an end to it.
It is significant, then, that the SNP at this time began to appeal 
specifically to the working class and to position itself as the 
political party that could canalise and best express this sense of 
a people being subordinate, and with the benefit of hindsight it is 
clear the Labour Party lost control over the political expression of 
class, and thereby lost their traditional role of proposing solutions 
in light of their inability to recognise the problem. As a result of 
the miners’ strike, the poll tax and the secession from the post-
War consensus politics of their parent’s generation, there ultimately 
emerged among a younger working-class generation a break from 
their dominated relationship to themselves, so that the period 
1979-1997 was a point of reflexivity which saw a sea-change in 
their self-understanding.
In the earlier quotes from Brown and Alexander (1999) 
I proposed that these are examples of misrecognition, as well as 
attempts to structure perception that are more or less fated to fail 
because this unionist politics of perception conflates Scotland with 
‘civic’ Scotland, and fails to recognise working-class nationalism 
has nothing to do with safeguarding civic institutions from 
which they are excluded anyway, and the remnant of Scotland 
(church, education and law) that negotiated its survival during 
the 1688-1707 settlement period is of marginal relevance to 
informants’ ‘being national.’ Their kind of nationalism is a class-
based rejection of political union with England that is indifferent 
to whether ‘civic Scotland’ is accommodated or not in a new 
constitutional era, and by persisting in clichés such as being 
“proud to be Scottish and British” and Scotland and England 
being “better together,” unionist thinking announces its inability 
to recognise, far less liberate, Scottish dasein, and announces its 
inability to recognise, far less address and resolve, the history of 
conflict and struggle these two nations and identities are responsible 
for. The unionist position fundamentally chooses to avoid a 
realistic grasp of ‘the present as history’ and is thereby more or 
less fated to imagine a constitutional position that misrecognises 
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the present and what is needed. The flight from integral dasein is 
seen in the desire to reduce the ferment of the period 1967-2007 
to the effort to preserve a nation where it is a movement to restore 
Scottish sovereignty.
Scottish unionist political parties, then, are handicapped by 
their inability to embrace the ‘return of the repressed’ as this 
would mean recognising and representing the integral interests of 
Scottish working-class dasein, and so they are more or less fated 
to fail to realise that throughout the 1979-1997 period, far from 
being in jeopardy, the nation was never more secure or awake, and 
that ‘civic Scotland’ is irrelevant to (working class) nationalism 
and the 1979-1997 (and 2010-2015) period was a godsend for a 
new and deeper politicisation of working-class dasein and a new 
and deeper exercise of reflexivity. Throughout the Thatcher/Major 
period the Scottish middle classes had their opportunity to reject 
Thatcher and mobilise resistance via nationalism but failed to do 
so because neither their class interests nor the civic Scotland they 
oversee and manage was in any jeopardy, and so much like 
Gordon Brown handing out packets of cigarettes to striking 
miners in Cardenden during the 1984-1985 strike, New Labour 
unionism that imagines that, with the advent of a devolved 
parliament the Scots have no reason left to be nationalists, is 
simply too little too late. Instead of embracing the release of 
Scottish working-class dasein and mitsein and championing its 
recognition and its possibilities, the Labour Party leadership’s 
attempt to reduce politics in Scotland to the choice between 
‘nationalism’ or ‘social justice’ is a hapless example of ‘scarcity 
thinking’ in the affluent era.
The heavily policed and very limited recognition of the reality 
of geo-political subordination that must characterise unionism 
explains why it cannot articulate a satisfactory ‘anthropological 
turn,’ and why unionist Labour politicians seem characterised by 
a desire to ‘disappear’ working-class nationalism from its policy-
making process and pursue a strategy of non-recognition. Hence, 
in a televised hustings on 23rd April 1999 during the first election 
campaign to the new Scottish parliament, the Labour Party 
representative (Wendy Alexander) was asked three times if her 
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fellow-Labour Party MP George Robertson was correct to claim 
that: “Devolution will kill nationalism stone dead.” With opinion 
polls reporting the SNP and Labour parties neck-and-neck in 
peoples’ voting intentions, Ms Alexander refused to concede that 
nationalism was obviously alive and well, despite being pressed by 
the programme presenter and the studio audience’s clamour for 
her to give a straight answer to a straight question. 
This behaviour evidences the struggle over representation; that 
what is at stake is not reality itself but the public recognition of 
reality, and that struggles for recognition are vital because “there 
is nothing outside the text” (Derrida 1976, p. 158) or nothing is 
real until it is publicly recognised, so that this unionist politician 
was prepared to become the object of ridicule rather than publicly 
concede nationalism was alive and well. What the viewers in the 
studio audience and at home saw was public proof that Labour 
politicians cannot bring themselves to publicly acknowledge that 
Labour politicians cannot publicly recognise contemporary 
Scotland. If unionists pay the price at the ballot box for their 
refusal to represent fully-contextualised Scottish dasein, a price 
paid by everyone during the nineteen-nineties was a toxic political 
atmosphere where the very phrase ‘Scottish nationalism,’ when 
recognised at all, could provoke in Labour councillors and 
prospective parliamentary candidates descriptions of nationalists 
as “sewer rats” and “racists.”
Given this toxic atmosphere it is unsurprising that when 
interviewing I came across instances of the misrecognition of 
Scottish nationalism as a form of racism that undoubtedly acted 
to prevent individuals from voting SNP. For example, then, when 
interviewing one informant (Miss Muir, Woodend Park) she 
advised that she was worried that to vote SNP was to endorse 
a racist ideology:
Me: Who did you vote for if you don’t mind me asking?
Miss Muir: SNP.
Me: Aye?
Miss Muir: Bit Ah wish Ah didnae really.
Me: Why?
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Miss Muir: Ah think we should jist probably be a’ one 
really, Ah think. It’s probably a bit racist.
Me: What did you say?
Miss Muir: Well, the Scottish against the English...it’s true 
though [embarrassed laughter].
Me: Do you think if you vote SNP folk will think...
Miss Muir: You’re against the English.
Me: You think that’s what it’s like?
Miss Muir: Aye, a bias.
In light of the above testimony and to give a more in-depth appre-
ciation of the up-hill struggle that the independence movement has 
undergone, I will analyse three ‘moments,’ the 1992 British general 
election, the issue of the Scottish Six and media coverage of the 
inaugural Scottish general election in May 1999.
1992 General Election
On the morning of 10 April 1992, the day after the British general 
election, I remember coming downstairs bleary-eyed as a result of 
having stayed up late the previous evening watching the coverage 
of the results, to find my father watching the news headlines 
before heading to work. “Who won then?” I asked. With the 
words hardly out of my mouth I could see the answer to my 
question from the television pictures of Conservative politicians 
and supporters celebrating their fourth consecutive general election 
victory. As my question hung in the air, I waited for my lifelong 
Labour-voting father to say something. Finally, in a weary and 
bitter voice he said: “Makes ye wonder why ye bother votin at a’.” 
On that morning the view that participation in politics was futile 
achieved the status of a self-evident principle in Labour-voting 
households across Scotland. On that morning, even unionists felt 
the terrible truth that there was a blatant democratic deficit in 
Scotland and that political union with England was the problem. 
As of 10 April 1992, the relation of political union with 
England became the entire political problem of Scotland. 10 April 
1992 saw no complaints about a lack of democracy or a lack of 
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political representation among Labour Party voters, as they had 
voted for and elected a remarkable fifty members of parliament 
out of a possible seventy-two. However, a few days later the then 
Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock, after visiting Scotland to 
congratulate party workers on their success, resigned as party 
leader and was replaced by John Smith. In many ways, then, one 
of the reasons why the relation of union became a working-class 
issue was due to the Scottish working class having for so long and 
so clearly chosen not to mobilise politically via their national 
identity, but almost exclusively via their class identity in the shape 
of voting for the Labour Party. Hence, the sense of defeat and 
futility at pursuing such a strategy was all the more stark and 
keenly felt on the morning of 10 April 1992, and this day more or 
less forced upon many Scots a new exercise of freedom insofar as 
after this day there occurred a moment of historic reflexivity and 
re-alignment of class and nationality that resolved that, in any 
subsequent election, the problem would move on from the relation 
of union to what the working class were prepared to do about it. 
The problem was not the Labour members of parliament they 
elected with their votes as they had not reneged on any policy 
commitments and the people had got the party and politicians 
they voted for. Ultimately, the lesson was the working class had to 
resolve to put an end to their own complicity in their geo-political 
subordination as a result of voting Labour.
The 1992 general election meant the need to defect from 
Labour to the SNP became a straightforward common sense 
observation. The relation of political union with England had 
become problematic because of class-based differences between a 
Labour-voting electorate in Scotland and a Conservative-voting 
electorate in England, so that the shift from Labour to the 
SNP was not a strategy to bring a halt to a lack of political 
representation but to bring a halt to a powerless political 
representation, so that nationalism is a power strategy that seeks 
to reconstitute the political field upon an exclusively Scottish basis 
as a direct result of having learned that voting Labour as 
a politicised expression of class interests was ineffective because 
of a vastly more numerous English electorate which returned 
439
a  s c o t t i s h  m o d e r n i t y
a Conservative government. To make being working class 
politically efficacious again, then, meant re-constituting the 
democratic political process without England. 
The relation of union with England became problematic not 
because it prohibited the free and democratic expression of 
political beliefs, but because the union prevented the Scots’ 
political will from being translated into political power, into the 
hegemony Labour-voting Scots in their localities and regions had 
come to expect. In this situation, since the nation cannot change 
and since one’s class cannot change, the only solution is to make 
a new State to ensure the two pillars of dasein (nation and class) 
can exist untrammelled by the eighteenth-century constitutional 
straight-jacket that the 1707 Act of Union is. Insofar as political 
union with England more often than not severs the link between 
democracy and government, the re-alignment of these two realities 
can only be secured by ending Scotland’s political union with 
England. Nationalism, then, is a response to a specifically Scottish 
problem of a Conservative-voting English electorate, so that the 
Scots are more or less coerced into creating their own state so that 
Conservative-voting can become a purely English affair that 
affects the English only. If there is the ‘return of Scotland’ it is 
because the political mobilisation of the nation is a politics of class 
that uses the nation as a cipher to achieve its ends. 
It was the success of the working class in entering and transform-
ing the public sphere and experiencing taking control of local gov-
ernment via their elected representatives that made possible the 
subsequent sense of ‘disenfranchisement’ and democratic deficit of 
1979-1997; only a prior empowerment meant a subsequent disem-
powerment was felt to be intolerable. After the set piece of the min-
ers’ strike in 1984-1985 and another two Conservative general 
election victories still to come in 1987 and 1992 and the introduc-
tion of the Poll Tax in 1988, an already anti-Tory prejudice became 
evermore entrenched, so that we may say it was the Scottish 
National Party who won the miners’ strike and benefited from the 
eighteen years of 1979-1997, as through this period of more or less 
open conflict, Thatcher’s infamous statement “there is no such thing 
as society” was equivalent to claiming there was no Scottish nation. 
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In the Scottish (working-class) symbolic order the advent of 
neoliberal market culture and society through the nineteen-eighties 
and nineteen-nineties were perceived to be an essentially middle-
class English project foisted onto the Scots thanks to the union, 
so that nationalism became a retaliatory ‘proletarian’ response. 
Already in 1987 the Labour Party’s record number of Scottish 
members of parliament had been labelled “the feeble fifty” by the 
SNP leader Alex Salmond,113 and it was from this paradoxical 
defeat-in-victory that the Labour Party converted to supporting 
a Scottish parliament as the irony of these historic successes of 
the Labour Party in Scotland was that they were ample proof 
that voting Labour in Scotland was silly and ineffectual. The 
‘nationalism’ of Home Rule then was designed to resolve unionists’ 
embarrassment at the glaring powerlessness of Scotland within 
the UK, and was a more or less coerced conversion to shore-up 
the credibility of the unionist parties in the eyes of the Scottish 
electorate and media.
While there has clearly emerged a political divide between 
Scotland and England since the nineteen-seventies, it is significant 
that the standard sociological work on Scotland (McCrone 1992) 
devotes more than half of its pages to arguing the point that 
sociologically speaking, Scotland is not particularly different from 
England, so that it seems only a geo-political or historical-cultural 
approach can shed light on this political divergence. The end of 
heavy industry and coal mining in the nineteen-eighties in Scotland 
was part of a wider process of neo-liberal globalization, and a new 
international division of labour that has impacted upon traditional 
all-British industries and all-British trade unions, and this transition 
to a post-British or globalised economy has had a decisive impact 
upon the fortunes of Scottish nationalism. To highlight the long-
term unforeseeable political consequences of deindustrialization 
within a multi-national state such as the United Kingdom, 
Siegelbaum and Walkowitz’s (1995) study of Ukrainian miners 
113 Or as one wit put it in large red paint on a gable end in the Craigmillar area 
of Edinburgh after the 1992 general election: “Vote Labour For Fifty Useless 
Bastards.” 
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has persuasively argued that, like Thatcher in the UK, Gorbachev 
in the USSR oversaw a massive retreat of the state from industry in 
general and national coalmining industries in particular so that, 
just as the mass strike in July 1989 by Ukrainian miners protesting 
against central government economic policy was followed by a 
withdrawal of support for the Soviet state, which paved the way 
towards Ukrainian independence in 1991, so an analogy may be 
drawn with the miners’ strike in Scotland in 1984-1985 insofar 
as a similar withdrawal of consent among a deindustrialised 
population from the State has meant the emergence of nationalism 
as a response to the neoliberalism of the political centre.
This shift to a post-British economy has also unsettled or 
‘dis-organised’ the established relationship between trade unions 
and the Labour Party. On 25 October 1998 there appeared an 
article in the Scotland on Sunday newspaper titled Unison Branch 
Demands Union Donate Funds to SNP which reported a trade 
union branch demanding Unison begin funding the SNP, and how 
a unanimously carried motion argued the SNP offered policies 
more in line with the interests of trade union members than the 
Labour Party with Alex Dingwall, the assistant branch secretary 
in Glasgow city saying:
There is a general recognition within our membership that 
given the changing nature of Scottish politics we have to have 
a voice in other political parties, arguing the Unison case.
Two further examples of the alignment of ‘labour and nation’ and 
the end of ‘Britain’ as a category of the political imagination came 
in November 1998 when the Scottish Socialist Party was formed, 
which indicated the end of British socialist parties and a process 
of seceding from all-British formats within left-wing parties and 
the adoption of the nationalist policy of Scottish sovereignty and 
political independence. On 1st May 2001 the Scottish Workers 
Party merged with the Scottish Socialist Party, which consolidated 
the alignment of ‘labour and nation’ and represented another 
defeat for all-British formats within the Scottish Left. Much of the 
rationale for the ‘eleventh-hour’ conversion of the Scottish Left to 
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nationalism was to take advantage of the new platform of the 
Scots parliament, as prior to 1999 much of the political Left had 
understood itself via the prism of modernism and had viewed 
nationalism as a divisive ideology that distracted from the 
international struggle of workers against capital and, insofar as 
they viewed nationalism as “that outlook which gives an absolute 
priority to the values of the nation over all other values and 
interests” (Hroch in Eley & Suny 1996, p. 62), many socialists 
in Scotland saw nationalism as a kind of ‘false consciousness.’ 
However, with the advent of a less extreme understanding of 
nationalism in Scotland as a national movement (Hroch 1993) 
rather than ‘blood and soil’ chauvinism, the socialist Left have 
completed a journey from opposition to enthusiastic embrace of 
Scottish independence.
Similarly, in my conversations with lifelong Labour voters 
I found there was a sense that independence was something 
approaching inevitability in the same way that, for example, the 
end of the mining industry had also been talked about as 
inevitable; as if the desire for independence was being brought 
about without any ‘ideological’ contestation or confrontation 
with ‘unionism.’ It seems, then, that during the nineteen-eighties 
and nineties, something passed into the political common sense of 
the Scottish working class that was not present in the pre-Thatcher 
era. During the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties the process 
described by Marx whereby “the struggle of the proletariat with 
the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of 
each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own 
bourgeoisie” (1996, p. 24), seems to have became more or less 
complete. When reading the tortured history of Scottish nationalism 
(Finlay 1994) from its beginnings in the Scottish Home Rule 
Association (1886) and over the course of the twentieth century, 
it is clear that there is a socio-economic mediation of nationalism, 
and that it is constituted differently among the different social 
classes and across the different generations.
According to Finlay’s account, for example, over the course of 
the SNP’s history there has been what I term a middle-class ‘purist’ 
or substantivist conception of nationalism which prevailed among 
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the leadership of the SNP until the nineteen-eighties, at which 
point a more ‘working class’ and younger leadership began to 
occupy leadership posts. I propose that so long as the SNP wanted 
the pure appeal of independence to attract support from each 
social class, it only succeeded in attracting those with sufficient 
‘cultural capital’ to take an interest in pure or substantivist 
nationalism, but thanks to the nineteen-eighties shift in SNP 
leadership there came the understanding that the project of 
independence had to step down from its purist pedestal and 
become fully contextualised in social realities, and this meant it 
had to appeal to the working class. In this regard, theorists 
have articulated the need to recognise the complex nature of 
nationalism as a movement of particular social classes and groups 
that has political aims and which mobilises a symbolic or cultural 
patrimony i.e. nationalism is a social and political and cultural 
reality, and none of these forces can be identified as the ‘real 
reality’ underpinning the other or as the real being of nationalism. 
As Gellner (1983, p. 121) has it:
Only when a nation became a class, a visible and unequally 
distributed category in an otherwise mobile system, did  
it become politically conscious and activist. Only when a 
class happened to be (more or less) a ‘nation’ did it turn 
from being a class-in-itself into a class-for-itself, or a nation-
for-itself. Neither nations nor classes seem to be political 
catalysts: only nation-classes or class-nations are such.
Similarly, Wallerstein (in McCrone 1992, p. 56) has remarked that: 
“I believe ‘class’ and what I prefer to call ‘ethno-nation’ are two 
sets of clothing for the same basic reality. However, it is important 
to realise that there are in fact two sets of clothing, so that we may 
appreciate how, when and why one set is worn rather than the 
other.” These theorists of nationalism, then, accord nations or 
‘ethno-nations’ equal importance with social class as historic 
forces, with the term ‘class’ referring to the global capitalist 
economy and the term ‘class consciousness’ essentially being a 
national and local culturally-specific phenomenon. In contrast to 
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unionist politicians foisting the fabricated choice of social justice or 
independence, then, Wallerstein (in McCrone 1992, pp. 56-7) 
points out that the social revolutions in Russia, China, Vietnam 
and Cuba have been social and cultural and national. 
It is similarly not at all accidental that oppressed lower strata 
in core capitalist countries (Blacks in the United States, 
Quebecois in Canada, Occitans in France, etc.) have come to 
express their class consciousness in ethno-national terms.
Confirming this McCrone (1992, pp. 56-7) has written, presumably 
with Scotland and New Labour in mind:
One can see the recrudescence of ethno-nationalisms in 
industrialised states as an expression of class consciousness 
of lower caste groups in societies where the class terminology 
has been pre-empted by nation-wide middle strata organised 
around the dominant ethnic group. 
Finally, Herzfeld (1997, p. 6) criticised theorists of nationalism 
such as Benedict Anderson for failing to acknowledge the need for 
immersion into local contexts, to allow ethnographic research into 
the various forms of nationalism to uncover its social ontology:
He [Benedict Anderson] does not ground his account [of 
nationalism] in the details of everyday life – symbolism, 
commensality, family, and friendship – that would make it 
convincing for each specific case or that might call for the 
recognition of the cultural specificity of each nationalism. In 
that respect, like Gellner (1983), he seems to assume that 
nationalisms are fundamentally alike in their debt to a 
common (European) origin and that they thereby represent 
the imposition of an elite perspective on local cultural worlds.
This new awareness that nationalism is endemic and integral to 
‘being modern’ represents a major advance over a previous 
theoretical consensus that imagined nationalism to be merely 
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epiphenomenal to the advent of modernity, and fated to end after 
the tensions and traumas of ‘becoming modern’ ended. This 
advance also guides us to view the original Scottish nationalism 
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, for example, as being 
similarly the means of becoming modern on their own terms, and 
that twenty-first century Scottish nationalism involves recuperating 
this original 12th century advent of the modern era and recuperating 
a holistic way of ‘being working class.’ This emphasis upon class, 
then, remains crucial because the fact is that the older generation 
of locals who remain Labour voters were never interested in the 
New Labour project that emerged after 1992 to make the Labour 
Party electable in England, and their children remain ideologically 
‘old Labour’ or left-of-centre but upon a purely Scottish basis or 
from a nationalist position that is concerned with creating for the 
second time a Scottish modernity on purely Scottish terms.
The Scottish Six
During doctoral fieldwork The Scotsman newspaper (20 October 
1998) reported that the British Broadcasting Corporation’s board 
of governors had decided to not allow Scotland to have its own 
six o’clock news programme after the advent of devolution, which 
meant Scotland after 1999 would continue to receive its main 
evening news programming from England. Commenting upon this 
decision, journalist Matt Wells concluded: “Now, many will feel 
that the BBC…already unpopular and distrusted among Scots…
will be seen as the English Broadcasting Corporation,” while an 
editorial of the Daily Mail (11 December 1998) had this to say:
The depth of anger felt about the decision to turn down 
Scotland for its own programme was summed up by Nigel 
Smith, former chairman of the Broadcasting for Scotland 
lobbying group: ‘What do we have to do? Burn ourselves to 
death on the steps of BBC Scotland to achieve this?’
As “control and manipulation of public information and discourse 
is an extremely important part of the activities of every regime” 
(Barth 1994, p. 21), this decision of the BBC preserved the status 
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quo ante across two constitutional eras, and was seen in Scotland 
as more evidence that the BBC was an elitist and authoritarian 
and anti-democratic and anti-Scottish institution. This failure 
of the BBC to match political devolution with ‘broadcasting 
devolution’ was fated to be seen as perpetuating English-rule and 
English cultural hegemony in Scotland, and confirm the perception 
that such centralisation and reserving of cultural power in England 
also meant the continued underdevelopment of Scottish culture. 
More generally, because post-affluent societies witness an 
explosion in the production and consumption of culture, the 
control and management of State broadcasters is of huge importance 
in every nation-state, and even more so in a multi-national state 
context. Similarly, the question as to which social groups populate 
media corporations and exercise control over broadcasting 
content is important, and it would be difficult to over-state the 
importance of the media (television, radio and newspaper) in the 
political process. While the BBC no longer enjoys a monopoly over 
television and radio broadcasting, as the State broadcaster the BBC 
produces the daily reality of England within Scotland twenty-four 
hours a day. Unsurprisingly, then, thanks to being an England-
based organisation there is a widespread perception in Scotland 
that the media in the post-1999 era remains dominated by English 
interests and English perspectives and English programming, 
and this perception has become markedly exacerbated in the 
post-1999 era because, as a result of so much power having been 
devolved to Edinburgh, far more news content broadcast into 
Scotland is only of relevance to English and Welsh viewers, and so 
this ‘broadcasting deficit’ is a daily spectacle and only fuels the 
general conviction that an independent Scottish broadcaster is 
the only possible solution to this cultural inequality.
The media then is an important ethnographic site because 
a daily struggle to structure perception occurs, and a significant 
event within the media came in the run up to the 1992 general 
election on 23rd January when The Sun newspaper splashed over 
its first sixteen pages its conversion to the independence cause, in 
direct competition with its unionist tabloid rival The Daily 
Record. This stunning development delighted nationalists as it 
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gave them for the first time a direct means to spread their message 
by “targeting a largely young, male, working-class market with a 
nationalist message” (Bennie et al. 1997, p. 19). While nationalists 
welcomed the novel experience of a newspaper on its side, this 
pro-independence stance proved short-lived, and so Scotland is 
that rarest of national movements in that it has not a single 
newspaper or television broadcaster in favour of independence.114
If we assume that a ‘representational deficit’ exists, this raises 
the question how this impacts upon the ‘schemes of perception’ 
of Scottish audiences across the generations. When Scottish 
Television’s newsreader Angus Simpson promises viewers “in a 
packed programme” at lunchtime news of “the new Keanu Reeves 
film where he plays a serial killer,” and BBC Scotland’s Reporting 
Scotland presenter Jackie Bird promises viewers another national 
news programme full of reports to the procurator fiscal “plus all 
the sport and a full weather report,” we can share Harvie’s view 
of television in Scotland as “a tundra” (1998, p. 153), and ask 
whether in Scotland there is a population that, insofar as it is also 
a television audience, is more or less coerced into accepting its 
subordination?
In this regard the only data that I gathered during fieldwork 
came when conducting an interview (April 2000) in the Dundonald 
area of the village with a woman who worked as a care assistant 
in a local nursing home, and as we sat watching the evening news 
bulletin Scotland Today my interviewee peremptorily complained: 
“See this Scottish news, it is absolutely pathetic!”115 What is the 
effect upon mental health as a result of daily disgust at television 
programming that provokes the reaction of resentment? If as a 
114 In June 2014 the Sunday Herald became the only newspaper to adopt an 
editorial line in favour of independence. More generally, the internet and the new 
social media it spawns is the only media where the nationalist voice not only has 
parity with unionists but tends to predominate. 
115 Interestingly, much like the pensioner from Whitehall Drive discussed earlier, 
this informant voted for the SNP at the general election of May 2011 for the first 
time in her life at the age of 72, after a lifetime of voting Labour and advised me 
she would probably vote ‘yes’ in the 2014 Referendum. 
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rule the dominated are ordinarily fated to have a dominated 
relation to their condition of being dominated (Gilfillan 2009), 
I propose the media reproduces and reinforces such a relation 
among its audience, and in the following exchange with Kenneth 
Anderson (127 Orebank Road) I speculate whether something of 
the isomorphism between the quality of broadcasting in Scotland 
and the quality of confusion and defeatism is evidenced:
Me: Do you mind if Ah ask how ye voted in the elections, 
if you did vote?
Kenneth: Ah cannae mind.
Me: Cause there’s been that much e them!
Kenneth: Aye. Eh…Labour.
Me: One question I’m asking is why do you think it is we 
have this parliament after all these three hundred years; why 
do you think it is?
Kenneth: Well Ah would rather we got complete independence 
really. Ah don’t vote SNP ye ken bit Ah’m prepared...
Me: How no if ye want independence?
Kenneth: Ah don’t know. It’s strange. Ah jist dinnae...Bit Ah 
wid...
Me: Would you rather ca canny first? Get a parliament first 
and then...
Kenneth: Well Ah wid rather go home rule right away sort 
e thing.
Me: But the Labour party don’t believe in independence.
Kenneth: Well Ah know bit that’s jist the way e ma thinkin 
just now.
Me: Do you not trust the SNP or something?
Kenneth: Well Ah don’t know what it is. Ah jist…well 
they’re no gettin there nae mair any quick eh? They’re really 
no quick enough.
Me: But they’ll need your vote!
Kenneth: Well Ah’m actually a Tommy Sheridan...Ah’d 
really go fir him ken. But they dinnae get backin an a’ this 
stuff ye ken. Everybody in Scotland’s that pathetic. Ah’m the 
same of course. Naebody just seems to really care.
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Much like our earlier discussion of an education system that is 
criticised for producing a people ‘without memory’ or history, 
I propose that in light of news programming being described as 
“absolutely pathetic” and informants describing Scotland as 
“that pathetic,” a ‘representational regime’ is able to make a 
nation into its image. While my minimum wage care assistant 
informant did not proceed to draw any political conclusions, 
it is clear that in the nationalist imagination BBC Scotland 
helps achieve the crucial political function of keeping Britain 
imaginatively together, and the ubiquity of England and English-
based programming and the normative middle-class bias in 
television schedules after 1999 is why the issue of a Scottish Six 
opens a window upon the ongoing struggle to structure perception 
that is played out in the media.116
5.4 Politics and the Question of Being (Whole)
Until May 2011 Cardenden was part of what used to be described 
as the Labour Party’s ‘heartlands,’ as the Labour Party has 
exercised a virtual monopoly over political representation at local 
and regional and national level for at least three generations.117 
Because of the importance of the Labour Party I had hoped to 
attend the monthly meetings of the local branch as part of 
fieldwork, and talking in January 1999 with the branch secretary 
116 The BBC2 programme The Referendum Debate broadcast from Kirkcaldy 
on 18 March 2014 saw a remarkable level of criticism of the national 
broadcaster’s news programming. When audience member Sandy Steel asked: 
‘Does the panel believe that the BBC have been impartial on their coverage of 
the Scottish referendum?’ many audience members burst into spontaneous 
applause, indicating their judgment that BBC Scotland serves unionist interests. 
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b03yq66n/The_Referendum_Debate_ 
18_03_2014].
117 I recall on one occasion hurrying from work to vote in a local Council 
election, only to find the Corrie Centre polling station empty and locked. After 
a few minutes wondering what everyone knew except myself, it dawned on me 
that the local Labour councillor must have been unopposed so that no electoral 
contest was needed. 
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(Wendy Fleming) about whether this would be possible, Wendy’s 
response was positive, and she asked me to write a letter to the 
branch saying something about myself and my research. In the 
letter Wendy advised it was important that I stress I was not 
interested in the party political or ideological aspects of local 
politics, but was simply wanting to observe a significant site as an 
ethnographer of the historic year of 1999. During our conversation 
I also had to address Wendy’s concern that I may be “an SNP 
infiltrator.” While I wrote the letter as advised I was not allowed 
to attend any of the party meetings, and the reason given was that 
only party members could attend. However, after the first election 
campaign for the Holyrood parliament I managed to interview 
Roberta Catherine (Orebank Rd, 14 November) who was an 
office-bearer in the local Labour Party, and having invited me 
into her house Roberta proceeded to give me an interview which 
I cite extensively as it is representative of many other interviews 
conducted during fieldwork.
Roberta: Ah widnae say Ah dinnae like Tony [Blair] because 
Ah mean Ah’ve got a photo taen wi Cherie [Blair] an that 
an they’re nice people but they’re Tories.
Me: You think so?
Roberta: Ah think so.
Me: You’re joking me! You can say that?
Roberta: Ah can say there’s a part e Tory in them. Aye. 
Come on noo! They’re rotten wi money. Where’s an auld 
Labour like ma dad, who went doon the pit on his hands 
and knees and voted Labour and a union member all his  
life; what does he have in common wi Tony Blair?
Me: You’re talking heresy.
Roberta: Ah know! Ah know! [Roberta begins to laugh]. Ah 
know. Ah know it’s no right but we’ve a’ Ah suppose got 
they kind e feelins.
Me: Maybe Ah’m bein naive but is that no a contradiction?
Roberta: Well Tony Blair’s faither wis a Tory. And at the 
Labour Party conference, Ah wis at the Labour Party 
conference, and Tony’s faither wis sittin doon. He was still 
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a Tory but he was at the conference. He changed tae a 
Labour Party member noo. Ah could never change. Ma 
husband could change. Ma husband could faa oot wi 
Labour an say “That’s it; Ah’m no votin any mair” bit Ah 
couldnae. Ah’m one hunder per cent Labour!
Me: Why do you no vote for the Socialists? The Workers’...
Roberta: Nut. You’re no tellin me Tommy Sheridan’s a man 
worth voting fir?
Me: Well what Ah’m sayin is you said it, no’ me. You 
said yer leader is a Tory.
Roberta: No Ah never said. Ah said he has...
Me: A bit e Tory in him.
Roberta: Aye. Ah widnae say he was a Tory. He’s still for 
the working people but he’s for middle England as well. He 
has to be of course or we would never have gotten in, if it 
hidnae been for middle England. Scotland alone could never 
get in, if it hidnae been fir middle England. Scotland alone 
could never get in under the Labour government; they  
have to have middle England. If we don’t have middle 
England we wouldnae’ve won the general election! Because 
ye could vote a hunder per cent Labour in Scotland but it 
takes middle England tae get ye intae power. That’s true.
Me: Do you think Tony Blair’s really Labour but he’s just 
pretendin in order to win middle England? D’ye think he’s 
jist being clever?
Roberta: Ah think he’s got Tory values! Three year ago, Ah 
stood oot on the streets in a’ the villages in Fife. Ah went up 
tae Inverness an Ah went right up north, an especially in 
Cardenden itself this jist gien ye one village, at that particular 
time, Ah could have got a hunder per cent Labour vote. Ah 
could go oot in the streets today an Ah’lI only guarantee you 
twenty per cent e a Labour vote.
Me: Ah thought Cardenden was quite solidly Labour?
Roberta: Aye, but they’re auld Labour. And they’re left. Ah 
could name ye a few people e this village who’ve been 
Labour voters an members e the Labour Party a’ their lives 
but are weary! Ah shouldnae really be sayin this tae you, Ah 
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hope yer no gonnae be sayin that Ah said this! Ah’ll get shot 
fae Gordon! [Gordon Brown, Cardenden’s MP] Ah’m only 
sayin what people have come tae me an said, aboot how 
they’re disillusioned. They expect different things, even fae 
the Scottish parliament.
Me: So what do you think they’re thinking noo? D’ye 
think they’re a’ busy sayin Ah’ll vote fir the SNP noo? 
They’re sayin we’re scunnered wi Labour, we’re gonnae  
vote SNP noo?
Roberta: Nut! They would never vote Labour,118 they 
would rather form a Labour Party.
Me: Ah heard there was some folk in Cardenden were tryin 
to have a new sort e Labour party but it fell through because 
there wisnae much interest.
Roberta: A lot e the people, let’s be honest, a lot e the 
Labour voters, they’ll only vote, they’re no politically 
minded. They’ll vote Labour because, an Ah hate tae say 
this, bit if ye were pittin a monkey doon there, in this 
village, the village e Bowhill would vote Labour. Because  
it’s part e a tradition. They dinnae ken any better.
Me: So you think only twenty per cent?
Roberta: There’s a lot e people disillusioned.
Me: And you don’t think the disillusioned vote is going 
any place in particular?
Roberta: Nut. They would just stay home. Ye’d bound tae 
watch the polls at the elections fir the Scottish parliament, 
how the drop was.
Me: When Ah wis growin up ye voted Labour and that wis 
it. There wisnae anybody else tae vote for. So where did the 
Nationalists come fae?
Roberta: They’re an organised party noo.
Me: But take some of the headlines in the run up to the 
parliamentary elections; the Nationalists were runnin neck 
and neck wi the Labour Party.
118 I assume Roberta meant to say SNP.
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Roberta: They’re a stronger party now because old Labour 
have disappeared. Although new Labour has got us intae 
power, it’s middle England that got us intae power; it wisnae 
the auld red Labour. The auld red Labour has went by the 
wayside but there’s still a lot e them there.
Me: But it’s this agreed reliance on middle England that 
maybe the Scots, the Labour voters in Scotland, got tired  
of. That’s why independence for Scotland became more  
popular no?
Roberta: But do you no think, Ah mean Ah’m Labour one 
hunder per cent so ye’ll maybe see why Ah’m contradictin 
masel again, but if the Liberal Democrats had a better 
leader, everyone of us is a bit e a Liberal Democrat; there’s 
a bit e Tory and a bit e Labour and a bit e Scottish National 
Party in every human being. Because ye want tae get on in 
life an ye want money and when Labour was Labour years 
ago everybody was the same. Everybody’s no the same noo. 
A’ tryin tae keep up wi the Joneses. So that’s the Tory part e 
ye. The Labour part e ye is yer still wantin tae see, yer 
wantin yer national health, yer social security; and SNP is 
the Scotland at heart. Ah believe in ma country. Ah dinnae 
believe in independence bit Ah believe in Scotland. Ah ken 
that’s maybe contradictin masel again.
In this refreshingly honest and revealing interview I gave Roberta 
every opportunity to euphemise her biting realism, but this seemed 
to encourage her plain-speaking and her determination to give as 
many hostages to fortune as possible and as quickly as possible. 
Roberta shows a remarkable commitment to voting Labour and a 
willingness to concede the concessions required in order to keep 
imagining herself as part of Britain, despite being clear she has 
good reasons to do no such thing. Roberta is also fully aware of all 
of the contradictions and electoral gymnastics that have to be gone 
through as a result of being Scottish, working class and left-of-
centre; the contradictions of someone who is “one hunder per cent 
Labour” and who has “Scotland at heart.” When surveying the 
political field, Roberta exhibits a sure touch and verbal command 
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but, alongside the assured delivery of her no-nonsense views, is her 
clear awareness of a number of blatant contradictions as she 
depicts the Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair as “a Tory,” yet “Ah 
widnae say he was a Tory,” and as someone who has “Tory values” 
yet is “for the working people.” Roberta also recognises the new 
alignments that are afoot in Scottish politics and the pressures to 
abandon the New Labour project as she openly acknowledges that 
her husband “could change.” Her difficulty is that she sees the 
sense in actions she is not happy with, and even identifies with 
those making hard choices: on the one hand there is the Roberta 
that sees Blair as a Tory but another Roberta recognises the shift 
to the right by the Labour Party was necessary to win middle 
England. She can see New Labour is ‘a necessary evil’ to win 
middle England, so that New Labour was an English solution to 
an English problem as no invention of New Labour was necessary 
to win Scotland and, to the extent that this new direction involved 
all of the Labour Party, is an example of the Labour Party in 
Scotland accepting its subordination as a pre requisite for New 
Labour to become a party of power.
If winning political power was dependent upon a rearticulation 
of English hegemony within the Labour Party, this is something 
Roberta nowhere explicitly mentions, and something else she is 
consistent in is her refusal to recognise any connection between 
the rise of the SNP and the demise of “old Labour,” and working-
class people feeling disenfranchised or “weary” with New Labour 
in the nineteen-nineties. With the benefit of hindsight and the 
2011 election when the SNP came close to defeating Labour in her 
own constituency, when Roberta advises that disillusioned Labour 
voters would not vote SNP but “would rather form a Labour 
Party,” she is clearly reluctant to recognise the full extent of the 
re-alignment that was happening between class and nation.119
If we were to ask the real Roberta to stand up we see her 
difficulty as she has constructed four conflicting ‘selves.’ Roberta 
119 At the 2011 election to the Scottish parliament the SNP reduced Labour’s 
majority to 1,247 votes. Helen Eadie (Labour) gained 11,926 votes while the 
SNP’s candidate Ian Chisholm received 10,679 votes.
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opts to be realistic, and therefore becomes untrue to (part of) 
herself. Rhetorically, she restores her integrity by saying she is 
“one hunder per cent Labour” and “could never change,” but in 
the same breath admits she is “contradictin masel again.” She 
admits many have left the Labour Party because they – like herself 
– identify with old Labour, but also says old Labour has 
“disappeared’’ and has “went by the wayside,” only to contradict 
herself by recognising “but there’s still a lot e them there.” She 
disappears old Labour by being pragmatic and justifies its 
disappearance at the hands of New Labour because “it is middle 
England that got us into power.” Her realism demands she 
marginalises her ownmost dasein and in the process accept and 
produce her subordination in order to belong to a party in power. 
As an office-bearer we may say she disappears her disappearance 
of Old Labour and this is what makes her “fit for office” as a New 
Labour office-bearer. 
It seems clear Roberta knows she is walking a tightrope where 
the need to be realistic is continually at risk of becoming flagrant 
subordination insofar as it endorses the forfeiting of real representa-
tion for some representation; in the end subordination is exacted 
because the alternative to Scotland accommodating itself to English 
Labour politicians’ New Labour project is the political oblivion of 
joining former colleagues by ‘‘the wayside,’’ or joining those who 
have changed their allegiance to the SNP. When Roberta advises 
“it’s middle England that got us intae power,” she sees clearly the 
reality of being ‘Better Together’ is that it takes middle England to 
deliver a left-of-centre government in Westminster, and it is not the 
Scots who exercise sovereignty over themselves but middle England, 
and if this arrangement is acceptable then one is a unionist and if it 
is not acceptable then one is a nationalist.
In a purely speculative manner I propose that there are two 
voices or ‘two consciousnesses’ present within Roberta during this 
interview. There is the Roberta interviewed at home, and there is 
the public Roberta who is a Labour Party official that accounts 
for the hesitation and the ‘loss of voice’ that occurs during the 
interview at certain moments. Roberta knows the Labour Party in 
Scotland has de-prioritised its core working-class voters to gain 
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power because only in England did the Labour Party need to move 
to the right in order to be electable in England. Being part of an 
all-British political party means, for a realistic working-class Scot, 
one’s political realism has to trump one’s preferred option to have 
a politics that truly represents one’s core voters. Being ‘better 
together’ means a duality instead of an integrity ensues, and so 
Roberta must construct a ‘second best’ politics and more or less 
spectate her real self in the name of a practical realism. Roberta 
realises very well that faced with this predicament, integral 
Scottish dasein becomes ‘weary,’ ‘disappears’ or ‘stays home’ from 
where politics becomes something that is spectated and perceived 
as unreal and unrepresentative. 
Moreover, in this situation it seems likely this dasein over time 
will no longer represent itself to itself insofar as it has given up the 
aspiration that such a self will be represented in politics. If one 
assumes that to spectate one’s being is in an important sense to 
already cease to be that being, one postpones representative 
politics because one has already in one’s own consciousness failed 
to represent oneself so that one compounds an already objectively 
subordinate class and national positionality. The reality of being 
‘better together’ is that Roberta must privatise herself and keep 
her “Scotland at heart” or keep it within the domestic realm and 
firmly out of the public and political realm.
If as a result of her national identity Roberta must accept a 
certain amount of subordination, as a working-class woman she 
is also clear that the ‘class system’ has infiltrated the Labour Party 
and that the middle class has taken over. During our interview 
Roberta spoke of the widely held view that the Labour Party 
leadership was “rotten wi money,” and insofar as New Labour 
distanced itself from traditional working-class identity in the 
name of modernisation, this removed traditional symbolic 
‘signposts’ for identification among working-class Labour voters. 
In this regard, the revelation of the first First Minister of the 
Holyrood Parliament being a multi-millionaire in the aftermath of 
his death did not go un-noticed or commented upon. When 
discussing the corruption of politicians in the aftermath of the 
Conservative peer Lord Archer’s being jailed for perjury in July 
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2001 one East of Scotland Water manual operatives (Mick 
Kelman) commented:
How the f*** is he [Donald Dewar] supposed tae represent 
us the workin class eh? A f***in Labour MP and he’s 
supposed tae represent the workin class in, where is it, 
Anniesland in Glesgae an he’s a f***in multi-millionaire! 
What the f**** is that a’ aboot? Ah bet they Glesgae c***s 
in their two thoosan pound cooncil hooses must feel like 
f***in muppets votin fir that c**t. Ah mean how the f*** 
can somebody be a multi-millionaire an be a f***in Labour 
MP? How the f*** is that possible? 120
This concern with a social elite enriching themselves was 
undoubtedly helped by the long-running ‘cash for questions’ affair 
that began in 1994 when Westminster politicians were found 
guilty of taking money from wealthy individuals to ask questions 
in parliament (and was to erupt on a new scale in 2009 in what is 
referred to as the Westminster parliamentary expenses scandal). 
At the other end of the social hierarchy, a constant theme that 
exercised the materialism of locals was that of unemployed locals 
living off state benefits; which for many amounted to a shameful 
refusal to constitute life authentically by responding honestly to 
the facts of life by working. For example, I recall in the kitchen of 
an elderly couple I was interviewing a notice board of family 
photographs and mementos and souvenirs as well as the following 
clipping taken from the Central Fife Times newspaper:
A Shocker
I enclose an extract from a letter carried in the Courier and 
Advertiser.
120 Mick was drawing upon the caricature of Glasgow as being synonymous with 
poverty and that Donald Dewar was the Labour MP for Glasgow Anniesland 
which had received media attention for being one of the poorest constituencies 
in Britain. The reference to “two thoosan pound Cooncil hooses” refers to media 
coverage at the time surrounding the proposed privatisation of Glasgow City 
Council housing stock, and the average market value of a Glasgow city Council 
house being reported to be less than £2000. 
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“A 65 year-old man who has worked all his life and paid 
national insurance and income tax for the past 50 years was 
entitled to a retirement pension of £115.40 per week for 
himself and his wife. Meanwhile, a similar couple who have 
lived off state benefits and have never paid a penny into the 
system all their lives are entitled to £140.55 per week plus 
rent, rates and all other handouts available.” These figures 
were apparently provided by and guaranteed correct by an 
official of the DSS in the Dundee area. Now one could just 
imagine the dismay and shock experienced by our local  
MP The Right Hon Gordon Brown when advised of this 
completely immoral and bizarre situation. Indeed Mr Brown 
was so upset he found himself unable to reply to letters 
concerning this apparent anomaly.
SPION KOP, Lochgelly. 121
When I asked the householder who had taken early retirement in 
2002 after forty years of continuous employment why he had 
pinned this letter up in the kitchen, he told me coyly: “Jist a 
reminder.” Along similar lines was the following short exchange 
that I noted prior to interviewing a Labour-voting man and wife 
while watching the evening news on the day of the first Labour 
budget for eighteen years (17 March 1998):
Wife: So long as they hammer the rich Ah’ll be happy.
Husband: They never do, they’d be daen it tae theirsels.
As with Roberta and Mick and this retired couple, there is 
a deeply-felt awareness of the absurdity of rich people represent- 
ing the working class and the working class voting for such 
121 Spion Kop is the name of a battle site in South Africa where the British army 
in 1900 was defeated by Dutch farmers. To explain the defeat of the British some 
reports adverted to inept military leadership, perhaps indicating the author is 
referring to the inept leadership of politicians to address the situation his letter 
refers to. 
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representatives, and we may say that there is a double domination 
here where the working class are unable to produce representatives 
from within their own class, and so are represented by middle-
class representatives who possess the linguistic and cultural 
resources for public life. This embourgeoisement of the Labour 
Party signals a crisis of identity for a party that was founded in the 
‘era of scarcity’ and which now seems to find itself at a loss as to 
how to negotiate its way in the ‘era of affluence.’ In Scotland, of 
course, this difficulty about what to do about the working class is 
compounded by the difficulty of what to do with the national 
question, and insofar as the Labour Party cannot solve these two 
issues it seems fated to decline while the SNP seems fated to rise. 
If the SNP is fated to become more attractive to voters, some were 
able to pinpoint a particular experience that helped inform their 
shift to a pro-independence stance. During the very first interview 
I conducted during fieldwork (Mr Ronaldson, Kinglassie Rd, 
7 June 1999) my informant recounted the following incident:
Ah mean if ye cannae stand up fir yer ain country...Ah mean 
okay, Ah’ll gie ye an instance e what Ah felt. Ah wis talkin 
tae a guy wane night, Ah wis at a do, an there was a 
Dutchman there. An Ah’ve worked in Holland, Ah know 
how they think, how they work, how they behave an a’ the 
rest e it...an this Dutchman was makin a fool e his sel, he 
wis enjoyin his sel, having a good time, an somebody wis 
sittin, they were all Scotch people, and he turns an says 
“You’re nuthin but a f***in arsehole” an he says “Aye, 
maybe Ah am...” he says “…but Ah govern maself. There’s 
a difference.” That summed it up. That summed it right up. 
As with the previous discussion of an elderly informant being 
made to feel ashamed insofar as her unionist views were revealed 
by a foreigner as colluding in their own subordination, something 
similar is being adverted to above, as central to this testimony 
is recognition of the fact that devolution is still subordination 
because the devolution settlement of 1 July 1999 does not amount 
to the sovereign self-government of independence enjoyed and 
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practiced by every other nation. Also, when the existence of the 
nation is long settled within the imagination of its members, there 
is no need to raise the formal ‘doctrinal’ definition of nationalism 
(i.e. that the nation and the state shall be congruent) to explicit 
conceptualisation in order for independence to be attractive, 
because such is the structuring of perception that the individual 
simply ‘looks’ and draws the ‘obvious’ conclusion:
Bit Ah mean Ah’m a’ fir Scotland bein on its ain ken. Ah 
mean, likes e, if ye look abroad, a’ the wee countries they’re 
a’ independent. An Ah mean they’re a’ joined up tae ither 
countries ken. So Ah’m a’ fir Scotland bein oan its ain.122
As a result of the universal organisation of geo-political space 
according to the nation-state template, any Scot can draw the 
nationalist conclusion by simply “looking around” and seeing 
smaller and poorer European nations voting massively in favour 
of independence throughout the nineteen-nineties (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Free from concerns about the long durée, the modernist nationalist 
can imagine his nationalism emerges more or less ex nihilo insofar 
as he need only draw upon thirty or forty years of history to draw 
the nationalist conclusion and so needs no resort to ‘medievalism.’
The ethnographer constructing a ‘native point of view’ that 
has a national identity component, then, must advert to its real and 
imagined relations with other nations and how they resolve their 
being-in-the-world. As per Roberta’s testimony, a Scottish work-
ing-class identity, for example, is aware of other identities such as 
‘middle-class England,’ so that each particular individual’s con-
struction of their being-in-the-world borrows much of itself from 
neighbouring identities. Put simply, seeing how others imagine and 
122 Andrew Peebles, South Dundonald Cottage No. 2 (East).
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practice their identities is part of the process of learning to imagine 
and decide whether or not to politicise one’s own. Because exist-
ence is always coexistence, the existence of other nations natural-
ises the mobilisation of national identity and the desire for 
independence and, as in the quote above, it is often contact with 
other nationality groupings that is the occasion for evoking a 
nationalist response, although this inter-national ‘spectre of com-
parisons’ can also provoke a risk-averse unionist response. Hence, 
asking one local (Mrs Penman, Muirtonhill Road) for her views on 
the reasons behind the Scottish parliament, she answered:
Ye always have the rebels who want these kinds of things, 
you know. And I really dinnae approve e pittin a line at a’ 
through a country cause when ye see what’s happening oot 
in Kosovo at the moment, and there are people who are 
gonnae fight wi each other like Ireland. And these kind  
e things Ah think are absolutely terrible. Ah really think that 
people should really try tae pull together and no go back.
Because this informant’s country is the United Kingdom, 1 July 
1999 brings three centuries of ‘pulling together’ to an end and the 
return of the repressed is ‘‘absolutely terrible,” and so she is more 
or less bewildered by the politics of identity that is ongoing in 
Scotland (and Ireland and Kosovo). In contrast to the non-
appearance of ‘Scotland’ in her discourse, another theme touched 
on by many informants was the perception of cultural differences 
between Scotland and England, with informants more often than 
not pointing to cultural difference, in addition to the obvious 
political difference, as part of their justification for supporting 
independence, although on the issue of cultural differences 
between Scotland and England next-door neighbours could 
express opposing viewpoints:
You know Ah really think we’re quite different from doon 
south as well in a lot e aspects you know.
Mrs McGlaughlin
Orebank Road
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No. Ah definitely widnae want tae see us bein independent. 
Ah jist think we should a’ be wane United Kingdom. Why can 
we no be wane? Ah jist think we’re a’ the same. Ah mean 
years ago they voted Scottish Nationalist because there was  
a big thing.123 It was a young person’s thing and ye were 
young an ye wanted tae vote fir them, bit Ah think in 
hindsight it was a bit silly and it never done any guid anyway.
Mrs Reilly
Orebank Road
If in light of the electoral victories of the SNP in 2007 and 2011 it 
is rather certain that we will never hear such views again as they 
were uttered on the brink of spectacular historic successes for the 
SNP, no hindsight is needed to realise the view that voting SNP in 
the seventies did not achieve anything was wrong even when they 
were first uttered as this married informant in her late-thirties 
seems oblivious to the fact that the nationalism she thought was a 
spent force had just reconstituted the basis for politics in Scotland. 
On the wider question of cultural differences between Scotland and 
England, Gellner in Nations and Nationalism (1983) argued that 
the emergence of Britain as a cohesive nation-state required the 
forceful homogenising of what were two markedly different 
cultures in Scotland and England, so that the successful emergence 
of Britain required the suppression of Scotland, Catholicism, 
Jacobitism, Gaeldom and the Scots and Gaelic languages, and this 
programme of cultural repression was functional not simply to the 
emergence of Britain but the emergence of industrial civilisation 
and modernity. 
However, I would propose Gellner misrecognises nationalism 
when he describes it as “a phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the 
idiom of Gemeinschaft” (1997, p. 74) because this formulation fails 
to realise that, due to the creation of Cardenden (and any number 
of localities in the central belt) as an occupational community, 
working-class nationalism needs no backward glance to a long-lost 
123 Mrs Reilly was referring to the late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1968, for 
example, the SNP had the largest membership of all political parties in Scotland. 
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Gemeinschaft or experience of community in order to constitute 
nationalism by as, such were the rigors and the homogeneity 
exacted by the industrial occupational community, that working-
class nationalism can equally be described as a phenomenon of 
Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gesellschaft as it does not need to 
resort to the ‘period costume’ of Gemeinschaft because industrial 
Gesellschaft is up to the job. Simply on the basis of their identity as 
a proletariat, only mobilising the timeframe of 1967-1997 (and 
leaving aside the historicity of their dasein altogether) there is 
conceivably enough to constitute a nationalist project by. Indeed, 
one might go as far to say that only the ’79 generation are emerging 
into Ferguson’s ‘civil society’ or Tonnies’s gesellschaft because up 
until the dotage of the ’45 generation locals had been living a form 
of modern industrial gemeinschaft in their couthie occupational 
communities and sharing in their undisturbed ‘sacred canopy’ 
which still burned brightly in their hearts and households until they 
were disorganised in the late nineteen-eighties.
Interestingly, regardless of their particular party affiliations and 
opinions about the cultural differences between Scotland and 
England, locals saw 1999 as a time of deciding once and for all 
the national question. While some locals wanted the status quo 
ante and some wanted independence, all seemed to agree this 
question had to be decided either way, so that in contrast to the 
devolution scheme created by border-crossing professionals for 
whom the constitutional settlement of 1 July 1999 is not “some 
sort of halfway house…an unstable mid-point between the status 
quo and separation’’ (Brown and Alexander 1999, p. 11), I found 
this is exactly how many locals viewed the new constitutional 
arrangement of devolution; and it seems clear that this view 
is sourced in the fact that they see other nations agitating and 
struggling for sovereign parliaments and not devolved assemblies, 
and so locals view independence and not devolution as the only 
imaginable end result for Scotland. 
This uncomplicated view of Scotland’s options and scepticism 
towards makeshift compromises worked out by unionist politi-
cians signals that nationalism is a social practice embedded in 
localities and follows a different logic to that of the reified public 
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political sphere. The concrete stuff of class and culture and ‘being 
European’ is the social grounds or the social ontology that gives 
nationalism its substance, and this is why ethnography for 
Herzfeld (1997, pp. 11-12) is particularly suited to uncovering the 
reality of nationalism.
[Anthropology]...through its resolute insistence on the signifi-
cance of the particular, is thus able to document how nation-
alism is understood (and sometimes recast) by living social 
actors...The fact that such processes [of reconstituting the 
past] often use bodily and kinship metaphors is not evidence 
of some cultural inability to think beyond immediate social 
experience but simply shows that members of local communi-
ties think about the state through much the same categories 
as those through which state officials woo local opinion.
Neither a reified ‘thing’ called ‘the union,’ nor any prolonged 
meditation upon something called the ‘British constitution’ is the 
ground of Scottish nationalism, but the much more embedded and 
‘thick’ state of affairs where the Scots vote one way and the English 
vote another and opposite way in the lived experience of the 
generation that came to political consciousness from 1979 onwards. 
Insofar as devolutionists conceded that there must be ‘Scottish 
solutions to Scottish problems,’ this was something of a hostage to 
fortune insofar as Scotland’s problem was not a ‘democratic deficit’ 
per se but that exercising political power comes on English terms 
i.e. access to the exercise of power is mediated through two 
electorates or nations fundamentally at odds with each other for 
a generation, so that no form of devolution can ever solve this 
Scottish problem. Again, the problem was not the unequal relation 
of union between a smaller and a less populous nation (Scotland) 
and a much larger and much more populous nation (England) per 
se because this had been the case since 1707. The problem, rather, 
was the difference between Scotland and England during 1979-
1997 that meant the relation of union became a class issue.
We should be clear, then, that this political difference was not 
caused by the union or caused by difference in national identity as 
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the political union with England does not explain the divergence in 
voting. Whatever the grounds of these differing voting patterns 
between Scotland and England, they were not caused by the union 
or the British constitutional settlement. It is political difference 
then and not the political relation of union that is the source of the 
’79 generation’s rejecting the relation of union, and only when the 
relation of union with England became a class issue did the need 
to politicise the nation become the issue for the working class, and 
so the imagining and constructing of working-class nationalism 
could begin in earnest thanks to the never-ending fuel of a geo-
political union with the right-of-centre English electorate. Despite 
the respite of a Labour government during 1997-2010, then, and 
the new devolved settlement of 1 July 1999, the reality of these two 
nations being ‘better together’ resumed normal service in 2010 
when most Scots voted for a left-of-centre government, only to get 
a right-of-centre Tory-Liberal government they didn’t vote for.
After their enfranchisement in 1918 the working class in 
Scotland quickly weaned itself from Liberalism to re-align itself 
with the Labour Party in their politicisation of their social 
conditions. Despite a brief period of ‘class and nation’ integralism 
during the nineteen-twenties when the likes of Connolly and 
Wheatley advocated Home Rule for Scotland, it was only 
subsequent to the advent of Margaret Thatcher on 4 May 1979 
that this earlier twentieth-century integralist politics was 
resurrected, after having been forgotten throughout the post-war 
period of consensus politics, and by the end of eighteen years of 
Tory rule the Conservative and Unionist Party were thoroughly 
discredited in Scotland.124 Hence, when interviewing Dauvit 
quoted earlier in Chapter 2, and noting his Scotland Forever 
tattoo on his arm which is something unremarkable among local 
men, I asked his views on the creation of the parliament: 
That f***in Thatcher reign jist kill’t everythin aff ken. Ah 
mean it’s gonnae take some rebuilding like. It’s got tae the 
124 Thatcher herself observed in her memoirs: “There was no Tartan Thatcherite 
revolution” (1993, p. 618).
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stage noo ken people’s jist sayin tae theirsel well, c**t it’ll 
no maitter tae us if it’s Tories or Labour or whoever’s in ye 
ken. People jist dinnae seem tae be interested nooadays 
ken...Ah mean it is like a Labour f***in community ken, bit 
anybody that is switchin their vote Ah mean, it’d hae tae  
be an idiot anybody that f***in votes Conservative ye ken.  
Ah cannae see anybody gaun that wiy eh...anybody that 
changes their vote it’s gonnae be SNP ken. The SNP gets 
stronger an a’...ken there’s mair people, Ah think they’re 
gaitherin votes here and there....As Ah say aboot here 
naebody really talks politics a lot eh...naebody seems tae gie 
a toss. If we had an independent Scotland it cannae be a bad 
thing. Ken Ah mean oor haunds were f***in tied there fir  
a while ken, at least noo we can f***in speak fir oorsels ken. 
Pit oor side o’er. 
If in Thatcherism the English commercial class produced its 
champion and provoked a rise in Scottish nationalism among the 
Scottish working class, there is a deep historical truth behind the 
assertion that ‘Thatcherism’ rescued an early twentieth-century 
‘integralism’ or alignment of class and nation which had come to 
a standstill insofar as Thatcherism taught working-class Scots a 
lesson in their own history as much as a lesson in class-based 
politics by making a spectacle out of the impotence of lionised 
middle-class institutions such as law, education and the Protestant 
church which New Labour unionist politicians imagine consti-
tutes the Scottish nation. The lesson that Thatcherism taught was 
that weapons more potent than ‘civic mindedness’ were required 
to defeat Thatcher; that without a State of its own to represent 
and protect Scotland from Thatcher or Major or Cameron, it 
became necessary to make one, and insofar as the professions-
based civil society and trade unions were refusing the leadership 
task of imagining Scottish sovereignty, they were fundamentally 
inadequate to the task of meeting the needs of the nation. The net 
effect was to produce a discourse of difference that by the time 
of fieldwork had passed into locals’ common sense. As Mary 
Gibbons (Orebank Road, 12th December 1999) told me:
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Ah dinnae believe we’re a’ wane country. There’s definitely 
a Scotland England divide, big time Ah think! Proved it time 
and again. Proved it! So, Ah think if we got oor independence 
it would have tae be Scotland, oor independence. Forget 
aboot the rest e them Ah think. What’s Britain done fir us? 
Ah mean look at the unemployment up here, you know. Ah 
jist, nut. Ah blame Thatcher’s government for the downfall, 
for the way things are the now. Ah blame her reign.
It is significant that no informant I interviewed obtained any 
satisfaction from criticising the Conservative Party, and I propose 
this was because this particular institution hardly registered in 
their imagination as ab initio it has been long perceived as 
irrelevant to their politics and their imagining of Scotland. For 
many, then, it was those institutions such as the Labour Party that 
had long been believed in and that had long held power in 
Scotland that were punished for the growing debacle of the 
1979-1997 period. Hence, when all of Scotland’s seventy-two 
Westminster constituencies rejected the Conservatives in May 
1997, all of Scotland was expressing the same anti-Tory ‘common 
sense’ that understood this party did not even attempt to recognise, 
far less offer a rival imagining of working-class Scottish interests. 
Because of the political and cultural irrelevance of the Conservatives 
it was the Labour Party and the political establishment in Scotland 
that was the target for criticism. Hence the prescience of Anthony 
Smith’s remark that: “the main battle of the nationalists is so often 
fought out within its chosen ethnie against the older self-
definitions” (in Eley & Suny 1996, p. 124). Some locals by the end 
of the nineteen years of 1979-1997 had become so frustrated by 
the reluctance of the Scots to solve their own problem that one 
informant (Alistair McLelland, Woodend Park, 18 July 1999) 
even accorded England the decisive role in the process of Scotland 
achieving independence:
Ah’m for it, for the parliament. Ah’m very for it. Ah still 
think it should be everything. Ah believe that Westminster 
shouldnae enter intae it. Hopefully it’ll come in the future. 
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Hopefully the English will see sense and do it for us, because 
Ah don’t think we’ve got the guts to do it. But certainly 
Ah’m all for it.
Because locals endured a long period of ‘democracy without 
dasein’ and the misalignment between democracy and government, 
the rise of a new politics that restored the fit between politics 
and power was inevitable. If Thatcher’s myopia concerning her 
own English nationalism more or less forced a reluctant Scottish 
working class to resume the 1918 generation’s politics of ‘class 
and nation’ integralism, and resume a politics of human being that 
would perform a second break with liberalism, it seems they saw 
in Thatcher their nemesis but borrowed the weapons she herself 
wielded i.e. an unapologetic integralist approach to advancing the 
interests of class and nation to the exclusion of all others, so that 
Thatcherism was a problem that came with its own solution. The 
combination of affluence and a certain freedom to imagine their 
secession from the ’45 generation’s consensual way of ‘doing 
politics,’ then, ended the hegemony of voting Labour as many of 
the ’79 generation feel they can afford a politicisation of class and 
history via nationality, in contrast to those of the ’45 generation 
who still imagine Scotland can not afford the real nationalism 
of independence. If once poor and through voting Labour they 
transformed their social conditions by creating the welfare state, 
they are now affluent and able to afford to politicise more holistic 
imaginings of themselves and so move from Labour to the SNP, 
and on this trajectory will move from Home Rule within 
the United Kingdom to independence within Europe after 2014.
Reflecting upon the period 1979-1997 it is clear that one’s 
class identity structures the ‘lived experience’ (Dilthey) of the 
nation. The identities of class and nationality are distinct and not 
reducible to the other, so that to say class mediates national 
identity is not to say Scottish nationalism is a simple ‘superstruc- 
tural’ expression of class conflict as this social ontology gives far 
too little recognition to the reality of historicity and nationality 
within contextualised human being. Attempting to understand the 
dialectic of class and nation but without reducing one to the other 
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has been a feature of the work of Gallagher (1991), Wallerstein 
(1979, 1980) and Hechter (1975, 1976) who have applied 
class-based analysis to Anglo-Scottish relations, and view Scottish 
nationalism as a form of class struggle transposed to the level of 
the nation. In this regard McCrone (1992, 1998) and Nairn 
(1997, 2000) have argued that Scotland was never a colony or a 
‘proletariat’ to a ruling English ‘bourgeoisie’ but rather the junior 
partner in a political union and the adventure of Empire, as the 
evidence is clear that many thousands of Scots over the generations 
have directly benefited from union with England and the British 
empire. However, while objectively it may be inaccurate to assign 
a colonial status to Scotland, my informants were not academics 
so that objectivist accounts were of limited concern, so that many 
imagine Scotland as dominated by England. As Mr Paterson 
(South Dundonald Cottages) told me: “As far as Ah’m concerned 
England rules us.’’
In the struggle over how Scottish nationalism is perceived the 
role of history looms large, and if in the working-class national-
ist’s imagining of Scotland there is a history of struggle against 
English ambition and the conviction that the 1707 Act of Union 
only ever happened because the English crown and the English 
parliament wanted it to happen, the very idea of Britain is imag-
ined as the invention of an Anglo-Scottish nobility that was sub-
sequently managed and run after 1832 by the native bourgeoisie. 
If the working-class nationalist is able to prove to his satisfaction 
the ‘proletarian’ credentials of Scottish nationalism, the anti-
nationalist working-class ‘loyalist’ socialist is similarly able to 
mobilise history and prove to his satisfaction the essentially ‘bour-
geois’ character of nationalism. While each dialectically opposed 
position constructs reality to its own preferred image and likeness, 
what each position shares is the triangulation of symbolic struc-
ture, social structure and the nation’s history. As a rule, of course, 
each class is disposed to identify with those representations of 
national history which suit its interests, so that when watching 
football or a film such as Braveheart, for example, the same 
‘nested structuration’ of perception will be at play so that when at 
the time of the cinema release of Braveheart there were newspaper 
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reports of incidents of violence between Scottish and English peo-
ple, (and I recall one tradesman telling me how after watching the 
film he had, “Wanted tae punch f**k oot e some English c**t”), 
there is nothing surprising or anomalous about a vegetable packer 
or warehouse worker identifying immediately and passionately 
with twelfth or thirteenth-century Scots peasants, as what is hap-
pening is a mundane social practice that has nothing to do with 
the warehouse worker’s grasp of the Lebenswelt of Scots peas-
antry but everything to do with his own everyday experience, 
which includes being subjected or positioned in a social and geo-
political hierarchy, and so finds catharsis via identification with 
cinematic representations of national resistance as they are a 
cipher for his mundane social and geo-political experience.
Much of the strength and vitality and appeal of nationalism is 
its ability to draw upon and integrate or morph itself into intimate 
aspects of dasein, such as being-in-history or the worked-self. 
Also, working-class nationalism is able to participate in a large 
economically and socially-grounded ‘return of the repressed’ so 
that among the ’79 generation there is an emergent integration of 
politics, culture and identity where Gellner’s (1983, p. 1) definition 
of nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that 
the political and national unit should be congruent” fuses with 
what Kravitz (1997) has identified as that which is defining about 
contemporary Scottish literature’s transcending the 1920s literary 
renaissance’s trope of the divided “British Scot” in favour of a self 
congruent with itself, and accompanied by a fully contextual 
literary production.125
If this integration of class and culture and nation and history 
(Mulholland 2011) has precedents, it is also fundamentally new 
because of the new economic and social forces that give this 
project a far greater social grounding than previous attempts at 
imagining this integralism into existence in the nineteen-twenties 
and nineteen-thirties (MacColla 1967). I argue the imagining of 
125 This view of a self ‘congruent with itself’ echoes Gellner’s definition of 
nationalism and Heidegger’s: “We want our Volk to fulfil its historical mission. 
We want ourselves” (in Wolin 1990, p. 86).
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sovereignty is today aligned with powerful forces released by 
affluence and education and the event of 1979-1997 so that 
Scottish nationalism is not only about achieving something for 
the second time but something greater, and succeeding where 
the twelfth and subsequent centuries failed: a sociologically-
informed account of the capacities of human nature upon a purely 
natural basis and giving a new and original account of integral 
liberation, and an inclusive foundation for an appreciation of 
the apotheosis of fully-contextualised dasein insofar as achieving 
this purely natural perfection readies dasein for its supernatural 
destiny (Chapters 6 and 8).
When McCrone writes “We are all nationalists now” (1998, 
p. ix), he is correct despite the fact that the September 1997 
Referendum to establish a democratic mandate for the Scottish 
parliament only saw 45% of the electorate participating, and 
despite the fact that the unionist architects of devolution confi-
dently predicted that devolution would “kill nationalism stone 
dead.” 126 McCrone’s words tell us unionist politicians suffer a 
form of ‘false consciousness’ if they imagine they can avoid the 
title ‘nationalists’ simply because they have so far prevented 
independence, as the fact is political parties and politicians are 
‘all nationalists now’ as the agreed forum for politics is the 
Holyrood parliament, and each must be a nationalist ‘more or 
less’ if they are to avoid political oblivion. To paraphrase Hegel, 
we might say that a cunning ‘medieval’ long durée has used its 
opponents to bring its victory nearer insofar as the Labour Party 
has danced to the nationalist tune and many Scots were in favour 
of a Scottish parliament to the extent they were Labour voters and 
have subsequently become nationalists after 1999.
In this regard, locals seem to be correct in their political 
instincts when they report that ‘nationalism as devolution’ is a 
contrived affair that has been misrepresented as the people’s 
‘settled will,’ in opposition to more radical imaginings such as the 
nationalism of sovereignty that locals see other former stateless 
126 George Robertson, former Nato Secretary General and former Labour MP for 
Clyde and Cumnock (Ayrshire), and now the life peer Baron Robertson of Port Ellen. 
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European nations achieving. Hence, when interviewing on people’s 
doorsteps I found a degree of suspicion regarding the Labour 
Party’s motives for establishing the parliament. As an example I 
reproduce the following exchange with an elderly couple (Thomas 
Shand, retired miner, and Helen Shand, Whitehall Crescent, 24 
October 1999):
Me: Why do we have a parliament now?
Tam: Because the English folk Ah think they’re wantin tae 
break away. It’s no us that’s wantin tae break away. Ah 
think the English folk are wantin their ain country because 
they see it. If it’s onything tae dae wi Scotland it’s British bit 
if it’s onythin tae dae wi England it’s English. Whaure could 
ye get a union if they’re gonnae be like that?
Helen: Well Ah dinnae ken actually. Ah didnae think we wid 
ever get it, the way the Labour went an everythin.
Tam: Ah think it’s through the nationalists, the nationalists! 
They’re the wanes that pressed an…
Helen: Aye that’s right!
Tam: …they have, they’re at the bottom e getting the 
Scottish parliament. It’s no Labour! Labour would have 
went along the way they were gaun… 
Helen: Aye.
Tam: …sittin doon there! 
Helen: Couldnae care less!
Tam: Bit the nationalists got the parliament up here.
Me: Dae ye think it’s jist tae shut them up, keep them quiet?
Helen: Ah think so.
Tam: Could be. Bit Ah don’t think it’ll quiet them.
Helen: It’ll no quiet them.
Tam: Bit Ah mean if they keep at it they could get in theirsels 
ye ken.
Similar suspicions came from Ena Herd (Orebank Road, 14 November 
1999):
Ah dinnae think much e Tony Blair like. Ah dinnae like him. 
He’s a control freak. He’s just like, Ah think they’re a’ jist 
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like big brother is watching you. So Ah dinnae ken what his 
reasons are for letting Scotland get their parliament and get 
power. Ah dinnae ken what the reason fir that wis. There 
must have been some reason. Ah mean jist suddenly come 
up an says ye can have yer ain parliament jist like that you 
know. That jist doesnae jist happen itsel. Ah honestly jist 
think it’s a set up. That’s what Ah honestly think. Ah dinnae 
really think that the parliament is daen us much guid, 
because Ah dinnae think it’s allowed tae dae much guid. 
They’ve a’ got tae get in there an be there but they’re bound 
tae ken theirsels that they’re only jist puppets, eh? That’s 
how Ah feel.
Again, from the same street Mr. Proctor (68 Orebank Road, 
14 November 1999) told me after I had asked why after so long 
Scotland had a parliament once again:
It’s a mystery tae me. Ah still think we will never get away 
fae England cause there’s too many MPs doon there…they 
cannae even f***in tell the truth among theirsels. They’re 
always fightin each other. There’s that many lies gaun aboot. 
Ah joined up when Ah wis fifteen an was in the Middle East 
before Ah wis seventeen. Ah’m eighty-two noo.
And, finally, Susan Steele (Woodend Park):
Ah dinnae think the government’ll let that go...easily. An  
Ah think they’ll say right you’ve got yer parliament, give  
us a wee bit power and we’ll think we’re alright, we’ve got 
what we want but we dinnae really cause they’re still in 
control. Really at the end e the day they’ve still got the say 
and the last bit e control. Bit they’ve given it tae us because 
there’s too much rumblin about independence and stuff  
like that ye see. It’s been gaun on and on and on and gie 
them a parliament and they’ll think they’re comin oot lucky 
sort e thing, eh? That’s what Ah think. That’s ma thoughts 
anyway.
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Many informants are of the clear view the Labour Party’s 
implementation of Home Rule is a matter of political expediency, 
and that the real direction of travel of history is not fulfilled by the 
schemes of the Constitutional Convention set up in 1989 but lies 
with the nationalists who walked out of this convention because 
it refused to consider independence as a constitutional option for 
Scotland. We might say, then, that the real ‘historical subject’ 
driving devolution lies outside itself because the devolution of 
the Constitutional Convention was conceived ab initio as a means 
of preventing the ‘real nationalism’ of independence. In the above 
testimony of Ena, for example, there is the view that unionist 
Holyrood politicians have to more or less pretend they are 
nationalists in the hope that the electorate do not see through the 
pretence, and Tam and Helen likewise know that devolution is not 
sovereignty and that Holyrood is not a real parliament because 
the Westminster parliament remains in charge or sovereign. To my 
mind, then, these informants express the ‘integralism’ which 
unionist politicians are afraid of, so that in contrast to Donald 
Dewar’s fact-finding trips to Catalonia or Labour MEPs travelling 
to federal Bavaria as they construct Scotland’s future, this is not 
where locals look to for models of their nation’s being-in-the-
world because these do not provide (in the words of my English 
informant discussed earlier) “their own personal government.”
Many informants were open in their constitutional views to the 
extent that even if they voted SNP or Labour, this did not 
automatically imply an ideological commitment to unionism or 
nationalism. Unlike the two English interviewees quoted earlier 
for whom voting Conservative was an option, this was not the 
case for Scottish locals no matter how much they may have 
disliked New Labour. As a rule, locals vote SNP or they do not 
vote at all if they do not vote Labour, so that the unionism of 
locals would never go so far as voting for the Conservative and 
Unionist Party as this would require negating a far stronger class 
identity, and so this has resulted in a situation where many 
individuals with no real engagement with the constitutional 
question will ‘go with the flow’ rather than oppose devolution 
because such a position would be to ally with the only political 
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party to oppose the creation of the Scottish parliament i.e. the 
Conservative Party, so that instead of devolution being the ‘settled 
will’ of the people, the settled will is whatever the Conservative 
Party opposes. As the following interview with retired local 
(James Reid, Whitehall Crescent, 24 October 1999) shows, while 
there is anger because “fir years we’ve been ruled by Conservatives,” 
there is also a political fluidity between the unionist Labour Party 
and the nationalist SNP to the extent that an apparently solid 
lifelong commitment to voting Labour does not seem able to last 
a five-minute interview:
Me: How did ye vote?
Jim: Ah’ve always voted Labour.
Me: Do you think we really need this parliament?
Jim: Course we need it!
Me: Tell me why.
Jim: Well fir years we’ve been ruled by Conservatives and 
this is the first break we’ve ever hid. An’ now we’ll have to 
make good.
Me: Why do you think we have this parliament now?
Jim: Ye can take it all the way back. Fir years and years and 
years and this is the only chance we’ll ever get of putting our 
thing right.
Me: Right, we need a parliament. Are you in favour of 
independence?
Jim: Yes.
Me: Is that not treasonable talk if yer a Labour man?
Jim: Ah am a Labour man!
Me: But the Labour Party doesn’t want Scotland to be an 
independent nation.
Jim: Ah tae hell! It’s times everythin was changed. Everythin 
else is changin and it’s times this was changin also.
While James would be at home with the Labour for Independence 
group that emerged in 2012, we already see in 1999 the intuition 
that devolution is not something stable or that it is something that 
has difficulty ‘being itself’ because at its heart is an unsatisfactory 
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compromise, so that just as locals view New Labour as a peculiarly 
English phenomena or an English solutions to an English problem 
of its working classes voting for the Conservative Party, so they 
view the devolution settlement as a unionist solution to a problem 
that only nationalism can solve. However, if the invention of New 
Labour is to the credit of the English political Left insofar as it is 
an attempt to address an English problem, this only serves to 
highlight the fact that the Labour Party in Scotland has only 
managed to dance to the nationalist tune, and this is a truth that 
many ’45 generation Labour-voters (such as Thomas and Helen 
Shand) freely admit, while the Labour MPs they elect cannot 
freely admit.
Given the class, generational, historical, cultural and party 
political forces that already in 1999 were aligning in favour of 
a new imagining of Scottish sovereignty, the events of 2007 and 
2011 were perhaps not entirely unpredictable given that the 
political party that cannot align itself with these forces is fated to 
be marginalised. In this regard, another instructive example of 
how the people were ahead of unionist parties in 1999, and which 
added to the sense that devolution in 1999 was already a kind of 
interregnum period, was when the media began using the phrase 
“the Scottish government” in their coverage of the affairs of the 
restored parliament, only for that phrase to be discontinued by 
the media sometime after July 1999, so that much to their surprise 
the people discovered that they did not in fact have a Scottish 
government but something called a “Scottish Executive.” Watching 
the news programme Reporting Scotland on 10th November 1999 
the phrase “the Scottish Executive” was used but only to be 
subsequently discontinued in favour of “the Scottish government” 
when Henry McLeish readopted this phrase upon becoming First 
Minister in October 2000. Finally, according to media reports, 
McLeish was instructed by English Labour MPs not to use this 
phrase and so it disappeared once again from the media until May 
2007 when the SNP formed a minority government and officially 
adopted the phrase ‘the Scottish government.’
Once again, what we see is the struggle to structure perception, 
and this struggle over who is entitled to describe themselves as ‘the 
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government’ added to the sense of an unstable constitutional 
settlement having been foisted upon the populace. The spontaneous 
belief of having a government as opposed to something called an 
executive betrays the confusion as to what exactly devolution is, 
so that even immediately after 1 July 1999 informants did not 
have a sense of a series of problems having been resolved once and 
for all. Instead, as events have proved, the only thing that was 
settled on 1 July 1999 was that the constitutional question was set 
to be fought over every four years at every election to the Scottish 
parliament.
5.5 The Public Emergence of Reality: 1967-2007
Today for most people is the first day of reality.
Roseanna Cunningham SNP MSP
12 May 1999
Let’s be honest, some of us hoped that we would never  
see this day.
David McLetchie Conservative MSP
12 May 1999
The above quote from Roseanna Cunningham adverts to the long 
struggle to reconstitute politics in Scotland upon the basis of the 
nation, and while nationalists celebrated the return of the Scottish 
parliament, the Labour First Minister Donald Dewar had his 
own narrative to meet any suggestion that 1 July 1999 was 
a nationalist triumph, or that the return of the long-repressed 
sovereign ‘medieval kingdom’ of Scotland was under-way. For 
Dewar, 1 July 1999 was to be celebrated because it established a 
democratic parliament which was without precedent in the long 
history of the nation. In his address to the new parliament on the 
occasion of its official opening, the First Minister delivered a paen 
to democracy, despite the fact the Scots had enjoyed democracy 
since universal suffrage in 1918 and 1927. In his speech Dewar 
gave no recognition whatsoever to the view that nationalism was 
responsible for 1 July 1999. While every schoolboy knew 1 July 
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1999 was about reversing an error made nearly three centuries 
previously, Dewar’s description of the ‘present as history’ turned 
to the tried and trusted modernist myth that the Scots needed to 
wait for the French revolution of 1789 and the late eighteenth-
century Friends of the People tradition to be taught to desire 
their political freedom – perhaps the greatest ever public act 
of ‘repression of history’ and the greatest insult ever delivered to 
Scottish history.
This opening speech of the de facto political leader of the 
nation was ample evidence that, in his self-understanding, Dewar 
was not a nationalist and had no truck with the very non- 
liberal and non-politically correct business of making sovereign 
States out of stateless nations. Insofar as Dewar’s claim that the 
meaning of 1 July 1999 was that on this day the Scots successfully 
democratised an idea from eighteenth-century France, this is a tried 
and trusted modernist trick of burying the past, and how for the 
modernist there can be no admission of historical wrong-turnings 
such as the union of 1707 because to condemn three centuries of 
Scottish history as a fatal error is to bury the Enlightenment myth 
and modernist doctrine of ‘history as progress.’
Remarkably, despite the fact that the previous thirty years of 
Scottish politics had nothing to do with establishing democracy in 
Scotland as this had arrived in 1918, by only emphasising the new 
parliament was democratically elected, Dewar misrepresented 
1 July 1999 as a victory for democracy so as to suppress his sup-
pression of history, and the fact that political union with England 
had been the problem 1 July 1999 was created to solve. Dewar’s 
speech was carefully designed to kill off any suggestion that more 
history was to come or that there was any more history still left to 
be corrected or fulfilled, because in the Enlightened liberal imagi-
nation there can be no more ghosts of the past weighing upon the 
politics of the present. The resultant de facto ‘end of history’ nar-
rative of unionism inevitably means a lack of depth to politics and 
the reduction of politics to ‘eternal managerialism’ insofar as the 
future is imagined as perpetual undisturbed liberalism.
Such are the tales unionists tell themselves, and it is clear 
they remain far from a holistic understanding of modernity and 
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a fully-contextualised dasein and mitsein, so that the two unionist 
parties who were in favour of the devolved parliament (Labour 
and Liberal) were more or less fated to be seen as the uninvited 
guests at a party they were officially hosting insofar as Scottish 
nationalism was a social movement neither party could bring 
themselves to recognise and understand, far less celebrate and 
embrace. 1 July 1999, then, was a snapshot in time that captured 
the confusion in Scotland today that is sourced in the signature 
ambivalence of unionism which is evident in the Scotland 
Act (1998) in which the government published its intention to 
legislate for a Scottish parliament, and in which not a single 
nationalist flourish or crumb of long durée rhetoric appears, 
despite being written to bring about nationalist ends and amend 
historical wrong-turnings. This modernist document par excellence 
announces ex nihilo that: “There shall be a Scottish parliament” 
and is cleansed of all traces of history; a creation from nowhere 
of no lineage.
Despite these criticisms of modernism it is clear that nationalism 
has a modernist form insofar as it is dismissive or embarrassed 
at historical ‘period costume,’127 and has an integral form that 
freely embraces its source in the historic long durée. Despite these 
divergent understandings of the place of the past in the present, 
what unites both forms is that the nation must be sovereign 
regardless of whether the nation is a twelfth-century creation 
(Broun 1999) or an eighteenth-century invention (Davidson 2000), 
and both agree the nation is the medium through which they 
organise much of their political perception, so there is no need 
to imagine the nationalist as guilty of ‘false consciousness’ or 
backward-glancing even when the twelfth-century version of 
nationalism is opted for, because the twelfth-century is contem-
porary or ‘fit for purpose’ because the project that emerged at this 
time and first imagined and first achieved and first practiced the 
nation and first imagined and first achieved and first practiced 
sovereignty, ‘condemns’ every subsequent imagining and practicing 
127 My preferred form of modernist ‘false consciousness’ which I have to keep 
mysef from falling into is the period 1967-1997.
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of this project to repeat, restore, recapitulate, retrieve or resurrect 
this original era. Contemporary nationalists, then, need not be self-
consciously ‘medievalist’ to be aptly described as resurrecting 
a twelfth-century project of national freedom and modernity 
as this twelfth-century ‘politics of being’ (as opposed to the 
twelfth-century ‘mode of production’ or the twelfth-century 
level of technology) is what remains defining of the ‘present as 
history.’
If desiring and achieving and exercising and enjoying national 
sovereignty is what the present is about then, by definition, 1 July 
1999 and 18 September 2014 represent the return to a ‘medieval’ 
project that achieved this national sovereignty first. In any 
nationalist project then the ‘medieval’ must always be ‘in fashion’ 
or must always be perennial (with the only time that Scotland 
reneged on this patrimony being the brief eighteenth-century 
‘North British’ identity developed among Enlightenment figures 
and the modernist experiment of Britain). The ‘medieval is 
perennial,’ then, only insofar as the nation is mobilised or 
imagined or desired as the locus of sovereignty, so that whenever 
political sovereignty is not imagined or not desired in this 
way, then for that era the medieval is clearly not a template 
and the medieval ceases to be perennial. On the cusp of 
18 September, then, I propose the ’79 generation’s ‘tasks of 
freedom’ consist of transcending the Reformation/Enlightenment/
unionist/modernist/liberal/secularist imagination, and a class-
based recuperation of the long durée from below that is comprised 
of two elements:
1) a late medieval or early modern cultural-ideological 
complex, and
2) post-industrial class relations in an advanced affluent 
market economy and society.
What is emergent today is ‘repressed reality’ in all of its ‘never-
been-modernist’ fullness (Latour 1993), and the metaphor we 
might use to express this might be that fully-contextualised 
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working-class dasein in all of its ‘heavy historicity’ or in ‘full 
period costume,’ is one of the social carriers of this symbolic 
complex that has survived the long durée of 1707-1999 and its 
long defeat among social elites in Scotland, and is emergent 
thanks to affluence and the new relationship to the symbolic order 
among the working class and the event of 1979-1997, signalling 
the end of the modernist imagining of Scotland.
If this description seems to privilege the concept and role 
of ‘social class’ I am happy to entertain the position that 
‘historicity’ and ‘nationality’ are finally emerging in their fully 
modern ‘period costume’ form of social class. While I have 
emphasised class I am clear, then, that this category can not do all 
the work that is required. If we take the case of a working class 
that was unable to mobilise via nationalism during the years of 
neoliberal triumph 1979-1997, such as the English working class, 
we see that no matter what historic timescale we allow this 
population to organise and re-imagine their class mobilisation, 
they can never mobilise their class interests via nationalism 
because the ‘symbolic stuff’ is not only shared by another class but 
has already been mobilised and monopolised by another class, and 
so cannot be mobilised against that same class. 
For this population, then, to construct a route to class 
mobilisation via nationalism would require a truly modernist 
ontology and involve imagining northern England, for example, 
seceding from the rest of England and its inhabitants imagining 
this piece of England a distinct nation from the rest of England. 
However, being too English and ‘medieval,’ what is only ever 
really available to the English working-class ’79 generation is the 
same ‘Scottish project’ of imagining itself free from modernist 
assumptions and developing its own free imagining of English 
integral sovereignty. However, even the purely philosophical 
question as to whether the modernist conception of nationalism is 
possible is ill-conceived, as even if the population in the north of 
England imagined a nation for themselves and seceded from 
England, this would require mobilising medieval realities and 
categories to achieve this allegedly ‘modernist’ scenario. More 
accurately, modernist theories of dasein and nationalism will only 
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become plausible the day Afro-Americans, for example, imagine 
a country of their own on that continent and secede from the 
United States of America. Until such events happen, nationalism 
among the working class in Scotland must be understood as 
the operationalisation of a ‘medieval’ or twelfth and thirteenth-
century national inheritance and tradition and is impossible 
without this symbolic order or patrimony.
While I have emphasised class throughout I also recognise 
that insofar as “the nation is the medium” of our imagination 
(Craig 1999, p. 32), then the Nation can be considered the real 
agent of contemporary Scottish society and politics insofar as 
it is the Nation that has mobilised the working class to resurrect 
itself and more or less coerced the working class to break from its 
accommodations to affluence and post-War consensus. Likewise, 
on this structuralist view, it is not social actors who imagine 
‘the nation’ back to life but, rather, it is the nation that vivifies the 
imagination of social actors, and gives them the tools and the 
symbolic material with which to think their ‘present as history.’ 
The two pillars of ‘class and nation’ then animate a radical view 
that is fully alive to the importance of social class and embraces 
the nation as the medium of their hopes, as it is the nation that 
vivifies and gives life and gives context and ballast and a territory 
for their imagining of a new future.
Among the liberal commentariat in the media, an imagined 
freedom from territory and the routine denial of fundamental 
framing realities along with an imagined escape from historicity is 
something of an epidemic given their disposition to imagine 
themselves and their views as free of ‘vulgar’ social determination. 
This liberal misconception of human being was also fashionable 
among dominated working-class political activists for most of the 
twentieth century, and so the history of working-class political 
activism in Scotland is full of the confidant dismissal of “Braveheart 
an a’ that shite,” and full of the conviction that any turn to history 
was backward. Reviewing the history of Marxism, for example, 
it has clearly prided itself upon its theorisation of modern 
industrial class-based society, and yet is also a clear example of 
the modernist fight from real human being. As the brilliantly 
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antinomian Communist Manifesto ([1848] in Howell 1986, p. 4) 
famously put it:
The workers have no country. No one can take from them 
what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of  
all win political power, must make itself the ruling class, 
must raise itself to the position of a national class, must 
establish itself as the nation – it is, so far, still national, 
though by no means in the bourgeois sense of the term. 
In this extract the working class are made into Marx’s image 
of what it is to be modern and are a modernist’s dream come true 
as, on this description, they are the storm troopers of ‘pure 
revolution’ as they incarnate Mankind liberated from all culture, 
custom, religion, history and nationality as a result of the 
‘ontological cleansing’ effected as a result of ‘becoming modern’ (at 
least according to the modernist imagination); are reduced in their 
very being to the immaculately modern social and economic forces 
that brought them into being ex nihilo in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth-century. This modernist proletariat, even after the 
advent of affluence and leisure and higher education, are forbidden 
to turn to history, nationality or Christianity to imagine or paint 
themselves using these colours or develop these aspects of dasein as 
their ‘full period costume,’ because they are imagined to have been 
reduced completely to their social conditions and all trace of such 
pre-modern superstitions have been wiped clean from their ownmost 
selves. As so often with Marx, an unprecedented recognition of the 
real sits alongside a tremendous modernist flight from the real and 
this has meant that, if informants have come to expect a more or 
less systematic neglect of all things Scottish and working class from 
the political Right, the response of the Left has not been much 
better, prompting the former Marxist (and now nationalist) 
intellectual Tom Nairn to observe that nationalism is “Marxism’s 
greatest failure” (1981, p. 329).
The fundamental failure of Marxism is having articulated 
a theory of the working class that ab initio was infected by 
modernism and an anthropology irreparably scarred by ‘scarcity 
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thinking.’ These errors are responsible for Marxists’s inability to 
theorise ‘secondary natures’ and embrace fundamental aspects of 
contextualised human being such as culture, the nation and the 
historicity of working-class dasein in particular, thanks to its 
modernist contempt for history and anything other than purely 
natural sociological forces. A faulty doctrine of Man, then, lies 
beneath a tremendous turning towards Man, and is a fault which 
the current age of affluence exposes.
The Marxist legacy then affords ample evidence of the 
misrecognition of Scotland, such as Davidson (2000, p. 4) who 
has argued: “The Scottish nation was only formed in the late 
eighteenth century.” As a devout Marxist, Davidson argues that 
purely capitalist-era processes created Scotland so that it was 
only after the Highlands came to an end as a distinct and separate 
region that the two sub-national regions of the Highlands and 
Lowlands came together as one united national territory with a 
shared market, language, religion and a shared consciousness 
of their identity. However, Davidson concedes the existence of 
the Scottish state prior to the commercialisation of Scottish 
society and before the industrialisation of Scottish society and 
identifies something called ‘regnal consciousness’ in the twelfth 
and thirteenth century Wars of Independence, and acknowledges 
that it was in the twelfth century that there was established 
a sovereign Scottish state, while taking care to retain his thesis 
that the arrival of a Scottish nation is a purely eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century affair. 
Davidson, then, argues that the twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
nobility and clergy and peasantry fought and died for a sovereign 
Scottish territorial state, but had no concept of a Scottish 
nation and had no national consciousness. The Scots fighting at 
Bannockburn, then, had no ‘national consciousness’ but were 
merely doing their medieval ‘regnal duty’ when they fought and 
died for Scottish independence. In a repetition, then, of Weber’s 
(1976) argument regarding France i.e. that having created France 
the next task was to create Frenchmen out of peasants, or 
Garibaldi’s quip that having made Italy the next task was to make 
Italians, so in Scotland’s case the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
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made Scotland and the next task was to create Scots – something 
which only occurred in the eighteenth-century.
In making his argument Davidson makes the usual modernist 
moves when he states that Scottish national consciousness as we 
understand it today wasn’t around in 1296 or 1320, and this kind 
of equivocation is repeated in Scotland: Class and Nation (1999) 
where we have, at the eleventh hour, the tried and trusted Marxist 
hermeneutical principle of dichotomising ‘class and nation’ to 
discredit the legitimacy of nationalism as a working-class politics; 
hence the following from a member of the Socialist Workers Party 
(1999, p. 1):
The history of Scotland I learned from an early age was  
that the Scottish nation stretched back to the dawn of time. 
In this version Scotland was one of the oldest nations in 
Europe. But this was false. Far from there being a seamless 
evolution of the Scottish nation, modern Scotland was 
created by a series of convulsions stretching back just a little 
over two and a half centuries.
Instead of providing evidence that Scotland is not one of the 
oldest of Europe’s nations, Bambery states the hardly insightful 
proposition that “modern Scotland” does not stretch back to the 
dawn of time, and because this point is so trivial, Bambery is of 
course unable to provide evidence, for example, that the Scots or 
the French or the Irish believe modern Scotland or modern France 
or modern Ireland stretch “back to the dawn of time.” As a result 
of chewing upon the old Marxist cud, then, the antinomian mind 
reproduces misrepresentations of the real so that the ideologist 
might play the starring role of ‘bringer of enlightenment’ and 
‘materialist liberator’ of all those under the spell of nationalism. 
Similarly, Davidson’s claim to know the consciousness of the 
twelfth-century Scots peasantry is only matched by his incom- 
petence at knowing the twentieth-century Scottish working class 
when he writes that “over the last 20 years there has been a 
greater flourishing of Scottish culture than at any time since the 
1920s and 1930s…Yet this has not been accompanied by any 
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significant or sustained increase in support for the Scottish 
National Party” (2000, p. 2).
Already in 1999 these words were evidence of Davidson’s 
ideologically-driven lack of judgment which, in light of the fact 
that the SNP went on to win the elections of 2007 and 2011, is all 
the more evidence of his lack of judgment. Davidson’s inability 
to suspect these immanent developments which many working-
class Scots knew were likely is evidence that Davidson is no guide 
to the national consciousness of working-class Scots today, far less 
the consciousness of twelfth and thirteenth-century Scots peasants. 
Indeed, what also seems clear is that Davidson has misread twelfth 
and thirteenth-century Scots in the exact same way as he has 
misread twentieth and twenty-first-century working-class Scots 
i.e. just like his imaginary medieval Scots peasants who had 
no ‘national consciousness,’ so in 2000 Davidson imagines the 
Scots working class have only very recently taken up nationalism 
so that Scottish Marxists like Davidson cannot be accused of 
failing to see what wasn’t there to be seen.
The truth of the matter, however, is that unencumbered by 
‘historical materialism’ the Scottish working class became nation-
alists while Marxist intellectuals like Bambery and Davidson 
remained mired in their brilliantly antinomian Marxism that was 
unable to anticipate, far less participate in, the historic develop-
ments they are living through. Insofar as these Marxists want their 
readers to imagine they are a guide to the consciousness of a 
medieval peasantry living seven centuries ago or the present-day 
working class, they are like so many Marxists who are made blind 
by the “polished folly” (Yves Simon, in Hellman 1991, p. 459) 
they imagine makes them able to see. 
To propose that every twelfth and thirteenth-century 
Scots peasant who fought for their Scottish kingdom and its 
independence from a predatory English sovereign and nobility did 
not have national consciousness because the nation (arbitrarily 
defined as a unified territory with a common market throughout 
that territory with one religion and one language) did not exist 
yet, is clearly to load the definitional dice in favour of a particular 
outcome. Indeed, given such rigorous criteria for what constitutes 
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a nation, it is tautologous to argue we only find such evidence in 
the more recent past. To say that medieval Scots peasants did 
not have such a national consciousness similar to the national 
consciousness of today is likewise tautologous given our media-
saturated age. On this question, I am open to conceding that upon 
the basis of the four criteria laid out for national consciousness by 
Davidson Scotland did not meet such criteria until 1800 or 1900 
or 2000, or indeed might never meet this criteria as his hopelessly 
homogenised criteria for the existence of a nation would mean the 
Scottish nation would have to vanish if he came across Hebridean 
Catholics, for example, with no desire whatsoever to share in 
the language or religion of the Lowland Protestant. 
However, if we choose to define the nation using Seton-Watson’s 
(cited in Davidson 2000, p. 9) definition: “A nation exists when a 
significant number of people in a community consider themselves to 
form a nation, or behave as if they do,” then on this criteria histo-
rians have concluded that the Scottish nation existed in the twelfth 
century, and that medieval peasants possessed a form of national 
identity that can meaningfully be described as the direct ancestor of 
our contemporary national consciousness.
Davidson’s argument that the twelfth and thirteenth century 
population living in Scotland wanted an independent and sovereign 
‘Kingdom-State’ and that they had a ‘Kingdom consciousness,’ 
which is different from ‘national consciousness’ and the desire to 
have a nation-state, is semantic game playing. If we choose to 
define nationalism, for example, as the desire of a people to have 
a state of its own we can have nationalism but without any need 
for a nation or national consciousness. If there were a ‘regnal 
doctrine,’ for example, that stated every kingdom shall be a 
sovereign state of its own, this is clearly a direct ancestor and 
source of the nation and the nationalist consciousness that when 
politicised states that every nation shall have a state of its own, 
with ‘regnal consciousness’ being the direct ancestor of national 
consciousness.
The truth of the matter in such ‘definitional dances’ is that 
in the pre-devolution socialist imagination, nationalism was 
routinely judged to be a bourgeois fiction foisted upon the 
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working class, so that anti-nationalist socialists such as Bambery 
could write “John Maclean was not a nationalist” (1999, p. 29). 
In the Marxist imagination the nationalist is not simply someone 
who wishes to have the state and nation congruent but is someone 
who is prey to all sorts of mystifications that blind him to his class 
interests. Such clichéd ‘schemes of perception’ look in the wrong 
places for the reality of Scottish nationalism and disappear the 
embedded reality of nationalism and betray an inadequate social 
ontology as well as ignorance of the working class. 
However, with a purely Scottish political context upon them, 
the Scottish Socialist Party was created and began wearing the 
‘medieval’ nationalist clothing of independence at the eleventh 
hour, although their then leader Tommy Sheridan betrayed his 
antinomianism and opportunism when he refused to admit he 
had become a nationalist when interviewed on television.128 It is 
because of this traditional ‘flight from reality’ that we have the 
long-standing criticism of Marxists in Scotland: ‘‘They have built 
around themselves a paper wall of English books; no wonder the 
common Marxist cannot see Scotland” (MacColla1927, cited in 
Finlay 1994, p. 54).
Another ideological position that routinely fails to understand 
Scottish nationalism is liberalism, which may be viewed as another 
major carrier of antinomian ‘flight from reality’ insofar as it is the 
‘ideology’ of choice among the powerful middle classes. I argue 
that to explain why nationalism and not a political form of 
liberalism is increasing in popularity among the working class 
(and indeed even the middle classes) is to explain why liberalism 
is another alienation from working-class reality as a matter 
of liberal principle, and to outline this argument I take as 
a representative liberal text the former leader of the Liberal 
128 Perhaps the Spanish language offers a way out for the anti-nationalist 
socialists as the word independentista refers to someone in favour of independ-
ence and the doctrine of the nation and state being congruent, but has none 
of the fascist and ‘false consciousness’ connotations associated with the word 
nacionalista.
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Democrat party Charles Kennedy’s The Future of Politics, which 
characterises the ‘present as history’ as follows (2000, p. xiii):
The old verities have become a bonfire of the political 
vanities, and the joyous collapse of the Berlin Wall was to 
socialism what Black Wednesday became to Conservatism. 
There are no more glad, confident dawns. A good thing  
too. This uncertainty defines the territory upon which the 
Liberal Democrats now operate. Society seems to be defined 
by near-instantaneous flitting images; as a consequence we 
have to be fleet of foot politically.
According to Kennedy, who describes himself as “an open-minded, 
pro-European, moderate-thinking Scot” (2000, p. xiii), the ‘signs of 
the times’ require us to update ourselves so as not to remain mired 
in old loyalties, and to move ourselves on from “voting on purely 
tribal lines” (2000, p. 170). However, this ‘moderate thinking’ is 
itself mired in ‘tribal liberalism’ and the old verities of modernism in 
its imagining a new post-class and post-national era is upon us. 
Faced with ever-changing society, the moderate thinking Scot must 
keep up with the times and must become post-Labour and post-SNP 
in his voting habits so as not to suffer from obsolete ‘false conscious-
ness.’ Thanks to this construction of the ‘present as history,’ then, 
the same old refusal to recognise social class is legitimised because 
such realities, in true modernist style, are imagined to be passing 
away, so that under the guise of recognising the emerging new, thick 
historical and social and national realities (in the spirit of J. S. Mill) 
can be dispensed with for the sake of progress. 
Because of this flight from the real, political liberalism remains 
marginal to working-class politics due to its threefold lack of 
mediation via place, class and nationality, and this absence of 
emplacement in real time and space means liberalism rules in 
neither the inner-city nor the countryside, so that the question as 
to where Liberalism is located is more than a question of location 
on the political spectrum. Paradoxically, liberalism’s only success 
in Scotland is in those parts of the Highlands where it has 
established a tradition and a loyalty in a particular locality. 
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Instead of making a ‘bonfire of the political vanities,’ then, we can 
say that Kennedy reproduces all of the traditional liberal defects 
such as its traditional inability to come to terms with the rise of 
class society and class politics after 1918 which ended the long 
hegemony of political liberalism in Scotland.
Also, Kennedy’s denunciation of ‘political tribalism’ echoes 
The Scotsman editorial discussed earlier that warned against 
“deranged anthropologists” describing the Scots and English as 
two different ethnies. This deployment of the ‘primitive’ trope 
to discredit fully-contextual positions, and any kind of politics 
that would recognise such integralism, is in fact integral to how 
liberalism constitutes its apparent ‘moderation.’ Hence, when the 
then Liberal member of the Westminster parliament Paddy 
Ashdown came to Scotland during the election campaign to the 
first Holyrood parliament, and was questioned about Scottish 
nationalism, he replied with a textbook discourse on the evils 
of nationalism citing events in the Balkans and Yugoslavia as 
evidence of the inherent evils of nationalism; and thereby gave 
an exemplary indication of the spectres and fictions of ‘tribalism’ 
and ‘fundamentalism’ that haunt the liberal imagination.
In the new conditions of affluence and deindustrialization, 
then, Kennedy pitches for a new relevance of a political Liberalism 
that is fully aligned with the times thanks to advocating the 
undesirability of constituting politics upon the old-fashioned lines 
of class and nation. This desire to constitute politics ‘without 
any period costume,’ then, repeats the history of liberalism insofar 
as Liberals have a long pedigree of alienation from class 
and nationality-mediated reality, having split on the issue of Irish 
nationalism in the eighteen-nineties and having disintegrated 
even further upon the issue of class after 1918. There is clearly, 
then, a deep principle at work in liberalism that results in its 
being perennially ‘unreal’ or a class ideology which is afraid of 
engagement with class and national identity; as if liberalism is 
designed to mask from liberals themselves a determined lack of 
engagement with these fundamental realities.
Insofar as the liberal is shocked by the nationalist ‘will to power’ 
and the nationalist’s recognition of the territorial imperative in 
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politics, nationalism easily appears as a form of authoritarianism or 
fascism, so that we may say nothing has changed since Bruck 
observed: “Liberalism is the death of nations” (2012, p. 100). That 
liberals have been marginal to Scottish politics since 1918 because 
of the rise of class-based politics yet refuse to bring this to clear 
consciousness is indicative of a doxic ‘scheme of perception’ and an 
unconscious dogmatism that means they are more or less con-
demned to constitute politics as ‘enlightened’ to the extent that 
it is divorced from reality. While political liberalism and socialist 
internationalism share this antinomian flight from reality, and 
despite the few working-class socialist activists who remain at their 
modernist posts, this confident neglect and depoliticisation of 
Scottish history and dasein is at an end as a ‘medieval’ patrimony 
is mobilised to the horror of cosmopolitan liberal commentators.
The greatest obstacle in the way of achieving thinking that 
is free from modernism and ‘paintings’ of ourselves free from 
the black and white palette of the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ is the 
liberal imagination. I argue because the twelfth-century saw the 
advent of a new level of technologisation and urbanisation across 
Europe, where incipient ‘spheres of life’ existed in their own right 
and far from being imagined as being fated to ‘liquidation’ or 
privatisation as a result of the onset of modernity, the task 
of ‘being modern’ was to reform and renew and integrate these 
developments and new ‘life spheres’ within each society’s ‘sacred 
canopy’ (Berger 1967), and I propose that this remains the 
only adequate way to imagine the task of being modern in 
the twenty-first century. If such is the original and perennially 
valid understanding of European modernity then, what has to be 
perennially resisted is the always-present temptation whenever 
there is a new step-change within modernity (such as the advent 
of the post-industrial era) to resort to the clichés of liberalism or 
modernism and imagine our historical ballast must be thrown 
overboard in order to be fully coeval with the times.
Because of the ‘dissolving’ pressures of modernity it is precisely 
those modern urban affluent societies that teem with people more 
or less fated to struggle with the question whether or not they 
should liquidate their historicity and nationality and locality and 
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begin ex nihilo both as individuals and as members of a people 
or a nation. This signature tension of ‘being modern,’ however, 
needs the ballast of the long durée if it is not to degenerate into 
the clichés of modernism. Also, thanks to affluence and education, 
this tension is no longer the reserve of an elite but increasingly 
the general condition, so that even working-class populations 
face these issues as they are released into the dilemma of ‘being 
modern’ in their own right, rather than having this tension being 
submerged in material disadvantage. Today, then, we are all more 
or less modern and live this tension as even repentant modernists 
like Nairn recognise that romanticism or the need for holism 
was an integral aspect of modernity rather than a regression from 
it (1997, p. 209), and is finally able to recognise that Scotland is 
a nation where “the road not taken haunts the one actually 
followed” (1997, p. 209). The link, then, between the 12th and 
21st centuries stems from the fact the ’79 generation has been 
recently freed to re-think and reinvigorate and renew the integration 
of their social conditions and their historicity and nationality, and 
in the twelfth century there is an historical precedent for this 
contemporary situation that allows us to simultaneously turn to 
the new social conditions but on the basis of a holistic understanding 
of our integral selves.
5.6 Thinking Modernity & Thinking Human Being
It seems tae hae been oor generation that started it and 
they’re gonnae finish it off. Ma mum an that, she thinks we 
should get it [independence] noo, bit when Ah wis growin 
up she jist voted Labour. Whereas noo they see us, me an  
aa ma mates vote SNP so we’re startin it. We’ve got the 
parliament and the ones that are growin up they’ll hear it 
mair fae us than we did fae oor mum and dad, so they’re 
gonnae pick up on it.
Steven Haggart
38 Muirtonhill Road
25 July 1999
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The above quote captures many of the themes to emerge from 
fieldwork and is as precise a summary of an emergent working-
class nationalism as I could have hoped for from an informant. 
Steven speaks of historical and political processes and the shift in 
allegiance across the generations in the intimate idiom of kinship, 
and reveals the self-understanding of his generation as that which 
achieved the Holyrood Parliament and, in due course, will achieve 
independence some time after 2014. An integral part of this self-
understanding is a critique of the ’45 generation as Steven is clear 
that his mum and dad ‘‘jist voted Labour.’’ This advertence to the 
intimate intergenerational family context signals a critique of any 
account of nationalism that fails to understand the importance of 
class, and which one is responsible.
If we take Nairn, for example, there is a long-standing 
uncertainty as to which social class is the ‘social carrier’ of 
nationalism. On the one hand (1997, p. 189):
All comparative studies of nationality have underlined  
the crucial place of such professional strata in generating  
the identity shifts behind nationalism: it is teachers,  
clerics, lawyers, journalists and loose screws who cause the  
trouble, far more than landlords, bankers, manufacturers  
or trade-unionists.
And on the other hand (1997, p. 187):
[T]he awful, paralytic truth is that an upper-servant class 
may find it far harder to take such a decision [‘to rule, rather 
than to merely administer’] than those who are genuinely 
below stairs – the outcast or dispossessed whose life chances 
have, suavely or brutally, been defined for them. The latter 
may quite easily tell itself there is nothing to lose. The Scots 
managing class has not been brought up to think that way 
at all; and it has permeated the nation with its caution.
For the young pre-nationalist Nairn (1977, p. 334) the origins of 
nationalism were: “located not in the folk, nor in the individual’s 
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repressed passion for some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the 
machinery of world political economy,” and it would be difficult 
to find a more different approach to nationalism than that of 
ethnographers such as Kapferer (1988) and Herzfeld (1997) who 
set themselves the problem of understanding the popular class-
based appeal of nationalist discourse. For Herzfeld (1997, p. 3) 
the metaphors of belonging deployed in the construction of 
locality, for example, are an integral aspect of belonging to the 
larger community of the nation.
I suggest that the model of cultural intimacy is a particularly 
apt concept for anthropologists to contribute to the study  
of nationalism (as well as to other idioms of identity 
formation), because it typically becomes manifest in the 
course of their long-term fieldwork, a site of social intimacy 
in the fullest sense.
Cardenden then affords scope to articulate the ‘iconicity’ between 
local and national identity, as both draw upon an ideology of 
‘sameness’ which is used to mark boundaries of belonging, so 
that nationalism may be seen as a bounded community of 
meaning that draws its reality from the ‘social intimacy’ of small 
communities. In Cardenden the expression of belonging is largely 
through the idiom of kinship so that a person belongs because, 
like his mother and father, he was ‘born and bred’ in Cardenden 
so that kinship and residence are the medium through which 
belonging is imagined and comes about. Also, however, because 
an adequate explanation of working-class nationalism must 
include an adequate account of how people experience being 
a certain class, an adequate explanation of ‘being Scottish’ must 
explain much more than national identity if it is to avoid the 
reification of national identity. To give an integral explanation of 
experience then is the challenge to give an integral explanation 
of the experiencing of nationality and class and other relevant 
relations, and how each of these identities mediate and influence 
each other. This is why before the subject of nationalism was 
broached directly I spent the first three chapters dealing with 
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apparently unrelated issues in order to convey to the reader how 
the quality of ‘being national’ is not something heaven-sent or 
transmitted intact through the ages, but is informed by a fully 
socialised ontology i.e. is shaped bodily, has an ingrained somatic 
coding and quality one would expect, for example, from a retired 
sixty-four year old miner (Bert Lister, 25 July 1999, 39 Woodend 
Park) who declares: “Ah’m Scottish through and through!”
Claims about the self such as Bert’s derive their onto-substantive 
quality from an unequivocal class experience, so that the ‘national 
self’ is consubstantial with the worked-self, and such discursive 
claims (which are never uttered by a middle-class ‘moderate think-
ing Scot’) emerge from the triangulation of id, identity and ideology 
or nature, nurture and nation described earlier. There is a lived 
identity that is not fragmented or decentred but a substantial endur-
ing quality which Bert’s ‘Scottishness’ presents itself to him as hav-
ing; a national identity that is not the result of choice or deliberation 
but necessity. While the ‘social constructivist’ position maintains 
there is nothing ‘natural’ about the existence of nations or persons 
‘being national,’ once we allow that the self is socially mediated and 
allow for the play of time and place upon human being, social con-
structivism is compatible with recognising a miner will experience 
not simply national identity but his body in a determinate manner, 
and that when key social relations endure from generation to gen-
eration, a constructivist approach to identity must accede to talk 
about structural constructs becoming substantive realities that are 
able to lead a life of their own, leading to a social ontology of 
essences or stable ‘secondary natures.’ 
Such a social ontology, then, can have its cake and eat it insofar 
as it rejects the ontological universalism that imagines human 
being having essences or as being “self-identical entities persisting 
during all changes in time and possessing the same qualities or 
properties” (Rapport 2002, p. 176), and transfers this classical 
Aristotelian view of essences onto the ‘secondary natures’ of 
class and nation and the ‘secondary essence’ of the ‘condition 
of reduction,’ for example, described in Chapter 2. A social 
constructivist sensitivity then does not involve championing the 
idea of a postmodern ‘liquid’ self precisely because it must take 
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account of temporality and historicity and their structuring or 
‘fixing’ impact upon the dasein of social actors.
If we take seriously the thesis that social stratification and 
mental structuration will come to exhibit an isomorphism that 
will endure over time, there is still the matter of establishing the 
particular empirical details which change over the generations as 
a result of social and economic and historical change. I propose, 
then, that the ’79 generations are capable of greater reflexivity 
as, previously, the “dictatorship of scarcity” (Beck 1992, p. 20) 
held subjectivity and reflexivity in a particular stage or level of 
development. Because there is a homology between social 
conditions and mental habits, the development of society leads 
directly to the possibility of a new lived experience of the mind 
within younger working-class generations; leads to new mental 
achievements that previously were not possible. 
More concretely, then, with the end of pure laissez faire politics 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the State intervened 
directly into the condition of the labouring classes firstly via 
liberal paternalism and then via political parties constituted upon 
the basis of representing the interests of labour and capital and 
exercising political power. As industry and the local coal company 
were displaced as providers of non-workplace benefits such as 
schooling, housing and gas street-lighting, there occurred what 
Bourdieu (1998) names the ‘uncoupling of fields,’ so that the 
worker was able to free himself from the company’s omnipresence 
in his life. Insofar as the company withdrew from its domination 
of local public space and retreated from its paternalist welfare role 
to become simply a coal company, something similar was able to 
occur within the worker insofar as, in proportion to this retreat 
from the extra-economic role of ‘patron’ the worker divested 
himself of his dependency upon the company and began to think 
his existence and emerge ‘in himself’ in his own consciousness.
As the worker could divide his experience as worker and as a 
free self, a space emerged into which the worker could begin 
to recognise submerged aspects of dasein; as if his ‘worked self’ 
only became visible because it was different from other selves he 
was now able to become. Because he now inhabited a structurally 
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changed relationship to the organisation and experience of 
social space and this led to a new relation to himself, he could 
even dare imagine and constitute a separate politics based upon 
objectively being structurally released to begin the same ‘turn 
to the subject’ that is continued and evermore released among the 
’79 generation(s). With no need to “keep in with the gaffer” as 
one of Corrie’s songs expresses it, or cue at the private doctor’s 
house and pay for treatment at the point of delivery because his 
health care was out of middle-class hands thanks to the 
nationalisation of health, the two classes could each go their 
separate ways. When we add to this the advent of affluence and 
deep literacy, the ’79 working-class generations inhabit social 
conditions that more or less coerce them to break with the ’45 
generation and resume the integral politics of the 1918 generation, 
and turn to subjectivity in all of its colours, so the current 
challenge is that of exploiting the opportunity to think working-
class dasein and mitsein free of the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ and 
modernism.
The current generation’s ‘politics of being’ then may be viewed 
as the third stage corresponding to the third stage of capitalism 
(Lash and Urry 1987) where the first round was the transformation 
of politics after the enfranchisement of 1918 and exemplified in 
the likes of Connolly, Wheatley and McLean, and round two was 
the inauguration of the welfare state after 1945 and, thirdly, the 
contemporary emergence of working-class dasein laying claim to 
think itself and its free development free of modernism, materialism, 
supernaturalism and secularism, and which in the realm of politics 
means the pursuit of its own nation-state. In this regard it is 
significant that since the nineteen-eighties representations of 
class and nation have become integral to what Kravitz (1997, 
p. xix) views as a new kind of literature in which prior literary 
representations of the “subaltern Scot” have been replaced by 
representations of Scots as “whole, not split people.” Kravitz’s 
assertion evidences that working-class dasein is expanding its 
repertoire of colours and its self-definition to include post-material 
realities and to contribute to musical and literary traditions as 
working-class interventions into the symbolic order, which is in 
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line with the emerging exigence of cultural self-determination 
identified by Mulholland (2011). Class then becomes culture as 
well as nation, so that opposition to ‘Thatcherism’ and now the 
drive to independence in 2014 becomes as much cultural 
as political, as evidenced by the organisation Artists For 
Independence in the wake of the 1992 general election and the 
host of contemporary groupings such as National Collective 
founded in 2011.
If the SNP are the main political beneficiaries of this movement 
to holism there can be little surprise as the SNP through much of 
its tortuous history was defined by the fact it wished to represent 
and advocate that which formerly dominant unionist parties 
sought to repress. According to Finlay (1994), the SNP was 
created because firstly the Liberal Party and subsequently the 
Labour Party failed to enact the Home Rule legislation they 
claimed they wanted for Scotland. In the history of the SNP also, 
there has been a long and tortuous history of grappling with the 
question of how best to mediate the appeal of nationalism i.e. via 
‘secondary natures’ or not, and this has resulted in a number of 
mediation battles having to be successfully negotiated before it 
could credibly appeal to the working class. 
It is because the SNP until the nineteen-eighties favoured a purist 
disdain for the messy and divisive particularity of ‘secondary 
natures’ that it long delayed re-constituting itself on the basis of 
nationality and class, so that the great mistake of the nineteenth-
century nationalist movement was its failure to come to grips 
with the ontological revolution in dasein that went hand in hand 
with the industrial revolution. In each step-change in the modern 
era ‘secondary natures’ or real contextual dasein is made into the 
image of the times, so that a new relation to dasein has been 
recently made possible and a traditional relation to Tradition has 
been abolished so that Tradition and historicity and nationality 
(as well as sexuality and artistry and creativity etcetera) have been 
liberated from their traditional confines within the ‘dictatorship 
of scarcity.’
Crucial, then, to the post-1979 phase of nationalism has been 
the decisive defeat of an ‘immaculate’ nationalism that has aligned 
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with the fully-contextualised nationalism of a new generation of 
nationalists, symbolised by the left-wing ’79 Group which was 
crucial to preparing the shift of the working-class Labour vote to 
the SNP after 1987 and 1992. If the SNP leadership finally 
constituted itself via class and nation, this does not mean working-
class nationalism occurred once a political party finally sorted 
out its electoral identity. Rather, after the nineteen-eighties there 
began a fitting together or alignment of SNP leadership and policy 
and a renewed electoral appeal among the working class. The 
crucial shift has been the realisation that, because working-class 
nationalism must ‘mediate or die’ because it is a socialised and 
historicised phenomenon that required the event of 1979-1997 to 
constitute itself by because it does not have the resources to 
operate at the level of ‘pure reason,’ there is nothing paradoxical 
in the view that unless it is deeply mediated or even dissolved ‘into 
other things,’ working-class nationalism has difficulty existing, 
far less being able to stand on its own two feet and dominate 
the political scene. If a Labour government had been elected in 
1987 or 1992, who is to say the Labour-voting Scottish working 
class would have shifted to the SNP so that instead of an 
Independence referendum in 2014, the cause of nationalism today 
could still be faced with the task of contesting Westminster general 
elections on an all-British basis.
If for nationalism to succeed politics had to become a politics 
of class and nation, then the nineteen years of 1979-1997 was 
the necessary ‘event’ to resurrect this integral political project. 
The nationalist hope is that nationalism becomes “not a mere 
by-product but the very stuff of social change…not its reflection, 
its cause, its expression, or its engine, but the thing itself” (Geertz 
1993, pp. 251-2), and no longer at the mercy of relations 
and events for its being, and I would propose that if Scottish 
nationalism were a middle-class project then independence 
would have been achieved long ago given this class’s control of all 
major institutions and most of the sites of cultural production. 
The kind of momentum that we see in Scotland where a dominated 
class has achieved a degree of leadership can only happen in 
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exceptional circumstances, whereas a middle class can expect to 
exercise political leadership under normal circumstances.
Because Labour won ‘middle England’ in May 1997, working-
class Scots were spared yet another debacle, and how much worse 
it would have needed to become before nationalism became a 
substantive stand-alone reality among the working class we will 
never know, but we do know that the period 1992-1997 was the 
high-point in the disjuncture between politics and reality and an 
integral politics was resurrected. In this regard, having successfully 
constituted itself as left-of-centre the Scottish National Party has 
reaped the benefits of the system of proportional representation 
put in place for the first Holyrood election. As Bennie et al. (1997, 
p. 16) observed: “the SNP has consistently had most to complain 
about” as they had consistently been penalised most by the first-
past-the-post electoral system, and the working-class SNP vote in 
the central belt had the greatest increase in representation thanks 
to the introduction of proportional representation. 
As of 1 July 1999, then, there has occurred a far greater align-
ment between representation and reality at the national level, and 
a further alignment of cultural and class reality at the local and 
regional level of government occurred when a more proportionate 
voting system was adopted at regional elections in 2007, and from 
this point onwards the already established reality of SNP/Labour 
contestation at the national and European parliamentary level 
has its full public emergence at the local and regional council 
level and, unsurprisingly, at the May 2007 regional elections the 
Labour party went from controlling thirteen Scottish Councils to 
controlling two, while the SNP went from controlling one regional 
council to forming ruling coalitions in eleven councils, and the 
Labour Party’s domination of local government in Scotland came 
to an emphatic end.
Nationalism is so powerful in the modern era because it is the 
best solution to the predicament of ‘being collective’ and ‘being 
modern:’ how to produce a real sense of community after the rise 
of mass society in hugely-populated free-market societies, so that 
integral to the modern drama is the fear of losing authenticity and 
identity, and so integral too is the question of cultural authenticity 
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which is the objective impulse for nationalism because, as seen 
by Eriksen (in Olwig & Hastrup 1997, p. 109), national identity’s 
“great emotional power, and its unabashed linking up with the 
intimate sphere, suggests one important sense in which nationalism 
has more in common with kinship or religion than with, say, 
liberalism or socialism.” In the endeavour to uncover “the social 
bases of nationalism” (Gellner 1983, p. 113) the very human 
being of social actors is implicated because of nationalism’s ability 
to morph with and draw upon what Geertz has called ‘primordialist 
sentiments’ because the nation can symbolise and canalise our 
ownmost dasein. It is because symbolic constructs such as the 
nation are ‘empty’ enough that they can receive everything thrown 
at them by ‘secondary natures,’ and this means they can be 
spontaneously interpreted by the individual or social group with 
meanings that are only available to those individuals and social 
groups. As Cohen (1985, p. 21) has written:
Symbols are effective because they are imprecise. Though 
obviously not contentless, part of their meaning is ‘subjective.’ 
They are, therefore, ideal media through which people  
can speak a ‘common’ language...without subordinating 
themselves to a tyranny of orthodoxy. Individuality and 
commonality are thus reconcilable.
If nationalism is able to appeal to integral human being, we now 
turn to thinking ‘being human’ and ‘being modern’ upon the basis 
of Special Ontology, or upon the basis of certain performative 
accomplishments that we now turn to in order to explain some 
knowledge-claims that have been made in passing but without 
having given any details of the developments of dasein that 
justify them. We proceed then to outline the ‘perfections’ of 
fully-contextualised Scottish working-class dasein that are possible 
among the ’79 generations, and I do so upon the basis of firstly 
having accomplished them within myself. If such an outline is to 
be given or if dasein is to be capable of painting itself (and others) 
with a full palette of colour, the artist must firstly have a full 
palette of colour available to him. Hence, upon the basis of 
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particular developments that add the finishing touches of colour, 
the final three chapters give the performative detail that grounds 
what I describe as an affluent politics of holistic dasein, not only 
‘in full period costume’ but at the very apotheosis of its natural 
powers and even beyond these natural powers as the question of 
transcendence and the supernatural comes into view.
(ii) Special Ontology
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6
The Natural Apotheosis of 
Contextual Scottish 
Human Being
Reflexivity…can be a means of examining a field problem, that 
is…the study of the ‘Natives’’ reflexive acts.
Myerhoff & Ruby 1982, p. 17
An a priori study of man’s nature is impossible. The only way 
we can know it is by studying its acts.
Bettoni 1961, p. 73
6.1 The Worker & Self-Appropriation
In my account of the integral development of contextual dasein 
the structuration effected by truth is a privileged event, and in 
light of the transformation brought about within the worker-
inquirer by a particular act of understanding, it is necessary to 
speak of the unique ‘agency of truth’ that structures the dasein of 
the worker-inquirer in a unique manner. Ever since Aristotle’s 
observation that “falsity and truth are not in things…but in 
thought” (in Barnes 1984, p. 1623), truth has been recognised as 
a modification that occurs within the knower and not in the object 
or thing that is known. I propose then to describe an intellectual 
development within the worker and draw upon the Aristotelian-
Thomist tradition and the work of Lonergan’s (1957) philosophy 
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of self-appropriation and develop an emphasis upon the intellect 
in the shadow of Marx’s (in Arthur 1970, p. 61) ‘scarcity thinking’ 
point of view which famously declared “liberation is an historical 
and not a mental act.” While I have much sympathy with this 
view, the fact remains that to develop dasein in a holistic manner 
is to develop a specifically intellectual or cognitional ‘performance’ 
or ‘act’ to the extent that we will argue liberation is above all a 
mental act. This stance presupposes an integral account of dasein 
must concern itself with achieving an integral self-understanding, 
and how this understanding is achieved is important not only 
because a series of cultural and social conditions stand in the 
way of the individual worker-inquirer achieving this act of self-
understanding, but because by giving an account of this specifically 
cognitional or intellectual development, this presupposes a situated 
performance of cognitional structure,129 and to achieve this 
cognitional agency the strategy I propose will be the appropriation 
of that part of the self which the worker-inquirer cannot fail to 
be interested in i.e.
1) the incarnate self immersed in and transformed by the 
mundane world of work, and
2) the symbolic self emergent from ‘at risk’ moments where 
the interface between ‘self’ and ‘society’ is made existentially 
real for the worker located in the occupational hierarchy.
While an emphasis upon the world of work and the workplace 
has a long history in social research and theory, the desire to 
integrate the workplace and questions regarding the possibility 
of ‘revolutionary consciousness’ among workers has a decidedly 
129 I will use Lonergan’s Insight (1957) as a roadmap for the worker-inquirer 
achieving self-understanding by drawing upon his account of cognitional 
structure in which there are nine steps: (1) presentations to the senses, 
(2) attention to the empirical data, (3) imagination, (4) the drive to understand, 
(5) insight, (6) conception, (7) reflection, (8) grasp of conditions for understanding 
and (9) judgment. 
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pre-neoliberal ‘new world order’ feel today. Previously, mainstream 
texts such as Blauner’s Alienation and Freedom: the Factory 
Worker and His Industry (1964), Edwards’s Contested Terrain: 
the Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) and Gordon et al.’s Segmented Work, Divided Workers 
(1982) analysed workers in light of theoretical expectations that 
they could and should respond oppositionally to capitalism and 
develop a socialist alternative, and so these texts took up the 
search for the obstacles and blocks that impede a development 
within workers as a result of their immersion in the labour 
process. This rich heritage of empirical studies of a wide range 
of industrial contexts and workplaces, however, not only took 
place prior to the decisive shift away from positivism to 
interpretivism within social theory, but prior to the decisive 
neoliberal ‘triumph’ of the nineteen-eighties, symbolised by the 
Thatcher and Reagan eras so that, if intellectuals throughout 
the nineteen-seventies failed to answer the neo-liberal charge 
that “the poor get in a competitive market economy more than 
they would get in a centrally directed system” (Hayek 1985, 
p. 67), perhaps the greater failure of many of these studies is 
that they read as complacent and unsuspecting insofar as their 
focus and range of theoretical concerns were ‘pre-Heideggerian’ 
in their negligence of fundamental questions of dasein and 
‘being working class,’ with the result that any relevance they 
might have had has been swept away by the advent of the post-
industrial era.
If we take the approach and concerns of Burawoy’s 
Manufacturing Consent (1979), for example, which seeks to 
explain why workers are compliant and which is concerned with 
identifying aspects of the labour process that are involved in 
producing complacency, I believe such an approach to be quite 
sterile. Similarly, Burawoy’s The Politics of Production (1985) 
assumes that the naked appearance of surplus value in the eyes 
of the workers must inevitably create radical conflict, and that 
workers’ subjectivity has become integrated to capitalism and 
shop-floor behaviours such as game-playing that relieve boredom 
and tension seduce workers into accepting their work conditions 
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as inevitable, thereby defusing opposition. Tanner et al. (1992, 
p. 443) have usefully commented:
While the incorporation of worker subjectivity into  
labour process analysis reflects an increasingly optimistic 
approach…there is no guarantee that re-introducing subjec-
tivity will substantively create a hopeful picture. Indeed,  
the ironic upshot of Burawoy’s and the segmentationists’ 
revisions of labour process theory is that workers are  
portrayed as increasingly incorporated throughout the 
twentieth century.
With the benefit of hindsight, a weakness of much of these 
studies was the fact that in the sociological literature dealing 
with industrial workers there was no emphasis upon turning 
to the ‘life of mind’ upon the basis of a prior reintroduction of 
subjectivity, or turning to the self or dasein constituted at the 
‘point of production.’ Whether writers from this era give optimistic 
or pessimistic estimations of the ‘revolutionary possibilities’ of 
the labour process, none used the labour process as a means and 
medium to lever an interior event within the worker himself. 
This omission is fatal, insofar as the first consciousness that needs 
converted or awakened to the reality and significance of the dasein 
brought about by the social practice of labour, and any implications 
this might have for political action, is that of the worker himself, 
and if he is not intellectually convinced of this then any project of 
politicisation upon the basis of self-appropriation upon the basis 
of this ‘worked’ dasein is more or less at a standstill.
This failure of ‘labour process theorists’ can be traced back to 
Marx himself who similarly believed that the production system 
was the seedbed for the workers’ consciousness, but failed to 
show how shop-floor behaviour or ‘trade union consciousness’ 
becomes revolutionary consciousness. The absence of any accounts 
of such a process, which must have included a purely cognitional 
or intellectual component which must have stood in some relation 
to an account of proletarian Man’s ‘purely natural end’ or 
beatitude, has haunted Marxism throughout its history, and for 
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this omission many have criticised Marxism for being a secular 
version of an idealist metaphysics insofar as its ‘materialist 
theory of history’ and ‘proletarian revolution’ were never remotely 
ethnographically or cognitionally grounded in a historical 
context, or at the level of the individual proletarian via an act 
of cognitional agency. In light of the absence of any kind of 
performative verification, Marx’s theory of labour, for example, 
was fated to remain full of philosophical a priorism and he, like 
his followers, never committed to integral contingency and where 
it might lead. Typically bourgeois, such was his biography that he 
was never able to suspect, far less theorise, the reach of thinking 
upon the basis of the contingent being brought about via 
labouring, so that Gorz (1997, p. 16) could rightfully point out:
Marx’s theory of the proletariat is not based upon either 
empirical observation of class conflict or practical 
involvement in proletarian struggle. No amount of empirical 
observation or practical involvement as a militant will lead 
to the discovery of the historical role of the proletariat...On 
the contrary, only a knowledge of this mission will make it 
possible to discover the true being of the proletarians. 
Consequently it is of little importance to know what 
proletarians themselves think.
Gorz neatly brings into view the fatal weakness of Marxism which 
was its inability to perform die anthropologische wende because 
the real subjectivity of the ‘subject of history’ (the proletariat) is 
more or less irrelevant to the truths of Marxism; truths which are 
free to become a set of propositions independent of any contact 
with any working-class population, and so Marxism as a set of 
doctrines was itself more or less fated to be accused of being 
another nineteenth-century product of Germanic ‘pure reason,’ 
and certainly not built upon or emergent from any kind of 
living relationship between the particular human being of the 
working class and theory. Indeed, instead of offering a vital living 
synthesis between the two there is a mutual alienation that 
has been integral to Marxism from the outset. 
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In contrast to this legacy my procedure is to begin with the 
worker himself, and to think contextualised human being by 
firstly stripping my own thinking of prefabricated categories or 
hackneyed linguistic signifiers and attempt to confront this dasein 
at the level of being-qua-being in the fashion of Husserl. In this 
task the all-important element is the beginning i.e. effecting the 
shift from worker to worker-inquirer and this will be done by 
imagining and conceiving the self brought about by manual 
labour and by staking everything upon the conviction that, 
because the worker is convinced of the reality of his ‘situated self,’ 
this is the ground upon which the project of self-appropriation is 
most likely to succeed.
This initial step is all-important because while clearly manual 
labourers are immersed in their contexts and realities in a practical 
and pre-theoretical manner, simply being a determinate ‘worked 
self’ does not automatically imply the existence of any kind of 
imagining of this self, or any kind of conceptualisation of what in 
Chapter 2 I referred to after Castoriadis (1987, p. 168) as the 
being brought into being by doing. Men who know what it is to 
work hard and have the calloused hands to prove their long 
experience of labour are likely to have no interest in a project of 
self-appropriation, or a development of their intellectual nature 
beyond the specialisations of common sense, or the particular 
range of technicalities necessary for their working and domestic 
lives. Ordinarily, an intense identification with work is perfectly 
compatible with the absence of asking questions that one 
associates with developing political or class consciousness beyond 
a limited range of practical concerns, and this divorce between the 
life of labour and the life of mind is doubly applicable to a project 
of self-appropriation to the extent that it is liable to be still-born 
insofar as it will require overcoming a certain anti-intellectualist 
bias, as well as a bias against any appearance of narcissistic 
self-absorption, not to mention the obvious obstacles of lack of 
education and free time to conceive and desire such a project.
This gap, then, between ‘being’ and ‘thought’ is the defining 
tension within any kind of project of self-appropriation by the 
manual labourer as it is the tension between two very different 
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worlds and two very different aspects of the self: one aspect of self 
that is dominant over all other developments of the self, and 
another aspect of self which routinely even fails to exist. The 
difficulty, then, is that the self to be appropriated is the situated 
labouring self that may care nothing for intellectual inquiry and, 
on the other hand, the self to be appropriated is “the rational, 
intelligent, experiencing man” (Lonergan 1990, p. 193), so that 
the individual worker is faced from the outset with this paradox: 
in order to embark upon the intellectual pursuit of himself via 
a project of self-appropriation he must break with a firmly 
established ‘immediate’ relationship to himself if he is to effect the 
change from being a worker to being a worker-inquirer.
6.2 Labour and the Psyche: Justification 
In Chapter 2 we set the task of articulating the lived experience of 
physical labour and noted that, in addition to the obvious physical 
effects of labouring such as sweat and muscle strain etcetera, 
something else a worker may come to awareness of are certain 
psychological effects that come about as a result of working. 
Ordinarily, introspective reflection is able to advert to the fact that 
part of the data available to be brought to explicit awareness is a 
particular effect upon the self that may be described as the 
psychological experience of being justified. In contrast to elitist 
doctrines surrounding manual labour as dehumanising the worker 
such as we find in the slave-owner Aristotle, or descriptions of 
manual labour as alienating the worker from himself and others 
as found in Marx, the fact is that thanks to his working the 
worker at a basic level is justified in taking up or occupying and 
being in social space, is justified in ‘taking up room’ we might say, 
is justified in being in a particular public place at a particular time. 
The worker is spatially justified, then, because any occupation of 
social or public space requires a publicly or socially recognised 
reason or justification, and thanks to his performing work the 
worker in social or public space is not ‘out of place.’
Also, in his being-for-others, whether a workmate or his 
chargehand or a casual passer-by or even to a purely imaginary 
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other, the labourer’s doing work might be described as a passport 
legitimising his being in public in the eyes of others. Thanks to 
‘being there’ (dasein) because he has work to do, the public place 
in which he works becomes ‘owned’ and personalised thanks to 
being taken up and freely developed by the life of intentionality 
and freedom. This kind of reflexive being in social space is the 
opposite of the kind of ‘being in space’ experienced by the stranger 
or the new-comer, as social space in this case ‘interrogates’ the 
social actor and demands to know the reason why he or she is 
‘there.’ Performing work, then, removes this interrogation and the 
threat of being alienated or estranged from a place, and prevents 
a place becoming strange, and removes the threat of the self 
becoming a stranger or someone judged as being ‘out of place.’ 
Performing work then makes us ‘at home’ and is an obvious 
source of social inclusion and allows the worker to experience his 
‘being there’ in a particular way. More than simply having 
permission to be somewhere, the worker feels he has earned the 
right to his ‘being there’ thanks to his working.
Similarly, another two media or mediations of the experience of 
‘being justified’ are temporality and embodiment insofar as the 
sweat on the worker’s brow witnesses to how the worker has 
spent his time in public space, and so signals his possession of a 
particular relationship to time that justifies him. In contrast to 
elitist existentialist doctrines of the self being ‘at issue’ (Heidegger 
1962), part of the data about himself that is available to the 
worker is the fundamental experience of not being ‘at issue’ 
because the worker enacts or brings-into-being his justification in 
time, in space and via the body insofar as he is routinely literally 
covered in evidence that he has used time to good effect. The 
outcome of work then is not simply a trench dug to uncover a 
wastewater pipe to be repaired but a certain justification in relation 
to the use of time, resulting in a particular experience of ‘being in 
time,’ and a certain individual and interpersonal reflexive 
justification in relation to self, fellow workers and others. 
Faced with the ‘interrogation’ of time and space and his body 
and any potential interlocutor, the worker not only has an answer 
but is his answer as he embodies this condition as his very dasein. 
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Finally, beyond these spatial and embodied and temporal mediations 
of justification via the practice of work are the many issues of 
social integration that are resolved by working; issues of ‘identity’ 
insofar as, above all else, one’s relationship to money – the ens 
realissimum of labour for the labourer in a free-market society – is 
secured as money accesses a material realm of consumption as well 
as a symbolic realm of identity as paid employment resolves one’s 
relationship to oneself as a man, husband, father, brother, uncle 
and local etcetera, and one’s participation in a series of symbolic 
communities. In the free-market society paid work is the source 
par excellence of psychological and social individuation and social 
integration.
6.3 Labour & the Psyche: Alienation
While the body is constantly conditioned by its practice in the 
world and if performing the tasks of the world constantly leaves 
traces upon the body, another question is whether the structuring 
significance of performing manual labour for dasein is exhausted 
by the short-lived or long-standing physical effects of working 
with a high-pressure hose, for example, or whether the effects of 
performing manual labour extend beyond the physical socialisation 
or physical re-structuration of the body to become, for example, a 
sui generic ‘source of personality’ or source of self. If the fact that 
physical dasein is structured by the social practice of labour is 
hardly a novel discovery, perhaps a more interesting and involved 
question is whether and how the realm of meaning or the cultural 
context of performing labour also informs the very way embodiment 
is among manual labourers. 
My argument will be that the ‘brute fact’ of physical labour is 
not only passed through the medium of the human body but the 
media of time and culture, or the objective ‘symbolic order’ and 
intergenerational ‘filters’ or contexts; indeed is passed through an 
infinite number of media that feedback onto and effect the lived 
experience of work. Hence, in addition to a biological universal 
connecting labouring humanity around the world and across 
generations in a universal or fundamental ontology in Heidegger’s 
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sense, and that can be studied by students of human anatomy and 
bio-chemistry, the dasein brought about by doing is also fated to 
be refracted through the medium of culture.
More concretely, then, among the 1979 generation, for 
example, this laboured dasein will be informed by “the liberation 
of the instincts, the revolution of desire” (Pefanis 1992, p. 105) 
that occurred thanks to the rise of affluence in the West in the 
latter twentieth century. More generally, as a result of being 
passed through culture, “not even the simplest, dimmest 
apprehension of a feeling – say, the feeling of hunger not outwardly 
expressed – can dispense with some kind of ideological form...one 
can apprehend one’s hunger apologetically, irritably, angrily, 
indignantly etc…Outward expression in most cases only continues 
and makes more distinct the direction already taken by inner 
speech” (Volosinov 1986, p. 87). Finally, in addition to the filter 
of culture, the ‘self’ brought about by doing is enjoyed and taken 
up by freedom and reflexivity to become an endless source of 
informing of the person beyond the merely physical.
As a result of being taken up into the intentional order and the 
intentionality of the worker, the reality or significance of work 
from the point of view of the worker is not something fixed or 
definite once and for all, as its meaning and impact changes as the 
personal circumstances of the labourer change, with some mean-
ings only coming into being through the play of time and circum-
stance. In itself, work is physical activity involving the expenditure 
of energy but as a social practice manual labour within a market 
society is related to an occupational structure that is ranked 
according to a cultural judgment or according to prestige or status 
and through this to a public realm of discourse, representations 
and meanings. Within this hierarchical division of labour the 
manual labourer is located towards the bottom of the occupa-
tional and class structure, and in highly stratified social orders 
there is universal consensus that manual labour in every such 
society is performed by members of the ‘lower orders.’ 
Similarly, in the public symbolic realm of meaning and 
representations, not all social practices are equal as they have 
different values attached to them and these judgments have a 
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structuring effect upon the psyche of the labourer just as real as 
the physical structurations of the body of the worker. Manual 
work then exists twice: firstly as a physical structuration and, 
secondly, as a psychological or mental structuration. In a society 
fundamentally divided into different classes whose members 
perform different social practices, it is reasonable to imagine these 
are the fundamental realities configuring the consciousnesses of 
its members so that a question is, if a high-pressure hose can 
structure the body after thirty minutes, what structurations of the 
psyche will be present in the unskilled or semi-skilled low-paid 
manual labourer as a result of occupying his particular social 
position over the course of a lifetime?
To begin to answer this question I return to the thirty-three-
year-old informant Dauvit employed by the local supermarket 
trolley manufacturer Buko quoted earlier in Chapter 2, who began 
talking about his work:
Everythin revolves aroond money eh. If you’ve no got a wage 
e money comin in Ah mean life’s shit ken. Ken, what can ye dae 
wi nae money? Nooadays eh? Somethin tae live oan. Ah mean 
Ah’ve got a joab there the noo bit it’s f***** crap; the money’s 
crap. Bit it’s only five minutes o’er the road, eh. Bit the f***** 
money’s shite an a’. Ah mean Ah’m only comin in wi a hunder 
an seventy pound a week. Crap, ye ken. Bit there nothin better.
The above testimony adverts to the fact that the exercise of 
agency among the working class is caught in the grip of a social 
determination insofar as the disciplinary power of low-paid 
work means that any particular exercise of agency such as party 
political activism, civic engagement, some form of volunteering or 
the decision to practice a more healthy lifestyle or attain a greater 
level of educational achievement, will require a disproportionately 
greater exercise of agency among the low-paid, so that ordinarily 
this will mean a predictable lesser involvement in the political 
process, a virtual boycott of public life, a significantly lesser life 
expectancy, a much inferior level of educational achievement and 
a subjective relationship to the realm of meaning that is dominated 
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by objective domination. It is also clear from the above testimony 
that within the intentional and emotional life of the worker, an 
existential preoccupation with objective reality takes up much of 
subjective life; that intentionality is forcibly conformed to objective 
reality as a matter of mundane habitus, and a disciplining that 
is beyond the formal behavioural requirements imposed by the 
employer-employee relationship occurs, so that when intentional 
and affective life is dominated by market conditions, the coming 
into being of a particular mental habitus or intentional horizon is 
more or less inevitable.
It is in ‘free consciousness,’ then, and not simply behaviour that 
the extent of the reach and reality of the structuring of the market 
society upon human being will be registered and played out; it is 
in the intimacy and privacy of intentionality that will be found a 
forum for a dialectic of agency/constraint within what Baudrillard 
has termed ‘the mirror of production’ (1975). From Dauvit’s 
testimony it seems clear that he would not distinguish which 
spheres of his life are dominated by his relationship to the free 
market in labour and which are free of its gravitational pull, 
because the words ‘everything’ and ‘life’ are his choice of words 
to describe what is conformed to objectivity. It is in consciousness, 
then, where the domination of the market society is most free to 
colonise and ‘inform’ the lifeworld and fashion every realm of 
experience and every non-production relationship into its image, 
so that a question for the worker-inquirer who sets out on the 
journey of self-appropriation is whether he is ever, phenomeno-
logically speaking, ‘outside’ of work or free of the ‘mirror of 
production;’ whether there exists a meaningful space within him 
that is psychologically outside of work and is something other 
than a manual labourer; whether he has experiences beyond the 
reach of this determination, or whether as a result of his inter-
nalisation of objective determination, he in fact freely extends the 
structuration of the identity and dasein sourced in his objective 
occupational-based relationship to the market society into his 
every other relation.
Such a question of course can only be answered by the practice 
of introspection which will attend to the data of justification 
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discussed earlier. The worker-inquirer as he proceeds in his journey 
of self-appropriation will also recognise that this justification 
experience is serial, is patterned within his experience as it acts as 
a source of self and freedom in his behaviours and relationships to 
others. However, as well as the data of justification being brought 
into being by his doing, introspection will reveal something else, 
a particular dialectic that will also be seen to characterise the 
worker’s consciousness and behaviour, thanks to the reality of 
work being far more than what it subjectively is for the worker. 
Thanks to work’s relationship to a social hierarchy, the practice 
of introspection will reveal the following ‘dialectic’ at work in 
the worker-inquirer’s intentional life as a result of his coming 
to awareness of data that can be organised according to two 
‘ideal types:’
1) a realm of experience that has the reality of justification 
or inner integration as the departure point for his identity 
and the exercise of agency, behaviour and social action.
2) a realm of experience that emerges from the objective 
reality of his being-for-others and a patterned set of 
experiences characterised by being ‘at issue’ or ‘unequal’ as 
the departure point for his identity and the exercise of 
agency, behaviour and social action.
The worker will be familiar with the reality of labour as a 
source of how he experiences his body and how this experience is 
something he shares with other workers, and how a certain inter-
subjectivity and solidarity is established among his fellows. 
However, out of this camaraderie and fellowship and free recogni-
tion of himself, part of the data available to introspection is 
awareness of being ‘read’ by very differently placed subjectivities 
and very different lifestyles and institutions. There is awareness, 
then, not only of other codes but awareness of more powerful 
and more prestigious codes that operate in wider society and in 
powerful metropolitan centres that more or less coerce the worker 
into coming to terms with “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu and 
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Passeron 1977), or non-physical forms of domination that are 
present in the media and realm of representations. 
The manual worker is aware that outwith his fellowship with 
his fellows is a social context and a cultural context that reads him 
as occupying a lower or subordinate or less prestigious position. 
To the extent the worker-inquirer is conscious of these schemes of 
interpretation, he is aware they are an integral part of his ‘social 
awareness’ which also recognises a psychological tension in his 
behaviour and consciousness that has already been behaviourally 
operative in his life and, subsequent to reaching this awareness, 
also recognises there is a duality or dialectic (a ‘split’ dasein) in his 
life as a worker-inquirer insofar as he understands that there is an 
integrity and freedom ‘in work’ which is more or less fated to be 
put ‘at issue’ by the public realm of meaning,130 and coming to 
this awareness is a defining moment in his journey of translating 
or aligning his being with his consciousness.
Upon the basis of embodiment the worker enjoys an experience 
of integration and integrity. However, there is a second natural 
environment proper to human being that is the symbolic and 
cultural, so we can say that each adult social actor ‘swims’ in a 
semiotic ‘sea of signs’ and the labourer is always related to this 
objective realm of meaning, and in a historically class-divided 
society, this realm of meaning reflects this history of division and 
inequality and is just as hierarchical and stratified and real and 
powerful and present in its judgments as the unequal distribution 
of material and monetary resources is real and powerful and 
present in the judgments it makes upon social actors’ lives. We can 
also safely say that the socialisation processes of such historically 
divided societies involve the internalisation of the dominant 
meaning systems among both the dominant and the subordinate 
social classes via schooling and parenting, for example, and 
130 Important ethnographic testimonies of the suffering among working-
class persons that arises as a result of being trapped in their being-for-others 
is provided by Simon Charlesworth (1999), while Toni Morrison (1999) pro- 
vides a memorable literary treatment of the same phenomenon in terms of 
race/ethnicity. 
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are just as real in their disciplining of bodies, behaviours and 
consciousnesses.
When attention is focussed, then, upon the stratified order of 
meaning, the practice of introspection uncovers an emotional 
terrain occupied by the worker-inquirer and his family and even 
locality, and each of their histories as a result of living the position 
of subordination through time and its accompanying feelings of 
resentment, anger, shame and embarrassment, as well as the 
memories of living through encounters where this subordination 
became existential, such as moments of realisation one’s likely 
trajectory through social space is severely limited, or moments of 
being accused of ‘trespassing’ beyond one’s class fraction by self, 
friends and family, or moments of trespassing onto another 
class’s territory or trajectory. Crucially for the journey of self-
appropriation is that introspection grasps that there is something 
available to be grasped in this range of experience, so that 
exploring this psychological terrain becomes a matter of the 
worker-inquirer recognising his psychological reality and history.
For the worker-inquirer this introspection includes thematizing 
his being-for-others, and reflection upon his relationship to the 
socialised realm of meaning and its ongoing structuring effects 
upon behaviour and psyche, so that he wages a campaign of recog-
nising within himself his resistance to and his acceptance of the 
Geertzian ‘webs of meaning’ which class-based societies spin; 
either suspending him into behaviours and thoughts of subordina-
tion, or triggering behaviours and thoughts of resistance to his 
social fate and his allocated trajectory through social space. For the 
worker-inquirer who successfully carries out the project of 
self-appropriation there must come a point when he comes to a 
systematic awareness of his being-for-others and comes to aware-
ness of this defining tension in his consciousness and behaviour, 
this tension between his being-for-himself and his being-for-others 
that is likely to lead to an ambivalence when in the company of 
those who do not share the same class position and habitus.
The worker-inquirer who uncovers this data about himself 
also uncovers an emotional life that may be described as a 
cipher or ‘mouthpiece’ for this dialectic, so that the project of 
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self-appropriation recognises that much of the affective charge 
or ‘cut and thrust’ of social interaction as well as introspection 
lies in the fact that the working class is the social group least 
likely to articulate its condition via discourse and introspection 
because the closer an individual approaches this basic structuration 
as the existential data of himself, the less likely he is to voice this 
condition as, ironically, the closer one comes to one’s psychological, 
emotional and intellectual condition of insecure being-in-the-
world as an existential event, the less one is likely to translate 
these experiences into explicit awareness in an open, deliberate 
and ‘leisurely’ fashion because the psychological resistance one 
has to overcome within oneself to do so is considerable. 
This Gordian knot of self-representation and self-recognition 
seems impossible to cut insofar as emotions of fear and anxiety 
become the ‘live’ data of oneself once this dialectic becomes the 
focus of introspection, leading to recognising the patterning and 
history of fear and anxiety, the history of one’s being-for-others 
and its related behaviours and its related patterns of comportment 
that bring to awareness new vistas upon one’s biography. Outwith 
practicing psychological techniques such as the ‘healing of 
memories’ or what gestalt psychotherapy’s Friedrich Perls terms 
“the safe emergency of the therapeutic situation,”131 this data only 
becomes real when one’s structural objectivity is existentially 
apprehended and, in a cash economy, this normally only occurs in 
conditions of vulnerability because in secure financial conditions 
such ‘moments of danger’ do not arise, and so financial security 
disappears the ‘data’ of one’s self. As per our discussion of Dauvit 
in Chapter 2, only failure and crisis triggers the emotional 
patterning and the shame and insecurity that is in fact already in 
situ as essence, if not forcibly present as existence.
Because the necessary condition for sustained reflection upon 
this data is the ‘cut and thrust’ of occupying a dominated life or a 
position of more or less ‘failure’ as read by the dominant code, 
what becomes clear is why working-class consciousness has been 
131 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8y5tuJ3Sojc. [Accessed 18 April 2014]
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incapable of a phenomenology of itself, despite the fact that one 
social reality and one social practice that is not insecure but exists 
in abundance is material and symbolic insecurity. The paradox 
then is that should the task be to produce an ethnography, a 
culture, a literature, a psychology or a self-understanding, having 
the leisure to carry out this task will mean the disappearance 
of the data of oneself, which prevents the worker-inquirer or 
‘slave’ being able to “to choose himself on the ground of 
slavery” (Sartre 1966, p. 703) because being successful necessarily 
means becoming distant from the raw existential data which 
can furnish consciousness with the phenomenological data of 
itself. There is, then, an objective determination in place affecting 
the disappearance of a phenomenology of working-class dasein 
and which answers Edwin Muir’s wondering why unemployed 
Lanarkshire miners failed to write texts that plumbed the depths 
of human being.
The passer-by Muir in his Scottish Journey (1935) through 
industrial Scotland in the summer of 1934 who saw men who 
“seemed to me to have nothing to do but think” (1935, p. 143), 
fails to realise that this very position of unemployment is not a 
departure point for thinking because it is shameful and a source 
of regret and recrimination. As per our analysis of Dauvit 
in Chapter 2, often an integral ingredient to explaining the 
disappearance of working-class reality especially within the 
consciousness of the working-class person is the ‘thick’ reality of 
locality and intersubjectivity which means the thematisation 
of ‘failure’ is fated to be almost never cultivated in a deliberative 
and free or non-shameful way, because an integral part of living 
economic failure is having to live with other people having to 
live one’s failure, which often means the exertion of sustained 
pressure to read one’s failure exclusively from the dominant point 
of view i.e. as a shameful reality to be ended as soon as possible, 
and certainly not a reality to be explored and used as a point of 
departure for a project of self-appropriation.
Such is the level of harsh cultural commentary upon poverty 
that even to attend to it as ‘data’ is, in a sense, to already be 
beginning to be free of its grip and to attend to this reality requires 
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one’s intellectual life escape from being a cipher for conventionality 
and conventional responses such as shame. The difficulty for 
achieving a life of introspection and representation, then, is due to 
the nature of the reality being inquired into: being the decentred 
and ‘trigger-requiring’ reality it is means it is a source of self or ‘set 
of data’ that can be disappeared or hidden or euphemised or 
finessed by talk, or prayed about or forgotten in drink, or released 
from when happy or endured in silence or enacted in violence 
or mental ill-health. Only by becoming a worker-inquirer is the 
worker able to transcend this condition by instantiating, in 
addition to his deep integration to this reality, a certain alienation 
or distance from this reality, or a speculative or even contemplative 
relation to his immersion in the real, a reflective relation to his 
condition of being unable to afford the luxury of practicing 
introspection.
Taking the first steps on the journey of self-appropriation, then, 
must be difficult because what it requires is somehow or other 
developing an open-eyed, deliberate or ‘invulnerable’ relationship 
to one’s vulnerability, a strong relationship to one’s weakness or 
an articulate relationship to one’s being lost for words. Such is the 
difficulty in pulling this relationship to self off that the worker’s 
internalisation of his already in situ dasein and mitsein or being-
for-others will spontaneously raise the objection: how vulnerable 
can such vulnerability really be, or how weak can such weakness 
be, or how silent can such silence in fact be if the same vulnerable, 
weak and silent worker is able to face up to and recognise them in 
an open-eyed and deliberate fashion i.e. be invulnerable, strong 
and articulate in the face of such truths about itself, and deploy 
these weaknesses and ‘wounding’ experiences as resources to fuel 
a reflexive project of self-appropriation.
The defining tension within a project of self-appropriation in a 
manual labourer is bringing two very different worlds and two 
very different aspects of the self into a symbiotic relationship and, 
eventually, conscious alignment with each other. On the one hand 
the self to be appropriated is the situated labouring or working-
class self that will care nothing for intellectual inquiry. On the 
other hand, the self to be appropriated is “the rational, intelligent, 
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experiencing man” (Lonergan 1990, p. 193). From the existential 
standpoint of a particular individual, then, he must embark upon 
the intellectual pursuit of himself and in doing so break with a 
firmly established ‘immediate’ relationship to himself, and it is at 
this point that a further determination comes into view: if it is 
unlikely a campaign of understanding will be waged unless there 
is some expectation of the resultant benefits, from where other 
than theory or ‘pure reason’ (certainly not from experience) could 
such an expectation emerge? Also, if the only source of motivation 
is a purely theoretical source, the fact is that for the consciousness 
yet to be constituted by theory, any theoretical motivation is no 
motivation at all. This is the Gordian knot to be untied or the 
Rubicon to be crossed as this shift from worker to worker-inquirer 
that leads to the path of cognitional agency is the conditione sine 
qua non of the entire process.
As a result of stepping onto the road less travelled the worker 
becomes a worker-inquirer, and so far we have argued for the 
physical and psychological affects of work, including a certain sense 
of the worker being justified or dignified by his labour; a justification, 
however, that is a merely serial integration whose reality is tied to 
the serial reproduction of particular bodily conditions and physical 
praxis and that is not a permanent possession but something 
which has to be enacted or brought into existence again and again 
by fresh effort if it is to remain real. This raises the question: at what 
other level can the integration of self effected by work exist? To 
answer this question the worker-inquirer must not only ascend 
to the level of inquiry but must rise to the level of conceptualisation 
in order to give a more adequate account of himself and the being 
brought into existence by his doing.
6.4 Conceptualisation (or Why Reality Isn’t Enough)
French philosopher Simone Weil’s Factory Journal (1987) gives an 
account of her struggle to come to terms with her experience of 
manual labour and an indication of the difficulties involved in 
the worker-inquirer coming to an adequate self-concept. Reading 
Weil’s account of her eight-and-a-half months working in a 
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factory in 1934-35, it is illuminating to see how she resisted 
conceiving the new becoming that was happening within herself 
as a result of her life as a worker, and how she was unable to rise 
to any kind of conceptualisation of her new ‘secondary nature.’ 
The opportunity to conceive the new dasein that was occurring 
within her was resisted insofar as Weil preferred to indulge in a 
‘flight from contextual being’ rather than theorise her industrialised 
incarnation, with the result that she never set herself the task 
of thinking what was coming to pass within her. As her editors 
(in Weil 1987, p. 153) wrote of her time as a factory hand:
Perhaps even more important than the intellectual 
conclusions she drew from her factory experience were  
its psychological effects on her. When she attempted to 
describe it in letters to friends, she found it inexpressible;  
she became almost inarticulate and could only sum it up in 
such generalities as ‘it’s inhuman.’
Central to Weil’s difficulties in thinking her ‘worked self’ was 
having to cope with her physical exhaustion and what she felt 
was the impossibility of intellectual labour as a result. Instead of 
converting to the importance of embodiment and the importance 
of the body as a means of the self coming-to-know its being-in-
the-world via labour, for example, this existential truth which 
Weil was coming to know in her body was something she was 
unable to use as a standpoint for her theoretical work. While she 
had the social and cultural capital to accomplish the task of 
translating a ‘secondary nature’ into its adequate conceptualisation 
or representation but in fact failed to do so, it seems the key factor 
in explaining her failure to accomplish this was her failure to posit 
as a goal for herself the task of translating her particular ‘existence’ 
into its adequate conceptualisation, and in trying to understand 
Weil’s failure on this point it seems her philosophical training 
more or less blinded her to the need to discard her categories 
of ‘pure reason,’ and emerge from her immersion in factory life 
with new mental categories to think her new dasein. Insofar 
as Weil failed to align her ‘being’ with her ‘consciousness,’ it was 
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as a result of her philosophical training and long immersion in 
universalism that meant she was ill-equipped to see “it is not 
possible to strip away our ‘second nature’ in order to lay bare…
human being, because without those contents we would not 
recognise this subject at all” (Parker 2011, p. 12).
Similarly, when trying to understand how those of little 
symbolic capital and no training in universalism also fail in 
this respect, Chapter 2 concerned a consciousness chronically 
reduced to ‘the present’ and an existentialism that ordinarily does 
not reach representational, far less theoretical, self-consciousness. 
There I also argued that a purely linguistic construction or 
depiction of contextual reality was of little use when articulating 
working-class ontology, just as the domination of the public 
sphere by representations of time as ‘progress’ is unable to change 
the reality or the real relation to time effected by manual work 
or living certain housing conditions. However, in any project of 
self-appropriation, a reliance upon conceptual and linguistic 
processes is unavoidable because, to the extent the worker-
inquirer’s relation to language fails to escape an ‘inherited’ and 
then learned and freely practiced determinism, the worker-inquirer 
will be unable to rise to a project of self-appropriation.
This difficulty is, of course, exacerbated the less material and 
symbolic resources one has, because a sociality and personality 
forever tied to the compulsions of the cash-nexus requires of itself 
first and foremost that it survives such a situation, so that what 
is least of all necessary is a conceptual effort at understanding 
itself, far less wider society. Indeed such a self whose only dues 
are money is often the most convinced of all that such is all there 
is to understand about the self and society; that when the basic 
obedience of employment is achieved, the self can even imagine 
itself as indifferent to society, as living intimately within the 
confines of such financial pressures it is more or less inevitable 
that such thinking often becomes the extent of thinking insofar as 
it is the extent of experiencing the demands of one’s society and 
the conditions for being the self that one is. Insofar as one’s basic 
condition is a vulnerable condition then its raison d’ être is to 
simply reproduce its social relations in order to maintain itself 
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
526
(and without any thought to change them according to what is 
imagined to be right or just), and in the existential ‘success’ of 
merely coping and managing, this subjectivity is more or less fated 
to be content. Men and women who are objectively at risk of 
moving into poverty at some point in their lives are heavily 
invested in reproducing social structures, as by doing so they 
successfully keep a possible poverty precisely at the level of 
potentiality thanks to the immediate existential security of paid 
employment, and this is why any acquaintance with a working-
class population always involves acquaintance with economism.
In addition to intellectual and financial difficulties, the daily 
social practice of manual work ordinarily involves an immersion 
into the practicalities of life, which become a matter of habit and 
a matter of taste, preference and satisfaction and a source of 
identity for oneself and one’s being-for-others despite its rigors. 
Those living the body as their fate and living its sui generic self-
affirmation, then, routinely feel no need to sally forth upon a 
Lonerganian project of self-appropriation and jeopardise the solid 
pre-conceptual realities and knowledges they enjoy thanks to their 
embodiment of pre-conceptual truths. Because there is a non-
conceptual or kinaesthetic knowledge that justifies the worker, 
there is a freedom from the need for representation that is the 
freedom of existence ‘outside the text’ or a freedom from signs, so 
that attempting to reproduce this bodily justification via rational 
investigation seems unlikely, and certainly unsatisfactory, so that 
instinctively they distrust reason to reproduce their embodied 
‘truths.’ More concretely, an ‘anti-learning’ disposition is often 
present and can always be justified thanks to pointing towards the 
class of people who do invest in the realm of meaning and pointing 
to the objective need to keep making money every week. The 
issue remains the relation of tension between the existential and 
intellectual level; the developed cultural prejudices that are enjoyed 
and so brought to bear against a project of self-appropriation.
While the phrase ‘self-appropriation’ or ‘re-thinking human 
being’ seem inoffensive enough, what they involve if they are to be 
successful is the worker-inquirer being able to bear the weight of 
his long immersion into ‘naturalism’ pressing down upon his first 
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efforts of will, which are fated to be resisted de profundis so that 
the idea of having to think about one’s being in an open-eyed and 
deliberate fashion must ordinarily be pre-consciously rejected a 
thousand times before it succeeds in being sufficiently present to 
be recognised as a task in itself. The subject then must ordinarily 
undergo a crisis event in order to emerge from his natural 
possession of himself. What one reluctantly faces because one has 
to is precisely that which one does not want to be a source of self, 
or any more present in one’s life than is absolutely necessary, so 
that there is an existential basis for a campaign against self-
appropriation upon one’s ‘thrown’ self in favour of some other 
self that is free of coerced ‘becomings’ and unwanted empirical 
events. (Were I to criticise manual labourers for failing to 
instantiate a reflexive project upon the basis of the ‘signature 
dasein’ that they are I would be hypocritical, as I failed to do 
precisely this as regards my fieldwork housing conditions).
What seems clear from our discussion of Dauvit in Chapter 2 is 
that some kind of impetus is required to climb out of and transcend 
immanence, as both employment and unemployment ‘disappear’ 
the data that is needed to fuel the project of self-appropriation, 
insofar as both positions more or less coerce the self into acting and 
believing that its business is nothing other than the existential and 
the material. This of course is not to be understood as something 
that is learned as a proposition, but rather as a de facto unstated 
truth for the consciousness whose data regarding its existence is 
that of being continually moored to its material conditions, and 
which routinely does not have the intersubjective or network 
resources to raise further questions and escape its imprisonment 
within habitus. Such is the existential weight or hegemony of an 
embodied existentialism’s judgment as to what is real and worthwhile 
that it routinely judges there is nothing further to be concerned 
about, and certainly not a Hegelian or Lonerganian project of self-
appropriation, so that the hegemony of ‘scarcity thinking’ reigns 
even in conditions of affluence because of an existentialism that 
freely extends its immersion into material conditions and their 
determination of human being all the way to an antepredicative 
‘metaphysics’ that is deeply limiting and defining. 
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In the worker-inquirer’s journey to grasp himself intellectually 
he must find his way to align himself with Marx’s The German 
Ideology (1846) where he criticised Feuerbach for beginning with 
Man in the abstract, and not Man as the subject of a concrete 
political economy. Likewise, he must ally with Althusser who saw 
that: “One thing is certain: one cannot begin with man, because 
that would be to begin with a bourgeois idea of ‘man’…‘Man’ is 
a myth” (1984, cited in Tubbs 1997, p. 16). The worker-inquirer 
then must discard his first idea of himself that is conveniently ‘at 
hand’ insofar as what is certain is that the kind of being doing 
brings about has not been the subject of much progress, because 
those ‘thinking being’ have traditionally instantiated a leisurely 
non-working relation to doing, so that this has largely remained 
a non-question because the traditional producers of knowledge 
were not bringing their being into being by labouring. 
The worker-inquirer, then, does not yet know the reality nor 
the process of his liberation as he has no experience of it nor a 
theoretical representation or model of it in his mind. Indeed, 
insofar as the schemes of perception of the worker-inquirer are 
conventional he will have difficulty appearing before himself. 
Parenthetically, we may say that only at a later stage at the 
completion of cognitional structure will the worker-inquirer put 
the question to Althusser as to whether Althusser himself 
conceived a real concrete self and worked out the phenomenology 
of its liberation, or whether Althusser himself refused particularity 
and ethnography and in their stead was “forced to posit a 
subjectless discourse” (Tubbs 1997, p. 16), which brings us back 
to the starting point of Marx criticising Feuerbach, and calling for 
a break with a purely imaginary universal Man because no 
‘secondary nature’ or set of social conditions are universal.
It is because the conceptual order is a sui generic realm that a 
set of concrete material and social conditions that are dominant 
and present, and that never pass out of existential awareness 
into unconscious structure and which dominate everyday speech 
and everyday consciousness, can still fail to be the subject or 
content of an open-eyed and self-conscious reflexive project of 
self-appropriation. Because the work of translating ‘being’ into 
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‘consciousness’ is difficult at the best of times, something so real 
and ‘infallible’ in its reach and transformation of subjectivity and 
consciousness, can also remain perennially under-developed insofar 
as its existence remains tied to seriality. Also, this very condition 
of underdevelopment is often the result of an over-development of 
dasein in a particular direction, so that a determinate structuration 
of self and its continual occupation of intentionality paradoxically 
works to prevent that same intentionality from engaging with the 
world of meaning as a possible new medium for the expression or 
development of this same condition. This condition, then, may 
indeed create a reflexive project, but a project conducted against 
the realm of meaning, and this is the difference between the 
reflexive development of the ‘worked self’ via freedom and choice 
that follows the paths of least resistance, and something which is 
quite different: the open-eyed deliberate psychological self-analysis 
and conceptualisation involved in the project of self-appropriation.
In order to perform an act of intellectual understanding our 
sights have been set upon conceiving the worked-self as our aim is 
for the worker-inquirer to achieve self-appropriation, and the self 
to be appropriated is not only the worked-self but “the rational, 
intelligent, experiencing man” (Lonergan 1990, p. 193). We have 
seen that this project must ordinarily fail even to begin because 
the worked-self is only one aspect of dasein, and ordinarily is not 
the identity that is particularly loved and surrounded by doting 
attention when the worker is at his leisure. Self-appropriation 
depends upon the worker translating his dasein into his con-
sciousness, but it also recognises that the labourer is not the dasein 
brought into being by doing (Castoriadis 1997) in the same way 
as a stone is and always is its ‘being a stone,’ because the worked-
self is no thing-like substantive something either ‘out there’ or 
‘in there’ continually present to the worker, far less the casual 
observer. The non-substantialist nature of working-class identity 
then is caught sight of or is revealed in events or moments of 
strength/vulnerability, or justification or being ‘at issue’ that are 
captured by paying attention to the data of oneself, and then 
thematizing this data and interrogating it for its intelligibility and 
sorting the data of oneself into patterns, and sifting it as a possible 
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window onto one’s historicity, or a key to explaining behaviours, 
practices and intentionality. To ‘fix’ himself, the subject must find 
some way of grasping his non-substance-like self in a substantial 
manner i.e. in such a way that its being present to awareness 
escapes its slavery to a merely serial existence and to empirical-
come-physical conditions and ‘triggering’ events. This kind of 
presence can only be intellectual presence, and so the self must be 
grasped intellectually, so that a little more of his incarnation 
becomes habitually present in awareness.
In this simultaneous further immersion into the real and 
liberation from the real, the real is present in a fuller and richer 
manner as part of a reflexive project outwith its concrete ‘live’ 
triggerings, and for this to happen the worker-inquirer must firstly 
grasp the data of himself his psyche makes available, and then 
grasp whether or not they are a pattern and of significance, and 
then grasp the objective triggering mechanisms or social occasions 
that make these patterned feelings live within him. If he is to 
comply with his own cognitional structure, the worker-inquirer’s 
pursuit of self-knowledge must be a pursuit of adequate 
conceptualisation which rejects recourse to “a cloud of warm 
incense, a kind of thinking in terms of music, that does not get the 
length of notions” (Hegel 1967, p. 257). If the labourer is mindful 
of Hegel’s advice that after praxis comes theory, we can say that 
subsequent to the practice of the body, the mind must attempt to 
conceive this bodily dasein in the spirit of Dilthey as he searches 
for “the categories of life” and seeks to render Erlebnis or “lived 
experience” (in Makkreel and Rodi 2002, pp. 248-50) by locating 
the concept that renders the life and the lived experience specific 
to the manual labourer. If it is clear the conceptualisation of the 
lived life of labour is destined to play a crucial role, the question 
to which we now turn is whether it is possible to lay bare this 
‘second nature’ and to grasp it and conceptually know it?
6.5 The Reduction: (i) Reductio ad Sensum 
& (ii) Reductio ad Humanum
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of 
Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, 
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is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, 
but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.
Karl Marx Theses on Feuerbach (1845)
(in McLellan 1977, p.156)
When Bourdieu (1977, p. 1) wrote that: “It is not sufficient for 
anthropology to break with native experience and the native 
representation of that experience,” his intention was to justify 
adopting an objective structuralist approach such as that taken 
by Lévi-Strauss, for whom anthropology was not about a 
Malinowskian attempt to understand ‘the native’s point of view’ 
because natives themselves do not understand the real meaning or 
function of their practices, myths and beliefs. For Lévi-Strauss 
(1963), such meaning is only available to structuralist analysis. 
However, Bourdieu (1977, p. 2) argued that the ethnographer or 
interpretive sociologist must not only break with the native point 
of view but, “make a second break and question the presupposi-
tions inherent in the position of an outside observer, who, in his 
preoccupation with interpreting practices, is inclined to introduce 
into the object the principles of his relation to the object.” 
For Bourdieu, then, the unsuspecting analyst is more or less fated 
to imagine his relation to the object of study is the same as the rela-
tion the natives under study have to the object or social practice in 
question, and the analyst must be aware that this is a fatal error 
because, if we accept that integral to understanding the lived experi-
ence of being a manual labourer is the fact that it is taken up and 
developed by freedom, this condemns the person who knows noth-
ing of this dasein or its many forms to observation and the specula-
tions of ‘pure reason.’ If this conception of an embodied dasein that 
is enacted by social action means its bearer may be empowered by 
this invisibility and this inability to be spectated or known, it also 
divests the observer of the ability to know this dasein.
To avoid the snare of ‘pure reason’ then and establish the 
project of self-appropriation within the worker it is necessary to 
do so upon an adequate conceptualisation of that (physical and 
psychological) structuration brought into being by doing manual 
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labour, and this meant manual labour had to be integral to 
fieldwork if I was to answer the question as to what constitutes an 
adequate conceptualisation of the worked self. The search for an 
adequate conceptualisation of the worked self also faces the 
difficulty of abstracting from its innumerable instantiations not 
only in innumerable workers but its innumerable instantiations in 
one worker over the course of a lifetime, and to tackle this problem 
I take a chronological approach to the question by focussing upon 
the subjectivity of the worker beginning his life of manual labour, 
and in Chapter 2 I introduced the notion of ‘being reduced’ or the 
notion of a ‘reduction’ effected by working insofar as, just as when 
applying heat to a foodstuff in cooking it is said to be reduced, so 
the activity of working at its most basic is a physical expending of 
energy which has biological and physiological consequences that 
can be analogously described as reducing the worker.
In Chapter 2 the term ‘reduction’ was employed to draw upon 
the cluster of meanings surrounding the transformation of natural 
products into human cultural products such as the food served 
at table in the family home, and was also used in light of its 
suggesting a change or transformation that is ingested, embodied 
and occurs via a process of assimilation to the self, and being 
suggestive of a condition that comes into being as a result of 
the burning of energy in working and the somatic quality of the 
becoming that occurs and which we wish to adequately conceive. 
The metaphor of reduction is chosen, then, insofar as it suggests 
the interior bio-chemical processes or physicality of this becoming 
and usefully suggests a ‘second nature’ that is natural and a 
process of becoming that is pre-conscious and non-cognitive. 
Finally, the notion of reduction usefully suggests the impossibility 
of a ‘spectatorial gaze’ being capable of suspecting, far less 
knowing, this ‘secondary nature’ or contextual dasein that comes 
into being via working, because the ‘reducing’ effect of work is 
a reality for the worker alone and does not exist for the 
casual passer-by and is something which, before any effort of 
conceptualisation, is already real and part of the self.
In this conception of work, then, there is the daily enacting of 
a ‘secondary nature’ and the daily transformation of the natural 
533
t h e  n at u r a l  a p o t h e o s i s
body into a social and cultural body, and the integration of the 
worker’s social existence and his physical nature as well as his 
psyche insofar as the ontological consequences of this social 
action upon the body is not a superficial ‘clothing’ to be discarded 
at will because the reality of that which is enacted by doing is not 
an item of clothing or a veneer overlaying a universal and natural 
body. The worked-self then is a psycho-physical reduction effected 
by the expenditure of energy in labouring and, building upon 
the term reduction, I introduce its Latinate form reductio to 
accord this ‘ontology via labour’ a conceptualisation of its own 
and introduce the Latin preposition ad meaning ‘towards,’ to 
signify the dynamic or mobile nature of this secondary nature; 
to express the processual and temporal nature of this dasein that 
is brought about by doing (Castoriadis 1997, p. 168), as well as 
to indicate its intentional existence and dynamic tendency to 
‘in-form’ psychic life. 
The conjunction reductio ad, then, is used with the intention of 
conceptualising the non-objective decentred nature of the being 
of manual labour, and to give priority to the agency of ‘the world’ 
in the dasein and behaviour and cognitional processes of this 
decentred social actor. The conjunction reductio ad then is used to 
conceive and indicate not only the historicity of embodiment but 
its dynamic orientation towards the future as a result of its being 
taken up by intentional existence into the structure of the person; 
an embodied and dynamic habitus free of any suggestion of a 
mechanical programming of behaviour at the point of production 
that obliterates the exercise of freedom and the play of circumstance.
Integral to the worker-inquirer’s socialised dasein is a general 
sensual tendency and, thanks to his working with others, the 
worker-inquirer will recognise in a pre-theoretical fashion that 
this condition is not something that is private or unique to himself 
but is a shared interpersonal reality and a shared basis for 
behaviour and identity. To account for this further specification 
of the worked self as something not confined to life as physical 
existence, further specifications of the condition of ‘being reduced’ 
are required, and to this end I introduce the phrase reductio ad 
sensum to conceptualise the fact that not only is there a more or 
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less coerced reduction to physicality but freedom, choice and 
preference or amor fati take up this necessity and develop it, so 
that the exercise of choice and taste vitalises or ‘in-spirits’ the 
reductio into becoming a second nature, that makes itself at home 
in its ‘second skin’ as it is not only confined to but celebrates 
physicality. The reductio ad sensum tendency or modality then is 
based upon the daily production of a ‘simplified’ existence as a 
result of the prioritisation of embodiment as a result of performing 
a social practice which prioritises the body, and refers to a social 
practice transformed into a way of life, a grounded orientation 
towards living, and I use this term to convey the formally dynamic 
inner conversion to the sensual that occurs within the worker and 
signifies a determinate comportmental structure which is evidence 
of a decisive acceptation of a particular measure of the real and 
source of self: the working body.
The phrase reductio ad sensum above all is used to synthesise 
the living reality of manual labour performed daily by social 
actors who also exercise choice, so that the reality intended by the 
term is not a passive registration of the priority of the social world 
over the self or a surrender to that world, but the reality of the 
world being taken up into the life of the subject and becoming a 
quasi-autonomous principle of operation. I propose the view that 
in manual labour a chemical-physiological template or gestalt is 
established that acts as the conditione sine qua non for a bio-
physical ‘politics of identity’ which means that in his relationship 
to food, eating and sexuality, for example, as well as linguistic and 
intentional forms of self-expression, the worker generates ‘mimetic 
satisfaction’ in these areas of life as defined by the template 
or criteria laid down in the worker’s bio-chemical-physiological 
habitus that comes about as a result of chronic labouring, so that 
what will be satisfying are those experiences that mimic or 
reproduce the pattern already laid down. The phrase reductio 
ad sensum then adverts to this more or less coerced and free 
bio-chemical and psycho-somatic ‘politics of identity.’
When Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations (1776) visited a 
pin-making factory in the village of Pathhead outside Kirkcaldy 
and described the new post-artisanal division of labour that he 
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saw there, or when during my own fieldwork when working as an 
agricultural labourer at Kettle Produce or reporting to Pathhead 
treatment works as a manual operative with East of Scotland 
Water, there is a basic choice to be made between an ‘objective’ 
and a ‘subjective’ account of the point of production. Insofar as 
we take the latter approach it must be borne in mind that human 
experience is not objective (Laing 1982, p. 9), and this applies in 
a particular way to the experience of manual work and the 
character of the subjectivity of the worker who does this work 
which are not available to the observer or casual passer-by or the 
philosopher contemplating the ‘nature’ of work as it is a direct 
result of a particular social organisation of work. One only need 
think of the artisan and his self-imposed discipline and ‘ownership’ 
of the process of making and his ‘personal’ relationship to time 
and my own fieldwork experience of the freneticism of conveyor-
belt working, or having to complete time sheets every day to 
account for every minute of every working day, to suspect the 
difference between the artisan’s lived experience of work and that 
of the industrial manual labourer. My own practice of manual 
labour meant a very non-objective experience of work, and 
integral to which is a ‘structure of immediacy’ that establishes 
the subjectivity of the worker as a direct result of the pressure 
of time and completing the work as quickly as possible; of work 
performed within a temporal horizon captured by the expression 
‘time is money.’
Whether it is the frenetic pace of work imposed upon the 
factory worker by machines and conveyor belts or the imposed 
pace of work of the self-employed squad member on a building 
site, there is established within the worker a ‘structure of 
immediacy’ thanks to a particular organisation of work, but 
which has been further conditioned by the freedom and choice of 
the workers themselves i.e. those intrapersonal and interpersonal 
solidaristic and discursive practices among workers characterised 
by a sense of urgency and conviction; by what appears to the 
observer as an obviously libidinal relation to language, self and 
fellow workers that is free of delicacy, pretence or affectation and 
is consubstantial with an immersion into spontaneity or immediacy 
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and expressions dominated by being at home in the real, in what 
is, and a characteristic libidinal relationship the world and lack of 
distance from the world, and all this in opposition to behaviour 
that is prudish, strategic or distant or that have a calculating eye 
on the future.
Given a life where physicality is paramount, the preoccupation 
with the body over time inevitably results in a source of 
structuration of dasein which cannot be switched off at the end 
of the working day, and so is fated to be taken up by freedom 
into intentional life and the psyche, so that it is often in those 
informal private psychological spaces that are removed from 
public view and formal regulation that particular structurations 
can be practiced. Typically, then, it is in the privacy of interiority 
and intentionality and worker intersubjectivity that the cost of 
work and the fantasy of being free of its tyranny is expressed 
in language and developed when and where it is safe to do so. In 
their intentional behaviours, then, workers will often express that 
which is repressed at the ‘point of production,’ so that in their 
leisure time there is a return of the repressed which explains their 
‘over-determined’ behaviour, such as a raucous sensualism that is 
a form of ‘revenge’ upon their frenetic obedience to the will and 
command of others during the working week. Balance is restored 
via an interpersonal immersion into the pleasures of the body 
via food and drink and locality and sociality at the weekend, 
when among unmarried or single workers we see the full display 
of libidinal selves and ad libitum talk and practices; a linguistic 
sensualism sourced in the exigencies of paid labour and which 
becomes their preferred relationship to language and in which is 
sourced all manner of paralinguistic behaviours.
In this regard, I propose that those behaviours which require 
self-presence and interpersonal presence such as intimacy, parenting, 
loving, caring, aggressing, sexuality, gathering as a congregation 
to practice spirituality, or gathering as part of an audience or 
supporters of a local team etcetera, are likely to be informed by 
the gestalt laid down in manual labouring; that these practices that 
require something of the self or ‘intimacy’ borrow something of 
their phenomenological reality from manual labour and the social 
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constitution of the psyche. Just as scholastic philosophy argues the 
material object of perception insofar as it becomes a res cogitan 
exists in a new and qualitatively higher order of existence, so the 
reality of the physical reduction exists in a higher way in the minds 
and psyches of labourers and informs all manner of practices.
As a student of male manual work cultures Savage (1999) has 
remarked upon the objectively imposed and ‘de-privatised’ self-
understandings of manual workers, and I introduce the term 
reductio ad humanum to conceptually fix a further specification 
of the general ‘condition of reduction’ that concerns the particular 
kind of sociation brought into being by manual labouring. 
Performing paid labour is not the private affair of physical 
exercise to maintain one’s health or the collective effort of team 
sports, but is a free-market-driven social practice that is integral 
to the reproduction of society. The term reductio ad humanum is 
introduced to recognise that the worker-inquirer’s appropriation 
of the reality of intersubjectivity is intense and chronic and 
constitutes a particular kind of interpersonal realm. In performing 
work, there occurs the construction of a ‘we’ or ‘being with 
others’ (mitsein) and a group identity as this kind-of-being is not 
unique to any individual but something workers share.
As a conceptualisation of this interpersonal realm brought 
into being by doing among manual workers, the term ad humanum 
is intended to signify the dynamic tendency towards solidaristic 
behaviours and sentiments that reflects finding in the social 
practice of work the necessity and rationale for cultivating 
camaraderie among themselves and in their relations with others 
inside and outside of the workplace. This ad humanum disposition 
towards others, then, is not a matter of ‘fundamental ontology’ in 
the Heideggerian sense of a universal quality, as it is contingent 
upon a particular context and something exacted from the worker 
in his informal behaviours and relations to his fellows and only 
subsequently chosen, so there occurs a ‘free’ reduction to a ‘we’ 
that is firstly more or less coerced and subsequently enjoyed and 
cultivated. While prescinding from listing particular behaviours 
and assigning each to one or the other tendency, the term reductio 
ad humanum is introduced to signal a particular quality of relating 
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to self and fellows and to signal an interior condition of having 
conformed oneself to objective conditions and subsequently 
having developed a ‘second nature’ as a result of having freely 
committed one’s self to an ethic and ethos of solidarity. The 
reduction ad humanum then reflects finding in work the founding 
necessity and rationale for cultivating such behaviours among 
themselves and in their relations with others, as well as convey 
the reality of liking and learning this dasein so that it becomes 
a matter of free choice as one’s social fate becomes amor fati.
In arguing for the reality and practice of this mitsein or ‘being-
with-others,’ the term ad humanum also adverts to a libidinal 
intersubjectivity and overt visceral quality in the behaviour of 
workers at work and outside of work; signals the intersubjective 
and communal aspect of being and each worker’s participation 
in each other’s being, and indicates the experience of being as 
solidarity and communion with what one’s fellow workers are. 
Among manual workers, then, there is little sense of a solitary 
pursuit of a unique vocation but an impersonal functionalism 
which nevertheless does entail over time the cultivation of a ‘we;’ 
an enforced production then reproduction of a group identity 
and a sense of ‘membership’ that is independent of personal or 
unique traits as one’s fellow workers share in this condition. There 
is an ad humanum relation exacted from the worker in his 
working (and subsequently non-working) relation to his fellows. 
If the possibility of this fellowship is objectively ‘out there,’ it is 
only brought about as an existential condition by being immersed 
in this relationship, and is only available as a result of the practice 
of labour and so it is accurately described as an enforced and then 
learned and then autonomous reduction to a ‘we.’
The ad humanum term, then, specifies or ‘fixes’ a quality of 
relating to self and fellows in similar conditions, and signals the 
interior condition of having conformed oneself in one’s ownmost 
dasein to doing what is required by the job and having freely 
committed one’s self to its exigencies. What has to be committed 
to is an ethic of solidarity so that the ad humanum term is meant 
to convey that all workers share the same condition effected by 
working and this has clear solidaristic results. It is a mistake then 
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to imagine the ad humanum is the result of the inherent goodness 
or the universal human nature of the workers as the humane and 
attractive behaviours it signals have an objective or impersonal 
foundation and rationale that workers internalise. To complement 
the reduction to the body, then, there is a ‘reduction’ to inter- 
subjectivity and one’s neighbour in their ownmost dasein, and this 
‘primitive’ pre-theoretical experience of communion that is 
independent of discursive or linguistic construction is subsequently 
taken up by language, freedom and deliberation to constitute 
a kind of ‘politics of identity’ which will inform all manner of 
non-workplace activities.
I fundamentally disagree, then, with a writer such as Sartre 
whose analysis of ‘being-with’ (mitsein) was a direct criticism of 
Heidegger’s analysis of the experience of “we’’ and whether it can 
form part of the ontological structure of human dasein. I criticise 
Sartre who held “the experience of the We-subject has no value 
as a metaphysical revelation’’ (1966, p. 553) as the more socio-
logically sound view is that the grounds for individuation is 
the intersubjective context, whether it be the family or locality 
or school or workplace etcetera. My view as to why the “we” 
experience for Sartre is deemed unable to bear the weight of 
human being is consubstantial with why the kind of being doing 
brings about was not something of any real significance for Sartre. 
In this regard, thinkers who have instantiated a ‘non-working’ 
relation to the question of human being have been freed from 
group memberships and living such memberships as their fate.
Traditional producers of knowledge have not been bringing 
their thoughts on dasein into being after practicing manual labour 
or obeying the exigencies of group membership, and so in Sartre’s 
well-known analysis of the waiter who is represented as playing at 
being a waiter, this is extended to include workers who are daily 
required to perform manual labour. A fateful antinomianism that 
can write: “This obligation is not different from that which is 
imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly one of cere-
mony’’ (Sartre 1966, p. 102), involves accepting that a few thou-
sand particular acts of labour, for example, have only the slightest 
of footholds upon dasein and are only maintained in being as long 
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as ‘the player’ plays the game, as according to Sartre’s analysis the 
labourer can choose not to attend to any of his days of labour and 
have them “collapse in an infinity of particular acts’’ (Sartre 1966, 
p. 109), so that Sartre is an exemplary illustration of how embod-
iment and the reality of intersubjectivity can play no part in a 
thinker’s understanding of human being.
By highlighting within the ‘condition of reduction’ the two 
further (Weberian) ‘ideal types’ of the reductio ad sensum and 
the reductio ad humanum, the aim is to capture an existence 
marked by a privileging of the corporeal and the prioritisation of 
the body, an objectively coerced and then free tendency towards 
sensation. The terms reductio ad sensum and reductio ad 
humanum are based upon the fact that the condition of reduction 
becomes free and reflexive in all its modalities and this has an 
infinite number of consequences. First and foremost, the reduced 
dasein enjoys being itself, which means it is reflexive and 
deliberately comports itself towards itself; anticipates itself in its 
social interaction with others and prefers wherever possible to 
comport itself towards interaction and the future as the reductio. 
The phrase reductio ad sensum refers to the triangulation of the 
physical, the psychological and the social and the abstract 
attribute of humanity as ‘sociable’ and ‘sensual’ becomes existence 
in a distinctive orientation of living and experiencing sensuously. 
This daily integration of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ and ‘culture’ 
explicitly rejects any divorce or caesura between physiology 
or nature and nurture and freedom as the action of the various 
filters of society and culture upon the body are not the superficial 
matter of “clothing’’ the body, as this suggests such coding can be 
removed at will and that there is a constant ‘body part’ underneath 
the veneer of society and culture.
While the terms are products of abstraction, they are based 
upon empirical observation. When conducting fieldwork it is 
easy enough to spot the kinship or iso-morphism (from the Greek 
μορφή i.e. morph, meaning ‘form’ or ‘shape’) between a range of 
working-class behaviours and note the similarity or iso-morphism 
that exists between mental and material social conditions as the 
reductio morphs itself into other areas of life and ‘informs’ other 
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areas of experience. It is also clearly seen how the working class 
enjoy their dasein and how unlikely they are to instantiate any 
kind of real separation between social structure, reflexivity and 
knowledge as this would require the ‘modernist’ mythical ability 
to dissolve their heavy historicity into thin air and instantiate 
an impossible immaculate dasein à la Sartre. By conceptualising 
the reductio and these two modalities as the habitus specific to 
the manual labourer, the aim is to develop categories tailored 
to the life of manual labour as opposed to employing, for example, 
Bourdieu’s generic notion of habitus as a “system of durable 
dispositions” (1994, p. 190).
I propose the concept of the reductio as the habitus of manual 
labour and propose that it meets Cicourel’s (1993) criticisms of 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as needing empirical verification and 
grounding. I also mean to indicate a dialectic exists that is unique 
to each labourer between the ad sensum and ad humanum 
modalities, or between the carapaced behaviours or that complex 
of toughness Mary Searle-Chatterjee (in Wallman 1979, p. 285) 
identified among Benares sweepers in India, for example, and the 
humane ad humanum characteristics identified by Scheper-Hughes 
(1992) in the favellas of Brazil. In this regard, while the ad 
humanum behaviours of solidarity and community are cited by 
ethnographers such as Scheper-Hughes and Eric Wolf (Schneider 
and Rapp 1995) as a sign of a more humane society, it has to be 
borne in mind that these humane behaviours emerge from a 
position of subordination, so that while it is perhaps inevitable that 
the humanity contained within ad humanum behaviours is 
interpreted as an integral humanism and vision of a new society, 
this interpretation only interprets half the data, as these humane 
behaviours are consubstantial with the ad sensum behaviours 
that emerge from performing a particular social practice. This 
socially-constructed behaviour often means that when the 
compulsion of necessity is removed, the compulsion for humane 
behaviours is likewise removed, so that outwith the necessity of 
enduring certain conditions the consubstantial solidaristic 
behaviours and dispositions are more or less fated to disappear 
over time, and as Willis (1977, p. 185) observed in his ethnography 
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of the English working class: “The couplet accommodation/
resistance is riveted tight.”
If we presume we are making some progress in the effort of 
grasping the practice of labour ‘subjectively’ and making good the 
principal defect of all hitherto existing materialisms, it is because 
the concept of the reductio liberates the physical experience of 
working from its initial conditions of embodied existence, just as 
the imagination has the power to liberate sensual realities from 
their physical existence by being able to be ‘brought to mind’ 
despite their material or physical absence. To draw upon scholastic 
terminology, the reduction or reductio is the eidos or the ‘idea’ or 
‘form’ (Greek εἶδος) of manual labour. In cognitional terms, the 
reductio is the ‘universal’ which the intellect abstracts from 
the individual thing (or labourer in this instance). Insofar as the 
daily practice of labouring in-forms the psyche, the reductio is an 
ontic a priori comportmental structure or gestalt or imprint that 
determines the comportment and intentionality of the worker-
inquirer. Finally, this work of ‘in-forming’ other relationships is 
the result of the dynamism of ‘secondary natures’ being taken up 
by human freedom so that the concrete exercise of freedom must 
ordinarily be seen as involving the worker-inquirer freely allowing 
himself to be determined by his circumstances.
If the worker’s mode of being is to be captured via language 
and be represented mentally or verbally it requires conceptualisation, 
and having been made the matter of reflection, the laboured 
body’s mode of being becomes part of the life of mind as the 
worker-inquirer’s conceptualisation of self gathers its data from its 
dispersal in real being and real time and real labour, insofar as he 
transforms these into a res cogitans. Attempting to articulate 
‘working class being’ then, means rendering an embodied self 
mentally and textually, translating a being-in-the-world into its 
conceptualisation. Insofar as a particular kind of social doing 
brings about a particular kind of social being, manual labour must 
be established as a category of being if it is to be thinkable and 
in this effort, arriving at the idea of a ‘reduced’ condition is 
relatively straightforward. However, a more complicated and 
involved matter is grasping its systematic significance for a range 
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of behaviours and a range of ‘forms of consciousness’ and how the 
reductio acts as a template for other becomings.
In taking this step the argument is not that the reductio is the 
key to understanding every major relationship or every realm of 
experience in any causal or essentialist manner, as even for manual 
labourers who are the class fraction for whom this categorisation 
of being-in-the-world is specifically tailored, and among whom I 
do argue for the centrality of the reductio precisely because other 
realms of experience are in a relation of dependency or ontological 
kinship to the reductio, it is essential to safeguard the contingency 
and freedom of the empirical data that confirms this argument and 
safeguard against interpretations of the analysis being presented 
here as deterministic or mechanistic. I make no ‘pure reason’ claim 
or suggestion that a manual labourer’s relation to the aesthetic 
realm, language, gender, nationality, history or the transcendent, 
for example, are somehow ‘fated’ to never reach escape velocity 
from the gravitational pull of the reductio, as the question whether 
the exercise of freedom means the ever-increasing centrality and 
relevance of the reductio as a category of being thanks to its 
impact upon areas of experience outside of manual labour is 
something that can never be settled by theory but is an empirical 
question that can only be settled by empirical research.
The theoretical possibility that the reductio may fail to establish 
itself in a particular labourer for whatever reason must always 
be freely conceded. My empirical argument, then, is that when 
empirically grasped as a principle of the construction of self across 
various fronts, the true systematic relevance and cognitional 
import of the concept of the reductio is apprehended by the 
worker-inquirer for whom the intense effort of work, liberated by 
the exercise of free choice and taste, means the reductio is in 
fact the key that opens subjectivity to its adequate mental existence 
in the intellectual life of the worker-inquirer, and therefore must 
also be the key for the ethnographer insofar as the practice 
of introspective analysis reveals the reductio accounts for and is 
consubstantial with a libidinal or cathartic investment in a range 
of other relationships. For this assertion to be evidenced, the 
worker-inquirer must illustrate to his own satisfaction the 
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homology or consubstantiality of the being brought into being 
via work with other realms of being, and to make this argument 
we had to widen our discussion of contextual dasein in the 
previous chapter to recognise how other realms of being such 
as national identity, for example, are historically mediated and 
contingently configured via the social practice of manual labour.
The heuristic value of arriving at an adequate conceptualisation 
of the dynamic and multi-faceted structuring effected by labouring 
then is that it allows us to grasp a decentered reality insofar 
as “the notion [of the reduction] rises out of the dispersion 
of sensibility” (Hegel 1967, p. 286). While mindful that “the 
problematic of representation… as…violence to what it depicts – 
as if every word is the murder of the thing” (Parker 2011, p. 117), 
the worker-inquirer thanks to the concept of the reductio can 
press on and appropriate Hegel’s (1967, p. 566) assertion that 
“what is not comprehended through a notion, conceptually 
determined, is not” but without committing himself to the idealist 
notion that a thing is its representation (Gilfillan 2009). This 
adequate conceptualisation integrates the discontinuous realms 
of reality and representation, so that without the concept of the 
reduction the worker-inquirer would be unable to raise himself 
above empirical consciousness to intellectual existence. Hence, to 
achieve intellectual consciousness of his worked self, the worker-
inquirer must hit upon the notion of ‘the reduction’ or some other 
such concept that does the same integrating work if he is to 
proceed to the next level of cognitional structure upon the basis 
of the labouring subject that he is.
Also, the more progress the worker-inquirer makes in this the 
more he is able to put together the structure of knowing from his 
own experience. In his practice of introspection, then, the worker 
has insights into the self and uncovers the patterning of motivation, 
behaviour and intentional consciousness and the place of the ad 
sensum and ad humanum reductions as operative motivations and 
orientating forces upon the exercise of his freedom and behaviour. 
However, insofar as the worker-inquirer progresses there is also 
revealed the mind’s natural felicity in following insights and its 
natural delight in understanding and ‘catching on,’ so that a point 
545
t h e  n at u r a l  a p o t h e o s i s
of reflexivity is reached in the process where the worker-inquirer 
not only catches onto the reductio, but catches onto the fact that 
it is the reductio that he repeatedly catches onto. After this point 
in his inquiry he is able to suspect and anticipate its heuristic value 
so that he uses it as a hermeneutic to read himself.
Also, in making this progress there is reflection upon reflection 
that reveals the fact that, not only is the content of empirical con-
sciousness structured, but inquiry itself is structured i.e. insights 
recur, and at some point there is insight into insight until, finally, 
the reflexive worker-inquirer becomes aware that his inquiry will 
not be satisfied with merely following data but requires the integra-
tion of all of the data; becomes aware that an act of intellectual 
synthesis is required to terminate this process. The natural appetite 
and dynamism of the intellect is what Lonergan characterises as 
critical reflection heading for a ‘grasp of the unconditioned,’ the 
level of judgment that settles the issue and brings the process to an 
end, and upon completion of this task the worker-inquirer com-
pletes the final step of cognitional structure i.e. judgment, and 
makes the shift from worker-inquirer to worker-inquirer-knower.
6.6 The Moment of Being-the-Truth & the Natural 
Apotheosis of Contextual Dasein
If we presume the worker-inquirer has successfully aligned his 
self-consciousness with his reductio-informed behaviour, he has 
successfully organised his self-understanding along the lines of his 
history of instantiating a dialectical ‘to and fro’ relation between 
‘freedom’ and ‘unfreedom’ i.e. upon the basis of recognising how, 
when outwith the actual reduction in his being-for-himself (and his 
being-for-others) he is liable to being put ‘at issue’ in the semiotic 
‘sea of signs’ and discourse, not just by being read by unsympathetic 
dominant cultural codes but by the demands of his own rational 
nature and the demands of cognitional structure. Upon recognising 
the presence of a struggle or dialectic between his two histories i.e. 
the history of justification and the history of being ‘at issue,’ the 
worker-inquirer will also have adverted to the fact that his being-
for-others and his being-for-himself stands in a particular relation 
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to his condition of being reduced: that the reductio justifies or frees 
him in his being-for-others as it is its own sui generic source of 
justification outwith the gaze or ken of others.
Also, while his being-for-self and being-for-others is put ‘at 
issue’ insofar as he is immersed in the realm of public meaning, 
having come this far in his journey of self-appropriation he will 
notice this ‘being at issue’ or ‘being-for-others’ is not even 
primarily the result of symbolic domination in a free-market 
society but is recognised as being also the result of his rational 
nature that has been elicited and awakened, and which is restless 
until it articulates an answer to the questions of his interlocutors. 
This intellectual tension signals he has not yet brought to a 
successful conclusion the exigencies of cognitional structure which 
demand he give a reading or account of himself to himself; that he 
himself in all his contingency puts himself into signs and “into 
words for the very first time” (Heidegger 1962, p. 362), and onto 
what Lonergan calls the brink of judgment. What is sought above 
all is a true intellectual judgment of the self he is, because it is 
cognitional structure and not the class structure and its symbolic 
codes he is immersed in and which demand the right to pronounce 
its own judgment. Importantly, from the standpoint of the 
structure of his own mind, the only relevant criteria for deciding 
his understanding of himself is being judged in relation to the 
truth of himself he has laboured to arrive at.
If what is needed is an act of understanding where “the 
understander and the understood are identical” (Lonergan 1990, 
p. 238), this judgement can only occur when the data has been 
marshalled to the point where the intellect can grasp the sufficiency 
of the data; where subjectivity has been adequately translated into 
the intellectual order, as only at this point becomes possible the 
moment of knowing that the reductio is true because it reduces the 
data that is the worker-inquirer’s life to its intelligibility. This 
special act and insight is what is known as a judgment: a ‘live’ 
demonstration of the truthfulness of the conceptual apparatus 
that has been laboriously put in place thanks to understanding 
one particular act or behaviour via the conceptual apparatus put 
in place and seeing, for the first time, that in understanding a 
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particular instance of behaviour he thereby understands every 
other previous behaviour that were instances of the same pattern 
and dialectic.
This is the moment when the worker-inquirer passes the 
structure of himself into his intellectual consciousness for the first 
time, and the intellect of the worker-inquirer catches or recognises 
(using the reductio) himself or his dasein in the act of being its 
being and the adequacy of his conceptual grasp of himself is 
attained. Insofar as he conceptually catches his dasein in the act 
of being its being, this act simultaneously recognises and unlocks 
and understands all of the other data that this act is sufficient 
to explain i.e. the structure of his life and behaviour. He finally 
intellectually recognises and sees and knows himself through 
judgment, so that it is an act of judgment, then, and not desiring 
or wishing or suspecting, that is the event which puts the worker-
inquirer in cognitional possession of himself for the first time; 
puts the worker-inquirer in possession of the intelligibility of the 
history and events he has lived through throughout his life, 
because the moment of judgment is that point in time when the 
conceptual apparatus laboriously put in place grasps a particular 
instance of his structured behaviour intellectually i.e. by its idea or 
eidos (i.e. the reductio), and so by understanding one instance in 
a long history of such moments of comportment or behaviour is 
to unlock the intelligibility of an entire history. Judgment, then, 
releases the intelligibility that until this moment remained tied to 
its serial existence and confined to the heavy historicity of patterns 
of affectivity, behaviour and intentionality, and this moment of 
apotheosis is the highest natural joy for a rational nature because 
it releases the self from obscurity and ends the long historicity of 
doubt sedimented in the lived history of the worker-inquirer’s 
mental life, and which is why the moment of judgment can be 
described as delivering a lifetime’s worth of intelligibility.
Prior to this moment of truth, the worker-inquirer has two sets 
of data which both concern himself and which he knows are both 
true, yet pull in two different directions. On the one hand, he 
knows that he is free or justified as a result of ‘being reduced.’ 
However, the worker-inquirer also notices within himself his 
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history of not being free or justified but being ‘at issue’ in the 
world of discourse, because in the realm of language he has no 
account of himself to give himself or others, and so is easily the 
victim of ‘symbolic violence’ in his being for interlocutors and is 
insecure or liable to be ‘at issue’ in this medium. 
In addition to this class structure that positions the worker-
inquirer, however, there is another structure, the structure of cogni-
tion, that in its own sui generic way exercises its own sui generic 
discipline and sovereignty and even ‘violence’ over the worker-
inquirer. The worker’s own rational consciousness or his ownmost 
being-for-his-cognitional-structure reveals his ‘cognitional insecu-
rity,’ so that the key to overcoming this condition of being liable to 
‘cognitional violence’ is not to have something occur ‘out there’ 
within the class structure but to have something occur within him-
self; a cognitional development or act of cognitional agency within 
the worker-inquirer that can only happen if he has the adequate 
self-conceptualisation at hand. Insofar as the real source of his 
‘symbolic insecurity’ is not having a symbolic account of himself, 
the reductio becomes the key to furnishing him with such an 
account of himself because just as it justifies him while labouring, 
so it is the key ‘sign’ that unlocks his self-knowledge or conceptual 
justification and his performing an act of self-understanding, and 
thanks to the reductio he takes possession of the true account of 
himself and cognitional structure can be completed.
In this exercise of cognitional agency there is an obvious similarity 
between the ethnographic account just given and Lonergan’s (1957) 
account of self-appropriation and Hegel’s suggestion (1967, p. 431) 
that the intellectual life consists in an essence being retrieved from 
its dispersal in the world; of achieving the ‘moment of truth’ and 
the apotheosis where: “Self-consciousness…has attained its true 
conception of itself…has arrived at a consciousness of its own 
substance.” In Lonergan’s account of human understanding, grasping 
‘the sufficiency of the evidence’ is the cause and condition of the 
act of judgment as a result of the dependency of judgment upon 
sufficient evidence. In the ethnographically-situated account of 
judgment just given, I have highlighted the existential requirement 
of a life both socially-determined and freely chosen in a particular 
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manner since, being ‘structured in the truth’ of one’s being through 
judgment means understanding the life actually led and not some 
other life the worker-inquirer might have wanted for himself, so 
that the act of judgment is conditional upon a certain fidelity 
to a particular situated or class reality, to having been ‘condemned’ 
to a life and then having freely determined to choose and having 
allowed the reductio to play the role of ‘in-former’ of the life 
actually led.
What needs to be emphasised time and again is that this 
argument concerning the reductio informing subjectivity is an 
empirical observation and not a theoretical hypothesis, as it is 
based upon a description of how real lives known by fieldwork 
are in fact lived, and is not an argument about what another 
population somewhere else or what another generation might or 
might not do with their freedom vis-à-vis their social determination. 
It goes without saying, then, that in a life that has not been 
constructed and configured in this fashion, the concept of the 
reductio can not play this role in cognitional structure because the 
concept of the reduction can not explain the data. The act of 
understanding just described reveals how a life in fact has been 
lived; that insofar as understanding the life actually led, the 
reductio is the adequate concept that generates this act of 
understanding. The argument then is that this particular relation 
to the body and language and the nation and others is the relation, 
and not some other kind of relation; is the data, and so in these 
circumstances only bringing this to the brink of judgment can 
produce an act of self-understanding. There may be lives that are 
lived in such a manner that they can be crowned by different kinds 
of liberating acts of self-understanding that do not take the 
concrete social praxis of labouring as their starting point but the 
lives of manual labours will not be among them. Finally, only 
the act of understanding just described can liberate such a person, 
so that all other models of self-understanding will be derivative 
or additional where they are not illusory.
In giving this account of the integral liberation of integral 
dasein I am not concerned to settle ideological questions such as 
the causal priority of labour as a structuring agent of dasein, but 
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I am concerned to make the unremarkable argument that the 
‘condition of reduction’ does not invent ex nihilo the being of 
the nation or language or a particular self or a particular mitsein 
but, rather, enters into their social and cultural construction 
and mundane practice. This is why in Chapter 5 we added to our 
account of working-class dasein the element of nationality and 
argued nationalism was informed by an integration of id, identity 
and ideology or nature, nurture and freedom that itself is 
integrated with the exigencies established within human being 
by the practice of manual labour. Our argument was not a 
philosophical position that manual labour is necessarily the source 
of the libidinal charge of nationalist sentiment on view among 
locals performing their national identity while gathered to watch 
a football match, but an ethnographic and empirical observation 
that in working-class locations and among working-class people 
this integralism is present throughout the realms of consciousness 
and experience, and is evidenced in those set-piece occasions 
where locals gather and come alive to a preferred and privileged 
sense of themselves. In this phenomenology of physicality, 
consciousness and cognition, then, I have simply taken seriously 
realities that are mundane and obvious to any ethnographer of 
any working-class population, which is that the presence of the 
dominant structural reality and daily practice of work weighs 
heavily upon many other relationships and, given that it is 
difficult for other relationships to reach ‘escape velocity’ from the 
gravitational pull of the condition of reduction, we have given an 
account of intellectual liberation that has harvested the intelligibility 
that results from such a life.
In giving an account of the natural apotheosis or natural 
beatitude of contextualised Scottish human being we transcend 
the analysis of Sartre who was ignorant of this apotheosis but 
was familiar with the desire for it. For Sartre, Man’s decentred or 
‘dispersed’ nature was taken as sufficient reason for the dogmatic 
assertion of the impossibility of the human subject ever being 
united with his essence, and when drawing upon Scotus’s emphasis 
upon “the radical indetermination of the will” (Gilson 1980, 
p. 410) in human beings, Sartre drew the wrong conclusions and, 
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once again, great truths were held captive by great errors. If we 
take one of the earliest articulations of Man’s decentredness such 
as Mirandola’s On the Dignity of Man ([1486] 1998, pp. 4-5) we 
find Scotus’s break with Greco-Arabian necessitarianism and 
the discovery that God has commanded that Man’s fate is to be 
existence-led:
We have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy 
very own, no gift peculiarly thine, that thou mayest feel as 
thine own, have as thine own, possess as thine own the seat, 
the form, the gifts which thou thyself shalt desire. A limited 
nature in other creatures is confined within the laws written 
down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose 
hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; 
and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. I have placed 
thee at the centre of the world, that from there thou mayest 
more conveniently look around and see whatsoever is in the 
world. Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor 
immortal have We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed 
for being honourable, art the moulder and maker of thyself; 
thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost 
prefer. Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures 
which are brutes. Thou canst again grow upward from the 
soul’s reason into the higher natures which are divine.
What was alien to Scotus and Mirandola was any suggestion 
that Man is fated to be always separated from himself and, rather 
than possess himself, is to be continually thrown forward via 
intentionality to the future and becoming as in Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness (1966). The only solution to this insight into Man’s 
existence-led life being held captive by error is the performance of 
self-appropriation. In terms of the reconciliation of the Hegelian 
in-itself and for-itself which both Sartre and Lukacs declare 
impossible, I have argued the static subsistance of secondary 
substances (such as the reductio) make it possible for intelligence 
to effect the worker-inquirer becoming equal with himself and 
achieving the injunction we become coeval with ourselves. The 
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reductio, as the contextual existence of the worker, becomes a 
‘secondary essence’ and insofar as it becomes the subject of 
a project of intellectual appropriation by the worker-inquirer, his 
essence is grasped and the alleged impossible task of possessing 
one’s essence is achieved.
When Hegel (1967, p. 756) wrote in typical idealist style that 
“substance…enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness,’’ 
the sociologist adverts to the concrete ethnographic order where 
society and history intervene upon human being, and produce many 
kinds of existences and many forms of life and many ‘secondary 
essences.’ Parenthetically, we may say that rejecting a ‘metaphysics 
of substance’ in favour of existence paradoxically ends up another 
species of antinomian thinking for, if today’s post-structural 
deconstruction of ontology and the subject is to be welcomed as the 
working class, fully existential and decentred and undoubtedly 
favourable to a post-universalist ontology in which existence has 
precedence over essence, the fact is this still postpones our arrival at 
the correct starting point, because existence does not maintain itself 
immaculate and pure from (becoming) essence because, over time, 
it becomes essence or a fixed secondary nature, so the determination 
to start from the ‘facts of existence’ rather than an essential nature 
is not an adequate statement of the choices available because there 
is no such choice ever really available. In the intellectual biography 
of the worker-inquirer, however, an account of this process of 
existence becoming essence or habitus can be given. If Hegel is 
correct that “the object only has truth so far as it has the form of 
self’’ (1967, p. 553), then the worker-inquirer comes to the truth of 
himself once he gets the conceptualisation of himself as worker 
right i.e. lifts it free of merely endless seriality, and liberates it from 
its pre-conceptual and primitive day-to-day reality. If the account 
I have presented here is accurate then we have solved the 
problematic Hegel and Sartre and Lukacs who in his History 
and Class Consciousness ([1923] 1971, p. 110) described as “the 
antinomies of bourgeois thought” as he was preoccupied with 
the crisis of modern European Man and providing a solution to 
Schiller’s (1971, p. 139) articulation of the predicament faced by 
European culture:
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On the one hand, he [Schiller] recognises that social life  
has destroyed man as man. On the other hand, he points to 
the principle whereby man having been socially destroyed, 
fragmented and divided between different partial systems is 
to be made whole again in thought.
Lukacs’ Hegelian brand of Marxism rightfully intuited that only 
because the proletarian had been transformed in his very dasein 
by the industrial production process was he able to abolish not 
only his own reification but that of others, and integral to this was 
a purely intellectual or cognitional moment that can only occur 
“in thought.” However, if Lukacs failed to give any account of 
this cognitional agency, I have given an answer by demonstrating 
that only when the worker-inquirer has constituted the reductio 
throughout his consciousness is the cognitional act of liberation 
immanent. If others may wish to pretend for ideological reasons 
another natural beatitude is possible, I have given an account of a 
performative verification of my position that also has metaphysical 
reasons for being confident that no contradictory account will be 
forthcoming, such as the position that the human intellect is 
ordained to intelligible being famously expressed by Scotus’s 
phrase: falsum non est scibile (cited in Wolter 1987, p. 20). Hence, 
while there can be dogmatic and wilful assertions of positions 
contrary to the one developed here, or dogmatic assertions as 
to its impossibility as in Lukacs and Sartre, there will be no 
performative account grounding such positions.
This is why a fully-contextualised account of cognitional struc-
ture is no small matter, because it safeguards all that cognition 
achieves and without a cognitional theory one cannot account for a 
transforming event where a particular data set of behaviours is 
crowned by a particular act of understanding; where a ‘data set’ 
becomes a source of liberation insofar as self-appropriation trans-
forms a nested series of behaviours into a nested series of objects of 
thought, and judgment transforms these latter into a nested experi-
ence of liberation and apotheosis. With Lonergan (1972, p. 292), 
then, my position is that: “Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authen-
tic subjectivity,” so that “the individual and the subjective is a valid 
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position from which to know the general and apparently ‘objec-
tive’” (Hauke 2000, p. 85). The worker-inquirer, through fidelity to 
the data and fidelity to the historicity of his refusal to attempt self-
appropriation upon any other basis, transforms this existential deci-
sion into a fundamental option to thinking his concrete reality that 
results in knowledge of himself thanks to reproducing at an intel-
lectual level what it has taken him the course of a lifetime to con-
struct at an existential and behavioural level. By this event, the 
enquirer is liberated in his intellectual and rational consciousness 
and is freed in his being-for-himself and his being-for-others insofar 
as the realm of meaning is implicated in these relations.
At the heart of this attempt to think human being in an integral 
manner and in a way that is free of modernism and materialism is 
an event, a happening or performative verification. At the moment 
of completing cognitional structure the worker-inquirer translates 
his being-in-the-world into his rational self-consciousness and 
establishes his cognitional sovereignty, thanks to having reduced 
himself to a ‘pure act’ and reducing the self to its intelligibility 
and translating a ‘secondary essence’ into the content of an act 
of understanding thanks to making intellectually present to 
rational consciousness that which has taken a lifetime to 
assemble. In this achievement, grasping the isomorphism that 
exists between the order of cognition and the order of fully con-
textualised human being is the key moment as, at a mere behav-
ioural level, the worker-as-inquirer merely repeats or re-iterates 
himself behaviourally, and must remain sceptical about claims of 
a once-and-for-all ‘moment of truth.’
Prior to grasping the unconditioned, the worker-inquirer 
cannot make a judgment as to the true significance of the reductio 
which may be the truth of his being but may not be the truth of 
himself, as there may well be a further conceptualisation that 
is required that will allow him to grasp the sufficiency of the 
evidence about himself and that he has failed to suspect so far. The 
act of judgment presupposes an adequate conceptual grasp of 
the self but this conceptual grasp must be distinguished from the 
act of judgment. Our conceiving manual labour as a category 
of being involves an act of abstraction from particularity 
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to universality, and insofar as one conceptualisation fits a 
thousand dispersed acts of labouring, the concept of the reduction 
establishes the worker-enquirer’s intellectual self-awareness. Once 
the reduction’s empirical presence throughout consciousness, 
experience and behaviour is firmly identified, this allows inquiry 
to proceed to the next stage in the process of self-appropriation, 
and raise the question of the final cognitional significance of this 
concept i.e. the question of its truth. Successfully gathering 
the dispersion of the self via a conceptual grasp of the truth of the 
self is not yet the act of intellectual synthesis that grasps the 
connections between the data that must take place in order for 
the truth that enquiry demands to come into being. As stated, 
what is required is a ‘live insight’ into the behaviour and 
consciousness of the self that reduces all previous and future 
behaviours and patterns of consciousness to their intelligibility.
From Aristotle we learn that living substances are composed of 
their matter and their animating form (or eidos/idea), and while 
the real always remains singular so that a science of the singular 
is impossible, the fact is knowledge of the many (i.e. science) is 
possible because each human intellect grasps the one form shared 
by each member of a particular species. It is because many 
particular intellects grasp the same universal form that is only 
present and real in the many singular instances that science or 
objective knowledge of concrete reality in general is possible. For 
my purpose, then, it is because the reductio is the form or eidos of 
the worked body that sharing in this condition is the basis not 
only for manual workers’ self-recognition and self-knowledge but 
the objective basis for knowing how they experience and constitute 
their intersubjectivity. Each particular worker shares the same 
‘universal’ reduction as his own ‘private’ possession or ‘idiosyncratic 
form,’ as it is both a personal possession and shared by others 
who are doing the same tasks with the same nature and the same 
shared medium of the human body. As already stated several 
times, this condition is both individual and personal and a source 
of solidarity and group identity and a basis for social interaction. 
This explains why the worked self is more or less sovereign in its 
signification of self, meaning and world; is not simply sovereign in 
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the objective sense that in the cash economy it is the relation to 
money that is second to none in importance but is sovereign over 
intentional, psychological and interpersonal life i.e. is an intensely 
subjective sovereignty vis-à-vis the subject’s intentional life and 
affective horizon, to the extent that any other different reality 
must negotiate with it in order to become phenomenologically real 
and present to the self.
If for Aristotle the truth is a product of the mind and we have 
a natural felicity for understanding, we must not forget that if we 
are able to master reality intellectually it is because we have firstly 
been mastered by reality. The truth can neither be received 
‘second-hand’ from someone else or received by a delegate on our 
behalf or imposed upon us from outside. In the journey towards 
the wholly interior event of the advent of our truth, our initial 
steps were occupied with attending to a certain freedom or sense 
of justification brought about by manual labour. Thanks to work, 
a freedom and integration of self in relation to place, time, self and 
others occurs. Next, the notion of a physical structuration or 
‘reduction’ was extended throughout empirical consciousness by 
adverting to more data on the strength of its consubstantiality 
with other behaviours, and this consubstantiality was the clue that 
alerts the worker-inquirer to the fact that not only is there 
a certain way of relating to a diverse range of realities (self, others, 
language and nation etcetera), but that it is a preferred way 
of relating and a preferred sense of identity and sociality or 
individuation and sociation that is enjoyed and freely selected, and 
which can also become part of a politics of national identity. We 
identified this preferred style and characteristic behaviours as 
consubstantial with the signature of the reduction and concluded 
the reductio is an intense ‘libidinal’ hermeneutic that the worker-
as-inquirer adverts to as having been freely reproduced throughout 
the polymorphism of his being to the exclusion of other 
constructions and developments of individuation and sociation.
The worker-inquirer’s relations to the use of symbols, language, 
self and sexuality then are not simply imposed by objective social 
forces, but are actively taken up in preference to very different 
kinds of individuations and sociations that are taken up by those 
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immersed and socialised in other class conditions. Next, labour is 
also the source of a stigma and symbolic violence and a dominated 
or unfree being-for-others, and this reality has a history in any 
working-class individual and its reality is responsible for a 
dialectic of shame and defiance, so that intellectual consciousness 
constructs and maps a dialectic of freedom/alienation that is 
played out in consciousness, behaviour and biography. However, 
the miserablist temptation to imagine endless symbolic violence 
is to be resisted as, ultimately, it is in this realm of meaning and 
the sui generic realm of mind that the full development of the 
reductio as a source of self and intellectual agency is reached and, 
due to an intimate reproduction of self across many relationships, 
we can say this ‘integral being’ is the ground of what can be 
described as an integral rational consciousness insofar as the act 
of understanding grasps an entire life and reduces a lifetime to 
its intelligibility so that, if the life of mind torments and calls 
the worker-inquirer to lose himself in abstraction, it also ‘saves’ 
the worker-inquirer so that “knowledge itself [must] be accorded 
agency” (Parker 2011, p. 91).
In our account of the natural apotheosis of fully contextual 
Scottish human being, knowledge does indeed exert agency as 
the structuration effected by the truth is a privileged event and 
moment when the worker-inquirer becomes the worker-inquirer-
knower; is the moment when the agency and structuring effect of 
truth upon dasein occurs, and thanks to the shift from worker-
inquirer to worker-inquirer-knower many of the issues of 
‘pure reason’ such as whether complete rational self-knowledge is 
possible is settled. If Bettoni (1961, p. 73) is correct to assert that 
“an a priori study of man’s nature is impossible. The only way we 
can know it is by studying its acts,” then in light of the fact that 
an account can be given of a perfect act of self-understanding, it 
is reasonable to conclude it is proper to Man’s nature and that 
which it brings within range is likewise reasonable and proper to 
our human nature, and in Chapter 8 I will add one final perfection 
or one further ‘primary colour’ to my representation of fully 
contextualised Scottish human being as a result of the psychological 
experience of freedom discussed in the next chapter.
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7
Self-Actualisation  
& the Psyche
To make ourselves at home in our alienated being.
Marx, cited by Jameson in Lyotard 1984, p. xix
7.1 The Secret History of My Shame
If Scheff and Retzinger (2000) are correct to assert that shame is 
“the master emotion of everyday life,” then it seems to follow that 
every adult should not only have a long history of instances of 
‘being ashamed,’ but should have a greater history of instances 
of behaving in such a way to avoid adding to his or her history of 
‘being ashamed.’ Insofar as an adult practices introspection, then, 
he or she should have sufficient data available about himself to be 
able to recognise that shame may be described as a pattern or 
thread running through their lives. 
However, this assertion of Scheff and Retzinger poses a 
problem not only for the private practice of introspection but for 
any kind of ‘publication’ of what such introspection discovers 
insofar as, just as with our previous remark about the psychological 
improbability of unemployed miners grasping their unemployment 
as an opportunity to explore the dasein that comes about as a 
result of being unemployed, precisely because it is shameful and a 
source of self that is not nurtured or welcomed but normally only 
given the most minimal kind of recognition, so this same 
repression of that which is shameful implies that every adult must 
not only have a history of shame but a history of repressing this 
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shame i.e. a ‘secret’ history of shame. How the ethnographer 
might evidence such contentions, of course, is clearly problematic 
as the inoffensive-sounding task of uncovering the depth of society 
within oneself in the project of self-appropriation must include 
recognising the data of one’s history of shame i.e. data that will 
not be freely attended to, because introspection will meet strong 
resistance because of fears and insecurities surrounding shame.
To describe the prospects of the worker embarking upon 
a sustained analysis of how he is caught up in schemes of 
interpretation that involve feelings of shame and feelings of guilt 
about shame, then, Zizek’s judgment of the practice of 
psychoanalysis as being “necessary only where it is not possible, 
and possible only where it is no longer necessary” (in Parker 
2011, p. 194) seems to hit the target. The task, then, is to talk of 
my own ‘secret history of shame’ as this is the only history I have 
access to. 
I begin by recalling an incident when heading to work in 
August 2012 on the 6.37 a.m. A few minutes out of Cardenden at 
the next stop, a man in his early-thirties boarded the train and sat 
across from me in a carriage which we happened to have to 
ourselves. After we bought our tickets we got chatting and he 
informed me that he lived in Bowhill and was an unpaid volunteer 
scaffie (roadsweeper) based in Dunfermline with Fife Council. 
I told him that I had not long ago moved to the Dundonald 
area of the village to get a bigger house as my previous two-
bedroom Council house was too small for a family of five. At this, 
he reciprocated by telling me that he was divorced, and that his 
former wife who came from Cardenden had custody of their child 
and despite being from Ballingry (some five miles away) he would 
like to have his work route closer to Cardenden, but really would 
not want to have his work route actually in Cardenden because, 
“a’ the bairns wid be gien me cheek an take the pish oot e me.” 
As per the discussion in Chapter 5 of a female informant who was 
shamed by the remarks of a schoolboy as I sat in her home 
watching television, so from these few words of a scaffie and his 
diffident ‘knowing’ manner of making this remark, I immediately 
understood his meaning to be that if he worked in Cardenden or 
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the neighbourhood where he was known because he had lived 
there until his recent split from his wife, he would be liable to be 
put ‘at issue,’ and would find this quite ‘uncomfortable’ because 
the local children would recognise him.
After he had confided this to me I told him that some years 
previously when working in Edinburgh for the temping agency 
Margaret Hodge Staff Consultants at the pension fund company 
Scottish Widows, I was not earning enough money to live in 
Edinburgh and so was living with my parents and travelling back 
and forward between Cardenden and Edinburgh, and how at one 
point as I had made my way to the train station every morning 
I passed a group of locals waiting at the ‘double block’ bus stop 
on Cardenden Road to be picked up for their day’s hired labour 
of picking potatoes. I recalled how, as it was winter, I wore an old 
knee-length overcoat of my father’s, and as I passed this group 
shouts of “Ya mink! Ya f***in mink!” were aimed at me, after 
I was sufficiently beyond the group so that the individual shouting 
the insults could not be picked out as I had my back to them. 
From the day that I realised what was being shouted and that 
it was being shouted at me, I told my travelling companion that 
I then realised that this had happened several times before as 
I remembered having heard shouting on previous occasions 
as I had passed the group of day-labourers, but had paid no 
attention. I then recalled that as the days had passed and the 
shouted insults had continued, I grew more and more tense each 
day as I approached the group wondering who my tormentor was, 
and as I was now making a point of intently looking at the group 
as I passed, I presumed everyone in the group was wondering how 
I would react and what, if anything, I might do. Having initially 
decided to ignore the shouts, the next day as I made my way to 
the station I suddenly deviated from my usual route and walked 
directly up to the group, and stood face-to-face with the dozen or 
so individuals, male and female, predominantly young but also 
with older adults. I asked who was doing the shouting. As I stood 
there I recognised some older men with whom I made a point of 
maintaining eye-to-eye contact, perhaps to provoke them into 
‘breaking rank’ and breaking the silence they were all maintaining 
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and address the problem between us. I waited to see if anyone 
would say anything, but the only thing that was forthcoming was 
one or two giggles and muffled comments. I walked away not 
having managed to identify the individual.
Soon after I recalled this incident the train pulled into 
Dunfermline station, and my informant left the train for his day’s 
work. As I reflected that this was the first time I could remember 
ever having told someone about this episode, I remembered 
another occasion of having my objectivity handed to me, and the 
same feeling of ‘burning shame’ that accompanied it. The incident 
was from the same period of time when I was working in 
Edinburgh and concerned a girl called Julia with whom I was ‘in 
love,’ and after some months of working with her as part of a 
team in an office and cultivating her acquaintance, there came 
a point where I asked Julia in a half-serious and half-joking 
manner if she would go out with me, as I wanted to have a 
relationship with her. In the short ensuing conversation we had as 
we sat in a busy office, Julia had looked me in the eye and with a 
broad and beautiful smile had pointedly and seriously asked me: 
“What have you got to offer a girl that would make her marry 
you?” And in that moment I saw with perfect clarity, thanks to 
Julia handing me my objectivity, that I was not in love with her 
but had been merely enjoying being infatuated with her. In two or 
three seconds, I realised that all along my private fantasies of a life 
with Julia were mere daydreams that had been ‘cathartic’ insofar 
as they gave me psychic release from my subordination thanks 
to this fantasy being a cipher for the make-believe of living a 
successful life, as opposed to my reality of being one of the 
‘working poor’ written about by sociologists; and that from the 
outset and throughout such daydreams were fated to dissolve at 
the first contact with reality. 
The three instances of social interaction described above 
involve social actors recalling experiences of shame or behaviours 
motivated by avoiding the possibility of being shamed, and what 
they have in common is the truism that being placed in the bottom 
of a hierarchy (low-status job, too poor to buy clothes of high 
status, too poor to ‘afford’ a young beautiful woman of some 
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status) teaches those who are thus classified their position in 
society, and that moments of realising what one’s objective 
position in society is is not a game or ‘data’ that is material for a 
project of self-appropriation, as its meaning for dasein is of not 
being of value, and being left to endure the consequences of this 
objectivity. More generally, it is extremely difficult to raise the 
question of low status and how a person feels and lives their 
low status within a hierarchy, a difficulty that becomes more 
difficult the longer they remain positioned towards the bottom, 
because this ‘historicity’ is something of a direct line to a person’s 
capacity for self-worth and a direct line to the history of their 
failure to have been truly able to esteem themselves. 
If we look at the first incident mentioned with the volunteer 
road sweeper, what was not actually committed to words but 
could remain implicit, thanks to a shared horizon of meaning that 
was taken for granted as a result of my living locally and my 
working-class manner of speaking, was that local children were 
not liable to pick on or tease my informant because they would 
recognise him but because of the social meaning or the low status 
attached to his job, and therefore to him.132 Our shared horizon 
of meaning meant we both knew his fear was that, at least on 
occasion, the mere sight of him picking up litter would trigger a 
prejudice, so that in a literal sense it went without saying that as 
a result of his visible low status he was likely to be the victim of 
children’s resentment at those of low status; that they would act 
as a cipher for the reality of society and its classificatory system 
and make him feel ashamed of himself for having to do this kind 
of work. Also implicitly understood between us was that unlike 
the anonymous scaffie in the city whom no-one knows or pays 
attention to, the scaffie in a small provincial locality is known 
because he or his wife and child lives there.
132 Not only occupations, of course, but localities too are ranked according to 
status, as evidenced when Muir (1935, p. 107), freshly arrived from the Orkney 
Isles into lowland industrial Scotland wrote: “The main problem which puzzled 
me at that time was how all these people could live in such places without feeling 
ashamed.”
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In eliciting the resentments of others, then, the scaffie is 
confronted by the scapegoat mechanism as analysed by Girard 
(1989) insofar as the lone scaffie cleaning the streets becomes 
a target for judgments, and draws out of young people their 
resentments and has heaped upon himself spoken or unspoken 
insults. When this behaviour occurs, the condition of symbolic 
domination that normally goes unseen and unheard and 
unrecognised is caught sight of, and a window is opened onto 
children’s internalization of the cultural system that is aligned 
with the occupational and class structure. Also, of course, the 
symbolic domination learned as a child comes back to haunt 
or tease the adult if we assume this man as a child was as likely to 
have hurled abuse at a scaffie as the children whom, as a man, he 
is put ‘at issue’ by, so that we might say the symbolic domination 
he suffered as a child is something he colludes in inflicting upon 
himself as a man.
Likewise, in the second incident concerning my coat, this 
‘material sign’ was a visible provocation that triggered a particular 
behaviour if I am correct in presuming the daily insults were 
drawn by my hand-me-down overcoat, and what becomes 
transparent is that the working class in general have strong 
resentments and its deprived class fraction can be aggressive and 
vicious among themselves and to others, and the reason for their 
aggression is their shame at their deprivation and poverty: if the 
poor despise the other person they see to be poor, this can only 
mean they despise and feel shame at the selves they are should 
social interaction hand them the objective reality of their poverty. 
If objectively I could truthfully say that in 1993 when I was 
earning £3.95 an hour from a temping agency, which meant a full-
time weekly wage of £138.25, I was not likely to spend money on 
an expensive overcoat to protect myself from the weather and the 
culture of resentment that visible signs of ‘poverty’ provoked in 
others, the heart of symbolic domination is revealed in the fact 
that, if my first reaction was incredulity and the wish to shout 
back at my tormentors: “Why are you shouting that? You are 
poor as well!,” the proof of my own symbolic domination was 
that I did not shout this because I did not want to name or commit 
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to words that which went without saying, and thereby reveal 
what was on my mind and what was on all of our minds: being 
ashamed of ourselves as a result of our poverty i.e. it is not 
poverty, then, but shame at poverty that silences and wounds 
or ‘imprisons.’
Similarly, then, in relation to the third incident with myself 
and Julia, in the two seconds it took her to ask me her question, 
Julia handed me my objectivity, and revealed to me my symbolic 
domination not because of what she said but because she silenced 
me because I was unable to offer any ‘resistance’ or credible 
answer in my own estimation to her question. In this brief social 
interaction a woman handed me my semantic poverty, my inability 
to esteem myself, and only incidentally handed me the true or 
objective or sociological interpretation of my weeks of fantasising 
about having a life with her. Julia’s unexpected question to me 
made me realise my ‘social worth,’ but not because of any kind of 
insight she had about me but because her question made me come 
out of my fantasy and face the fact that in my own estimation 
I had nothing to offer a woman, and that society’s voice in me 
was stronger than my own voice, so that I was lost for words. 
By putting my subjective thoughts and feelings for her into 
another context, and thereby allowing me to glimpse my objectivity 
thanks to a pretty girl who didn’t know me being fated to see me 
via my objectivity and not my subjectivity, in this social and 
de-privatised and dis-enchanted context, everything I had rehearsed 
for our first real encounter suddenly became foolishness in my 
own eyes. My internalisation of the dominant symbolic system 
explains how a girl who didn’t know me could put me ‘at issue,’ 
and this power over me came not from Julia but from my 
immersion into a classificatory system that was suddenly activated 
from its latent state, so that my objectivity trumped my subjectivity 
as it suddenly became my existential predicament.
Far more explanatory of my encounter with Julia than not 
having any ‘capital’ was not having the freedom (from this 
classificatory system) to even convince myself that the fact that 
I had nothing was not important. Accepting I couldn’t have value 
for her, rather than dismissing or resisting my ‘social’ or ‘objective’ 
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truth as of no or little importance as I tried to win this girl, is the 
evidence of my symbolic domination i.e. I myself was complicit in 
my own domination because not only did I not have material 
things to offer a girl – no shame there – but I was revealed to 
myself as not having the heart to articulate a non-material source 
of value that I might have had for a very pretty office girl. It was 
not Julia but myself that had put myself ‘in my place,’ and thanks 
to her question I realised to my shame and embarrassment that 
indeed I had nothing of value to offer her and was out of my depth 
and Julia was out of my league. 
In attending to these social interactions, ‘shame’ is the key to 
bringing into view the fact that in shame there is ‘sociological den-
sity’ because in each person’s secret history of shame the symbolic 
order is made real. However, talk of a symbolic order is an example 
of reification insofar as it is people who oppress themselves. Every 
man who plays the game of cherchez la femme is fated to play the 
social game of distinction and desire to have social status, so that 
among those of low prestige or status, it seems the issue of having 
‘psychological space’ or ‘psychological time’ that is publicly sanc-
tioned for them to esteem and value what they are is problematic, 
so that their ‘being working class’ will come under pressure to be 
reduced to the bare sociological minimum and their contextualised 
dasein will not be enjoyed, celebrated or cultivated. 
Insofar as such an individual is sensitive to the symbolic order, 
he faces the paradox that his dasein is unreal and unrecognised by 
himself because for this individual it is unrealistic to imagine he 
can be anything of public or symbolic value in his own eyes by 
being this being in public. This is because if shame is firstly 
something that is objectively imposed upon members of the lower 
orders of class-based societies, it is fated to take on a life of its 
own within psychological life, but not as shame per se but as 
having morphed into a kind of permanent vigilance against the 
‘risk of shame’ that fuels a more or less permanent resentment 
among those of low status,133 so that shame structures behaviour 
133 According to Bourdieu (1992, p. 209) “being constantly reminded of your 
otherness stimulates a sort of permanent sociological vigilance.”
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and a ‘scheme of perception’ to the extent that, for example, the 
sight of someone in a shabby overcoat spontaneously triggers 
the desire to shout: ‘Ya mink!’ It seems clear that in this particular 
instance, if this day-labourer were ever himself to wear a shabby 
item of clothing, and as a hired potato picker he clearly has, 
he has shown his hand to everyone within earshot that he 
himself has a history of expressing this same insult at himself, 
and has revealed himself as someone who has had to actively 
repress making this judgment about himself, and is revealed as 
someone whom we can safely say habitually suspects others are 
either making this judgment about himself or are repressing this 
judgment about him.
This kind of ‘perpetual observance’ or standing guard over the 
possibility of shame and the repressions involved becomes 
transformed within some individuals into what might be called 
a standing ressentiment which, as always, will have an initial 
and ongoing objective basis but will have taken on a life of its 
own, so that in any contextual analysis of the life of the psyche 
in class-based societies, a sensitivity to repression is needed as 
it is promiscuous within individuals’ relationship to self and 
intersubjective interaction, and use of language and discourse in 
particular. In this regard, language is the cipher of choice of real 
or imagined resentments and hatreds that evidences the condition 
of being symbolically dominated, and those who are the victims 
of symbolic violence stand guard against any real or imagined 
aggressor and are ‘armed and ready’ to reproduce the very 
hierarchy or dominant understandings of status by invoking it 
against themselves – whether their clothes, country or their 
‘provincial’ use of language, such as when they opine, “The Fife 
accent is horrible.”
Those who lack symbolic resources reproduce the dominant 
reading of their language and they fail to suspect they have 
become ‘mouthpieces’ for their own domination, or exercise 
symbolic violence over themselves and are their own oppressors. 
In this regard, I recall the daughter of a former miner after 
reviewing a transcription of the interview I had done with her late 
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father telephoning me to talk about the interview, and having 
difficulty in bringing herself to say she had concerns about the 
interview; and when asked what her concerns were, being very 
reluctant to tell me, and at my suggestion to break an awkward 
silence that perhaps there was too much swearing in the text and 
that she wanted me to cut the more ‘colourful’ language her father 
used to express himself, she had said this was not the problem. 
Having then asked if she was concerned about confidentiality, to 
which she said no, she eventually and ‘shamefacedly’ said: “Well, 
it’s mair the language.” 
The problem, then, was that the interview transcript had not 
been translated into English, and she was embarrassed at reading 
her father’s words in Scots and needed reassurance on this point. 
Asking her if she wanted me to translate the interview into English 
she replied, “Ah dinnae ken what Ah want.” In the end I assured 
her by advising the long interview with her father, some seventeen 
pages of single spaced text, would never be published in its 
entirety, and that at most one or two short paragraphs might be 
used at a much later date and in a context with other extracts in 
Scots from a range of people other than her father, and that not 
translating Scots into ‘proper English’ was standard practice 
among academics.
This anecdote evidences that language is drawn into the 
hierarchical social structure, and that language is a potential 
source of embarrassment and shame if used ‘in public’ or outside 
of one’s village or with strangers from another social class, as it 
risks bringing shame upon the speaker and his or her people, and 
not simply on a particular occasion but in any similar ‘out of 
place’ context a person’s manner of speaking is liable to put them 
to shame. In this regard Bourdieu (in Jenkins 1992, p. 154) writes:
Linguistic relations are always relations of power and, 
consequently, cannot be elucidated within the compass of 
linguistic analysis alone. Even the simplest linguistic exchange 
brings into play a complex and ramifying web of historical 
power relations between the speaker…and an audience.
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The relations that exist between language and power are also 
configured by history, and so as not to fall into the “occasionalist 
fallacy” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 144n) where we 
explain a social practice such as ‘being ashamed of one’s language’ 
as an idiosyncratic folly, the process of the delegitimation and 
‘inferiorisation’ of the Scots language has been ongoing for 
centuries. In the Old Statistical Account of Scotland of 1790 
(cited in Houston 1924, p. 412) we find the minister at 
Auchterderran reporting:
Question 39. Is your accent particularly offensive to the ear 
of strangers, or are they pleased with it or easily reconciled 
to it?
Answer: They complain of its being drawling, and that  
it impresses them with a belief that the person speaking is 
sour and ill-tempered.
The consequences for language as a result of political union 
with England in 1707 included a more or less coerced cultural 
and linguistic union with England with the result that, while the 
Scottish middle classes have long become comfortable using 
English, the working-class Scots vernacular routinely becomes 
a source of awkwardness, social embarrassment and shame when 
used outwith the domestic or local context, so that a contextual 
analysis of language as a social practice evidences the relations 
between political and culture power, as well as the alliance 
between political and cultural empowerment/disempowerment. 
If Chapter 5 argued for an emergent class, nation and culture 
alignment, this regaining of integral sovereignty thanks to political 
and constitutional progress also implies the ending of the symbolic 
domination that results in a cultural inferiority that passes into 
good provincial common sense. I recall in this regard an East of 
Scotland Water operative opining, “The Fife accent is horrible” 
and the same opinion emerging while talking with two locals 
about a television adaptation of one of Ian Rankin’s novels. 
Having asked whether they thought the programme was unrealistic 
because the language used was English, their reply was that it had 
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to be in English because the Fife accent was “horrible.” Likewise, 
when watching the television adaptation debut of Rankin’s crime 
novels my wife had complained, “Why are they talking like 
that? Rebus is from Cardenden but nobody in Cardenden talks 
like that!”
This comment highlighted for me that only a foreigner 
whose structures of perception have not become assimilated to 
domination is able to ask such a question without being suspected 
of being disingenuous or acting in bad faith as, just like the 
English schoolboy shaming a Scottish pensioner, so the language 
question reveals the extent of the Scots’ acceptance of the situation 
where the different classes and their different cultures are not 
allowed to exist in Scottish television programming, and class and 
cultural realities have been cleansed from Scottish television 
programming for so long that only foreigners can sincerely find 
this cultural subordination very strange. Another mundane 
instance of how the Scots language has no status or prestige 
among its speakers came when chatting with a group of mums 
waiting for their children to come out of school and, when the 
subject of conversation turned to the school nativity play which 
that particular year (2010) had been performed by the children 
in Scots, one mother-of-four was emphatic in her opinion that to 
tell this sacred narrative in Scots was: “So vulgar! Embarrassing.” 
On this stigmatisation of the Scots language the renowned writer 
James Kelman (1992, p. 112) has observed:
Language is the culture—if you lose your language you’ve 
lost your culture, so if you’ve lost the way your family talk, 
the way your friends talk, then you’ve lost your culture, and 
you’re divorced from it. That’s what happens with all these 
stupid f***ing books by bad average writers because they’ve 
lost their culture, they’ve given it away. Not only that, what 
they’re saying is it’s inferior, because they make anybody 
who comes from that culture speak in a hybrid language, 
whereas they speak standard English. And their language  
is the superior one. So what they are doing, in effect, is 
castrating their parents, and their whole culture.
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Similarly, the writer MacColla (1933, cited in Macdonald 2009, 
p. 88) had long ago come to the same conclusion of Kelman on 
the centrality of the language issue in Scotland:
Language is the very crux of the whole matter. It is idle and 
windy nonsense to deny the fact, and indeed it is everywhere 
implied in the invariable and undisguised haste which the 
conqueror shows the conquered. And in the (sometimes 
desperate) attempts made by the conquered to retain  
the native tongue. There you have a tacit admission of the 
importance of language to peoples – having it they can never 
be destroyed, and if conquered they will rise again; losing it, 
they disappear.
In the opinion of Kelman and MacColla and many other 
‘producers of culture,’ so long has been my informants’ immersion 
into their specifically cultural form of subordination, that they 
do not read their evaluations of their regional voices as evidence 
of cultural domination but as simply recognising the way things 
are. More generally, it also seems a safe bet that if their language 
is unable to be valued as a source of status then their provincial 
Fife regional identity, much as the Scots vernacular they speak, 
will similarly be unable to act as a source or means of cultural or 
political conscientisation, so that the mobilisation of this sub-
national identity to restore its cultural and historical heritage after 
a long history of neglect will remain an unimagined project, so 
that imagining the project of a national Scottish modernity, for 
example, will not be mediated via this provincial identity. It is 
unsurprising, then, that none of the presenters on the radio station 
Kingdom FM, which consciously defines itself as Fife’s only 
dedicated regional radio station, speak in Scots, far less in a 
working-class accent, so that there is no programming recognition 
whatsoever of the Scots language spoken by its audience of 
listeners. Given the institutionalisation of such ‘cultural shame,’ 
the SNP Scottish government has begun to encourage Scots within 
schools, a policy which is praiseworthy but suffers from the 
familiar middle-class prejudice expressed by Geertz (1993, p. 243) 
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when he characterised many languages as fated to disappear due 
to being “psychologically immediate but socially isolating.”134
An alleged ‘social suicide’ as a result of only being able to speak 
a provincial dialect when in modern urban centres, of course, is 
not a great concern in the localities and workplaces of East of 
Scotland Water workers where speaking Scots is simultaneously a 
marker of authenticity, belonging and intimacy when ‘at home’ in 
the provinces, but is also outwith this couthie setting potentially 
stigmatising. In Adam Smith’s ‘society of strangers’ or the 
‘bourgeois society’ of formal market relations, hierarchies and 
bureaucratic officialdom, the power of context means a medium 
of expression that is enjoyed and mediates intimacy becomes 
potentially shameful and embarrassing, so that it is because “the 
unequal distribution of linguistic capital…is an aspect of the class 
system, as mediated by formal education” (Bourdieu, in Jenkins 
1992, p. 154) that Scotland’s anglicised middle classes, who have 
managed Scottish education for generations, have driven the Scots 
language out of many generations of Scottish children, as they 
understand that it is thanks to gaining control of language that 
allows classes (and nations) to neglect the languages of rival 
classes (and nations), and thereby exercise symbolic or cultural 
hegemony within the very ‘hinterland’ or the ownmost dasein of 
the dominated. The privileges of power then mean the ability to 
either save a language or condemn it to marginality and cultural 
invisibility, and it is the exercise of political power that enables the 
dominant to ‘capture culture’ and the public realm and impose 
their language as the lingua franca of the nation and state.
If we keep in mind the views of MacColla and Kelman 
expressed earlier and add Mead’s observation that “a person 
134 The Spanish and Basque writer Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936) confidently 
argued in a speech in 1901 that it was scientifically demonstrable that the Basque 
language was unsuited to modernity, while Irish and Scots Gaelic speakers were 
similarly once openly viewed by Enlightenment intellectuals and the likes of John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) as unfit for modernity, 
despite Gaelic being one of the linguistic mediums through which David 
I modernised Scotland. 
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learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new soul…He 
becomes in that sense a new individual” (1934, p. 283), this 
implies that the ability to take away or make a people unlearn its 
native tongue is also the ability to take their ‘soul’ from them, 
insofar as language as a social practice seems able to bear the full 
weight of a person’s social consecration or their social dis-grace, 
insofar as the command of the right kind of language stands in 
a direct relationship to the person being able to instantiate the 
‘right’ kind of trajectory through social space over the course of 
his or her life-course. When Rankin (2001) attributes the following 
words to a (Scottish) writer, “My language – I didn’t lose that so 
much as wipe it off my shoe,” it seems plausible to consider the 
proposition that the person who rejects their language also rejects 
their means of authentic individuation, because this act of 
rejection signals they are ashamed to embrace and enjoy their 
language as their ownmost means of freedom and thought, so 
that this act reproduces their domination and secures the 
next generation’s cultural subordination insofar as a ‘shameful’ 
relationship to their language is passed on to the next generation. 
Something else that will follow is that this ‘language shame’ 
means such a people will be unfree to develop an interest in their 
‘shameful’ class culture or even their national culture, as much of 
Scotland’s literature was written in Scots at a time when this 
shame was unknown and when Scottish people had a free 
relationship to their language. In terms of how the symbolic, 
intellectual and cultural levels are lived and experienced by the 
working class, then, we can say that thanks to the hegemony of 
unionist cultural modernists, the realms of experience of language 
and culture are not rich mediums of imagined community and 
individuation and sociation among the dominated, and so this 
‘cultural void’ is more or less fated to be interpolated by power, 
resulting in an individualised/privatised and de-nationalised 
consumerist relationship to culture where the offerings of global 
profit-organisations are consumed.
If a truly modern and truly Scottish culture is to develop after 
independence, then, a range of tasks must emerge to provide 
ballast and resistance against modernism and globalism, and it 
573
s e l f - a c t u a l i s at i o n  &  t h e  p s y c h e
is at the level of long-delayed cultural tasks where the ‘tasks of 
freedom’ must flourish if a Scottish modernity is to flourish 
precisely because of its long history of being so heavily policed 
and populated by a modernist imaginary. This cultural realm has 
to be re-made in the image of each class and, for the working 
class, can only happen if it stands upon a new relation to the 
realm of language if a free Scottish modernity is to happen, with 
the working class in particular needing to develop their own 
relationship to the realm of meaning and representation because 
this is the realm where their symbolic domination is most 
unsuspected and pernicious, as historically the realm of culture 
has been surrounded by the ideology of ars gratia artis. 
For the vast majority, of course, such a development will not 
occur as a personal achievement precisely because of this 
relationship to their own language and routinely occupying low-
status positions, which means many individuals’ self-assuredness 
disappears if their expertise in practicality is left behind and an 
occasion arises where they must take their chances in the realm of 
meaning. I know of men, for example, who are intimidated by 
having to complete bureaucratic forms, so that such men have yet 
to enter language and the imaginary upon their own terms, and so 
are fated to never know their way around this reality or medium, 
as if caught in a perennial fear of ‘castration’ via language, or fear 
of losing their integral sense of self and so remain fixed in an 
infantile ‘wholeness’ that refuses to suffer the ‘loss of self’ by 
entering the realm of language and abstraction.
A dasein characterised by integral subordination where the 
cultural, economic, political and social fields are all in alignment 
so as to ensure the acceptance of the status quo, means that 
linguistic subordination is a ‘blood relative’ of the conviction 
found on doorsteps of Scotland’s economic deficiencies, and is 
isomorphic with an acceptance of constitutional subordination 
and what one might describe as an integral inferiority. Because 
“the psychological self does not reside in a tranquil universe of 
meanings but in a set of conflicts and battles” (Porter 1997, 
p. 240), the worker who does not objectify himself or register the 
objectifying gaze of others is unlikely to reach self-knowledge 
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because self-appropriation is about attending to the data of 
oneself and re-presenting one’s life and paying attention to the 
dialectic or the ‘to and fro’ of occurrences of symbolic violence 
and occurrences of ‘symbolic consecration’ and re-presenting 
these realities to consciousness. Such is the bread and butter of the 
worker-enquirer’s journey towards self-appropriation. 
What the worker-inquirer learns through sifting the data of his 
experience is that how he feels about himself is a radically 
decentred piece of ‘social ontology’ that is ‘bought and sold,’ or is 
at the mercy of his social interaction. The worker-inquirer comes 
to see that he is not in charge of how he is perceived by others, nor 
is he in charge of how he perceives and feels about himself, as 
this too is more or less at the mercy of social determination. 
At this point the worker-inquirer either submits to amor fati or 
looks to muster the resources he has to transcend his fate. In all of 
this, however, the intellectual life is a unique and special place 
where the ability to both accept the reality and force of ‘social 
determinism,’ but also transcend this determination occurs 
because, thanks to his intellectual life, the worker-inquirer’s social 
determination is no longer blind, no longer occurs behind his back 
or beyond his consciousness, so that in his behaviours the worker-
inquirer can withdraw his consent and can choose not to be a 
cipher for his social relations and can choose to take his first steps 
in autonomy.
In practical life of course the simultaneous acceptance/rejection 
of society’s power is accomplished every day in people’s lives, 
so that if a dialectical relationship of ‘transcendence-within-
internalisation’ of social determinism within people’s inner 
psychological life is rather normal, what is special about the 
project of self-appropriation is that, the further the worker-
inquirer commits to self-appropriation, the more the thrill of the 
intellectual chase becomes a causal force in his life, so that shame 
behaviours facilitate discovering with Samuel Beckett that failure 
is always more interesting (to the inquirer). This counter-reading 
of self and counter-reading of shame and failure are the fruits of 
the worker-inquirer’s intellectual life, which takes on more 
psychological reality the more the worker-inquirer is able to 
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“call into question how [he has] been brought into being” 
(Parker 2011, pp. 140-1), so that the worker-inquirer becomes 
psychologically strong enough and free enough to contemplate 
his social determination, and accept the truth that “the individual, 
before it can determine itself, is determined by the relations in 
which it is enmeshed” (Adorno, cited in Jacoby 1997, p. 34) and 
see in his own life the truth of Hayek’s (2011, p. 163) remark that, 
“Man has not developed in freedom” as truths to be accepted as 
part of the chase of self-appropriation.
A paradox of the intellectual life, then, is that while the practice 
of introspection and contemplating how radically he is caught and 
immersed in his social determination, and seems fated to never be 
free of it, this coming to explicit awareness of the fact of his social 
determination frees him to pose the question of his freedom; frees 
him to ask himself whether his social determination might some 
day not exhaust the self he is; whether one day his behaviours and 
thoughts and emotions might include more than what his social 
position determines they shall be. The point, then, is that even 
if only as a matter of ‘pure reason’ or ‘pure desire,’ by simply 
asking these questions the intellectual life begins to deconstruct his 
conditioned consciousness, already begins his secession from his 
conditioning and stops dead in its tracks his long history of having 
freely and unsuspectingly collaborated in his social determination. 
At this point, instead of absolutely identifying with the self one is, 
one can look upon the self as a mask, see oneself as taking on 
social roles instead of being “Scottish through and through,” and 
sees the sense in the notion of being a ‘social actor’ engaging in 
‘strategies,’ and this is a significant victory, as one can imaginatively 
secede from being a cipher for the social structures one occupies 
insofar as the worker-inquirer can for the first time choose to 
accept or reject his social determination or his ‘roles,’ as he opens 
onto the drama of his freedom.
The freedom to turn to the data of oneself is difficult to achieve 
when the data in question is not only of no apparent value but 
is psychologically ‘painful’ to attend to, because our attention is 
caught in a social determinism which, to escape from, requires a 
paradoxical shameless relation to one’s shame i.e. requires 
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practicing a break with one’s normal relation to oneself and 
practicing a break with one’s being-for-others in one’s intellectual 
life and behaviour. Practicing this ‘shameless thinking’ by being 
prepared to overcome one’s ‘decency’ and not look away from 
oneself and others who are ashamed of themselves is of course 
a delicate affair, and not to be confused with advocating the 
absurd idea that shame is intrinsically a bad thing. As the 
following testimony recounting the price paid by miners who 
returned to work before the 1984-1985 strike ended shows, 
shame is a powerful weapon in the maintenance of social order:
When ye look at them, ye ken exactly what they’re thinkin. 
As much as tae say well, eh, are we gaun tae get them noo 
or dae we wait. An’ ye see their wee minds workin.’ Ah 
mean we wernae harmin’ the boy bit ye seen it. An’ this wis 
efter the strike. So Ah mean they kent within theirsel. As one 
e the boys said ‘We’ll never forget.’ Tae watch [Name] gaun 
aboot the village noo, tae watch [Name] gaun aboot the 
village noo, tae see [Name] gaun aboot the village noo. They 
ken within theirsels, everybody’s watchin’ them. An’ it’s a 
case e ‘Dae Ah gane here, dae Ah go there? Och Ah’ll jist 
burrel back an’ away back hame.’ Their personality his 
totally changed fir the sake e three weeks’ work. Ye’d need 
tae be totally oot yir heid tae get a convoy oot tae yer work 
an’ a convoy back fae yer work.
It is because “social repression operates more commonly through 
the threat rather than the commission of violence [and]…is 
therefore mediated by the psychic domain of meaning” (Goodchild 
1996, p. 90) that an analysis of ‘shame’ is the necessary ballast to 
tackling the question of working out what a free relation to the 
condition of domination involves. If I criticise the superficiality 
of the modernist nationalist’s vision of the post-independent 
future as a result of his ‘dissolution of history,’ there is a similar 
need to resist the fantasy of a psyche that is free of shame or that 
has an ‘immaculate’ psyche vis-à-vis social and cultural conditions. 
If the power of the social and the reality of domination per 
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se cannot be overcome, what can be overcome is a dominated 
relation to the condition of being dominated, and this is 
a tremendous achievement of freedom because a dominated 
(or ashamed) relationship to the condition of being dominated 
(or ashamed) is an integral aspect of the condition of being 
dominated, so that it follows that integral to overcoming the 
condition of being dominated is overcoming this dominated 
relationship to one’s domination. Something of this paradox is 
captured by Durkheim’s (2010, p. 727) insight that “the individual 
submits to society and this submission is the condition of his 
liberation” i.e. the reality of ‘being free’ only comes via recognising 
one’s prior unfreedom. Likewise, when Todorov (1999, p. 62) 
asked, “Did the Spaniards defeat the Indians by means of signs?”, 
it is because the answer is yes that the previous chapter talked 
of the need for the worker-inquirer to perform a specifically 
cognitional operation before he could gain his freedom in the 
realm of signs.
7.2 Victory in the Land of Signs & Freedom  
from Objectivity
 Man’s subjection to the symbolic gives benefits 
aplenty in compensation for this subjection.
Parker 2011, p. 140.
The liberating act of self-understanding or ‘cognitional agency’ 
outlined in the previous chapter gave little attention to the notion 
of healing or ‘trauma,’ and spoke instead of the worker-inquirer 
arriving to the adequate intellectualisation of the data of his 
behaviours and emotions, and identified a dialectic or a lived 
pattern of security/insecurity that was a constitutive part of the 
worker-inquirer’s psychological history, and catching sight of this 
intentional and behavioural pattern enabled this history to exist as 
a res cogitans in the life of mind, making it thereby permanently 
available to awareness and free from its plodding serial or episodic 
or iterative real empirical existence. Also, thanks to cognitional 
structure and the act of judgment, freedom itself becomes a res 
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cogitans i.e. free of its empirical episodic existence and, finally, 
by understanding himself, the world insofar as it is in him also 
becomes a res cogitans, and the worker-inquirer sets the world 
free of its episodic seriality. When freedom becomes a matter 
of thinking because one has resolved a lifetime of ignorance, 
insecurity and pursuit thanks to an act of self-understanding, 
what becomes a permanent possession and a permanently 
available possession is not just the ability to know what the social 
determinism of his unfreedom looks like when such occasions 
arise, but the power to anticipate these situations and, when they 
occur, to comport himself differently. While it is certain that 
society and social situations and the realm of social-interaction 
will retain their class-character, the worker-inquirer-knower 
suffers or endures or contests or changes rather than practices 
‘symbolic violence’ upon himself.
For an adequate translation of contextual dasein into explicit 
self-awareness to occur, the conscious ego has to come to recognise 
and liberate into the light of consciousness that which heretofore 
only existed pre-consciously, and in Freud’s understanding of 
therapy where “the work of culture and psychoanalysis is that the 
domain of the ego be enlarged” (Parker 2011, p. 96), so that 
the ‘therapeutic moment’ means having patterned areas available 
to the ego of the worker-inquirer-knower so that he can read 
these patterns for himself and from the standpoint of himself, so 
that his working-class identity can roam freely within his psyche. 
The goal of self-appropriation, then, is not to get the worker-
inquirer out of the comfortable immediacy of his id, but to get the 
prevalence of this comfortable immediacy into the full awareness 
of his ego. We can say then that just as in the life configured to the 
reductio via manual labour a template is laid down in this social 
practice which ‘in-forms’ other relationships and intentional and 
conscious life, so in light of the act of self-understanding there is 
a similarly promiscuous in-forming of all manner of relations with 
freedom, and that thereby become part of an integral freedom. 
As per Hegel’s statement “Wessen ist was gewesen ist. Essence is 
what has been” (in Sartre 1966, p. 72) and its psychologisation in 
Freud’s dictum “Where Id was, Ego shall come to be (Wo Es War, 
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soll Ich warden)” (in Castoriadis 1987, p. 102), freedom and 
power become available to the worker-inquirer-knower, and this 
freedom and power re-structures the psyche.
Just as ‘the nation’ is routinely a site of projection and 
transference or a ‘fantasy object’ that allows the self to be itself ‘all 
over again’ in an externalised object, so the same can be said of the 
self brought about by labouring insofar as the reductio in-forms 
other relationships and is given new life and new objects to make 
into its image, so that it fuels a politics of identity that sees and 
reproduces likenesses of itself ad libitum: in the nation, the football 
game or the desired woman etcetera, because each practice or 
fantasy allows the symbolic/psychological replication of the 
reduced self, and because these objects allow him to be himself in 
a thousand different objects and guises and instances. If we add 
this analysis of the worker-knower’s psyche to Aristotle’s argument 
in De Anima that the intellect can receive the ‘form’ of all things 
and so becomes intellectually united or ‘as one’ with all intelligible 
things, so we can say the aspect of dasein that escapes social 
determination is the intellectual life, and so it becomes a special 
area of freedom and will surrounded by social determinism. 
Until the worker-inquirer reaches this level of cognitional life, 
he is not securely set upon the road of self-appropriation as he has 
not yet reached the stage where the formally dynamic nature of the 
structure of cognition i.e. a natural structure that puts itself 
together, is his own personal experience and habit. While the reign 
of ‘immediacy’ upon finding its conceptualisation is overthrown at 
least in its reign over the life of the mind and imagination, this 
overthrow is only available as an intellectual development as it 
is never overthrown or transcended as a structuration of self, so 
that the space where freedom operates is the tension between 
immediatism and ‘the understood’ that was not there previously.
In The Imaginary Institution of Society (1987) Castoriadis 
makes use of the Lacanian thesis that the unconscious is the 
discourse of the Other within psychic life, so we may say it is in the 
worker’s psyche that the work of social domination is effected and 
victory for the worker-inquirer in the ‘land of signs’ means: “my 
discourse must take the place of the discourse of the Other, of a 
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foreign discourse that is in me, ruling over me: speaking through 
myself’’ (Castoriadis 1987, p. 102). However, for Castoriadis, this 
autonomy refers “not to an attained state but to an active situation; 
not to an ideal person who has become a pure Ego once and for 
all…How little it is a question in all of this of a power grab by 
consciousness’’ (1987, p. 104). In light of the previous chapter, 
however, where I gave an account of the purely natural apotheosis 
of contextual dasein, I argue that the reductio as the past made 
present via the body, insofar as it becomes the subject of a project 
of intellectual appropriation, the ‘impossible’ Sartrean task of the 
In-itself being made For-itself is no longer impossible, and a 
commitment to cognition involves a fundamental rejection of this 
prognosis of Castoriadis who in his discussion of the relation 
between the insights of Freud and Marx refused to conceive 
autonomy involving the purely natural apotheosis of the worker i.e. 
precisely that which happens via insight into the reductio.
The Lacanian thesis of Castoriadis is that in the unconscious 
lies the discourse of parents, society and history etcetera, while my 
experience is that to the extent it is brought to the light of 
consciousness via insight, Ego takes the place of Id and the subject 
is free not of his reality but free to consciously be and freely 
contest or reject his ‘programmed’ self should he so chose. 
Importantly, the person is now free to be the Tradition as in him 
the Tradition is now a free autonomous project in a member of a 
new generation. Castoriadis’s a priori defeatism on this point is 
presumably directly related to his failure to give an account of 
situated dasein’s natural perfection or ‘being in act,’ so that 
Castoriadis failed to escape the prison of ‘pure reason’ and did not 
succeeded in the practical or performative task of exercising 
cognitional agency. What is required is the performance of self-
appropriation before speculating upon the nature of autonomy 
and what autonomy is from a psychological viewpoint. I argue 
psychological liberation must be enjoyed and must satisfy the 
psyche, and must involve a ‘power-grab’ by consciousness so that 
when Castoriadis denies the possibility of the event of dasein 
becoming ‘fully in act,’ this is precisely what is possible in the land 
of signs (but without suggesting a human intellect can be ‘in act’ 
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in relation to everything about the person’s biography, far less can 
be ‘in act’ regarding the entire universe of intelligible being).
Long before the concept of the reductio and the judgment and 
knowledge and liberation that it makes possible becomes an 
existential event in the worker-inquirer-knower, the reduced body 
and psyche are already sources of freedom. The labourer is 
justified via the knowledge that he has worked hard, and that 
knowledge is in his bones and body, and is a source of freedom 
inter alia because a life lived ‘outside the text’ is a form of 
protection from the symbolic as the self ‘outside the text’ is not at 
the mercy of mind, and so the embodied self acts as a guide when 
the mind has no idea what to do, so that the worker’s body is the 
intellect’s first and last ally in the dynamic search for happiness 
and truth. The sui generic justifications of the body and psyche 
being reduced is an experience of decentering, of selfhood free of 
concern for the opinion of any other – including the self enthralled 
to abstraction and the public realm of meaning. 
Because it is the body or our incarnate self that decides which 
realities are really true and which truths are merely abstract or 
objective, the body is the most trusted of mediums of the real, and 
is a more trusted indicator of what we are than the thoughts that 
run through our head. The body, then, is a sui generic source of 
the reality of the dialectic of ‘inferiority/superiority’ or justification/
alienation, and all along has been witness to the worker’s history 
and his many episodes of freedom/unfreedom and has all along 
taught him he can not be unfree or autonomous without his body 
registering his being unfree or autonomous, because the body is 
what tells him if ‘freedom’ is not real before he begins to use this 
condition as a departure point for a project of self-appropriation.
Along with being justified or being ‘at issue,’ the condition of 
‘not knowing’ is a psychological state that registers in the psyche 
because the desire to know, precisely because it is a desire and a 
matter of eros, means the person who does not know or does not 
yet understand is frustrated, because his desire is not satisfied and 
he has to live with this cognitional and psychological tension. This 
tension or frustration of ‘not knowing’ has its reality through 
time, has its own historicity or weight that builds over time and 
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registers in the person’s psycho-somatic awareness. In the land of 
signs, then, every player needs their own theory of the contextual 
self to be ‘at home,’ because every other player in the land of signs 
has a ‘theory’ of the contextual self that they more or less seek to 
impose on others. This is why the insight of the last chapter is 
important as it means the worker-inquire-knower catches up with 
himself intellectually, and the freedom of becoming coeval with 
one’s history and ‘authoring’ oneself is sourced in using the 
reductio as the form or idea of the condition and the history of the 
condition of being symbolically dominated, and grasping this 
condition as the condition of knowing himself and his history – a 
kind of cognitional independence day.
Also, this insight has the power to free the worker-inquirer’s 
being-for-others because, if the insight described in the previous 
chapter is the conditione sine qua non for the worker-inquirer 
understanding himself, then it is also the conditione sine qua non 
for others knowing him i.e. others, in order to know him, must 
similarly understand what he has understood. Insofar as this is 
something interlocutors in the land of signs are unable to do, they 
are delegitimised and divested of the power to interpolate or know 
the worker’s dasein and its purely natural apotheosis, and so the 
worker-inquirer-knower knows he is free of the other players in 
the symbolic order because what it is that makes him free is that 
which they can never suspect, far less come to know and use to 
wield symbolic power over the worker-inquirer-knower. Insofar as 
objective structures of perception “are only objective inasmuch as 
they are perceived as such by actors and significant others” 
(Jenkins 1982, p. 272), in this act of understanding a new player 
in the scramble for pronouncing upon the proper classification of 
social reality emerges and the struggle over ‘objectivity’ and 
‘reality’ is renewed, thanks to the addition of a new player in 
whom the ‘bourgeois edifice’ collapses, and this power is a real 
power grab by consciousness by any standards.
7.3 Integral Dasein: the Realm of Meaning
At the moment of completing the structure of cognition, then, 
a revolution occurs within the worker-inquirer-knower as the 
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intellectual order becomes a space where he enjoys a non-
dominated or free relation to the realm of meaning. Thanks to 
his act of self-understanding, the worker-inquirer-knower’s 
relationship to the internalised realm of meaning and the 
objective symbolic order is re-founded and brings into being a 
deliberative and open-eyed freedom in relation to its being-for-
itself and its being-for-others and its many relations to the 
objective public realm. This reality which merits the word 
‘revolution’ is the change where that which was a source of risk, 
regret or disadvantage and shame to the extent that even 
recognising it, far less thinking upon its basis was resisted, 
becomes one’s anchorage, identity and ballast not only in the 
realm of meaning but, as the final chapter describes, the advent of 
the supernatural realm and the appropriation of the Christian 
tradition, as the long-held desire to understand and the long-term 
investment in the hope for a successful conclusion is brought 
to fulfilment.
In her sociological study of emotion, Lutz (1988, p. 3) rejects 
the idea “that emotion is in essence a psychobiological structure 
and an aspect of the individual...[while] the role of culture in the 
experience of emotion is seen as secondary, even minimal.” Lutz’s 
understanding of the relationship between affectivity and social 
structuration helps explain the tremendous catharsis effected by 
intellectual insight into the self; that the measure of psychological 
liberation is the measure of the intellectualisation of the amount 
of ‘violent’ or wilful or incompetent or humiliating readings that 
are sedimented in dasein and internalised as shame or anxiety, and 
that are uncovered by introspection and then brought to the cusp 
of judgment and finally ‘relieved’ of their intelligibility. The depth 
of healing of the psyche is the result of the fact that, insofar as 
any particular behaviour or situation of ‘justification’ versus being 
‘at risk’ is a structural replica of many prior and future occasions, 
to free one particular occasion is to free every other occasion 
and the range of this freedom is extended retrospectively to 
the past and prospectively to the future. While liberation is the 
liberation of relationships and the sublation of relationships 
configured by the reductio ad sensum and reductio ad humanum 
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modalities, it is also a conquest in the realm of meaning that owes 
nothing to the dominant’s discourse or wisdom.
The reality of a specifically psychological liberation that 
accompanies the specifically cognitional act discussed in Chapter 
6, then, presupposes the affective life of members of class-divided 
societies is constituted as much by symbolic as material realities; 
that the class structure exists not only ‘on paper’ but in bodies 
(Wilkinson 2000), and is deeply structuring of psychological 
life and the constitution of emotions so that class is deeply felt 
and phenomenologically lived (Charlesworth et al. 2004). The 
psyche, then, intensely participates in the structuring effect of 
‘not knowing’ or not yet being in possession of the truth, as 
well as intensely participates in and is structured by being in 
possession of the truth of itself. If the worker-inquirer lives 
the “alienation of the subject under the rule of the signifier” 
(Parker 2011, p. 151), then the worker-inquirer-knower knows 
the end of all ‘contemplative’ psychologies and the repatriation 
of sovereignty.
That there is a specifically psychological liberation is 
unsurprising given the recognition of what Bourdieu terms the 
homology between social and mental structures and, more 
generally, the ‘clinical’ value of this sociologically-informed 
therapy has long been recognised by sociologists and social 
psychologists. When asked whether his choice of sociology over 
philosophy or psychoanalysis was because sociology was a more 
powerful tool in the project of self-appropriation, Bourdieu 
replied that “given what I was socially…sociology was the best 
thing for me to do…I believe that I succeeded in my work: 
I effected a sort of self-therapy” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
p. 211). And when sociology “gets down to the nitty gritty of real 
life… it is an instrument that people can apply to themselves for 
quasi-clinical purposes” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 198). 
The reason a sociologically-informed act of self-appropriation has 
‘clinical results’ is because, prior to the act of judgment, we might 
say that the subjective demands of intellectual integrity form a 
kind of unholy alliance with the objective symbolic domination 
exercised by more dominant classes insofar as the being-for-others 
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of the cognitional subject lacking self-knowledge more or less 
collaborates with and makes himself more vulnerable to symbolic 
readings of himself that are not grounded upon the data of fully 
contextualised and socialised dasein. The act of self-understanding, 
then, not only fulfils cognitional structure but conquers the 
‘objective’ realm insofar as it has entered subjectivity in the form 
of socially dominant readings of working-class dasein. 
Because the worker-inquirer-knower instantiates a history of 
being a particular self, a particularly constructed historicity is 
integral to his secondary nature, and a deeply illuminating and 
freeing judgment of this historicity is possible, and a liberation of 
the historicity of the psyche and behaviour is also possible. This 
means the worker-inquirer-knower is free to use formerly despised 
cultural materials (language, history, provinciality etcetera) as his 
departure point and criteria for the realm of culture generally and 
his free participation in these realms of creativity as himself. From 
the position of his development, then, a ‘politics of culture’ and a 
programme of cultural renewal upon this new basis is possible, 
and has as an historical ally in this endeavour a previous era of 
cultural production in Scotland where a holistic conception of 
Scottish dasein and use of the Scots language was free of any sense 
of inferiority. Also, in terms of reading and critiquing contemporary 
Scottish culture upon the basis of this development, the worker-
inquirer-knower is able to recognise those ‘producers of culture’ 
who are not painting Scottish dasein with a full palette of colour 
and are still producing ‘scarcity era’ representations, as well as 
being able to recognise those ‘producers of culture’ operating from 
a more holistic understanding of dasein.
Upon the basis of a contextual performance of individuation, 
then, the internalisation of cultural inferiority is no longer simply 
lived or behaviourally repeated in an iterative sense but exposed 
to explicit self-awareness, where it can be explicitly rejected as a 
result of being placed at the disposal of a freedom that is in 
control and possession of itself. In this act of what might be 
termed ‘cultural agency,’ culture in a purely virtual or imaginary 
sense is liberated from its class-based and geo-politically-based 
subordinations in which it is actually immersed, and insofar as 
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a specific cultural subjugation is understood, there is a liberation 
of awareness of what is at stake in the cultural realm, and a 
liberating recognition of what has for so long been repressed and 
has gone unrecognised at the cultural level, and not only in 
relation to the past but in relation to the future, the freedom that 
comes from self-understanding is conditioned by its cultural 
context and there emerges the ‘tasks of freedom’ to re-make the 
Scottish cultural realm from within the horizon of this freshly-
acquired freedom that is immediately put at the disposal of 
intentionality, and which immediately enjoys a new and vital 
orientation and relation to culture and the ‘realm of meaning’ as 
it catches up with the analysis of Beveridge and Turnbull (1989) 
who identified the eclipsing and repressing of Scottish culture.
Thanks to achieving self-appropriation, then, a series of tasks 
are unlocked because this achievement is not the personal or 
private possession of an individual or the private catharsis of an 
individual, because the gaudiam de veritate is also a means for the 
further development of the ad humanum solidarity outwith the 
‘mirror of production’ at the higher level of rational consciousness 
and cultural effort insofar as the worker-inquirer-knower’s self-
knowledge is also a sharing in the as yet unrealised liberation of 
his neighbour and his compatriots. Because similars are similarly 
understood, to understand one structuration is to virtually 
understand all structurations and one act of judgment enjoys the 
empowerment that follows from objective understanding. Through 
insight, the labourer-inquirer-knower uses the reductio to leverage 
a symbolic revolution not only within himself in a vital fashion but 
in others in a virtual fashion because he shares his condition with 
others, so that his self-understanding is also the self-understanding 
of others and a source of intersubjective communion in the truth 
and the basis for a new form of individuation and sociation.
The joy of being structured in the truth then is the joy of 
exercising a free relationship to one’s self, others, temporality and 
the realm of meaning for the first time. The happiness of being 
structured in the truth is ending the symbolic domination 
internalised and exercised over oneself through one’s being-for-
others thanks to a dispersed and occasional freedom being raised 
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to a qualitatively higher level of reality; an intellectual freedom 
liberated from its material and psychological conditions. Only an 
act of understanding brings this freedom into being because only 
by being the content of an act of understanding can the occasional 
or serial freedom of the worker experienced in his bodily and 
mental justification be freed from the original conditions of the 
worker-knower being physically, in actual fact, reduced, and 
become permanently available as an item of knowledge. Thanks 
to his act of understanding, a physical condition becomes a res 
cogitans and the sense of justification as a result of labouring is 
spiritualised so that the worker-inquirer-knower does not need to 
be actually or empirically psychologically ‘in danger’ or ‘at issue’ 
in the symbolic order. In the realm of meaning, intellectual 
freedom is a freedom that is always available to oneself and is a 
permanent source of anchorage, truth and identity and never a 
source of regret or disadvantage. While the moment of joy passes, 
then, there is a permanent imprimatur of empowerment or a 
‘condition of freedom’ available by simply entering the realm of 
meaning thanks to this ‘revolutionary act’ which Lacan had in 
mind as it turns analysand into analyst.
7.4 Integral Dasein: A Free Relation to Domination
First, alienation is ‘real’ in its status as the necessary 
underlying condition for becoming a subject…The real…
appears only transitorily at moments of traumatic revelation; 
it is resistant to symbolisation…Second, alienation is ‘real’ 
as gap in the symbolic.”
Lacan, cited in Parker 2011, pp. 87-88
If we take the example of an old rich man who is long-accustomed 
to his status thanks to his long history of being successful, and 
then suppose that he attempts to achieve a particular goal but 
happens to fail, the man will acknowledge his defeat and perhaps 
analyse the reasons for his failure and come to a decision as to 
whether or not to try again. Acknowledging his attempt and 
acknowledging his failure will be more or less straightforward, 
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and will cost him little or nothing to do so as one defeat will not 
ordinarily require him to question himself, far less coerce him 
into a crisis of self-confidence. Similarly, his being-for-others will 
not be jeopardised or put ‘at risk’ by knowing and communicating 
his set-back, because any intersubjective judgment that he was a 
failure would be viewed as a wilful and even perverse over-
reaction. 
The rich man, then, will have a healthy and open-eyed relation 
to his failure and will not be mastered or defined by it. However, if 
we take the example of a poor man for whom poverty is a long-
established fact, the same historicity which inured the rich man 
from over-reacting to an instance of failure, in the case of the poor 
man will more or less coerce him into having a defeated relationship 
to his condition of being defeated, and it is more or less fated or 
inevitable that his failure will result in him constituting a particular 
kind of relation to himself, and that the poor man, as part of his 
very self, will have an ashamed relation to himself or be unable to 
look at his defeat clearly in an open-eyed and deliberate manner.
If a deep unwillingness and resistance to recognising sub- 
ordination and shame is a defining characteristic of the subordi-
nate, then thanks to the emergence of what may be termed a free 
integralism and a dynamic and developmental relation to the self 
and the realm of meaning having been brought about, a free field 
of perception contains as integral to itself the free recognition 
of subordination where it exists within oneself and others. The 
freedom that results within the worker-inquirer-knower thanks 
to achieving self-understanding is a wholly interior cognitional 
event and does not change objective social and cultural conditions 
at all, so that the worker-inquirer-knower continues in a social 
and cultural and national context that is immersed in unequal 
relations of power and symbolic violence. However, as previously 
stated, the natural environment of human beings is the realm of 
meaning and in an important sense, to know our domination is 
to escape it, not as a brute fact of social position but as a symbolic 
or mental condition.
Something else that is freed is the ability to recognise the will-
to-domination as it exists within oneself and in others so that, for 
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all of an earlier emphasis upon the ad sensum and ad humanum 
dispositions and behaviours being developed by freedom and 
chosen in preference to other possible dispositions and behaviours, 
the worker-inquirer-knower can recognise the ‘libidinal charge’ 
accompanying much of working-class behaviour and discourse 
emerges from a subordinate location within the social hierarchy 
that was never a matter of choice; a subordination which is 
often consubstantial with an anti-intellectualism which a free 
integralism has no hesitation in recognising for the alienated and 
resentful relationship to intellectual consciousness that it is. Along 
with the self-understanding of the previous chapter, then, comes 
an equally radical self-acceptance and freedom to recognise 
the reality of self-hatred, language-hatred and nation-hatred 
and the ‘nested’ or multiple inability to esteem or accept one’s 
dasein in all of its density, and this allows into view the full weight 
of the existential problem of structures of perception which 
have been trained to only see their comparative inferiority due 
to their immersion in a geo-political class-based universe of 
meaning, made all the more powerful by the absence of intellectual 
self-development.
Freedom to recognise one’s own ressentiment and one’s con-
tempt for subordination and failure in others, brings into relief 
the fact that the key to psychological individuation is an under-
standing strong enough to reverse these dominant structures of 
perception; that only a structure of perception structured accord-
ing to the standards of one’s own cognitional structure is able to 
break the subject free of internalised social and cultural logics and 
representations, and decisively intervene into sociological deter-
minisms and ongoing structures of self-perception operating in 
mass mediated class-based culture. Sartre’s helpful insight 
that: “The slave in chains is free to break them…[but]…it is neces-
sary fundamentally to choose himself on the ground of slavery” 
(1966, p. 703) is only possible when the worker-inquirer under-
stands that because his ‘secondary nature’ is his means to self-
understanding and his means to raise himself up to his natural 
beatitude, his ‘slavery’ has tremendous worth, as it is his only 
means to achieving his natural perfection and achieving the 
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Hegelian ‘negation of the negation’ and redeeming the judgment 
that “all subjected labour is cursed” (Adorno 1974, p. 217).
In embarking upon the project of self-appropriation the 
worker-inquirer had to obey the exigencies of his rational 
consciousness, which obliged him to give an account of himself 
that involved more than an appeal to intuition, poetry or 
spirituality i.e. a personal intellectual practice. On the presumption 
that this ‘pursuit of self’ had to do with knowing something, the 
procedure we decided most likely to meet with success was 
the pursuit of self-knowledge upon the basis of being a worker, 
and to that end we established a set of distinctive empirical data 
specific to the manual labourer, beginning with the reality brought 
about by his particular kind of doing as a sui generic bodily 
justification independent of consciousness. The next task was to 
show how a reality we had established operated ‘outside of the 
text’ not only had significance for consciousness, but exerted an 
informative ‘gravitational pull’ upon the whole of intentionality, 
affectivity and behaviour. In our account we noted the data of 
justification and established the link between the physical and the 
psychological, and in the process of self-appropriation an integral 
aspect of intellectual consciousness became an explicit awareness 
of the dialectical confrontation with the hierarchical realm of 
meaning that is intimately connected to the hierarchically ordered 
material resources of society.
This link between the physical and the psychological necessitated 
the expansion of the ontology brought into being by work into 
the symbolic order, where a dialectic of freedom/alienation within 
consciousness and behaviour was identified. We found that there 
were many consequences for consciousness and behaviour 
revealed by a contextual analysis of freedom, as each social class 
selects itself and develops a class-specific set of characteristics 
in contradistinction to other class-inflected relations to language 
and self i.e. freedom is used by each class to privilege its own 
standpoint and devalue others, while the social institutions and 
material and symbolic resources at their disposal as they pursue 
their politics of meaning are, by definition, unequal. Finally, 
insofar as this dialectic was taken up into the cognitional order, 
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our argument has been that upon its becoming an intellectual 
problematic, adequately conceiving physical structuration became 
a key to the construction and interpretation of other relationships 
and the content of empirical consciousness until, finally, via an 
act of judgment, this leveraged a revolution within the worker-
inquirer, and revolutionised the worker-inquirer-knower’s 
relationship to himself and his being-for-others and the realm of 
meaning. The significance of the concept of the reductio, released 
by the work of reflection from being confined to being merely 
a conceptualisation of physical structuration, played the pivotal 
role in constituting the rational self-consciousness of the worker-
inquirer-knower, because it re-founds his relationship to the realm 
of meaning according to cognitional structure and in active 
opposition to the control of meaning exercised by more dominant 
classes.
This empowerment allows a reading of ‘the present as history’ 
as well as a reading of previous attempts to diagnose the signs of 
the times, such as the revolutionary crisis throughout Europe 
during the 1920s and 1930s when, for many political activists and 
engaged observers of the period, the objective social conditions 
seemed ripe for revolutionary transformation, only to see the 
failure of revolutionary movements. As understood by the Frankfurt 
School, this failure was evidence that a purely objective Marxism 
was insufficient insofar as it was the ‘subjective response’ of 
workers to their objective social conditions that had been missing, 
and was to blame for the failure to bring about revolutionary 
change. In this light a critical social theory capable of die 
anthropologischte wende or ‘turn to subjectivity’ was required, 
and it is here that a paradox is brought into view. 
Just as Marxism failed to integrate working-class dasein into its 
vision, so the discipline of psychology has been engaged in a 
similar search for a liberation psychology that has resoundingly 
failed, and the root cause of the failure to articulate a liberating or 
empowering theory of the psyche is that any completion of the 
‘turn to the subject’ discovers that the psyche, precisely because it 
is immersed in and constituted by the medium of bourgeois 
capitalist society, is thereby ‘contaminated’ and unable to act as a 
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source from which to transcend or challenge these same social 
conditions, with the result that any empirically given psyche 
cannot act as a starting point for this new psychology. For Jacoby 
(1997), for example, this search for a new psychology by 
psychologists such as Fromm, Maslow and Rogers failed, so that it 
remains a matter of urgency to work out a relationship between 
psychology and social theory. In this regard, Adler was the first 
psychologist to write on Marx and psychoanalysis and argued 
that an “affective state” underlies class consciousness, but in the 
opinion of Jacoby, this began the move away from the insights of 
Freudian psychoanalysis towards the sociological consciousness, 
and this latter is the main culprit in the story of why a post-
Freudian psychology has been unable to articulate an ego 
psychology able to liberate the ‘bourgeois individual.’
Starting from the basic idea of the psyche as profoundly 
informed by social or intersubjective conditions, the process of 
attaining true self-knowledge requires an understanding of social 
experience as the individual is located in and often dominated by 
a number of social contexts. Furthermore, if the primary social 
context to which every adult looks in order to know himself, and 
to which other adults look to locate him and the social status 
he has, is the context of the occupational hierarchy, it seems that 
any theory of psychological development and maturity that 
was not a social psychology and did not include a contextual 
account of the psyche in which social conditions are more or 
less fundamental to attaining maturity, or did not articulate the 
psychological ‘secondary nature’ via which maturity was achieved, 
can not be ‘fit for purpose’ as it will be a product of ‘pure reason’ 
characterised by ahistoricism and universalism. 
The task for psychologists then is to articulate a psychology 
that transcends the legacy of bourgeois universalism and secedes 
from the ‘scarcity era’ psychoanalytic theory of Freud, but without 
falling into the superficiality of the affluence-fuelled ‘ego 
psychologies’ of the likes of R. D. Laing and Cooper. I propose 
that insofar as I have articulated aspects of psychological 
experience that owe little to a universalist concept of Man and 
shares little ground with the clichéd account of ‘self-actualisation’ 
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such as found in Maslow (1968), my account of psychological 
liberation is a step in the required direction, as in my account 
there is nothing of the facile ease with which freedom arrives as 
found in R. D. Laing and there is nowhere to be found readily 
available policies to usher in all-round equality such as liberation 
from the family and marriage, or absurd modernist slogans such 
as ‘smash monogamy’ or ‘free love’ or constructivist fantasies such 
as “nature leaves undefined the object of sexual desire” (Wittman 
1970, cited in Johnston and Noakes 2005, p. 59).
Rather than a social ontology characterised by such rationalist 
and voluntarist fantasies as freedom from marriage and the 
discipline of economic production and all such superficial 
individualism, there is instead a free relation to the ‘mirror of 
production’ and the freedom that recognises the repression and 
domination to be resisted, but also the need for repression as 
found in the institution of the family, Christianity and productive 
work, for example, and that all psychological theories that 
attempt to articulate freedom or ‘therapy’ without mediation via 
‘secondary natures’ are de-contextualised exercises destined to 
fail, and can only have appeal to those whose social conditioning 
is such as to inculcate a social ontology infected with the virus of 
immaculacy. 
The epidemic of failed projects aimed at articulating a holistic 
psychology share the same paradox: on the one hand they fail to 
articulate their ego psychology upon a particular contextual 
dasein or a real ‘secondary nature,’ and yet this very flight from 
the labour of engaging in any real ‘secondary nature’ is routinely 
the result of their enthrallment to the ‘secondary nature’ or social 
habitus of the middle class. The failure that they all share is that 
in turning to the subject they do not turn to their class condition, 
but instead turn to this class’s signature ideology concerning 
human dasein i.e. that there is an immaculate realm of autonomy 
and individualism. Hence, while with the advent of affluence and 
the need for an ‘affluent modernity’ it is necessary to articulate a 
fully contextualised account of self-actualisation, it was also more 
or less inevitable that forms of ego psychology would reach 
epidemic proportions, and the failure of psychology to give an 
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account of how Man’s full nature might emerge in post-affluent 
Western capitalist societies recapitulates the long standing question 
of whether a middle-class thinker can produce an account, firstly, 
of the conditioning of the middle-class psyche and then upon that 
basis give an account of how it is brought to its natural apotheosis.
In attempting this task a great problem has not only been the 
‘pure reason’ fantasy of a universalist psychology and one social 
class theorising the liberation of every class, but the persistence 
of contemplative pronunciations against immersion into particu-
larity. A prime example of this is Lukacs, according to whom 
(in Jacoby 1997, p. 77): “Opportunism mistakes the actual psy-
chological state of consciousness of the proletariat for the class 
consciousness of the proletariat…[and seeks to] reduce class con-
sciousness...to the level of the psychologically given.” Here, then, 
is the problem: if oppression, liberation and truth are never psy-
chologically given, then they cannot be known or experienced 
as a vital living achievement, but must remain metaphysical 
constructs of ‘pure reason’ unavailable to the worker-inquirer. 
While this alleged split between psychological experience and 
the class consciousness of the proletariat is useful for excusing the 
‘pure theorist’ from having to immerse himself in the life of any 
concrete working-class population (because if the worker himself 
is oblivious to the truth of his situation there is no point to 
ethnographic immersion, and so even ‘going native’ is no way to 
know their oppression and liberation), I argue the data gives the 
evidence of repression and that people are aware there is a social 
hierarchy of status linked to occupation; that the objective 
impinges upon comportment and inner psychological life, and this 
data is in plain sight and open awareness and talked about on 
morning trains and is enough to make a start on the journey of 
self-appropriation. This is the basis for rejecting theorists who 
imagine true class consciousness is foreign to psychological 
consciousness, so that the notion that true class consciousness has 
nothing to do with the given empirical consciousness of the 
working class, or class consciousness lacks all psychic content 
is a theoretician’s fantasy as any theory of class consciousness in 
which the sui generic movements of working-class subjectivity and 
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its cognitional acts are irrelevant to attaining ‘class consciousness,’ 
far less its purely natural apotheosis, is fated to be rejected as a 
form of ‘supernaturalism.’ 
The arrival of general affluence from the nineteen-seventies 
and nineteen-eighties in Western nation-based societies was often 
imagined as inaugurating a post-materialist and post-repression 
psyche, free from ‘the mirror of production’ and the traumas and 
repressions of family life and Christianity. In the era of affluence, 
ego psychologists were quick to imagine repression was obsolete 
as populations were freed to pursue their higher natures. What 
was envisaged by Carl Rogers or Abram Maslow was in fact a 
post-industrial and post-affluent fantasy of human beings ‘without 
qualities’ or without ‘secondary natures.’ Such a vision can only 
emerge from a “totally administered subjectivity” (Marcuse 1972) 
within consumerist cultures with no anchoring or repressive 
ballast to imagine the future of the psyche by, and an illustration 
of psychological modernism and the bourgeois fantasy that Man 
had escaped the ‘mirror of production’ is found in Carl Rogers for 
whom the fact of ‘social roles’ was a violation of our humanity 
and the real authentic self i.e. the free bourgeois autonomous 
individual that is supposed to be repressed and locked up within 
us all is constrained by an artificial social role or mask, and 
thereby immersed in an alienated mode of human behaviour. 
This rank secular form of supernaturalism that has no need for 
contextualized dasein to achieve freedom, is innocent of even 
the suspicion that ‘secondary natures’ are the very stuff that is 
needed to fuel a purely natural freedom – far less the very stuff to 
be redeemed, and that has a vital role to play in brining this 
redemption about. The problem, then, is how to articulate a 
humanist psychology when the very call for such a development 
is the favoured ideology of one-dimensional society (Marcuse); 
how to agree with Jacoby (1997, p. 103) that “the cult of 
human subjectivity is not the negation of bourgeois society but 
its substance,” and yet transcend that social and intellectual 
determinism.
My strategy has been to start from the fact that affluence and 
education allows the working class to cultivate a holistic dasein all 
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the way to its natural beatitude, and this holistic dasein takes 
aim at the rather vacuous accounts of developmental psychology 
developed by the likes of Rogers and Maslow. The flight-from- 
yet-immersion-in class remains an epidemic in every arts and 
humanities academic discipline, and if we look at sociology and 
psychology which in their modernist phases tried hard to be 
purely secular, and ask if they have succeeded where philosophy 
and theology failed to historicise and socialise the study of the 
human psyche and human society, it seems no discipline is able 
to resist being assimilated to the class structure and truncated 
‘scarcity thinking’ visions of human being.
Just as for Durkheim sociology was necessarily atheist 
(Richard, in Pickering 1975), so psychoanalysis for Freud was 
necessarily atheist, and the likes of Parker still call upon 
psychology to “find another secular path to the revolution 
in subjectivity that Lacanian psychoanalysis promises” (2011, 
p. 160). The doxic organisation of the psychological imagination 
revealed in sentences such as: “Psychoanalysis will only be able to 
break from capitalism if it explicitly breaks, renews its break, with 
Christianity and for that matter traverses any appeal to divinity 
as consolation for the subject” (Parker 2011, p. 154), hardly 
encourages the hope that psychology will effect the step-change it 
calls for any time soon. For my part I have given a purely natural 
path Parker calls on others to deliver, and in the process have 
transcended the ‘scarcity thinking’ that is unaware that the period 
of militant and materialistic thought is over, and to turn to the 
superannuated cliché that psychoanalysis must necessarily be 
atheist and reject all supernatural consolation indicates mono-
chromatic ‘scarcity thinking,’ and the continuing absence in 
psychology of an adequate model of the purely natural beatitude 
of the human psyche.
To bring the story of Scottish working-class dasein’s journey to 
its conclusion is to bring it to a higher perfection or a beatitude 
that is ‘beyond nature.’ In the next Chapter I add the last primary 
colour to my ‘picture’ of this dasein and turn to the famous 
analogia entis which has not been adverted to until now, but 
has been fundamental to everything written so far. When 
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describing the ‘present as history’ as the recovery of an original 
twelfth-century understanding of ‘being modern,’ a breakthrough 
that ultimately failed, I mean to argue that if Christian thinkers 
had historicised and socialised the analogia entis of St. Bonaventure 
(1221-1274), they would have given every subsequent generation 
a template of how to imagine a purely natural or social departure 
point for appropriating the Christian revelation. 
The analogia entis is the key to an integral psychology and 
sociology because it more or less demands a purely natural or a 
purely social departure point for the advent of the supernatural 
and in this regard, while Hard and Negri pinpoint the twelfth 
century as the beginning of the modern era and credit Duns Scotus 
and others with an original ‘turn to the subject,’ their view that 
the “discovery of the plane of immanence…[was] founded on an 
attack on transcendence” (Hardt and Negri 2001, p. 91) and that 
“the refusal of transcendence is the condition of possibility of 
thinking this immanent power” (Hard and Negri 2001, p. 92) 
mistakes an original and historical critique of supernaturalism for 
an attack on the supernatural, and reveals once again modernist 
thinkers’ remarkable ability to snatch error from the jaws of a 
correct understanding of European modernity.
In grappling with the errors of much mainstream sociology of 
his time, Yves Simon (1991, p. 129) wrote: “freedom is an intense, 
excellent and overflowingly powerful mode of causality [and]…it 
becomes possible to consider coldly the question whether the 
object of social science comprises…some facts pertaining to the 
use that human freedom makes of itself.” In the next chapter 
I seek to envisage a social science that takes as its object some of 
the consequences of human freedom, and argue that one of the 
uses human freedom makes of itself is to bring about the advent 
of the living God within fully contextualised human dasein fully 
in act, and when making this argument I hope not to be accused 
of idealism as I have waited until after completing chapters 
devoted to a range of concrete working, social, housing, political, 
cultural and psychological conditions before completing our 
journey by turning to Scottish working-class dasein’s capacity for 
the supernatural. The final chapter then argues that just as the 
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‘worked self’ is not the whole of Scottish working-class dasein, so 
the purely natural achievements of the worker-inquirer-knower is 
not the end of his journey. Having completed our account of the 
person as imago mundi, the final task is to give an account of the 
worker-inquirer-knower as he co-reveals himself to be imago Dei, 
as thanks to accomplishing his self-actualisation or reducing 
himself to a ‘pure act’ via a perfect act of self-understanding, the 
worker-inquirer-knower imitates the living God who is actus 
purus or ‘pure act.’
Part 2
The Supernatural 
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8
The Sociological Mediation 
of Christian Redemption
That which is wholly done for us by God, namely deification by 
grace, is yet also our highest act and as such properly our own.
John Milbank 2005, p. ix
8.1 Integral Sociology & the Proportionate  
Actus Purus of ‘Secondary Nature’
Initially, a description (“positivism”) of the religious 
phenomena is required: immediately, free of theories, the 
phenomena in themselves (cf. the similar demand by Max 
Weber for sociology). Religious phenomena are to be 
observed naively, as not yet hackneyed.
Heidegger 2004, pp. 14-15
On the 7th of March 1988 I was in bed in St. Mary’s Orphanage 
on Dum Dum Road in Calcutta (India). It was early on a sunny 
Monday morning, and I was lying dreaming. In my dream I heard 
a sound and looked up to see what the sound was and saw my 
mother standing looking at me. She was standing still, holding out 
a telephone towards me in her right hand indicating to me to 
come and take the phone. “I think it’s Him” she said diffidently. 
I went over and put the phone to my ear and said ‘Hello?’ At this, 
I heard a voice say with great enthusiasm: “Paul, the quality! 
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The quality!” At that moment what I saw changed. Now, looking 
within myself I saw a vast open expanse set before me. I looked 
upon this scene as if perched high above, and as I looked down at 
the scene that stretched out far below me, I saw what I first took 
for a mass of white slow-moving billowing clouds. I then realised 
they were in fact enormous clouds of fire and flame, and as they 
came closer I could see they were fires of deep brilliant orange and 
red and white and yellow; slow-moving yet coming towards me as 
if from the centre of some nuclear explosion that had occurred out 
of sight, deep within me. Then, from within the slowly moving 
colours that had now expanded to fill the whole of this landscape 
within me that stretched from horizon to horizon, I realised I was 
looking upon the face of Jesus who was looking directly at me. As 
the slow-moving coloured fire rose upwards to crash and break 
against me, I momentarily became afraid and wondered whether 
I might burn or come to harm, and wondered what I should do. 
I decided to stop looking, and I lay down and closed my eyes and 
readied myself for the impact, wondering what it would feel like. 
As it reached me I lay completely passive with eyes closed and felt 
the fire reach me and slowly burn its way through me and expand 
uniformly and slowly, in every direction outwards to every surface 
of my body. Realising it was not painful but felt like a deep 
burning that did me no harm, I relaxed and allowed it to happen. 
When the uniform pulse of red and orange and yellow fire reached 
me and slowly burned its way through me, it came to an end. 
I remained still and kept lying on the bed. After a few moments of 
marvelling at what had just happened, and with nothing else 
happening, I opened my eyes to see the bright sunny day outside 
and got up and got dressed, before heading off for breakfast with 
the Christian Brothers.
The experience described above happened a week after 
I achieved an act of self-understanding during the night of 
28-29th February 1988, which was the basis for the previous two 
chapters and is the experiential basis for the argument that, 
if a methodological ‘rule’ of interpretive sociology is to follow 
wherever human dasein leads, whether to the structuration 
effected by living particular housing conditions or the structuration 
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effected by manual labour or the structuration of dasein effected 
by reflexive acts of self-understanding, or experience of the 
supernatural, then a sociology that is ‘fit for reality’ cannot 
be only natural or exclusively naturalistic as it is more or less 
coerced into including the supernatural as an element of human 
experience and, as a reasonable extension of that inclusion, a 
presence or reality in the lives of societies and human history. 
An integrally developed dasein then requires an integral 
sociology, a post-secular sociology if the dasein under sociological 
study has mastered self-appropriation and achieved its purely 
natural beatitude, and received some positive experience of the 
supernatural. Moreover, however, far more than merely conceding 
the possibility or actuality of the supernatural, sociology is more 
or less coerced not only into exploring what sociology can 
contribute to the alignment of “social science and self-actualisation” 
(Bhaskar 2012, pp. 117-164) but is more or less coerced into a 
new self-understanding insofar as it has a role to play in mediating 
the living God to socialised human being.
Because the worker-inquirer’s self-actualisation is more than 
a private psychological affair because it is directly relevant and 
linked to an entire class condition, it is also directly relevant to 
the history of social theory and social research that has practiced 
class analysis, so that the work of self-appropriation is also able 
to illuminate the failures of ‘scarcity sociology’ that affluent 
modernity sociologists must address in the spirit of Archer et al. 
(2004, p. 168): “More recently, some critical realists…have raised 
the issue of…spiritual emancipation which has traditionally been 
the work of religion. This…is a new subject matter for critical 
realist thought, widely referred to...as a ‘spiritual turn,’” while 
Habermas (2010, p. 18) has called for a post-secular shift to allow 
advanced post-Enlightenment Western societies to recover their 
faith in reason: 
My motive for addressing the issue of faith and knowledge 
is to mobilize modern reason against the defeatism lurking 
within it. Postmetaphysical thinking cannot cope on its own 
with the defeatism concerning reason which we encounter 
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today both in the postmodern radicalization of the ‘dialectic 
of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism founded on  
a naïve faith in science.
While in the spirit of Habermas it is good metaphysical manners 
to refrain from aggressive and exclusionary sectarianism, by 
building upon the performative basis of self-appropriation, 
this post-secularist basis is rooted in the fact that beyond the 
structuring of the person effected by working or nationality or 
truth, is the direct supernatural action of the supernatural (or 
the person of the Holy Spirit in the Christian mind) within the 
worker-inquirer-knower. Thanks to the worker-inquirer-knower 
exercising his own ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ over himself, 
the ‘analogy of being’ (analogia entis) becomes an existential truth 
insofar as his passing the structure of himself into his intellectual 
consciousness means he ‘creates’ himself or gives birth to himself 
as a res cogitans, and in this achievement there is an analogy with 
the procession of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity i.e. the 
worker-inquirer-knower by accomplishing his own proportionate 
actus purus makes it possible for him to recognise God as actus 
purus, and that he is an image of this God and also makes God 
see a very weak likeness of Himself in fully-contextualised 
1979 generation Scottish working-class dasein fully ‘in act,’ and 
is pleased by this and takes pleasure in this and brings this 
achievement of his creature to a perfection ‘beyond nature,’ by 
communicating Himself in the gift of supernatural grace. Hence, 
in contrast to Corrie’s despair in The Image O’ God (1927):
  Crawlin aboot like a snail in the mud,
  covered wi clammy blae,
  Me, made after the image o’ God –
  Jings! But it’s laughable, tae.
the worker-inquirer-knower is empowered to write another kind 
of poetry (Rilke 2009, p. 23):
  What will you do, God, when I die?
  When I, your pitcher, broken, lie?
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  When I, your drink, go stale or dry?
  I am your garb, the trade you ply,
  you lose your meaning, losing me.
  Homeless without me, you will be
  robbed of your welcome, warm and sweet.
  I am your sandals: your tired feet
  will wander bare for want of me.
If this sociological account of grace is something of a novelty, 
the sanctification by which the human person participates in the 
redemption of Christ has been seen since the first days of the 
Church as creating a new ontological reality within the person, 
and over the course of two thousand years of speculation there 
has accumulated a daunting literature devoted to the nature of 
this transformation and the reality of grace and the presence of 
the Holy Spirit within human being. In making a contribution 
to this long durée tradition, the interpretive sociologist is able to 
understand that the “transformation that a human being undergoes 
when he is incorporated into Christ” (Kerr 2002, p. 145) is made 
possible by the operationalisation of fully contextual and fully 
contingent ‘secondary nature’ while remaining a supernatural gift 
beyond nature, and an integral sociology begins to deliver upon 
the task first sighted in the twelfth-century Latin West which 
called for “the refraction of the gospel’s truths throughout a 
determinate social structure” (Chenu 1997, p. 38). In their efforts 
to understand the action of grace or the Holy Spirit within 
the person, medieval theologians developed the notion of a 
supernatural habitus to describe the structuration brought about 
by sanctifying grace.
According to Chenu’s (1997) Nature, Man and Society in the 
Twelfth Century, in reaching the view that each human being 
had a purely natural beatitude or a purely natural perfection 
that is proportionate to or corresponds with human nature, 
as well as having a supernatural beatitude or perfection that 
is disproportionate to or beyond human nature, the great leap 
forward was the discovery of the categories of ‘Nature’ and 
‘History’ and their import for the historicisation and socialisation 
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of the Christian understanding of salvation, understood as a 
specifically supernatural structuring of the person, and the term 
‘super-natural’ referring to that which, by definition, is above and 
beyond ‘nature’ and the natural powers of the human being. In 
this regard, the ‘discovery’ of nature and history in the work of 
Alan of Lille (1128-1202) and Alexander Neckham (1157-1217) 
formed part of a wider mental revolution and renewal of 
Christendom which called for new theologies and spiritualities to 
replace a pre-modern monasticism that had privileged sanctification 
via practicing withdrawal from the world.
These new social and intellectual developments were the 
context for Scotus’s turning to particularity (Llywelyn 2010, 
pp. 185-223) and contingency and inaugurating a paradigm 
shift (Picksttock 2003, p. 11) that explicitly conceived Christian 
salvation in a temporal and processual manner. By the thirteenth 
century the term habitus was used to denote a fixed and permanent 
reality or a ‘second nature’ as opposed to a mere ‘disposition,’ and 
according to Lonergan (1971, p. 13): “Between Peter Lombard 
and St Albert the Great there emerged the idea of the supernatural 
habit,” with Lombard affirming against Augustine’s anthropological 
pessimism: “there are many good acts prior to prevenient or 
operative grace, and that these acts are due either to grace and free 
choice or even to free choice alone; but by them man merits 
neither justification nor eternal life” (Lonergan 1971, p, 12). 
In Lonergan’s view it was Peter, Chancellor of the University of 
Paris, who made the break from a thoroughgoing pessimism 
regarding human nature to understand the significance of ‘second-
ary natures’ and their causality, thanks to the key distinction 
between a natural amor amicitiae erga Deum (love and friendship 
for God) and the properly supernatural grace-filled love of God. 
Thanks to the distinction between a natural love towards God 
and the supernatural life of grace, a purely natural apotheosis was 
theoretically discovered and defended, along with purely natural 
knowledges about purely natural realities and knowledge of ‘sec-
ondary natures.’ Insofar as an inherited Augustinian pessimism 
that insisted every good deed was to be accorded to grace was 
finally rejected, in its place came the recognition of a natural and 
607
t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  m e d i at i o n  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
dynamic orientation towards God, and in the new mental universe 
of twelfth and thirteenth-century Europe, nature and ‘secondary 
natures’ in the form of the desiderium naturale were given their 
rightful place and human being was accorded a natural desire for 
God to act as an immanent and dynamic anchor for the sacred 
within humanity itself, while the dogmatic issue that supernatural 
justification and sanctifying grace were supernatural realities that 
were God’s free initiative alone, and remained beyond the power 
of nature, was safeguarded.
While the “unique impulse” (Chenu 1997, p. 38) of the twelfth 
century was an attractive integral humanism overcoming the long 
winter of Augustinian pessimism concerning human nature, this new 
appreciation of the human being’s purely natural orientation towards 
and capacity to receive the supernatural was never a unanimous posi-
tion that commanded consensus, so that if there emerged a turning to 
the contingent, processual and temporal nature of human beings in 
their co-operation with the work of their redemption, this did not 
automatically inaugurate an era of contextual theology. 
Kerr (2002) has given an account of the twentieth century’s 
recovery of the dynamic developmentalism at the heart of 
Aquinas’s (1225-1274) account of human beatitude, and how the 
recovery of this ‘version’ of Thomism was the achievement of 
Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), a rediscovery which Milbank 
(2005) has described as the most important development in 
twentieth century theology. In de Lubac’s version of Thomism, the 
human being enjoys a natural capacity and desire for face-to-face 
vision of God, and in de Lubac’s integral revolution – so-called 
because it rejects the view that each individual has a separate 
natural beatitude and an additional and separate supernatural 
beatitude i.e. rejects the “two-storey model of nature and grace” 
(Kerr 2002, p. 136) in favour of one single or integral order of 
salvation – it is impossible to separate the natural and supernatural 
contributions to the unity that is any particular concrete human 
person, with the important consequence that: “the social and 
political cannot be separated from the spiritual” (Kerr 2002, 
p. 148), and “every human being enjoys a de facto relationship to 
Jesus Christ” (Boff 1987, p. 122).
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o l o g y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  r e d e m p t i o n
608
In constructing my sociological account of Christian redemption 
or the advent of the supernatural, I reject de Lubac’s rejection of 
the two-storey model of nature and grace, and draw upon the 
‘discovery’ of nature and the emergence of the idea of a ‘second 
nature’ or habitus, so that secondary or socialised nature can be 
given its rightful place within what might be termed a sociological 
‘economy of salvation,’ and argue for the theonomic value of 
‘integral contingency’ insofar as the sanctification of the worker-
inquirer-knower is prepared for via his contingent ‘secondary 
nature.’ Drawing upon Kerr’s version of Aquinas, I construct 
a sociologically-grounded version of Aquinas’s analogy between 
the secondary causation of the creature and the causation of 
the Creator that Aquinas developed to answer the question of 
how God causes an individual’s salvation. 
More concretely, then, just as intelligence liberates the ad 
sensum and ad humanum modalities from their original immediacy 
to the higher level of ideal or cognitional existence, so insofar as 
supernatural grace builds upon and does not destroy nature, then, 
insofar as there is the infusion of a supernatural habit, the nested 
structurations of the reductio are simultaneously elevated above 
themselves and are the condition for the possibility of this 
elevation i.e. the act of self-appropriation mediates or ‘triggers’ – 
but does not cause – the worker-inquirer-knower’s supernatural 
elevation. The argument is that if “God moves the will according 
to its condition” (Lonergan 1971, p. 130), then He moves it 
according to its apotheosis i.e. mediates the preparation of the 
worker for his salvation through his grasping his secondary nature 
as this is the purely natural or purely socialised means by which, 
thanks to conceptualisation and the act of judgment, the worker 
reduces himself to ‘pure act.’
More generally, then, the argument is that in industrialised 
societies, without the necessary class and cultural mediation of 
‘causality,’ a person cannot exercise the co-operation or ‘secondary 
causality’ he must exercise if he is to order himself towards his 
supernatural end. Because God’s salvific will is constant and 
universal, the event of the gratuitous gift of sanctifying grace 
requires a ‘triggering’ event on the part of the worker-inquirer-
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knower who is to receive the gift of grace; as if God’s advent is 
dependent upon a prior event occurring within the person. The 
heart of the matter turns upon the ‘cause’ of grace, and for 
Aquinas “a cause that acts in time, acts at a given time neither 
sooner nor later. We have to discover why it does not act sooner 
and what makes it act when it does” (Lonergan 1971, p. 70).
According to philosophical and theological tradition, the 
predicament faced by human beings is that they are created natures 
which, unlike angels, are not created in full possession of their 
faculties and powers and so, because “Nature gives us nothing in 
act” (Lonergan 1990, p. 161), human beings must achieve their 
perfection via “a greater actuation of the agent” (Lonergan 1971, 
p. 71), so that the concrete solution to this human dilemma will 
consist of locating the mechanism whereby the worker-inquirer-
knower operationalises his situated or secondary nature via 
conceptualisation, language and the structure of cognition. If we 
accept Kerr’s argument (2002, p. 173) that “it is by one’s own 
activity that one is drawn into God” and that the activity that is 
privileged in bringing this about is achieving self-knowledge as this 
“gives the created agent a special participation of the pure act of 
being” (Kerr 2002, p. 163), our sociological account of grace 
may be stated thus: the concept of the reductio, insofar as it is a 
milestone along the road of language and conceptualisation that 
the worker-enquirer must travel in his journey towards an adequate 
account of himself, is also the triggering causal mechanism for the 
exercise of cognitional agency which reduces the worker-inquirer 
to ‘pure act,’ and thereby prepares him for the moment of grace. 
The reductio categorisation of the situated self is our ethno-
graphic account of how the universal desiderium naturale is opera-
tionalised and culminates in ‘triggering’ the constitution of Scottish 
working-class ’79 generation dasein as imago Dei. If this account 
is valid, then we have a sociologically-grounded solution not only 
to a theological problematic first sighted in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, but to a problematic which preoccupied late 
nineteenth and twentieth century attempts at articulating an inte-
gral sociology: evidencing the supernatural purely upon the con-
temporary and modern basis of ‘integral contingency,’ and thereby 
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providing an alternative to the ‘modernisation is secularisation’ 
paradigm that has been dominant in sociological theory. 
Textual evidence in broad support of this position is provided 
by Aquinas when he describes preparation for justification 
“in terms of an Aristotelian promotion” (Lonergan 1971, p. 100) 
or act of self-understanding which, as well as being its own sui 
generic reality, is also preparatory for grace due to inhering within 
a created nature that is dynamically oriented to a higher order. 
Within this ordered order, the purely natural achievements of 
intellect and freedom and will, act as the conditions for the 
entitatively distinctive supernatural structuration – the advent of 
the fire of the Holy Spirit within the soul of the worker-inquirer-
knower. The beatitude of the worker-inquirer-knower, then, 
considered as imago Dei must also be an analogous matter of 
achieving a profound act of knowing and profound act of love. If 
we follow Aquinas’ Trinitarian theology whereby God’s happiness 
or bliss consists in His self-understanding and self-loving, so that 
a person is imago Dei insofar as he or she produces acts of loving 
and understanding, and where Aquinas describes God as existence 
‘fully in act’ or actus purus, the worker-inquirer-knower likewise 
can refer to his own experience of being ‘fully in act’ thanks to his 
operationalising of his situated being, so that a purely sociological 
means of preparing for the reality of divine love within dasein 
is to firstly establish the reality of purely natural human love 
within the worker-inquirer-knower, as it is by generating an act 
of human love that the worker-inquirer-knower co-operates with 
his sanctification, so that the advent of grace can be described as 
gratuitous but never purely adventitious.
The joyful experiences of understanding or the gaudiam de 
veritate and the joy or bliss of ‘love of self’ (as well as acts of 
knowing and loving others sharing this dasein), however, must 
not be mistaken for experiences of the supernatural, as performing 
a radical act of self–understanding and a radical love of self are 
acts within our natural powers. At the same time, however, from 
the experience of this intellectual operation it is legitimate to draw 
an analogy between the worker-inquirer-knower ‘saying himself’ 
as he passes the intelligible structure of himself into his intellectual 
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self-awareness for the first time, and the procession of the Word 
in Trinitarian theory. Similarly, it is legitimate to draw an analogy 
between the procession of the Holy Spirit within the Blessed 
Trinity and the worker-inquirer-knower’s bursting forth into an 
act of love as a direct result of the joy of self-understanding. 
These analogies refer to purely natural operations of dasein 
‘fully in act.’ However, while we reject any suggestion that it is 
possible to ‘naturalise’ or ‘socialise’ the supernatural, these purely 
natural and social actions are indeed preparatory for a gift or 
an operationalisation of human nature beyond nature’s powers, 
so that a great paradox is that the gift of the Holy Spirit that is 
beyond nature, reason and merit, is at the mercy of our 
co-operation and, thanks to the necessity of this co-operation, our 
salvation may be described as a reality which in a real sense is 
something we co-operate in bringing about. 
This view of ‘pure nature’ is not the view that human beings 
are able to ‘bootstrap’ their way to God as no human being is 
able to lift himself to the supernatural. Rather, the task of 
human being is one of working out its twofold destiny; both its 
natural development and its supernatural salvation are connected 
and are both processual matters whereby, unless the situated self 
brings not simply the pre-industrial category of ‘nature’ found in 
patristic and early medieval theology but the ever-increasing 
complexity of our integral contingency or ‘secondary nature’ to its 
purely natural apotheosis, they do not prepare themselves for the 
advent of the supernatural moment of grace. As Milbank (2005, 
p. ix) has it: “That which is wholly done for us by God, namely 
deification by grace, is yet also our highest act and as such 
properly our own.”
8.2 Integral Contingency as Post-Metaphysical  
Foundation for Experience of the Supernatural
As Christians we must simply accept the fact that there will 
be ever more man-made reality which is neither ‘numinous’ 
nature nor is profane in the bad sense.
Karl Rahner 1970, p. 78
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In the writings of sociologist Max Weber who emphasised the 
other-worldliness of Christianity and identified a more or less 
antagonistic relationship between the Christian and the World as 
integral to Christianity, there is no awareness of the great reform 
movements in the eleventh and twelfth-centuries which wished to 
fundamentally re-think this relationship. In contrast, contemporary 
historians (Hollister 1969; Stiefel 1985; Constable 1996; Bisson 
2009) identify in twelfth-century Europe a radically new concern 
to articulate the relations between the sacred and profane, and 
to find new ways of living and conceiving the relationship between 
nature and grace as a result of a twelfth-century intellectual 
revolution (Stiefel 1985) or renaissance (Hollister 1969) or 
reformation (Constable 1996), which saw efforts at ecclesial and 
social reform and an evangelical awakening that wished to put 
the Gospel into practice in post-monastic and secular forms of 
Christian life. 
In the new post-agrarian urban settings that were a feature 
of twelfth-century Europe, the spread of urban living occurred 
as a result of an eleventh century agricultural revolution and 
technological progress which meant larger food surpluses so that 
greater urban populations could be supported. Rapid urbanisation 
of more and more of the population in turn led to commercial 
expansion throughout Europe in the twelfth century, and in its 
wake a new post-feudal occupational landscape emerged across 
Christian Europe, along with a concern to integrate this new 
social order with the traditional concern for salvation.
This movement for the reform of Christian life drew upon a 
pervasive awareness of living in a New Age, and Europe at this 
time gave birth to new Christian communities such as mendicant 
orders like the Franciscans and Dominicans that were committed 
to non-monastic or secular lifestyles dedicated to serving the laity 
in urban centres. This ‘new evangelisation’ also saw the spread of 
large numbers of lay apostolic groups such as the Humiliati, the 
Poor Lombards and the Cathars who were also caught up in what 
historical hindsight can see as the advent of the modern era. While 
eleventh-century efforts at reform were often aimed at the renewal 
of monasticism, what emerged in the twelfth century was efforts 
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at social and ecclesial reform outwith inherited feudal and 
monastic paradigms, thanks to a new understanding that salvation 
was not to be found in retreating from the world but in “the 
sacred embrace of the secular condition” (Trinkaus and Oberman 
1974, p. 24), and with this came a preoccupation with integrating 
that which had previously been kept apart i.e. worldly activity 
and concern for salvation. Among the new religious orders and 
lay associations were the fraticelli who were a lay branch of the 
Franciscan order who “took an active role in siding with the poor 
against their lords, sometimes fomenting open revolution and the 
seizure of lands” (Viladesau 2006, p. 146). For the lay urban poor 
who wished to have the theological and soteriological significance 
of poverty stated by the Church, the Franciscan reform provided 
the ‘sacred canopy’ that they needed, or “a moral response [to]…
what the fate of the socio-economic forces had decreed” (Trinkaus 
and Oberman 1974, p.7).
The shift to the embrace of the natural and human beyond 
an Augustinian pessimism was also evident in artistic expression 
where the ‘supernaturalist’ formalism of Byzantine iconography 
was displaced by the naturalism of Giotto (1267-1337), in whose 
depictions of the Christian mysteries for his Franciscan patrons 
we have a modern commitment to realism and the rejection of 
non-naturalistic depictions of the sacred, and in their efforts 
at keeping abreast of these developments and leaving behind 
previously solid and enduring social formations, the nominalist 
school of thought which spread throughout Europe at this time 
signalled a move away from what Gilson (1980, p. 410) has 
described as pre-Christian necessitarianism toward a new emphasis 
upon contingency which, when applied to theology, placed 
“emphasis on the absolute freedom of God, rather than on 
intelligible necessity” (Viladesau 2006, p. 147). 
For the likes of a Franciscan such as Duns Scotus, then, the 
incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth were freely 
chosen means of salvation and not part of a preordained or 
eternal plan, and thanks to highlighting the freedom of God “to 
create another world, to choose other means of salvation, and to 
establish another order” (Trinkaus & Oberman 1974, p. 12) 
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nominalism trumpeted the importance of contingency not only as 
regards the manner whereby God saved Man, but the way Man 
made his way through life and made his way to God. 
If scholars (Cross 1999; Ingham 2003; Llywelyn 2010) do not 
explicitly state that Scotus places the full weight of the achievement 
of the redemption brought about by Jesus of Nazareth upon the 
shoulders of his human nature, it is clear that this is the direction 
of travel of Scotus’s thought, and contemporary Scotus scholarship 
(Cross 1999, p. 115) argues that in Jesus “the human nature 
united to the Word is not informed by the Word” according to the 
mind of Scotus. This claim is revolutionary and utterly fundamental 
to understanding the tectonic shift within the European Christian 
mind that is occurring at this point in time. In this regard, in his 
efforts at articulating a theology of nationality, Llywelyn (2010) 
has turned to Scotus and the early modern Christian tradition 
as in Rupert of Deutz (c. 1075-1129) and Alexander of Hales 
(c.1185-1245) that understood the motive for the Incarnation 
not as reparation for human sinfulness but as something intended 
by God before the Creation, and my own articulation of the 
theonomic or soteriological value of nationality has emerged from 
a sociological account of dasein and a sociological account of 
contextualized human nature reaching its natural apotheosis.
Insofar as nominalists stood against “the implication that 
our world is a mere reflection and shadow of higher levels of 
being” (Trinkaus & Oberman 1974, p. 13), it also broke free 
of necessitarianism or fatalism in terms of how the Christian 
was to view the established social and political order i.e. as some-
thing that was not part of a preordained plan but a secondary or 
contingent construct. According to the Scotist doctrine of free-
dom, then, Christian redemption is not the unfolding of a neces-
sary a priori plan but the exercise of freedom in relation to 
a particular historical context, and the exercise of freedom vis-à-
vis the play of events in which the individual who would imitate 
and come-to-know the God of Jesus of Nazareth is called upon to 
exercise his freedom in achieving his salvation; each person like 
the historical Jesus of Nazareth must freely win his or her salva-
tion, and imitate Jesus not by following a pre-conceived and 
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already established route to salvation but by constructing his or 
her route to salvation upon the basis of his or her unique immer-
sion into their contingent socio-historical-cultural conditions.
This shift from pagan necessitarianism and the return to the 
Judeo-Christian God of history, was the retrieval of the earlier 
patristic “emphasis on covenantal and not-necessary relationship 
between God and his world” (Trinkaus & Oberman 1974, p. 15), 
and meant a focus upon contingency and particularity cleared the 
way for a turn to Nature and History, while the significance of the 
nominalist school for politics was to sound the death-knell for 
the legitimation of the exercise of arbitrary rule by an individual 
lord or king (Bisson 2009) and the first articulation of social 
contract theory in Scotus (Wolter 2001). This, then, was the 
beginning of the end of the monopolisation of political theology 
by elites and status quo doctrines regarding the social order, and 
the ‘explosive’ pluralisation of rival political ontologies among the 
different social strata and even within religious orders.135 In this 
regard, a piece of social theory that stretched back to St. Paul’s 
letter to the Romans 13: 1-3 was fundamentally weakened: “You 
must all obey the governing authorities. Since all government 
comes from God, the civil authorities were appointed by God, and 
so anyone who resists authority is rebelling against God’s decision, 
and such an act is bound to be punished” (Jerusalem Bible 1968). 
Once this taboo was lifted from the political consciousness of 
believers, they were more or less free to conclude any social order 
which contradicted the Gospel had to be changed. 
As a theory of knowledge, the consequences of nominalism 
had similar far-reaching consequences, such as the end of a naïve 
realism and the end of uncritical estimations of Man’s natural 
knowledge of God as nominalism claimed no demonstrative 
knowledge of God was possible, and thereby ruled out any easy 
victory of ‘pure reason’ while safeguarding against scepticism 
135 In 1323 pope John XXII ruled against the proposition of a group of 
Franciscans known as the Spiritual Franciscans that the usus pauper or the 
restricted ownership of material goods should be obligatory for all followers of 
St. Francis (1181-1226).
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insofar as it accorded a new soteriological significance to reason 
or man’s cognitional life in light of its conviction that, just as 
God had committed Himself to a freely chosen and established 
order of salvation, so He had likewise committed the full 
responsibility or the full weight of knowledge of intelligible being 
to the natural power of the human intellect. In the nominalist 
theory of signification, then, “words are the connecting link 
between the mind and reality and between the world and God” 
(Trinkaus & Oberman 1974, p. 80), and when Boehner (1990, 
p. li) writes that nominalism was the original via moderna and 
that, “One historical fact, however, seems to be quite securely 
established: it was the physics of the via moderna which gave birth 
to modern physics,” we can see in the following passage from 
Ockham (cited in Boehner 1990, p. 11) something of the trust 
in reason that Habermas feels has been lost thanks to the freely 
created cognitional order having been freely ordained to the order 
of being:
Properly speaking, the science of nature is not about cor-
ruptible and generable things nor about natural substances 
nor about movable things…Properly speaking, the science 
of nature is about mental contents which are common to 
such things, and which stand precisely for such things.
The insight of nominalism, then, was that just as the human mind 
was made to bear the full weight of knowledge of intelligible 
being, so the full weight of freedom and working out one’s natural 
and supernatural destiny was to be borne by situated dasein as 
nominalism embraced the centrality and the efficacy of ‘post-
ontological’ verbal covenants or relationships between God 
and man, relationships that were no less dependable for being 
contingent and voluntary in origin. Just as for nominalist natural 
theology the order that prevails in the physical universe is in no 
sense necessary, so for nominalist social theory, the order that 
prevails in the social and economic sphere is in no sense necessary. 
Nominalists, then, took seriously the contingency they saw in 
nature, in human cognition, in social organisation and at the 
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supernatural level in the manner by which Jesus had redeemed 
humanity.
Within this perspective, contingency is not simply a brute fact 
but is providential, and its theonomic value is revealed in the 
practice of operationalising one’s relationship to one’s natural 
and supernatural destiny, which are not a matter of following a 
necessary and universal ontology but of exercising practical and 
‘cognitional agency’ which are dependent upon contingent 
contextual dasein using words, signs and concepts in its intellectual 
and intentional life, so that ultimately, contingency is providentially 
designed to bear the weight of the person’s redemption, so that 
Man can work out his salvation upon the basis of “laws voluntarily 
and contingently established by God” (Trinkaus and Oberman 
1974, p. 80). The discovery of the contingency of signification 
where signifiers or mere names (nomenes, from which we derive 
nominalism), whose only form of existence is cognitional (as 
opposed to also existing as eternal Platonic Ideas or models or 
templates of things in some non-earthly realm), is the point in time 
when the Christian mind began the historicisation of reason and 
the end of the reign of metaphysics or ‘pure reason’ over theology, 
insofar as the realities or processes of knowing and ‘being saved’ 
were entrusted to ‘secondary natures’ and ‘secondary causality.’
In Catholic Scotland the patient study of mental acts or 
‘cognitional agency’ has a long history and in the view of Broadie 
(2008, p. 2), Scottish intellectual life remained within the benign 
shadow of the Subtle Doctor until the disastrous wrong-turning of 
the Protestant Reformation of 1560. “Scotus was the great 
philosopher of freedom of the Middle Ages” and his influence 
upon John of Ireland (c.1440-1495) is clear from Ireland’s close 
following of Scotus’s doctrine of free will and his adopting the 
classical conciliarist position in The Mirror of Wisdom (1490) and 
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (c.1480), which 
located authority within the Church in the communal nature of 
the believing community, rather than exclusively in the Pope or 
the Church hierarchy (see McDonald 1991). Conciliarism, then, 
was a doctrine that, when politicized, became a ‘democratic’ 
argument that located sovereignty within the community or the 
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people rather than Crown or Parliament. As Broadie (2009, p. 5) 
has put it: “[Scotus’s] political philosophy almost certainly had an 
impact on two of the great documents of early Scotland, the 
Declaration of the Clergy (1310) and the Declaration of Arbroath 
(1320).”
James Liddell’s On Concepts and Signs (1495) carried on the 
nominalist tradition’s patient study of mental acts, while Lokert’s 
(c.1485-1547) Writing on the Subject of Notions (1514) maintained 
this epistemological turn and its focus upon the cognitional 
subject as integral to Scottish intellectual life. Indeed, such is the 
theonomic conception of human reason that in the opinion of 
Broadie (1990, p. 19), “Ireland has regard for the fact that we do 
tend…to see our acts as causally determining God to respond.” 
Likewise, in the work of William Manderston (c.1485-1552) 
when dealing with the question whether the motivations to 
morality and belief are purely natural or not, he argues: “a 
person’s free will can produce an act which is morally entirely 
good without God’s special help (cited in Broadie 1990, p. 71), 
and Broadie concludes his discussion of the goodness of human 
nature and whether there is a purely natural ability to know and 
love and be moral with the observation that: “Manderston thus 
places the full weight of responsibility upon our free will” (1990, 
p. 71). Other significant Scottish nominalists included Lawrence 
of Lindores (1372-1437) who as inquisitor-general in Scotland not 
only burned heretics but, in his capacity as rector of St. Andrews 
University and a devout nominalist, banned the teaching of naive 
realism.
The relevance of these writers for the project of articulating 
working-class integral liberation, then, lies in their recognition of 
the causality of knowledge and the need to exercise ‘cognitional 
agency’ in achieving a purely natural apotheosis. At this point we 
may say in the rejection of naïve realism there is a ‘coming of age’ 
in Scottish and European intellectual life which consists of 
inaugurating or recognising a ‘perennial’ tension that henceforth 
lies at the heart of the modern Christian consciousness as a direct 
result of having to reconcile the conviction that the supernatural 
is at work in socially stratified and unequal societies, and from the 
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twelfth and thirteenth-centuries, theology is more or less coerced 
into becoming fully contextual insofar as the task of becoming 
Christian is the task of triangulating the autonomous orders of 
human cognition and the Gospel and human society. Henceforth, 
integrating or aligning the three levels of cognitional structure, 
socialised dasein and the supernatural is the ‘ideal type’ synthesis 
that will keep Christianity alive in the hearts of modern men and 
women. Also, however, if recognising the need for this triangulation 
is the achievement of the twelfth and thirteenth-century, it also 
allows us to see that any subsequent failure to maintain the 
tension of this new vision will be a regressive opting for one of 
two equally erroneous and false choices:
1)  a regressive supernaturalism that does not recognise 
and embrace the theonomic value of (i) the purely 
natural and social life of the person and (ii) a regressive 
clericalism in the life of the community called the 
Church.
2)  a regressive empiricism/materialism that concludes the 
empirical realm of nature or ‘secondary natures’ is the 
proper object and full extent of human inquiry, 
knowledge and reality.
I propose that these two ‘ideal type’ errors can be used to read 
subsequent eras that were faced with maintaining the threefold 
tension of ‘being human,’ ‘being modern’ and ‘being Christian,’ or 
the tension of being imago mundi and the transcendent call to 
be imago Dei. In this regard, the advent of experiments in new 
forms of Christian living in community in the world which 
sought to combine a life of faith and the attempt to build a new 
social order during the twelfth-century reform of Christianity 
was similarly keenly felt during the emergence of industrial 
civilization throughout Europe in the early nineteenth-century, 
and triggered the search in industrialising societies for what 
might be termed an integral or a ‘socialised Christianity’ in light 
of Rahner’s (1967, cited in Losinger 2000, p. xxix) recognition 
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that: “Today dogmatic theology must be anthropology and such 
an ‘anthropological turn’ is necessary.” In The Great Transformation 
([1944] 2001) which charted the advent of free-market society 
and the production-based society that we inhabit today, Polanyi 
(2001, p. 176) identified an early example of this triangulation or 
integralism in Robert Owen’s village of New Lanark which was 
organised upon co-operative principles.
Owenism was a religion of industry the bearer of which was 
the working class…it was the beginning of the modern trade 
union movement. Cooperative societies were founded…
determined to devote the profits of the venture to the 
furtherance of… the establishment of Villages of Cooperation.
In Owen’s A New View of Society (1816) Polanyi identified the 
resolve to resist falling into the error of both a regressive 
otherworldly supernaturalism and a regressive materialism, as 
Owen fought to retain the ‘whole man’ in industrialising society 
and resist the modernist anthropology which wishes to ‘privatise’ 
and separate ‘spheres of social life’ (religion, politics, art, economic 
activity etcetera) and which sociologists would incorrectly 
come to identify as integral to or a signature characteristic of 
modernisation itself. Throughout Europe at this time, similar 
attempts at the integration of Christianity and the new industrial 
order were seen such as Saint-Simon’s New Christianity ([1825] 
1964) which sought to articulate a vision where new social 
conditions might stimulate a pan-European response in the form 
of a European-wide Christian integralism,136 something which 
Polanyi viewed as part of European societies protecting themselves 
136 Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was influential in the history of sociology for 
coining important terms such as ‘industrialization’ and ‘positive science,’ as well 
as his role as mentor to August Comte (1798-1857), the founding-father of 
‘social physics’ who was to coin the term ‘sociology’ in 1839. As an erstwhile 
French Catholic attempting to align modern social conditions and Christianity, 
Isidore Augusto Marie François Xavier Comte ended up articulating his hugely 
influential theory of the three stages of society (see Gane 2006). 
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from the excesses of the free-market order insofar as the latter 
involved the ‘total mobilisation’ of resources, not for subsistence 
but the never-ending ‘godless’ pursuit of profit and new markets. 
Seen in this light, then, much as nationalism is no longer viewed 
as an irrational throwback to an earlier and simpler social 
formation but as a reality generated by the very modern conditions 
of new social formations, so the attempts to articulate a New 
Christianity were new movements attempting the recuperation of 
an earlier integralism and an earlier organisation, and not 
backward or forlorn attempts at returning to the past but fully 
integral to modernity itself. 
8.3 The Failure of Supernaturalism as  
a Paradigm for Sociology
In line with these early attempts at integralism or aligning the old 
with the new, nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe and North 
America saw attempts to establish a Christian sociology in order 
to contest a purely academic and largely secularised sociology. In 
1893 the American Institute of Christian Sociology was founded 
and in 1894 the Oberlin Institute of Christian Sociology was 
established,137 while in the following year William J. Kerby 
introduced the study of sociology to the Catholic University of 
America. The widepread desire to relate faith to the study of 
society led to the establishing of The American Catholic Sociological 
Society (ACSS) in 1938, an initiative largely based upon the 
widely-shared premise that a purely naturalistic social theory 
could only be an inadequate basis for a discipline concerned with 
understanding human societies, and the fact that many scholars 
137 Such was the widespread acceptance of a Christian standpoint for doing 
sociology at this time that in volume 1 of the American Journal of Sociology 
(1895, p. 15) we read the following editorial: “To many readers the most 
important question about the conduct of the Journal will be with reference to its 
attitude to ‘Christian sociology.’ The answer is, in a word, toward Christian 
sociology sincerely deferential, towards alleged ‘Christian sociologists’ severely 
suspicious.” 
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viewed sociology as threatened by what they saw as the dogmatic 
secularism of founding figures such as Emile Durkheim138 whose 
influence had prevented sociology from dealing adequately with 
spiritual or religious realities in the life of society. Durkheim’s 
sociology was taken to task for its dogmatic atheism which, in the 
opinion of his former collaborator Gaston Richard (1923, cited in 
Pickering 1975, pp. 228-276), had infected sociology with a 
naturalistic metaphysics so that mainstream sociology has 
misconstrued the relationship between modernity and religion.
The basis for a Christian sociology, then, was the conviction 
that the attempt to understand real human beings and their 
communities and cultures across time “cannot be reconciled with 
the naturalistic thesis…put forward by so-called scientific 
sociology” (Sturzo 1947, p. 14). The search for a sociology that 
recognised the reality of the sacred and the secular was felt to be 
the only kind of sociology that could be capable of studying 
human beings and society and history realistically, or as they in 
fact are insofar as real human beings do not divide themselves or 
their lives into binary oppositions such as ‘material life’ and 
‘religious life.’ What was required then was a break with the 
merely “empirical attitude to social questions and relate social 
analysis to the true nature of humanity” (Lyon 1983, p. 231), so 
that in the view of the ACSS, a new sociology was needed to 
combat positivist sociology which had abandoned every attempt 
at synthesising or integrating faith (or moral values) and social 
reality, while in Europe the same concern in the nineteen-thirties 
saw the development of sociologie religieuse or ‘religious sociology’ 
associated with the work of Gabriel Le Bras and Jacques Leclerq. 
This European initiative was a sociology inspired by pastoral 
concerns, and involved empirical research and collecting 
demographic data on the changing patterns of church attendance 
and the different organisational structures of rural and urban 
parishes, and culminated in the founding of La Conference 
138 The received view that Durkheim foisted a materialist metaphysics onto 
sociology has been recently contested by Riley’s (2010) Godless Intellectuals? 
The Intellectual Pursuit of the Sacred Reinvented. 
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Internationale de Sociologie Religieuse (CISR) in 1948 at the 
Catholic University of Louvain, with the aim of pursuing a 
sociology to serve the needs of the Church. 139
Despite these developments, however, and the fact that many 
social scientists held religious beliefs, a supernatural or Christian 
standpoint for ‘doing sociology’ failed to establish itself as a 
legitimate standpoint in the way positivism or, more recently, 
gender has established itself as a legitimate standpoint for doing 
sociology. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that simply 
recognising the triple tension of ‘being human,’ ‘being modern’ 
and ‘being Christian’ and identifying the need to respond by 
articulating a form of integralism, does not effect the necessary 
alignment between the human and the social and the supernatural. 
Insofar as the heart of the matter was enacting or performing 
this new triangulation through original data and research and 
conceptual innovations upon the basis of contingent realities 
such as class-based ‘secondary natures’ or industrialised dasein, 
the advocates of a non-naturalistic sociology were too caught up 
in arguing for the sui generic reality of the religious sphere of 
human experience in opposition to the widespread reductionist 
sociology of religion, and failed to realise that a genuinely 
Christian sociology had to establish itself upon a sui generic social 
basis, and as long as it was simply an extension or application of 
theology it would fail to establish itself as a legitimate sociological 
standpoint. The widely-shared desire for a post-positivist sociology 
was not in question, but to establish such a new sociology, 
something much more than this negative unity was required. 
In the opinion of Lyon (1983, p. 229):
The Christian sociologists generally followed the mainstream 
route, without elaborating the implications of their particular 
139 Leclercq believed that religion could not be studied by non-religious people 
without great risk of erroneous interpretations and that “religious sociology 
could be pursued only by religious minds, and in particular, that the sociological 
study of the Catholic Church should be done by Catholics knowing theology” 
(Dobbelaere 1989, p. 381). 
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metaphysical commitments, some of which could, ironically, 
have contributed in the long run to a genuinely distinctive 
sociological outlook.
The longer the project of a religious sociology remained trapped 
in a form of theologically-inspired intuition, those who were 
unhappy with a merely dogmatic assertion of the existence or 
possibility of a Catholic sociology eventually began to suspect that 
the very idea was misconceived, and the longer this failure to 
articulate such a new sociology went on, pre-Conciliar Catholics 
such as Evans-Pritchard (1965, p. 121), for example, not 
untypically resorted to a professional agnosticism on the question 
of the possible alignment of the professional anthropologist and 
the ‘private’ believer:
As far as the study of religion as a factor in social life is 
concerned, it may make little difference whether the 
anthropologist is a theist or an atheist, since in either case he 
can only take into account what he can observe. But if either 
attempts to go further than this, each must pursue a different 
path. The non-believer seeks for some theory–biological, 
psychological, or sociological – which will explain the illusion…
On this point I find myself in agreement with Schmidt in his 
confutation of Renan: ‘If religion is essentially of the inner life, 
it follows that it can be truly grasped only from within.’
The failure of a Christian sociology came down to the fact that 
those in favour of such a project failed to demonstrate ‘proof of 
concept.’ Hence, one of the pioneering advocates of a supernatural 
sociology, Luigi Sturzo (1878-1955), could make the following 
observation (1947, p. 14):
I know of no sociologist who as such admits that there  
can be a free supernatural initiative…I do not say there are 
no Christian sociologists who believe by faith in the divine 
revelation; what I do say is that even their sociology remains 
on the purely natural plane – as if a natural society really 
existed free from any influence of the supernatural.
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From the perspective of the ‘integral sociology’ that will be 
outlined in the final section, these first attempts to establish a 
Christian sociology should be viewed in much the same way 
in which Strauss (1983, p. 6) viewed Schleiermacher’s lectures 
on the life of Jesus: “The truth is I found myself repelled by 
almost every aspect of these lectures…Schleiermacher proceeded 
from a construction of the person of Christ out of the Christian 
consciousness; this could only impress me as an uncritical 
presupposition.” This harsh judgment is deserved insofar as the 
responsibility for the failure of a Christian sociology lies with the 
failure to overcome what I term supernaturalism, which I would 
define as any attempt to found a sociology upon a metaphysical 
basis. An example of supernaturalism is the following entry for 
‘sociology’ in The Catholic Encyclopaedia of 1913 (p. 117):
Modern non-Catholic sociology hopes to arrive at a 
metaphysics through the systematic observation and inter- 
pretation of present and past social facts and processes.  
In the Christian-Catholic view of life, however, the social  
sciences are guided by a sanctioned metaphysics and 
philosophy. This philosophy is derived not from induction 
but from Revelation.
The above quote highlights the defining characteristic and defining 
failure of the supernaturalist approach, which was the inability 
to realise a Christian sociology like any kind of sociology must be 
founded upon the basis of ‘secondary natures’ i.e. upon empirical 
data and research and genuine first-hand discovery. While 
individual clerics were exceptional in maintaining a commitment 
to belief and conducting original empirical research (and in the 
case of Greeley (1989) have the scars to prove it), the fact is 
responsibility for the failure to establish a Christian sociology lies 
with those who saw the need to reject ‘supernaturalism’ but failed 
to provide a model of how the supernatural is at work in the 
industrial era. The reason behind the failure to establish a 
Christian sociology was because their entire point of view came 
“out of the Christian consciousness” (Strauss 1983, p. 6) and was 
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not sourced upon empirical research i.e. the entire basis of their 
wished-for sociological standpoint was itself removed from any 
kind of empirical demonstration, and this meant the non-believer 
had no ‘point of entry’ to recognise such a project as sociology. 
The only way a Christian sociology could credibly establish itself 
as an idea or project was to establish the reality or reasonableness 
of the supernatural upon the basis of purely natural empirical 
research, and because of its failure to do precisely this Lyon (1983, 
p. 237) could conclude:
As with English Christian Sociology…its American counter- 
part failed to make a systematic investigation of the 
connections between ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what is’... 
Christian sociology…did not survive as a distinct entity.
Because of the failure to synthesise or bring into alignment ‘what 
is’ i.e. modern life, with ‘what ought to be’ i.e. the advent of the 
supernatural to contextual dasein, the alignment of modernity 
and Christianity upon an empirical basis did not happen, and 
meant the idea of a Christian sociology lost credibility not only 
among its otherwise progressive supporters but saw some 
drawing the conclusion that the project of aligning these three 
realities and producing a Catholic sociology was analogous 
to constructing a Catholic geometry.140 In light of this failure, 
even someone open to the possibility that a purely naturalistic 
sociology may ultimately be inadequate as a paradigm for 
sociology can identify Luigi Sturzo as someone who failed to give 
any account of how the supernatural is at work via ‘secondary 
140 “Although he [Francis Friedal] and others in this group thought that Catholic 
sociologists should do sociology in the interests of a theologically inspired social 
reform, he did not think that the Catholic sociologist qua sociologist inquired 
into the dynamics of the social world in a manner distinct from other sociologists. 
As Paul Mundy observed, this point of view considered sociology “an 
autonomous social science, inherently distinct, analytically ‘pure’” (1958: 307) 
so that there could no more be a Catholic sociology than there could be a 
Catholic geometry or a Catholic biology” (Kivisto 1989, p. 357). 
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natures’ in industrial society, and thereby failed to overcome 
supernaturalism, so that even in Sturzo one can conclude that a 
genuinely sociological inquiry was never underway. As Sturzo 
(1947, p. 22) himself admitted: “I may be reproached with having 
left my integralism incomplete, since in my books I have dwelt 
little…on ethnographical studies.” 
In this regard John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory: 
Beyond Secular Reason (1990, p. 397) argues that theology must 
articulate “a full-blown social theory that is grounded in the 
Christian worldview.” For Milbank (2006, p. 9), “Once, there 
was no ‘secular’…[and no] ‘purely human’…Instead there was the 
single community of Christendom,” and it was nominalists such 
as Ockham, following Scotus, who invented and first imagined the 
space of ‘the secular’ and the space of ‘the political’ and ‘the 
social.’ This position seems unaware that previous efforts at a 
Christian sociology ended in failure because of this a priori 
ambition to assimilate sociology to theology, and as someone 
sympathetic to the call to move beyond ‘secular reason,’ I fail to 
find any ethnographic investigation in Milbank that evidences his 
contention that the supernatural is at work in contemporary 
society, and so Milbank remains an example of supernaturalism to 
the extent that his theological vision is not constituted via a pre-
theological immersion into any particular ethnographic context.
Unless such a project is established purely upon the basis of 
‘secondary natures,’ it can not command a hearing from those 
who do not already share a Christian standpoint, and for theology 
to articulate a full-blown social theory it must begin from the 
bottom and work its way up, an approach that is the very opposite 
of that of supernaturalism which is to already have all the answers 
up its theological sleeve. Whereas social analysis conducted upon 
a purely natural basis need not justify such an approach as the 
reality and existence of nature or society is empirically given, 
when proponents of a Christian sociology begin from the 
assumption of a reality ‘beyond nature’ and ‘beyond society,’ they 
are more or less faced from the outset with the problem of 
justifying this belief. As a standpoint for doing sociology, as 
opposed to a mere private belief of an individual researcher, the 
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supernatural has to be evidenced by some social or empirical 
means in order to be credible. The project of a Christian sociology 
was largely stillborn, then, because the problem of evidencing the 
supernatural upon the basis of modern contingency never arose 
insofar as it was assumed the fact of the Church and its obvious 
impact upon society, culture and history constituted empirical 
evidence of the supernatural at work.
If the devout supernaturalists, however, can be excused for 
failing to complete a project they never attempted, those who 
cannot be excused are those who rightly refused this convenient 
‘at hand’ evidence of the supernatural but who failed to ‘re-found’ 
the supernatural outwith the visible Church and upon the purely 
natural or purely social basis of integral contingency. If the 
supernaturalists applied already established principles from 
theology to the social order without suspecting that a real effort 
at coming-to-know that new social order was a precondition 
for coming-to-know the new categories of being and religious 
experience that would inculturate the Gospel into terms that 
modern men and women could understand, the non-supernaturalists 
likewise failed to articulate a purely natural and purely social 
post-metaphysical foundation for the supernatural, and so the real 
failure lay with those who recognised that specifically modern 
features of culture and society were stumbling blocks to faith and 
sources of alienation from belief in the supernatural; with those 
who recognised that the cultural and social realm were realities in 
their own right which merited their own sui generic study as a 
precondition for discerning whether or not they could mediate 
higher orders of human experience. 
Even would-be post-supernaturalists who saw the reconciliation 
of the social and supernatural required much more than the 
Church as evidence of the supernatural assumed precisely that 
which needed to be established: the existence of the supernatural 
at work in contemporary society. What the advocates of a Christian 
sociology failed to realise needed to be put to the test was the very 
possibility of the advent of the supernatural to modernised dasein, 
and so they had unwittingly stumbled upon the fight of their lives; 
for unless they could bring these two orders into alignment, they 
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would in their own way become agents of secularisation in their 
own eyes. Alternately, if the would-be ‘Christian sociologists’ had 
accomplished this then their standpoint would have become 
immanent to contextual dasein and being modern and the ‘proof 
of concept’ of a Christian sociology would have been secured, and 
some of the pain that was to explode into plain view among post-
Conciliar generations could have been avoided.
With the benefit of historical hindsight, this failure to establish 
a Christian sociology was consubstantial or iso-morphic with 
other failures of Christianity, such as the failure of nineteenth-
century Neoscholastic theology to offer a credible modern 
narrative of the supernatural, the failure of nineteenth and 
twentieth century theologians to ‘flesh out’ or incarnate God in 
the modern industrial era, and so in their own way they repeated 
the much earlier nominalist failure insofar as it had ‘discovered’ 
integral contingency, but had ultimately failed to articulate a 
contextual theology or a post-supernaturalist account of the 
advent of the supernatural in conditions of modernity; a failure 
which according to Long (2010) is ongoing in the current post-
conciliar context. 
The fundamental failure remains the failure to establish the 
analogia entis, or a relationship between the supernatural and the 
post-agrarian industrial era empirical reality that can overturn or 
at least offer some kind of resistance to the common sense view of 
the likes of Corrie when describing his fictionalised Cardenden in 
Black Earth (1939, p.1): “Neither the stars nor the moon seemed 
interested in the little township beneath them. And why should 
they? What was down there to interest eternal things?” The failure 
to compliment the traditional question of natural theology by 
developing a purely social and modern basis for theology meant 
attempts at a Christian sociology suffered a perennial identity 
crisis until calls for a Christian sociology disappeared from the 
membership of the ACSS by the nineteen-fifties (Varacalli, in 
Kivisto 1989, p. 358) and, most tellingly of all, the very institutions 
established to resist the secularisation of social theory themselves 
succumbed to the forces of naturalism or ‘secularisation,’ so that 
in 1970 The American Catholic Sociological Society (ACSS) 
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became The Association for the Sociology of Religion (ASR), 
while its journal The American Catholic Sociological Review 
secularised itself and became Sociological Analysis.
The back-story to this self-secularisation was the older clerical 
members of the European CISR and the American ACSS tended 
to favour a theologically-inspired sociology, while a younger 
generation of lay members of the CISR and ACSS criticised 
sociologie religieuse as theoretically under-developed but, cru-
cially, abandoned the creative tension of locating the supernatural 
within the realm of secondary natures in their research and meth-
odological debates, so that both the memberships of the ACSS 
and CISR more or less split between those who advocated the 
existence of a Catholic sociology and those who “sought to main-
tain an autonomous sphere for sociological discourse separate 
from social philosophy and Catholic theology” (Kivisto 1989, 
p. 356). In continental Europe, Leclercq, like Ralph Gallagher in 
America, lived to see the secularisation of the organization he had 
founded at the hands of a new generation of members who were 
neither clerics nor theologians. By the 1970s the CISR like its 
American counterpart had become just another academic society 
concerned with promoting the sociology of religion.
While a younger generation recognised large swathes of 
populations immersed in modern industrial social and cultural 
conditions were alienated from the supernatural, insofar as 
they failed to articulate a relationship between these new 
conditions and the supernatural, the project of a Christian 
sociology was unable to challenge mainstream sociology’s truism 
that modernisation entailed secularisation. If no sociologist 
did more than Max Weber to articulate the sociological thesis 
of Western secularisation, we look in vain for the Christian 
sociologist who credibly articulated the counter-narrative of 
‘modernisation is sacralisation’ and resist Weber’s thesis that 
modern processes of rationalisation and differentiation of life-
spheres led to secularisation. No Christian sociology demonstrated 
that the same sociological processes could be embraced as a new 
starting point for articulating how the supernatural was possible 
and in fact operative in a new way in conditions of modernity, and 
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how modern processes and new social conditions were ultimately 
the very conditions, and not simply stumbling blocks, that made 
experience of the supernatural possible for contemporary men and 
women socialised and immersed in these modern social conditions.
There is no small irony in the fact that just as an open invitation 
was extended to the kind of vision for sociology which had been 
pioneered by the founders of the ACSS and the CISR i.e. a post-
positivistic sociology, “there was no one interested in responding 
to the call” (Fitzpatrick 1978, cited in Kivisto 1989, p. 360). After 
the pluralisation of standpoints for sociology that emerged from 
the nineteen-eighties, and in response to Gouldner’s call for a 
Catholic sociology from the perspective of the option for the poor, 
the theologian turned sociologist Gregory Baum concluded: “I do 
not think it would be a useful strategy” (cited in Izuzquiera 2006, 
p. 403-4n). Intriguingly, the fact that the call for a different kind 
of sociology became mainstream from the nineteen-eighties was 
itself the result of another history of failure of another kind of 
sociology, this time the failure of purely naturalistic sociology to 
emulate the hard sciences and as the next section will detail, 
the criticisms levelled at attempts at a Christian sociology bore 
a striking resemblance to purely secular or materialist forms of 
‘doing sociology’ that had a commitment to human liberation.
8.4 The Failure of Secularism as a Paradigm for Sociology
If Christian thinkers largely failed to successfully engage with the 
new industrial era as an opportunity for the re-foundation of their 
understanding of God’s presence to history, and his ‘adventability’ 
to industrial dasein and mitsein, it seemed only a matter of time 
before purely naturalistic thinkers succeeded where they had 
failed thanks to being free of any theological baggage, and which 
meant they could wholeheartedly embraced the new bourgeois 
free-market era as the new basis upon which to achieve Man’s 
liberation from inequality and poverty, and begin the rational 
organisation of economy and society. Such theorists of the new 
post-gemeinschaft order had no hesitation in sloughing off any 
remnants of ‘organicism’ from their social theory as their 
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materialist recognition and emphasis upon class struggle became 
installed as a central feature of their social theory and political 
activism. From the outset, then, a purely natural social theory 
sought to achieve a materialist conception of Man’s integral 
liberation not only upon non-idealist philosophical sources such 
as Hegel but upon no appeal to transcendence. As Giddens (1986, 
p. 4) put it from his modernist/secularist point of view: “In the 
French Revolution…for the first time in history there took place 
the overall dissolution of a social order by a movement guided by 
purely secular ideals – universal liberty and equality.”
However, the great strength of mind shown by the likes of 
Feuerbach (1804-1872) and Marx (1818-1883) in their pursuit 
of a post-metaphysical foundation for a radically liberating 
and critical social theory and destruction of all manner of 
‘supernaturalism’ was accompanied by a fatal weakness. When 
Feuerbach (1957), for example, declared theology to be simply 
an alienated form of anthropology, and claimed to have discovered 
the alienated anthropology hidden within theology, he appeared 
to solve a great riddle for those already wearied of the long 
failure of philosophers and theologians to articulate the purely 
natural apotheosis of the fully contextualised human being. 
Feuerbach’s claim answered or ‘spoke to’ some of the long durée 
failures of European modernity, and his readers imagined the 
great achievement of demythologisation had dissolved the 
‘superstitious’ tension of the transcendent and the immanent, 
and found a kind of liberation in this naturalisation of the 
European mind and Feuerbach’s ‘simplification’ of the burden of 
‘being European’ and ‘being modern’ and ‘being Christian.’ With 
Feuerbach, the dominant self-understanding of the modern era 
becomes that of instantiating a caesura with the past (Ardener 
1985), and the significance of the issue that had tormented 
European minds was lost sight of insofar as it was claimed that the 
solution to what had been troubling the European mind for 
centuries could be peremptorily summarised as the ‘materialist’ 
triumph over ‘idealism.’
While Feuerbach gave a plausible explanation for the existence 
of religion for the dogmatic non-believer by explaining it away, 
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for many non-believers and believers Feuerbach resolved nothing. 
Perhaps the real achievement of Feuerbach was to ‘clear the decks’ 
to allow the question of Man’s purely natural beatitude to take 
centre stage – although the issue of the natural beatitude of Man 
remained whole and entire, and far from showing history a clean 
pair of heels, Feuerbach had simply succeeded in resurrecting the 
twelfth-century problematic of a purely natural human beatitude 
and failed, just like his twelfth and thirteenth century forebears, to 
give any account of it, and so the great merit of Feuerbach was 
precisely his retrieval of this long durée problematic. However, as 
I will argue, in this regard Feuerbach was to prove to be a template 
for the failure of Marxism and twentieth century critical social 
theory’s attempts to find an immanent anchor for a purely natural 
account of integral human liberation.
Despite their mutual antagonism, the tie that bound Christianity 
and Marxism together was the task of imagining a non-alienated 
human dasein and society, and Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity 
([1841] 1957) may serve as the watershed text because it is here 
that the tension of the integral revolution, the link between 
the twelfth-century and the nineteenth-century industrial era, is 
taken up again only to fail, because of the failure to articulate 
the purely natural beatitude of a particular class-based dasein. 
Marx and everyone else, of course, quickly spotted the fact that 
Feuerbach had given a de-contextualised or universalist treatment 
of the problem, and was fully confident that a fully contextualised 
account of human liberation would be forthcoming. However, the 
fact is that rather than solving a long-standing problem, Marx 
himself imitated Feuerbach’s weakness for liquidating long durée 
problematics with the stroke of his ‘materialist’ pen, such as when 
he wrote that “liberation is an historical and not a mental act” 
(Marx, cited in Arthur 1970, p. 61). 
There is something tragic and comedic in noting Marx’s 
celebrated ending of idealist philosophy occurred wholly within 
the realm of ‘pure reason,’ and the same can be said of Marx’s 
theory of working-class liberation, which is drawn entirely from 
the philosophical reflections of members of society whose ideas 
Marx was otherwise keen to expose as ideology. As a member 
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of that social elite himself, Marx’s ideas on the sociology of 
knowledge should have meant his own ideas should have remained 
ideological weapons that could neither know nor liberate 
working-class dasein or mitsein. How Marx escaped the social 
determinations he was quick to identify in the ‘idealistic’ 
thought of others, and how he neither needed a contextualised 
phenomenology of working-class dasein nor a theory of working-
class liberation from the ‘inside’ yet could still claim to theorise 
their freedom in a non-idealist fashion, reveals the extent of the 
reliance upon ‘pure reason’ by the advocates of what was called 
‘materialism.’
With the benefit of historical hindsight it is clear to us today 
that Marx produced a version of Hegel in which the Hegelian 
subject’s dialectical journey to self-knowledge and liberation 
was replaced by a non-empirically and non-historically verified 
theory of history and theory of society. While it is clear that Marx 
envisaged the need for the de-mystification of consciousness, and 
despite his purely idealistic disavowal of idealism, Marx did 
indeed presuppose a purely intellectual or mental liberation, he 
himself nowhere gave an account of it. The articulation of this 
particular aspect of human liberation was only taken up by 
others such as György Lukács (1885–1971) and Karl Korsch 
(1886-1961) who saw the absence of a ‘materialist’ phenomenology 
of mind or account of revolutionary consciousness as a fatal 
weakness in Marx and one which they sought to correct. In this 
regard Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness ([1923] 1971) 
remains the landmark effort insofar as it attempted a revision 
of Marxism, and attempted to succeed where the idealist 
Hegel and the ‘materialist’ Feuerbach and Marx had failed, 
by effecting a reconciliation between Hegel’s view (in Hodgson 
1984, p. 113) that: “Human beings are truly human through 
consciousness – by virtue of the fact that they think and by virtue 
of the fact that they are spirit,” and the material condition of 
alienation where a person’s real social existence is in conflict with 
his human essence.
While for Hegel it was Christianity which recognised the 
“cleavage of the subject, of the ego, from the infinite” (cited in 
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Hodgson 1984, p. 105), this theological overcoming of alienation 
became naturalised in Feuerbach and Lukacs as a historical and 
political imperative of the proletariat to reconcile its existential 
self with its objective social conditions and achieve the Hegelian 
‘identical subject-object.’ Lukacs, then, recognised (1971, p. 68): 
“The unique function of consciousness in the class struggle of 
the proletariat has consistently been overlooked by the vulgar 
Marxists who have substituted a petty ‘Realpolitik’ for the great 
battle of principle,” and in his History and Class Consciousness 
(1971) he set himself the task of describing a dialectical process 
whereby “the proletariat is the identical subject-object of the 
history of society became truly concrete” (1971, p. 206). However, 
already in this text, Lukacs (1971, pp. 205-6) had advised his 
reader:
The individual stages of this process cannot be sketched in 
here. They alone would be able to show how proletarian 
class consciousness evolves dialectically (i.e. how the pro- 
letariat becomes a class). Only then would it be possible  
to throw light on the intimate dialectical process of inter- 
action between the socio-historical situation and the class 
consciousness of the proletariat.
From the outset, then, it was recognised that some kind of 
description of this process was desperately needed. However, 
when writing a new preface to his classic text published in 1967, 
Lukacs (1971, p. xxiii) not only failed to give what he promised 
in 1923, but rejected the project of the proletarian coming into 
intellectual possession of himself as a res cogitans as a utopian 
fantasy:
But is the identical subject-object here anything more  
in truth than a purely metaphysical construct? Can a 
genuinely identical subject-object be created by self-
knowledge, however adequate?...We need only formulate 
the question precisely to see that it must be answered in the  
negative.
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Lukacs’s abandoning of the task of giving an account of what 
the European mind had cut itself in half for all the better to 
achieve, goes a long way to explaining the failure of radical 
social theory and the current post-Enlightenment malaise, as 
it represents another chapter in the long durée failure to find 
something which the European mind has been searching for 
since the twelfth-century i.e. an account of the purely natural 
apotheosis of Man or the ‘identical subject-object’ via an act of 
self-understanding. If today such reflexive acts and cognitional 
agency are deemed imaginary constructs of ‘pure reason,’ the 
failure of the Lukacsian project is a crucial factor in explaining the 
defeatism that Habermas (2010) has alluded to. 
Similarly, for Held (1981) and Bronner (1994), the nineteen-
twenties and thirties were decisive insofar as the failure of the 
working classes to challenge the rise of fascism and the capitalist 
social order meant that, by the nineteen-forties, the Frankfurt 
School had already displayed a symptomatic malaise regarding 
the ambition of articulating the purely natural apotheosis 
of contextual human dasein and had become hostile to the idea of 
the standpoint of the working class being the ‘subject of history,’ 
as well as hostile to the related Hegelian and Lukacsian notion of 
an actual or potential unity between subject and object. In their 
acclaimed Dialectic of Enlightenment ([1944] 1973) Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s view that the proletariat was not the revolutionary 
subject of history was consubstantial with the end of any real 
belief in the ability of reason to illuminate social and political 
practice in a revolutionary way. As the defeated Adorno (1974, 
p. 28) put it: “In the end, glorification of splendid underdogs is 
nothing other than glorification of the splendid system that makes 
them so. The justified guilt-feelings of those exempt from physical 
work ought not become an excuse for the ‘idiocy of rural life.’ ’’
This demotion of the proletariat from their starring role thanks 
to their failure to fulfill their assigned role within the Marxist 
imagination more or less signaled the end of the (left-wing) 
Enlightenment project which, bereft of any anchorage in the 
working class, led more or less directly to a reliance upon the 
weapons of ‘pure reason’ which in turn resulted in a certain despair 
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at reason. If there was a healthy recognition that ‘pure reason’ was 
simply incapable of directing political practice or of knowing or 
liberating different contexts and different contingencies, there was 
no immersion in particularity, and Horkheimer refused to identify 
the freedom of the individual with any objective political ideology 
or social arrangement, either Soviet socialism or Western capitalism, 
to the point where any kind of social anchor for the project of 
triangulating humanity and modernity and Christianity was lost. 
Adorno’s ‘negative dialectics’ theoretically sanctioned this flight 
from particularity and contingency by affirming the non-identity 
between the person and his or her social conditions, and referred 
to the “ontology of false conditions” in the name of an endangered 
subjectivity. For Adorno, any position which claimed to articulate 
a relationship of ‘identity’ between reason and reality was by 
definition ideology, and such was the contradiction held to obtain 
between the socialised self and authentic human being that Adorno 
(in Held 1981, p. 72) spoke of a ‘totally administered’ subjectivity:
Adaptation of men to social relationships…has left its mark 
on them such that...even breaking free mentally…has come 
to seem a fable and a distant one. Men have come to be - 
triumph of integration! - identified in their innermost 
behaviour patterns with their fate in modern society.
Perhaps the theorist associated with the Frankfurt school who 
came closest to recognising that ‘pure reason’ had to be overcome 
by an ethnographic turn was Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), as 
already in 1928 he had drawn the conclusion that a phenomenology 
of dasein in the style of Heidegger’s Being and Time ([1926] 1962) 
was inadequate because it bypassed material conditions, and that 
it was fruitless to ask questions concerning concrete human 
existence in terms of ‘existence itself’ in the manner of Heidegger, 
because the division of society into classes meant there were a 
number of different human existences because there were different 
social existences. Describing Heidegger’s position as one where: 
“Daily existence…can recall its own actual being; it can take over 
“being itself (Siende) in its dejectedness” (Marcuse 1969, p. 15), 
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Marcuse was optimistic that: “The labour of the proletarian 
prevents any self-fulfilment; his work negates his entire existence. 
This utmost negativity, however, takes a positive turn” (Marcuse, 
cited in Held 1980, p. 239), although, as per Lukacs, he similarly 
failed to give an empirical analysis of how ‘utmost negativity’ 
could take a positive turn. 
This problematic of proletarian autonomy or freedom similarly 
preoccupied Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997) who had also 
identified the absence of any real analysis of dasein within 
Marxism as a major theoretical weakness. In The Imaginary 
Institution of Society (1987, p. 57) Castoriadis recognised, in 
contrast to vanguard positions which valorised the role of the 
Party or an intelligentsia, that “the emancipation of the workers 
will be the work of the workers themselves:”
We cannot directly present a theory, even our own, as 
‘representing the point of view of the proletariat’, for  
the history of the past century has shown that, far from 
offering the solution to all the problems, the point of view 
of the proletariat is itself a problem, for which only the 
proletariat (let us say, to avoid quibbling, labouring 
humanity) will be able to invent, or will fail to invent, a 
solution (1987, p. 36).
In the opinion of Castoriadis, an adequate account of the 
specifically symbolic aspect of domination was necessary if the 
possibility of the purely natural apotheosis, whereby an uncoerced 
ego becomes identical with itself, was to be realised. Also, the 
problem of giving an answer to Lukacs’s question (1971, p. 46) 
“what, then, is the meaning of class consciousness?” for Castoriadis 
was yet to be answered because “the relation between the 
revolutionaries and the masses, remains whole and entire” (1987, 
p. 61). In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
the global triumph of the neoliberal New World Order, such 
practico-theoretical problems for many seem more or less obsolete. 
However, the attempt to articulate the notion of the free or 
autonomous worker is not simply the last remnants of the old 
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Hegelian cud, as what lies beneath this project is the twelfth-
century turning to immanence as Hegel’s phenomenology was 
from start to finish a more or less obvious attempt to naturalise 
the Christian’s duty to work out his or her salvation.
The modernist phase of social theory started out confidently 
believing a liberation from religion had happened as a result of 
the advent of modernity, and to this was added the belief that 
this liberation was a precondition for the emergence of a fully 
autonomous social theory.141 However, when Marx asserted in 
Towards A Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1844) that 
“the criticism of religion is the presupposition of all criticism” 
(cited in McLellan 1977, pp. 63-74), he was paying a debt to 
Strauss’s Life of Jesus (1835) as it was Strauss’s epochal criticism 
of supernaturalism both in theology and historical scholarship 
that informed every subsequent (alleged) materialist critique of 
idealist philosophical thinking about the nature of society. It was 
Strauss who had broken the taboo of critiquing religion, and it 
was thanks to him that demythologisation became the order of the 
day for a generation of thinkers free to criticise ‘everything that 
exists,’ so that Marxism may be described as a school of Straussian 
demythologisation insofar as Marx’s ambition was to do for social 
theory what Strauss had achieved for theology and the history 
of religion.
It was from Christian theologians, then, that ‘left Hegelians’ 
such as Feuerbach and Marx learned how to ‘do sociology’ and 
demythologise the state and religion and bourgeois society, 
because it was Strauss the demythologising theologian who 
provided Feuerbach with a model of how to dispense with 
‘supernaturalism’ as a result of nineteenth-century theologians’ 
141 Probably the most well-known example of the secularisation thesis in social 
theory and the myth of modern societies being post-Christian, and sociology as 
the study of modern societies being more or less coerced into being non-religious, 
is Comte’s ‘law of the three stages’ according to which human history has passed 
through three stages: (1) the theological stage (until 1300), (2) the metaphysical 
stage (from c.1300 to 1800) and (3) the positive stage (from 1800) characterised 
by belief in science (Gane 2006). 
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search for the historical Jesus of Nazareth as opposed to the Christ 
of faith. We might make the case then that Marx was not Straussian 
enough insofar as Marx remained happy to chew the old Hegelian 
cud, and retained much of the idealist Hegelian edifice which 
Strauss had already exposed as unhistorical. In his Defence of My 
Life of Jesus Against the Hegelians Strauss (1983, p. 8) observed: 
“Hegel was personally no friend of historical critique. It annoyed 
him, as it annoyed Goethe, [to] see the heroic figures of antiquity, 
to which their higher feeling clung lovingly, gnawed at by critical 
doubt. If, occasionally, these figures were puffs of mist which 
they took to be pieces of rock, they did not want to know.” In 
conclusion, then, we may say that despite the great prospects for 
human freedom opened up by Marxism, this great promise had 
become largely exhausted by the nineteen-seventies in Western 
Europe, with Marxism itself criticised as having become an 
obsolete set of ideas. In the opinion of Piccone and Delfini (1970, 
p. 38), for example: “Marcuse is the only philosopher who has 
addressed himself to today’s problems as they are…and not as they 
should be according to some preconstituted ideological scheme.”
8.5 An Integral Sociology
The similarity between the failure to develop a Christian or 
supernatural sociology and the failure to develop a purely secular 
account of integral liberation is striking. What is also interesting 
is that both projects failed because both failed to articulate a 
performative account of the purely natural apotheosis of fully 
contextualised dasein. Firstly ‘religious’ and then ‘secular’ thinkers 
attempted to come to terms with the new industrial order emerging 
around them, and both attempts failed to break with ‘pure reason’ 
or ‘faith positions’ and establish themselves purely upon ‘secondary 
natures.’ With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that critical theory 
in its allegedly ‘materialist’ guise in fact failed to transcend the 
(Christian) idealism of Hegel, and reproduced the failure of those 
Christians who wished to break with supernaturalism, and both 
projects based their critiques of social conditions upon a merely 
theological or philosophical rebellion of pure reason that could 
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not find in concrete ethnographic reality the means to leverage the 
transformation needed. 
In light of this shared failure the way is clear for embracing a 
fuller conception of modernity and the conscious rejection of a 
false modernist understanding of dasein; an understanding of 
modernity and dasein that allies with the artistic modernity of 
Baudelaire who wished painting to depict the contemporary and 
the everyday, and that allies with the modernity of Benjamin who 
wished to recapture “the glow of the profane” (cited in Bronner 
1994, p. 6), as these artists draw upon the original inspiration of 
Giotto to paint modernity and dasein with a full palette of colour. 
Similarly, the way is clear to be modern with Foucault for whom 
being modern is to cultivate a critical relationship to one’s 
contingency via instantiating a dialectical relationship of accepting 
oneself while simultaneously ‘breaking with’ the self, in order to 
elaborate a critical encounter with one’s historicity and fashion 
one’s authenticity and sanctification. 
Given this recent history of intellectual failure from the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one can better appreciate 
the difficulties faced by twelfth-century theologians trying to 
break free from philosophy and theology with only the tools of 
philosophy and theology to do so. Inaugurating an anthropological 
turn against a dominant supernaturalism was clearly a task that 
ordinarily had to fail, and both the attempt and particular failures 
are blood relatives of nineteenth and twentieth-century theorists 
in both the Christian and the Marxist tradition attempting to 
instantiate an anthropological turn against the dominant idealist 
philosophers to secure a profane or secular anchor for liberation. 
The failure of secular sociology to deliver an account of inte-
gral liberation has a direct counterpart in Christian sociology’s 
failure to evidence the supernatural at work in capitalist society, 
so that the original breakthrough and subsequent failure of the 
twelfth-century has been recapitulated in secular form and in reli-
gious form. While it is now recognised that theology and meta-
physics heavily influenced secular theorists in their search for a 
critique of the industrial capitalist social order, we can see in 
the rise and fall of Marxism the same rise and fall pattern within 
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the Christian tradition, where a founding ‘revelation’ simultane-
ously highlighted the nature of a particular reality and more or 
less effectively ended the need to dialogue with and learn from 
empirical reality, so that Marxism like the Church discovered 
the hard way that a ‘truth,’ whether religious or secular, when 
inherited second-hand rather than re-established afresh upon the 
basis of integral contingency, becomes a set of a priori truths that 
leads to disdain for calls for its experiential verification. If purely 
naturalistic sociology when faced with the issues of ethnographic 
verification resorted to the idealism of Hegel which it retained up 
its ‘naturalistic’ sleeve, we might characterise the failed project of 
a Christian sociology as the approach which when faced with the 
problem of explaining the modern ‘adventability’ of the living 
God, always had the answer up its ‘theological’ sleeve.
Having argued that the error modernism is disastrous for 
thinking Scottish dasein and the nation, we can also say now is the 
time for a reconciliation or a higher synthesis of these erstwhile 
rivals that recognises the only solution is to pursue an open-eyed 
and deliberate tension between fully contextualised dasein and the 
deep ballast (nation, religion, class etcetera) it needs to reach its 
perfections. Now is the time to recognise that an epistemology 
incompatible with the analogia entis is also likely to have 
disastrous effects upon the resolve to think human being with a 
full palette of colour, because the analogia entis is in league with 
the need to break with modernist anthropology and a modernist 
view of history, because it delivers us from intellectual lives where 
nothing final can be achieved by our understanding our contingent 
and ‘fleeting’ secondary natures, and delivers us from national 
histories where, again, nothing of eternal significance is at play.
Our exercise of secondary causality such as the act of self-
understanding that we have described and whose content is 
contingent, not only safeguards our natural apotheosis but our 
existential opening to the supernatural and “the novelty and 
gratuity of Jesus Christ” (Healy 2008, p. 535). If contingency 
‘captures’ eternity, then we are obliged to refuse to entertain a way 
of being modern or a way of being Scottish or a way of being 
Christian that is independent of fully contextualised dasein. 
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Similarly, to be rejected is a way of imagining ‘being historical’ 
where the destination and the meaning and direction of history is 
already known, so that contextual dasein is again irrelevant to 
coming-to-consciousness of this destination and journeying to this 
destination. Also, all such claims to such knowledge which require 
contextual dasein to exercise blind faith are to be rejected as they 
require each class to instantiate a forgetfulness of its being. If, by 
definition, the modernist imagination cannot unite the person or a 
nation with its past then a modernist sociology cannot furnish 
‘depth interpretations’ of thick events such as 1 July 1999 or what 
is likely to come after 18 September 2014, nor give an account of 
Scotland today where a twelfth-century long durée patrimony has 
not only survived but is driving current events and which on any 
modernist reckoning was never meant to happen.
As the politician quoted at the beginning of Chapter 4 reminds 
us, twenty-first century nations and peoples are not supposed to 
go back to the twelfth century to retrieve institutions in order 
to resolve the problem of how to ‘be modern,’ and even the 
modernist nationalist likes to object that this resurrection of 
‘medievalism’ is in fact just the epiphenomenal ‘period costume’ 
worn by modern social forces, and certainly not their conditione 
sine qua non. However, theorists of nationalism have more or less 
established the ‘perennial’ need for period costume because it is 
integral to modernised dasein and mitsein, and the empirical proof 
is that four centuries of ‘all that is solid melts into air’ modernism 
have not been sufficient to liquidate the need for period costumes 
because the condition of ‘being modern’ requires the ballast of 
the past (or period costume) to constitute the tension of ‘being 
modern.’
Something the Scots know after 1 July 1999 and will know 
again after 18 September 2014 is that what is glossed as the 
epiphenomenal need for ‘period costume’ is in fact the perennial 
need for a holistic self-understanding that can stand against the 
“ontology of false conditions” (Adorno, cited in Bronner 1994, 
p. 181), and because fundamental elements of contextual dasein 
cannot be wished away or dissolved in the acid bath of modernity, 
the whole of past history and the whole of history to come will 
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continue to be a ‘fancy dress’ affair as modern nations and modern 
peoples will not wake up one day and cut themselves in half.
The merit of a fully integral sociology, then, is that the account 
it is able to generate of Man’s purely natural apotheosis is more 
convincing than any account drawn by the modernist mythology, 
and from those who choose to paint modern dasein with very little 
colour at their disposal. Another merit is that the account it is able 
to provide of ‘becoming Christian’ is far more convincing than any 
supernaturalist theology lacking any ethnographic content or 
grounding. If the likes of Carlyle and Nietzsche were right to 
proclaim the drama of modernity had been the death of God, an 
integral sociology is able to resurrect the drama of human being 
and being Christian on the basis of modern secondary natures, and 
succeed in articulating a phenomenology of Christian redemption. 
If “The ‘modern[ist] man’ – that is to say, the post-Renaissance 
man - is ready for burial” (Yorck, cited in Heidegger 1962, p. 452) 
it is because affluence and education have ‘democratised’ the 
rejection of impoverished imaginings of dasein and so, if even the 
modernists today in Scotland’s anti-independence political parties 
accept they have been negligent in the ‘fancy dress’ department, 
when these erstwhile un-maskers and demythologisers turn upon 
themselves the structure of perception they train upon others, 
they are more or less fated to don ‘fancy dress’ if they are to 
acknowledge the need for a holistic or integral symbolic structure 
to match and mirror and model our integral or holistic dasein and 
mitsein. Once this step is taken, all forms of bourgeois modernism 
from Marxism to liberalism become part of the problem to be 
solved as their faulty view of human dasein and their materialism 
and idealism means they are profoundly unreal, and so find 
themselves in need of new masks and new myths if they are to 
be suitably dressed for twenty-first century Scotland.
Also, whether social science is to be similarly suitably attired 
or only fit for the dustbin of intellectual history is a pressing 
question, as Douglas and Ney’s (1998) search for an adequate 
view of man other than homo economicus among Western social 
scientists reveals the latter’s complicity insofar as sociology did 
not so much release the study of Man from the ‘mystifications’ of 
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theology and philosophy but re-make the study of Man in the 
image of a ‘scarcity metaphysics.’ Insofar as the ‘demystifying’ 
and ‘demythologising’ Hume, Feuerbach, Comte, Marx and Freud 
wished to erect a new modern ‘science of man’ and steal back 
Man’s ‘essence’ from the pedlars of supernaturalism (theologians) 
and ‘pure reason’ (philosophers), the effort was to be applauded 
because in its own clumsy way it was a rebalancing and return 
to the twelfth-century Franciscan opening to the defeat of super- 
naturalism and the turning to nature, society and the world. 
However, insofar as it fell into the same errors of the Renaissance 
and declined into secularism and modernism, the nineteenth 
century succeeded only too well and repeated the failure of the 
twelfth century to secure its breakthrough in the European mind 
insofar as they dissolved all of philosophy and theology into 
‘fancy-dress’ clothing, which they set about removing in order to 
reveal Man as they imagined he really is and always had been. 
However, for as long as the majority of populations remained 
within the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ era, this modernist error only 
affected a fraction of the population.
Today, however, the struggle to resist modernism in favour 
of integralism embraces all who are literate and is becoming the 
general condition. We may also say that for as long as sociological 
studies were conducted in conditions of scarcity, there was 
more or less a rationale for ‘reading off’ behaviour or action from 
social position, because social conditions meant the practice of 
a reflexive ‘freedom’ hardly arose for the vast majority of the 
population. There was then a crude sense to arguing ‘being poor’ 
or ‘uneducated’ explained why poor and uneducated people 
were religious, for example, or religion was functional to social 
cohesion. If this could pass as an explanation of social phenomenon 
such as religion, a secularist metaphysics or disenchanted view of 
dasein and European history did not necessarily cause too much 
damage, or obstruct sociological explanation and so sociology 
was not coerced into examining its modernist assumptions. 
However, with the loosening of the grip of scarcity upon the 
practice of freedom from the nineteen-eighties onwards, this 
‘scarcity sociology’ is more or less obsolete, and these explanations 
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explain less and less as sociology is forced to recognise, defend 
and then shed its modernist assumptions.
If for most of its history sociology turned its attention to a 
fraction of Man’s being and pre-occupied itself with the ‘scarcity 
questions’ of social order and conformity (Bauman 1976), this era 
has come to an end insofar as the relation between ‘social structure’ 
and ‘superstructure’ is now free to be particularised and individuated 
for each particular social group. More than ever as a result of 
affluence and deep literacy, then, to continue to confine dasein/
mitsein and its sociological study into a ‘scarcity metaphysics’ is 
regressive, insofar as it disfigures the purely social or immanent 
realm because such an approach harries and presses the natural 
and social and cultural to deprive itself of its historicity, religiosity, 
nationality and locality etcetera. 
To persist in such modernist interpretivism is to make sociology 
not the study of the social as it is really experienced and lived and 
thought about by real men and women, but to align sociology with 
a mythical account of Man made in the image of the post-Christian 
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, and lock the social sciences into a 
nineteenth-century class myth about human dasein. By depriving 
itself of the means to imagine how men and women live their lives 
and experience their social and cultural conditions, sociology 
condemns itself to a myth about Man and not Man himself. I say 
this despite the deluge of declarations by ‘postmodernists’ that 
modernity is at an end as these declarations in fact reproduce the 
error of modernism all over again insofar as the historic opportunity 
to recapitulate and reappropriate History (and Christianity) is once 
again avoided in favour of declaring purely imaginary caesuras 
once again under cover of a turning to the new.
A sociology that recognises the objective social pressures for 
the privatisation of the realm of meaning and behaviour, so that 
more and more of conventional beliefs and practices become 
the free choice of the free individual and so become more or less 
fated to decline, must not itself fall victim to such pressures and 
declare issues of fundamental anthropology and ontology 
a ‘private’ matter for the individual practitioner of sociology. 
A discipline which buckles under this pressure which it is obliged 
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to study becomes infected with the modernist germ and proclaims, 
just as with forebears such as Feuerbach and Marx, that by 
recognising the ‘signs of the times’ the discipline thereby comes 
into alignment with history and society. Another reading, however, 
of the present moment informed by the ballast of the long durée 
sees these pressures as the latest terms of engagement of a tension 
or dialectic that is as old as modernity itself, and one which we 
really should be learning to recognise by now, so that when faced 
with the new ‘new’ we should by now be bringing more balance 
to our interpretations and more ballast to readings of the ‘present 
as history,’ instead of the clichés of capitulation to conditions 
that are false (Adorno) or, on the other hand, imagining we must 
begin from scratch and take the latest development as the new 
standard by which to measure ourselves.
Much as at the outset of the industrialisation of European 
society in the nineteenth century, so at the outset of the present post-
industrialisation of European society, there are those readying 
themselves to assert once again that ‘all that is solid melts into air,’ 
and readying themselves to declare yet another radical break with 
the past, this time with the modern era. And once again the 
modernist imagination is as much wrong as it is right. Because it is 
far easier to proclaim the end of a number of difficult tasks than 
reconstitute them upon the basis of new conditions, today’s post-
structuralist rhetoric of ‘endings’ and the lionising of tropes such as 
fragmentation, dispersal, decentering and difference, stems not 
from a bourgeois relation to ‘the real’ but from a bourgeois relation 
to a bourgeois myth about history and Man and the present.
What complicates the prospect of reaching any consensus 
upon the correct understanding of the present as history is the 
existence of different social classes that are not going away, and 
the fact that occupying a subordinate or dominant position within 
a hierarchy does not simply mean that each position is related 
to a shared reality such as ‘history’ or ‘society’ or ‘reason’ or ‘the 
present’ albeit differently, as the very range and nature of objects 
are different for each different class and are not shared across 
classes because the relations are different, and so what constitutes 
‘objectivity’ and what there is to be objective about is different. 
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The emergent turn to and recognition of particularism in social 
theory signals a crisis for the intellectuals of that social class which 
has most ‘symbolic capital’ to lose from the end of universalism, 
and an opportunity for that class which has most to gain from the 
end of universalism. On this reading much of the malaise of 
contemporary social theory stems from the middle class attempting 
to come to terms with its cultural decline. In its modernist 
and ‘optimistic’ phase which corresponds to its historic rise to 
hegemony, and in its current ‘postmodern’ pessimistic or post-
‘heroic’ bourgeois phase, the same class relation to the totality 
remains. Modernism then was the ideology of the confident 
and emergent bourgeoisie and was a cipher for this particular 
class’s domination of the modern imaginary and their domination 
of how the present and the future were imagined. The post-
modern rhetoric of endings, then, signals an imagination becoming 
aware that it is bereft of historical ballast or ‘fancy dress,’ and 
this is the sociological truth that underlies intellectuals’ discussions 
concerning the end of rationalism and universalism, and 
reveals the recent ideology of postmodernism as the cipher of 
an erstwhile domination and power to signify the present coming 
to an end.
If this analysis is not entirely off the mark then the profound 
knitting together of selves and circumstances that, once seen and 
appreciated in one group must be conceded as occurring in all 
groups, means that each class’s habitus is equally ‘fatal;’ that 
bourgeois dasein even in theory is not more readily holistic or 
more dynamic and open to departing from the past and from mere 
empirical reality, because in practice this very freedom means 
a greater level of freely committing to merely reproducing their 
socially privileged position at the expense of operationalising any 
cultural or political leadership of the nation, or developing the 
historicity of dasein and thereby putting social reproduction at 
risk. In the case of Scotland this fatal grip of habitus or ‘secondary 
nature’ has resulted in perhaps the most depoliticised and 
miserably modernist middle-class Europe has ever seen; a middle 
class that did not even partially ‘correct’ Scottish history by 
leading the modest change of 1 July 1999.
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To explain this strange failure of nerve, I argue it is because their 
social condition is to enjoy the ‘privilege’ of not having to be 
more or less coerced into doing something about historical and 
national dasein, that all talk of the historicity and nationality 
of dasein was more or less embarrassing for this class that fulfils 
none of the leadership roles other national bourgeoisies perform. 
If a Heideggerian reading of authentic dasein emphasises the 
fundamental exigence whereby “authentic Dasein must ‘choose 
itself’” (Wolin 1990, p. 75), then this is a class that is afraid to 
mobilise its historicity and nationality and presides over an 
education system that is deeply ambivalent, if not resentful, 
towards going beyond the liberal peace, to say nothing about the 
under-development of all things purely Scottish, or the question of 
transcendence among them. If this has been a class that has been 
incapable of inaugurating a Scottish modernity, then from the 
point of view of the ‘end of history’ thesis of Fukuyama (1989), his 
thesis has been true among the Scottish middle classes for centuries.
In contrast to Prime Minister Blair asserting in 1999 when 
addressing his Party’s annual conference: “The class war is over. 
But the struggle for true equality has only just begun,” it has to be 
asserted that the ‘mirror of production’ remains intact in the era 
of affluence, and this diagnosis of the ‘present as history’ is a 
perfect example of bourgeois thinking fated to misrecognise the 
fact that Scottish history is being made by a class which is 
supposed to be ‘finished’ thanks to the class war having been won 
by the middle classes some time in the nineteen-nineties. Socio-
economically and cultural-territorially-grounded epistemologies 
and subjectivities remain intact and still go unrecognised and 
untheorised in the dominant discourses as a result of three inter-
related positions that stem from a class habitus that more or less 
coerces its bearers into imagining the working class in their image, 
and that the working class:
1) instantiate the same (bourgeois) relation to the real.
2) have been ‘dissolved’ by affluence and post-industrialisation.
3) are equally caught up in their individuation reaching 
escape velocity from a given and determining material base.
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If the 1979 working-class generation(s) are arriving to the realm 
of cultural production they are also fated to give their reading on 
‘being modern’ based upon the fact that they are still confined to 
their socially and historically and spatially-determined dasein; do 
not ordinarily have the relation to the totality to imagine they 
have reached ‘escape velocity’ from the conditions that condition 
them, so that a still-defining truth is not the escape from being 
determined by social structure but the free determination of what 
this determination means or amounts to. If no working class 
escapes the ‘mirror of production,’ it increasingly does not take up 
the pre-packaged ‘scarcity era’ self-image the dominant symbolic 
order has prepared for it, nor the superannuated accommodations 
to domination prepared for them by the working-class 1945 
generation, and so is increasingly free to work out the extent of 
their ‘being modern’ and their natural apotheosis on their own 
terms.
Furthermore, having articulated a purely natural beatitude, 
I have deliberately not left the question of transcendence open 
or simply trusted the ‘purely natural’ to arrive at the supernatural 
through the free exercise of its powers, as I do not share in any 
kind of soft liberal humanist confidence that the purely natural 
may be left to its own devices on this point. Even achieving a 
purely natural beatitude requires the exercise of a long ‘repression’ 
that leans upon the disciplinary power of (Christian) transcendence. 
While the appropriation of a holistic view of dasein and ‘being 
modern’ must be done upon the basis of its own merits, the 
question of transcendence and Christianity can not be simply 
left to the free development of dasein or the cut and thrust of 
‘affluent modernity,’ because I do not believe that the felt absence 
of transcendence is inevitable or somehow fated to be widespread, 
so that ‘structures of repression’ (in the psychoanalytic sense) 
such as the family and Christianity within affluent modernity are 
simultaneously not needed and more needed than ever to avoid 
‘affluent modernity’ becoming characterised by nihilism. Liberalism 
and secularism exert so little disciplinary power over dasein 
and mitsein to be capable of modeling even the transcendence 
necessary to achieve the purely natural beatitude outlined earlier, 
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so that unless there is a free return to structures of repression, 
there can only be lives more or less immersed in a permanent 
nihilistic ‘crisis of the West,’ while those who remain European 
and Christian will remain defined by and alive to its perennial 
tasks and tensions.
For the modernist it seems compelling that there is a 
fragmentation of self, community and de-Christianisation, and 
to resist this representation of the ‘present as history’ must be a 
Canute-like gesture in full flight from the facts. However, insofar 
as there are populations that retain intact in their biographies the 
material of a Christian identity and its practices thanks to none 
of their once-peasant-and-now-proletarian ancestors having had 
a modernist relation to modernity, the present as history can 
also be understood as an affluence-fuelled reflexive liberation 
not from tradition but an affluence-fuelled liberation of Tradition 
from its long confinement within the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ era 
insofar as the reflexive 1979 generations radicalise that (Christian) 
tradition, and instantiate a radical break from the modernist motif 
of ‘modernisation as secularisation.’
While I do not contest the empirical evidence of the de- 
Protestantisation of Scotland and a similar process among Catholics, 
the definition of being modern cannot be equated with particular 
capitulations to modern pressures or social determinations. More 
concretely, then, if we follow Harvie (2004) and identify a mod-
ernisation period from 1950-1971 which saw the start of the 
decline in Protestantism and political unionism because from this 
point onwards unionism was modernised and, free of all social 
embeddedness, had to become the free choice of the free individual 
to survive, we can say there was an older generation whose behav-
iour and practices were de-Christianised even while their ‘con-
sciousness’ or self-understanding was perhaps little de-Christianised, 
but in the next generation both consciousness and behaviour 
became aligned, and this resulted in integral de-Christianisation 
(which if often incorrectly equated with ‘secularisation’).
While many Scots have become post-Christian to judge by 
their consciousness and behaviour, to be modern and to be post-
Christian or secular are not the same, and so to describe a younger 
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generation that has become fully post-Christian as ‘fully modern’ 
implies the believer is somehow not modern or not as modern 
as the non-believer. Instead of this false interpretation we 
should understand ‘being modern’ simply as being subject to 
a set of objective pressures, and be careful not to identify ‘being 
modern’ with a particular set of subjective ‘capitulations’ or 
accommodations to an objective set of pressures - while at the 
same time recognising that it is a safe bet that there will be a 
‘collective’ set of capitulations insofar as many will accommodate 
themselves to a dominant form of social conditioning that will 
involve not maintaining the full tensions of ‘being modern.’ This 
allows us to say that while there may be a majoritarian modernity, 
there is not one form of ‘being modern’ but several, and which 
may be ranked (from a purely secular modernity to a full Scottish 
modernity to a Catholic modernity etcetera) in order of possessing 
the fullness of modernity. The predicament of ‘being modern’ then 
is universal while the form of the response is particular.142 
If we complicate things further by adding the radical indeter- 
minacy of the human will and human reason (Scotus) to the 
indeterminacy of modernity, an appreciation of the ballast that 
Christianity brings to the ‘tasks of freedom’ of the 1979 generations 
is able to emerge. While all can subscribe to the pursuit of a natural 
apotheosis, the opening to the supernatural and the turn to 
Christianity ensures a purely natural humanism does not exhaust 
the new imagining of a free modernity, and I would paraphrase 
the argument of Mauss (1979, p. 84) that until Christianity “the 
notion of the person still lacked a firm metaphysical foundation. 
This foundation it owes to Christianity,” and argue that as a result 
of Man’s indeterminacy and the indeterminacy of freedom and 
affluent-era modernity, the repression or discipline necessary 
to believe and strive for even a purely natural beatitude or 
apotheosis would otherwise be lost sight of, so that the repressive 
142 That modernity has many forms is something that is recognised in sociological 
theory and is reflected in the European theory of ‘modernisation as secularisation’ 
thesis (Weber, Durkheim), and the American theory of ‘modernisation as 
sacralisation’ thesis (Parsons 1964; Greeley 1971).
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or disciplinary ethos of Christianity is needed because even purely 
natural perfections must firstly be matters of authority and shared 
belief before they become matters of purely natural individual 
achievement.
In this regard, Bourdieu’s entire oeuvre and analysis of the social 
condition suffers from being trapped into an account of dasein 
stripped of all dynamism towards the full range of intelligible being, 
and his failure to give an account of the purely natural beatitude 
the sociological imagination is fundamental to achieving is evidence 
that alerts us to the dangers of over-confidence in pure nature. 
Bourdieu’s failure to give a reading of habitus as it dynamically 
moves towards its natural and supernatural perfections means 
that, ultimately, even the incomparable Bourdieu must be termed 
a pre-integral ‘scarcity sociologist’ insofar as he does not follow 
the golden rule of sociological methodology which is to follow 
dasein wherever dasein goes, and to think dasein in all its colours, 
and develop a metaphysics if need be that allows the inclusion of 
dasein’s reflexive acts and what they lead to. In a similar manner, 
while Charlesworth (1999) is an exemplary ethnographer and 
sophisticated analyst, his phenomenological description of working-
class dasein does not articulate the purely natural apotheosis of 
English working-class dasein and his Phenomenology of Working 
Class Experience (1999) fails to give an account of cognitional 
agency or intellectual and psychological liberation, far less anything 
concerning its capacities for the supernatural.
To practice sociology with a full palette of colours is to paint 
a picture of contextualised dasein in free possession of itself, and 
it is upon this basis that is decided the extent of what is real. To 
get to this end-point I began by introducing the term reductio 
as a descriptive phenomenological category that occurs when 
labouring and doing fieldwork among manual labourers. The 
reductio was described as a ‘phenomenological datum’ by the 
theorist and while the concept relates to he who does conceptual 
work, the concept does not appear to the worker who is not 
also an inquirer, so that the reduction is not a phenomenological 
category of the worker’s experience insofar as he does not do 
the intellectual work of conceiving his patterned experience as 
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generated by his life of manual labour. To commit to conceptual 
work is to move from being a worker to being a worker-inquirer 
and set out upon the road of giving a phenomenology of this 
journey. The fact is one could write endless descriptions of what 
appears to working-class consciousness or what appears to 
the student of working-class experience and, while necessary, the 
point of introspection and phenomenological description is 
not to remain purely descriptive but to mount to an adequate 
conceptualisation of working class being in order to arrive at an 
act of understanding, because the structure of the human mind 
dictates so because it is a formally dynamic structure. Such is 
what Lonergan terms following the unrestricted desire for 
understanding and what scholastics term allowing oneself to be 
led by the finality of the intellect i.e. living a life dominated by the 
structure of knowing which puts itself together according to its 
own natural exigencies.
If this is part of practicing an integral sociology, there 
is some truth to the argument that to paint dasein with a full 
palette of colour during the ‘dictatorship of scarcity’ era was fated 
to appear sociologically naïve and hardly evidence-based. If the 
accusation of a ‘scarcity anthropology’ levelled at Western social 
science by Douglas and Ney (1998) was met with the reply 
that most modern human beings most of the time did not paint 
themselves with a full palette of colours and ‘fancy dress costumes’ 
and ‘sacred canopies’ were deemed epiphenomenal to material 
realities, today, social science will fail to represent post-affluent 
societies adequately unless it acquires a metaphysics and an 
epistemology that does more than ‘tolerate’ human being in 
all its colours. A social science hoping to explain us to ourselves 
must articulate a holistic sociology if the ‘sociological imagination’ 
is to be relevant and realistic in the era of affluent modernity, 
because a feature of affluence-era societies is that the ‘realm 
of meaning’ becomes volatilised and increasingly differentiated, 
as each social class and tradition negotiates its survival and 
reproduction. Among the symbolically dominated, for example, 
the once-solid reality of Britain was largely based upon the fides 
implicita of the culturally and economically weak, and parents of 
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the ’45 generation who have this fides implicita relation to the 
realm of meaning have educated and modernised 1979 generation 
children who do not reproduce this dominated relation to the 
symbolic realm, nor their parents’ fides implicita.
In terms of ‘being modern,’ then, many who have lived and 
died within a modern society have not been modern in the manner 
of an existential predicament as a result of being post-conventional. 
Many social groups have until recently been modern by proxy 
whereby an authority figure or institution – church, government, 
family, parents, husband etcetera – has been delegated the task of 
negotiating with modernity on their behalf, so that such social 
groups – women, the working class, the laity etcetera – have only 
recently had to deal with the predicament of being modern as 
their personal existential predicament. In terms of a younger 
working-class generation, I argue that the cocktail of events 
such as the cultural changes of the nineteen-sixties, affluence, 
deindustrialization and literacy have more or less coerced this 
generation into a conscientisation or awakening to the predicament 
of being modern.
However, even when a whole array of sociological forces are 
in alignment with each other, because of the radical ontological 
difference between reality (res) and consciousness (res cogitans), 
it is normal for there to be a sharp discontinuity between an 
individual’s objective social reality and his or her consciousness 
of that reality. This means that the ‘historical consciousness’ 
(Gadamer 1979) that is deemed characteristic of post-Enlightenment 
modern cultures will only point in a clear direction among a 
fraction of a population. The exercise of freedom and reflexivity 
is condemned to involve ‘the crisis of the West’ which may be 
described philosophically as the condition of being mired in 
the radical indeterminacy of reason or, more sociologically, the 
situation of members of post-Enlightenment cultures having no 
rational basis for their beliefs and values, and being more or 
less fated to search for personal verification of the truths and 
values they believe in. The values, traditions and beliefs that 
are inherited as part of membership of groups or institutions to 
be continued, then, must be personally appropriated in light of 
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rational examination and reflexive freedom. Whereas previous 
generations enjoyed a fides implicita so that many made their 
way through life through a process of fides implicita as their 
beliefs and values were socially sanctioned and as real as the 
reality of society itself and did not need a personal act of self-
appropriation, members of a younger generation are more or less 
fated to run a rationalist gauntlet before their beliefs and values 
are intersubjectively or socially verified. In this regard, sociological 
wisdom teaches us that those beliefs and practices which require 
the free commitment of the free individual for their survival are 
destined for long-term decline, so that every kind of belief and 
every value has to be either in conformity with social power or 
grounded in personal experience or suffer the fate of long-term 
decline. Faced with such social pressures, the available cultural 
resources of a people through which a living connection with 
the past could be made and which could act as the medium 
through which a population might find ballast to counteract social 
determinations and the indeterminacy of freedom and reason 
becomes all-important.
Faced with this challenge, my predicament has been to take a 
working-class population that has comparatively little cultural capi-
tal and, beginning from manual labourer’s dasein, argue that insofar 
as it is reduced to its intelligibility via an act of self-understanding it 
is capable of an act of self-conscientisation sufficient to destroy one 
long durée edifice and resurrect another; that insofar as ’79 genera-
tion producers of culture successfully meet the challenge of produc-
ing a ‘generational literature’ of modern significance, and establish 
this connection to an older modernity, they break with their sym-
bolic and cultural poverty and simultaneously inaugurate a pre-
sumptuous ‘betrayal of self’ that at the same time makes the tasks of 
their ownmost selves available to them for the first time. My method 
of procedure was to stake everything upon the conviction that 
because the worker is convinced of the reality of his situated self, 
this is the ground upon which his project of self-appropriation as 
worker-inquirer is most likely to succeed.
In giving this account we succeeded where both supernaturalist 
theology and naturalistic social theory have failed, as we articulated 
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the “interrelation of thought and existence that has ceased to be 
contemplative, by the concrete demonstration of the identical 
subject-object” (Lukacs 1971, p. 215) and by providing the 
missing ethnographic content, and the missing performative event, 
we have also provided the first ethnographically grounded account 
of how the worker-inquirer-knower is a dynamic image of the 
Blessed Trinity and how, in the first place: “it is by one’s own 
activity that one is drawn into God” (Kerr 2002, p. 173) and 
secondly, how extra mundum nulla salus (Schillebeckz 1990, p. 
12) and, thirdly, how “that which is wholly done for us by God, 
is yet also our own highest act and properly our own” (Milbank 
2005, p. ix) and in the fourth place how “a greater actuation of 
the agent…gives the created agent a special participation in the 
pure act of being” (Kerr 2002, p. 173 & p. 163) and fifthly, how 
the worker-inquirer-knower is “consciously a conditioned being” 
(Gadamer, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan 1987, p. 103) and, 
sixthly, how “eternity appears, not as such, but diffracted through 
the most perishable” (Adorno, cited in Held 1980, p. 212-3) and, 
seventhly, how actual being can take over “being itself (Siende) in 
its dejectedness” (Heidegger, cited in Marcuse 1969, p. 15) and in 
the eighth place, how “the proletariat is the identical subject-
object of the history of society” (Lukacs 1971, p. 206) and, 
ninthly, how “utmost negativity, however, takes a positive turn” 
(Marcuse, cited in Held 1981, p. 239) and, tenthly, how “the 
emancipation of the worker is the work of the worker himself” 
(Castoriadis 1987, p. 57) and, finally, constructed a purely natural 
or sociological “straight gate through which the Messiah might 
enter” (Benjamin 1992, p. 255).
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Epilogue
At journey’s end and looking over the road travelled, it is clear 
that in coming to understand my data the ground upon which 
I stood shifted on more than one occasion. As stated in the 
introduction, my intention for a long time was simply to write a 
study of working-class nationalism at the time of its historic 
triumph in 1999, but as I came to understand the significance of 
nationalism went far beyond achieving political independence, 
I understood that the focus of my study had to enlarge to include 
a study of ‘being modern,’ and what a working-class project of 
modernity might look like. 
If catching sight of this new question meant a change in 
perspective was required, a shift that was resisted for much longer 
came as a result of it becoming clear that I could not carry on the 
fiction of not acknowledging, as integral to my methodology, 
the fact that I was caught up in the drama I was attempting to give 
an account of, and so I felt more or less compelled to go ‘all the 
way’ in my reflexivity, and so my focus became enlarged again 
to include an element of auto-ethnography and experiences that 
I had previously never imagined I would need to include and 
disclose. This ‘coming clean’ with my reader seemed my only 
option, as it meant I could avoid artificially ending my journey 
and pointing vaguely to a future direction of travel that I would 
leave for another day, and so I decided to include the section on 
Special Ontology. This final enlargement of focus also meant a 
change in the title was necessary, and so what was originally 
meant to be a straightforward study of Scottish nationalism 
became a phenomenology of Christian redemption and an 
argument for a new integral sociology capable of recognising the 
free imagining of integral human being.
If these were some of the motivations for changes in the range 
and scope of the text, a more practical consideration that led to 
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including the final three chapters came from my students and their 
not unreasonable expectation that I should model how the study 
of society can be of some public service and engage with the ‘signs 
of the times,’ and how sociology integrates with and illuminates 
personal life. Just as I was taught that part of the purpose of 
studying sociology and anthropology is to become coeval with 
the times, so I feel a responsibility to model such a sociology 
and ethnography and so I tell my students to judge a sociology by 
whether or not it recognises them, and whether it can take the full 
weight of their lives. It is obvious to me that sociology must 
be integral to answering the question of the proportionate or 
natural beatitude of people who spend their lives as members of 
societies, so that sociology is indispensable because it enables the 
gathering of the necessary data that makes possible the act of 
self-appropriation that ‘squeezes’ historicised and socialised 
dasein of its intelligibility. However, this conviction had to be 
learned, and it is because I have learned as an ethnographer and 
sociologist to place the entire weight not only of our purely 
natural beatitude but Christian redemption upon the shoulders 
of the particular ‘secondary nature’ that is Scottish working-class 
dasein that, like a mathematician, I am able to ‘show the working’ 
behind my claim that an integral sociology can stand upon the 
shoulders of Scotus insofar as “the guiding idea of Duns Scotus 
[was] to safeguard contingency (servare contingentiam)” (Boehner 
1990, p. xxi).
A necessary element of ‘safeguarding contingency’ is to reject 
modernism as a coercive force that would turn us into tourists 
vis-à-vis our ownmost dasein insofar as we are coerced into 
imagining nothing of lasting value will accrue to us by thinking our 
contingent and ‘fleeting’ selves, and this is why how we imagine 
what it is to ‘be modern’ is central to how we imagine ourselves 
and our future, and why a proper respect before ‘contingency’ is so 
important. I have argued, then, that as a result of being infected 
by the modernist imagination, many intellectuals have been in 
flight from the very times they imagine they reduce themselves 
to and define themselves by; have been in flight from the new 
tasks demanded by the new times and have failed the ‘new being’ 
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brought into being by the industrialisation of society and humanity 
because of a false and superficial metaphysics that lacks historicity 
and transcendence. The modernists are enthralled to the mistake of 
imagining they can better serve the representation of the novum by 
abandoning the task of achieving their own integral holism, and 
so they abandon the task of re-making Tradition anew through the 
medium of the new and thereby fail to fulfil the original ‘signature 
dialectic’ of being modern.
I also, of course, recognise that critics of modernity often make 
the fatal mistake of imagining they can better preserve historicity, 
transcendence and tradition by resisting the challenge of the new 
and, as I have adverted to, I am not insensitive to the modernist 
temptation because when studying the social class that is arguably 
most reduced to their socio-economic ‘secondary nature,’ the 
working-class mind can not fail to see much that is indispensable 
in the modernist spirit if ‘being and time’ or ‘history and reason’ 
are ever to come into alignment within consciousness. If affluence 
and literacy make the synthesis between the Old and the New 
possible to more and more people as never before, what has to be 
resisted as never before is the democratisation of the modernist 
imagination, which imagines all kinds of fictitious caesuras in 
human being and human history. This resistance to modernism 
then must be brought into focus and made an explicit part of our 
consciousness of the ‘present as history.’
To safeguard contingency is to safeguard a drama that has 
an unknown end and a journey that must put the inquirer at risk. 
The individual who would put sociology to the test must also 
undertake the long task of ‘translating’ his or her life into their 
intellectual self-consciousness, as this is a precondition of being 
able to put their lives onto the scales of a sociology and judge 
whether or not the latter is ‘fit for purpose.’ While students readily 
recognise they belong to a particular territory, generation, class or 
religious tradition and that this fundamentally impacts upon their 
lives, something more personal and exacting is necessary for 
a deeper appropriation of the sociological imagination i.e. a 
prolonged effort of practicing reflexivity and gathering the data 
and its patterns in their lives, and passing all of this through 
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the sociological lens and their native cognitional structure. 
Having translated something of my own dasein into my own 
intellectual self-consciousness, I have shown the indispensable 
nature of sociological reasoning in achieving my own self-
appropriation and that the ‘sociological imagination’ is capable 
of its original promise of succeeding where the instruments of 
‘pure reason’ are fated to fail.
Another aim of this book was to model the process of self-
appropriation to a working-class audience, and in this regard 
everything I have written here was first developed while 
I instantiated what Bourdieu refers to as a split habitus; a dual 
worker-come-intellectual habitus as a result of living in the relative 
poverty of someone who had only ever performed minimum wage 
level jobs until the age of forty. My hope is that my descriptions 
and my outlining of the conceptual ‘building blocks’ of working-
class dasein may be a stimulus for working-class readers to do the 
work of reproducing and identifying these elements within their 
own experience in their own journeys of self-appropriation, so 
that my hope is to be of some use to the reader achieving self-
appropriation by arming him or her with a template of how to 
achieve an integral self-understanding.
The restoration of the Scots pairlament is only part of a 
much larger and exciting task of achieving a kind of thinking 
characterised by systematically reopening the long durée of 
Scottish history, and the question of a Scottish modernity and the 
task of re-thinking human being. Thinking through these questions 
is an integral part of the ‘tasks of freedom’ of the ’79 generation(s) 
among whom the long haul of overthrowing modernism in favour 
of the retrieval of an original discovery of the modern era is at 
hand. Re-founding our imagination and politics and culture upon 
our ownmost ontology and reversing four centuries of attempting 
to live without the synthesis of culture, history and dasein are 
within the performative grasp of the ’79 generations, and I would 
hope that by achieving independence some time after 18 September 
2014, the modernist organisation of and imagining of Scotland 
will come to an end among us, and a deeper rejection of modernism 
will be at hand, and this will determine whether we are successful 
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or not in achieving an intergenerational project of reflexivity after 
independence that can think working and middle-class dasein and 
the ‘present as history’ to its foundations and to its limits.
In achieving this re-foundation my view is that a cognitionally-
based empowerment of human being upon its ownmost dasein 
ensures the post-1979 generations are able to re-imagine Scotland’s 
culture and to think locality, class, nation, governance and the 
question of transcendence outwith the paradigms of modernism, 
supernaturalism and secularism. This development also challenges 
conventional sociology as to whether it is able to recognise this 
development using prefabricated categories developed to think 
previous eras, and it seems to me that to think dasein and mitsein 
to the extent of their capacities, as opposed to their merely current 
empirical state, requires a new kind of sociology insofar as it 
requires the sociologist resolving to equip himself or herself not 
only with the usual suspects of class, status, generation, gender 
and nationality, but with the “attempt to contemplate all things as 
they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption” 
(Adorno 1974, p. 247). 
To retrieve the tension of being modern beyond the ‘scarcity 
imagination’ that has dominated us until now and be modern 
according to the original Catholic conception of modernity in 
Europe, not by dissolving or liquidating half of the tensions it 
brings but by respecting the tensions between the natural, social, 
economic and material realms, and the transcendent or supernatural 
aspects of desire and human experience, is to practice an ‘affluent 
modernity’ that is modern without the scarcity metaphysics that 
demand Man must live by bread alone, and that imagines that to 
turn to the present we must invent epistemologies and ontologies 
that disrespect and disqualify and misrecognise much that is 
integral to late-modern human being.
In order to not repeat previous errors, however, talk of affluence 
and a release from scarcity must avoid becoming another flight 
from reality in the very effort at capturing the emergent and con- 
temporary, so that integral to rejecting the modernist imagination 
is accepting, for example, that we are not heading for the classless 
society any time soon, as this recognition frees the imagination 
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to resist facile imaginings of a future independent Scotland and 
recognise that class is not being dissolved but is rather being 
purified of post-war accommodations and compromises, and class 
among the ’79 generation is being liberated from the insecurities of 
‘scarcity modernity.’ Similarly, if we are heading for a humanity 
that sees the issue of transcendence being similarly released from 
previous answers such as the supernaturalism that was served up 
by ‘scarcity Christianity,’ this helps us dismiss its illegitimate off-
spring that is secularism, and allows into view the fact that if 
Scotland is about to arrive for the second time to a sovereign and 
free modernity, it is also arriving late to the need to avoid dangerous 
forms of integralism. While dasein and mitsein must struggle to be 
free of all forms of subordination, an empowered Scottish dasein 
must consciously dis-align itself from any kind of regression to pre-
Christian forms of integralism, so that if the turning to the full 
historicity and territoriality of dasein and mitsein in opposition to 
liberalism and bourgeois modernism and Marxist materialism 
is necessary, the ‘repressions’ of Christianity are also needed if an 
empowered Scottish dasein and mitsein are to steer clear of neo-
pagan versions of integralism (de Benoist 2004; Sunic 2011; 
Krebs 2012) after independence.
The objective sociological forces that are aligned with the 
reopening of the question of transcendence reveals all the more 
starkly the need to reconcile the reality of class with a sociology 
of the living God as a result of particular questions being more or 
less fated to become relevant and pressing such as: what image 
will be revealed to a younger working-class generation as it looks 
into the ‘mirror of production’ having exercised reflexivity and 
cognitional agency beyond the confines of the ‘dictatorship of 
scarcity’? What image will a post-materialist and post-scarcity 
and post-secular and post-supernaturalist look in the ‘mirror of 
production’ reveal? These questions remain for every working-
class generation as they remain ‘fixed’ to the mundane exigencies 
of reproducing what might be termed affluent subsistence, but 
are also disposed to not reproduce symbolic accommodations to 
their domination but to break from centuries-old geo-political 
relations by the deployment of a long durée symbolic patrimony, 
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or any number of more superficial beliefs should they choose. If 
‘Thatcher’ broke every rule in the carefully constructed and 
carefully managed house of cards that was the United Kingdom, 
she paid the price by aiding and abetting a retaliatory integralism, 
because by destroying all-British industries and all-British trade 
unions the London-based neo-liberal economic project of 
globalisation destroyed the bases for the symbolic reproduction 
of Britain among the Scottish working class, and unwittingly 
opened the gates to the Scots politicising upon the twelfth-century 
basis of a ‘two-storey’ or integral sovereignty. But for this 
development the United Kingdom may well have lasted another 
three hundred years as a result of a largely inert and certainly 
de-politicized historicity and nationality, but due to the advent 
of a purely Scottish context an entire symbolic and institutional 
realm has been more or less overthrown, so that today Scottish 
society and Scottish politics exist as imaginary and institutional 
entities in their own right and have very little of the fake existence 
of ‘Scottish civic life’ endured throughout the years of political 
union with England.
As the classless society is not at hand, this brings into sharp 
relief the question of what the middle-class contribution to the 
new Scottish imaginary will be in light of the fact that its 
domination of the public realm and all public institutions after 
independence will have been reproduced across not two but 
three constitutional eras. What seems clear is the level of cultural 
leadership exercised by the middle classes in Scotland is at an 
historic all-time low, and insofar as they may justly be described 
as having led the retreat from an integral or Scottish modernity 
and sovereignty, their fate within the Scottish imaginary seems 
sealed for the foreseeable future because, unlike the working-class 
generations which were more or less coerced into taking action 
and a more or less open reckoning with their traditional political 
and cultural allegiances, the Scottish middle classes have not 
been objectively coerced into undergoing this process and so have 
largely failed to re-imagine themselves. 
If earlier I described the Scottish Labour Party as having failed 
to do much more than simultaneously oppose nationalism and yet 
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dance to its tune, the middle-class Conservative Party in Scotland 
has contributed even less to Scottish political life, and this curious 
position of a middle class is no doubt directly related to the fact 
that during the 1979-1997 period this class experienced a 
‘democratic surplus’ thanks to political union with England, while 
the working class suffered a ‘democratic deficit’ because of 
political union with England. Insofar as the middle-class does not 
claim any credit for the creation of the Scottish parliament, so the 
long-awaited advent of a Scottish modernity will perhaps uniquely 
among European nations be characterised by the absence of the 
middle class which seems to have slipped into invisibility within 
the Scottish imagination to such an extent that Marx’s dictum 
about the workers having no country seems to have been directed 
at the wrong class as far as Scotland is concerned. This class’s 
deep misalignment with the present moment is also no doubt 
the result of their ‘scarcity thinking’ in an age of affluence, and 
insofar as “the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie is geared 
to economic consciousness” (Lukacs 1971, p. 64), this has blinded 
them to historicity and nationality, and led directly to their 
invisibility within Scottish culture.
If the return of Scotland is no longer scorned as a hapless 
return to ‘medieval particularism’ by the affluent metropolitan 
middle classes, it is because this re-nationalization of politics and 
political power has been aligned with or integrated with their 
social reproduction, so that even the traditionally anti-nationalist 
Left-Liberal middle classes more or less genuflect to culture and 
history, and some kind of holistic dasein after the firework display 
of 1 July 1999. Likewise, formerly ‘vanguard modernists’ among 
the working class in the shape of socialist party activists now 
support independence, and concede more than one colour is 
necessary to paint a realistic portrayal of working-class dasein, 
and that not only must the project of a Scottish modernity be 
disentangled from political union with England but the project of 
‘being modern’ is essentially compromised by union with England.
These developments signal a much-needed and long-awaited 
change in the symbolic order has occurred in light of the fact that, 
while Scotland’s GDP per capita ranking against OECD countries 
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puts Scotland as the eighth richest nation in the world (Scottish 
Government 2013), such bare facts of material affluence have 
not been enough to make the Scottish middle and working-classes 
break with ‘scarcity thinking,’ and that what has been decisive for 
the victory of nationalism has been the decline of one structure 
of meaning and the emergence of another which, while helped 
by affluence, requires more. This ‘more’ has been a formative 
experience of conflict and contestation across the generations, and 
for the ’79 generation Thatcherism and the deindustrialization 
of the nineteen-eighties and the triumph of neoliberalism are 
the key experiences that meant the ideologies of unionism, 
internationalism and socialism have evaporated in the heat 
of battle, with the 1979 working-class generation having been 
taught the lesson that achieving sovereignty was not just about 
taking political control via independence but taking control of 
culture and the imagination. The nation, then, has been re-imagined 
and there has been a successful re-imagining of the telos of politics 
much as the ’45 working-class generation successfully nationalised 
the State via the creation of the Welfare State so that the political 
realm became congruent with the nation, and a younger generation 
has re-created politics along Scottish lines and in achieving this 
shift at a political and symbolic level, sovereignty at the level of 
the symbolic is understood as crucial in their pursuit of integral 
sovereignty.
However, if the advent of the Scots parliament was simul- 
taneously the result of an exercise of freedom that was more or 
less coerced by events, the fifteen years that have passed since 
1999 has created a political context and a political dialectic whose 
centre of gravity is Scotland and which owes little to extrinsic 
events for its nature and development. Thanks to the retrieval of 
the original twelfth century advent of the modern era, the question 
is whether Scotland can not only embark on its own modernity 
but can proceed to complete the unfinished project of modernity 
(Habermas 1981, in Entreves and Benhabib 1996, pp. 38-55) by 
an alignment of the project of modernity with the fundamentals 
of the earlier Catholic invention of modernity (Habermas 2010, 
pp. 15-23). To depict this retrieval of this historical ballast in 
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order to orient a movement to face the present and future, Nairn 
(1997) has used the Janus-faced metaphor, while McCrone has 
used the metaphor of a younger generation having to deploy its 
deepest anchors in response to Thatcher when describing the 
nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties in Scotland, so that this 
generation’s nationalism is the response of their very ownmost 
being insofar as the 1979-1997 period forced ‘the question of 
being’ onto their generational self-consciousness.
Articulating an adequate response to (English) neoliberalism 
meant not only articulating a response to this first iteration of 
Thatcher but to every subsequent ‘Thatcher’ that was to come 
along, so that when in May 2010 the next iteration duly arrived 
to Downing Street, it is an indication of the sea-change in meaning 
that has occurred that every ‘new Thatcher’ becomes a living 
reminder of Scots’ deeply inadequate way of ‘being modern’ and 
‘being Scottish,’ so that increasingly the only rational response is 
to reject all conceptions of ‘being Scottish’ and ‘being working 
class’ that are complicit in reproducing the existence of the zombie 
category of the United Kingdom, and every acolyte ‘systems of 
meaning’ that is embarrassed or ambivalent at exercising 
sovereignty and the mobilisation of integralism as they are 
complicit in perpetuating political and cultural subordination.
Affluence brought an end to the period of reducing class inter-
ests to purely economic matters and has coerced working-class 
populations out of their crass materialism and into imagining the 
post-industrial and post-materialist tasks of constructing 
new visions of dasein and mitsein and identifying their cultural 
interests and a post-industrial narrative. This transcending of 
‘materialism’ is no private choice or idiosyncrasy but a sociological 
exigence that has become something of a death sentence for those 
left-wing socialist political parties which are more or less fated to 
shift to the middle-ground and struggle to retain their traditional 
working-class voters, insofar as both fail to imagine the multi-
chromatic post-materialist ‘tasks of freedom’ that are upon them. 
If populations are a people as well as a members of social classes it 
is because they are structured as much by geography and history as 
by social structure, so that it is an impossible task to separate these 
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two aspects of one integral reality as the ‘social structure’ itself has 
its historicity because it is steeped in time and place and nation. 
The agency of territory, history and social structure, then, act 
to effect an ‘internment into the present’ among populations and 
suggests the unlikelihood of any class playing the role of the 
subject of history, and instead the likelihood of classes and nations 
inter-ciphering or acting as the mouthpieces for each other and the 
embedded positions they occupy. Hence, framing the question of 
agency in the tired manner of ‘structuralism versus humanism’ is 
unhelpful as constraining structural conditions simultaneously 
predispose classes to act in a historically significant and freeing 
manner, and because we live in nation-based societies, the social 
structure has its being within history and within the nation so that 
the 1979-1997 period saw not only issues of class being raised 
thanks to the triumph of neoliberalism but the geo-political 
relationship of union with England emerged simultaneously as 
integral to how to respond to class identity being put ‘at risk’ 
at this time. It is because this social structure continually puts 
their integral being ‘at issue’ that integral to their historicity and 
nationality and locality is a long history of conflict and ‘risk 
management,’ so that the working class reproduce within 
themselves and their communities a sharp concern for safeguarding 
the historicity and nationality and locality of dasein and mitsein.
For every nationalist, 18 September 2014 will be a straightfor-
ward matter of Scotland beginning to catch up with normal 
national development and implementing a tried and tested for-
mula that other nations have used to resolve the predicament 
of how to settle the practical political question of how-to-be-in-
the-world. However, I propose that both 1 July 1999 and 
18 September 2014 can also be a unique rejection of a false view 
of human being and a false view of modernity insofar as a work-
ing-class nationalism rejects a false view of ‘being modern’ in a 
moment of self-affirmation, having itself been subjected to a very 
full project of modernist modernisation, so that the Scottish work-
ing class are perhaps the first to be coerced into rejecting a non-
holistic practice and understanding of modernity. This is a new 
development because if no-one today takes offence at ‘fancy dress 
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costume’ or holistic conceptions of dasein, what many still find 
very offensive and what is still very divisive is the working class 
opting for an integral practice of itself that mobilises and politi-
cises upon the basis of this self-understanding. Until very recently 
the Scottish working class were just as reductionist as their mid-
dle-class ‘managers’ in leaving divisive non-materialistic matters 
well alone in order to keep to the ‘liberal peace,’ and we may say 
until 1967 this class left half of its dasein out of its politics lest any 
‘inflated’ holistic issues of identity jeopardise their immediate eco-
nomic interests, so that if the temptation to ‘economism’ or ‘scar-
city thinking’ among the working class is fated to remain so long 
as the mirror of production (Baudrillard) remains, so it is likely 
that their mobilising and politicising nationality may be relatively 
straightforward with the real prize after independence being the 
emergence of a self-understanding free from non-integralist forms 
such as liberalism and materialism.
The ‘thick events’ of 1 July 1999 and 18 September 2014 
require ‘thick explanations,’ and insofar as they are the result of 
a history of preceding political events and the effects of affluence 
and a symbolic revolution that uncoupled the ’79 generation from 
the symbolic order of their parents’ generation, these dates in 
Scotland’s history represent something that no previous generation 
has achieved: an electorally significant new integration of 
nation and state or the re-socialisation of the nation along 
class lines. After 1979-1997 (and again after 2010) only the 
inheritors (Bourdieu) and politically ‘over-represented’ middle-
class Conservatives fail to draw the nationalist conclusion, so that 
after this time a new class-nation-culture alignment was more or 
less fated to make its way onto the stage, but not as the mouthpiece 
for the superannuated clichés of modernism. If many of the ’45 
working-class generation do not participate in this alignment it 
is as a result of belonging to traditions that are defined by the 
disavowal of imagining dasein in a holistic manner and their 
appropriation of union, Empire and a secularised Protestantism 
which they use to imagine themselves.
This working-class generation, then, are defined by their 
internalisation of categories that collude with their subjugation so 
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that the members of the local history group revealed a lifelong 
alienation from the deep narrative of Scotland and their lifelong 
work of ‘forgetting’ that is a homage to a job well done by such a 
symbolic order. There is, however, a transvaluation of symbolic 
systems underway insofar as the meaning of social positionality, 
nationality and locality between the generations has changed from 
being an ‘eternal’ imprisonment in subordination to being the 
departure point for an empowering project insofar as a basic 
‘social ontology,’ that in one generation was complicit in consigning 
people into the invisibility of shame, has become the ballast or 
pearl of great price that purchases the tasks of freedom and 
secures the resumption of an unfinished project of integralism in 
the next generation; a positionality that in one generation meant 
being condemned to an eternal treadmill of catching-up, but in the 
next generation is the freedom from all such imposed relations to 
history and the present-day order thanks to breaking from a 
cultural subordination.
If at any time there is no surer sign of being dominated and 
having surrendered to power than having appropriated the 
signification of history developed by the dominant, so there is no 
greater sign of appropriating the ‘tasks of freedom’ than the 
conscious rejection of the signification work of elites. If there is a 
healthy rejection of the old unionist cud among the working class, 
it seems the Scottish middle classes are still largely trapped in a 
‘dominated’ or unfree relation to their domination of Scottish 
society, insofar as they fail to break with their domination or their 
traditional exercise of power. These tensions can only heighten in 
the run up to September 2014 as both classes come under pressure 
from the weight of the historic moment to break with the 
modernist signification of history, and to the extent they manage 
this, their contribution to the ‘present as history’ will be more 
than simply working out the terms of their surrender to the clichés 
of modernism. If “an ethically constituted nation lives in direct 
unity with its own substance, and…on its organized distribution 
into the spheres of the various classes, each with its particular way 
of acting which co-operates to form the whole” (Hegel 1967, 
p. 710), then we can say that just as the individual intellectually 
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recapitulates the life led by an act of self-understanding, so a 
nation’s history can be recapitulated, and can be made to come 
into alignment with itself ad fontes once again in the event of 
a ‘yes’ vote in September 2014, so that the tear in the nation’s 
substance and story can be finally healed.
If the opportunity for a nation to become identical with 
itself once again is rare, in the case of the individual person it is 
true to say that he or she ordinarily is free at any time to embark 
upon the project of self-appropriation, notwithstanding it is a 
task that requires years of effort. My account of the fundamental 
‘secondary ontology’ of working-class dasein, then, was pre-
paratory to the act of self-appropriation and agreement with 
Aristotle’s teaching of the unique value of truth and that a man 
can only possess himself by knowing himself. In this regard 
Christian theologians teach that men, unlike angels, are not born 
in full possession of their powers and so require childhood and 
youth to come into full possession of their powers. Similarly, no 
man can know himself immediately but must make a long effort 
to do so, as a man does not possess his existence like the stone 
in his hand which is always identical with itself and always is 
what it is and suffers no diremption within itself. Unlike a stone, 
however, a man only comes fully into possession of himself 
intellectually and when this happens there is then and only then 
the apotheosis of dasein and thought being integrated and the 
predicament whereby “human reality as for-itself is a lack and 
that what it lacks is a certain coincidence with itself” (Sartre 1966, 
p. 147) is resolved. Conceptual self-knowledge then is a perfection 
of an antepredicative or merely embodied way of being working 
class and is the only basis upon which to recommend the 
intellectual life (Sertillanges 1947) to the working class as a means 
of liberation.
In taking from Hegel the dialectic of being and nothingness 
Sartre recognised this dialectic “historicises itself in the time of 
Duns Scotus” (Sartre 1966, p. 669), so that at this point in 
European history the insistence upon the radical indeterminacy of 
dasein opened the way to the dissolution of a universal Man by 
the action of time and place and history, and with the benefit 
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of hindsight we can see that this was just the opening salvo in the 
shift to immanence and humanity by this son of St. Francis, as it 
was simultaneously a turning to the world, time, history and 
social structure. Happily, self-appropriation transcends the 
dispersal and deconstruction of the subject insofar as the dispersal 
of self can be ‘totalised’ into its adequate concept so that lives can 
be intellectually recapitulated. Such is the privilege of intellection 
and it is how we answered the dogmatism of Sartre (1966, p. 268) 
when he adverts to the “perpetually indicated but impossible 
fusion of essence and existence.’’ More generally, insofar as 
“Scotus stood at the centre of a paradigm shift in the late Twelfth 
century” (Pickstock 2003, p. 11), he and others effected a turning 
to the soteriological value of the social realm and it is at this point 
that can be seen the origin of the social sciences thanks to Scotus 
and his contemporaries and near-contemporaries being men who 
“never lost sight of…the burden of our freedom” (Broadie 1990, 
p. 51). The Scottish Enlightenment, then, was regressive when 
seen in this younger and earlier light, and is exemplified in the 
example of Hume who was a devout unionist whose much-lauded 
‘science of Man’ had no use for the exercise of sovereignty upon 
the basis of his ownmost dasein, other than its dissolution via 
union with England thanks to his view that this was the only road 
to the modernisation of Scotland and to accomplishing the shift 
from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft.
Today’s modernist nationalists of course will not repeat 
the mistakes of eighteenth-century ‘scarcity unionists’ as they 
understand that if modernity is to be real it must bend to Scottish 
dasein, and be refracted through this medium if it is to occur at 
all. Fully-contextualised Scottish dasein, then, is the condition for 
the possibility of modernity in Scotland rather than the sacrificial 
victim to be offered up that modernity may come. Like every 
nationalist, I too am a nationalist because it is in my modernising 
interests but my imagining of modernity “takes modernity back to 
its Scotist roots” (Pickstock 2003, p. 14) and in the interests of 
identifying the social carrier of this vision I have outlined the 
fundamental ontology of a particular situated or contextualised 
dasein and its natural condition and its natural and supernatural 
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beatitude, by building upon a real ethnographic foundation as 
opposed to entrusting such a project to a particular economic 
theory or a particular view of worker exploitation or a particular 
view of history or a particular religious tradition.
In the specific case of Scotland today, to be coeval with the 
times is to be concerned with the emergence of a full or whole 
ontology in which political independence is only a part, and in 
which a break with modernist nationalism is necessary as there 
can be no question of independence being the remedy for all the 
ills of Scotland but rather one of the conditiones sine qua non of 
the larger project of modernity which simultaneously includes the 
drama of social subordination and the drama of human knowing 
and the drama of secondary natures being released from out-dated 
conceptions and subjugations and, for some of us at least, the 
advent of the supernatural as integral elements of this drama. In 
arguing modernism has to be consciously rejected the aim is 
to avoid an epidemic of ‘successful lazy nationalism’ that in 
proportion to becoming popular rushes into making all of the 
mistakes of modernism. In this regard modernism is consubstantial 
with the imaginations of left-wing liberal authors who as part 
of their class condition seem fated to imagine the immanent end 
of all sorts of repressive and determining realities rather than 
the democratisation and nationalisation of a long durée tension 
and project.
This misrecognition became an epidemic in post-structuralism 
and post-modernism and is exemplified in many pre-1989 Marxist 
and liberal intellectuals who proclaimed with invincible confi-
dence that nationalism was a spent force, and argued for an inter-
nationalist organisation of geo-political space until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the 
USSR. The post-modern flight from History reveals its kinship 
with modernism’s original attempt to re-signify or re-imagine the 
real history of Europe whereby it became a ‘pre-history’ spent in 
preparation for the arrival of Man no longer mystified in his con-
sciousness with regard to himself, and this has been the signature 
fantasy of the middle-class intellectual as this ‘beginning from 
scratch’ fantasy continually dilutes the meaning of European 
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history and is the cipher for this class’s myth about itself because, 
at all times, thanks to its social condition, this class views 
participation in real historic Traditions as obsolete because this 
myth is how this class imagines it achieves its true historical 
consciousness, so that anything that threatens its modernist 
self-understanding or its ‘leadership of history’ is automatically 
seen as a threat to its hegemony, and any fidelity to any belief or 
tradition that jeopardises this is more or less fated to be rejected.
To take the obvious examples, then, as soon as the disciplines, 
repressions and rigors of family, community and church were 
conceived to be purely human constructs with no analogia entis, 
the motivation to maintain these tensions and institutions in 
conditions of modernity was weakened, and instead of maintaining 
a tension there was the surrender to new social conditions, with 
the result that thinkers more or less coerced themselves into 
a spectatorial gaze upon history and society and their own dasein 
as they liquidated the work of synthesising Tradition and the 
New, and thereby deconstructed the tasks of freedom without 
knowing it. This is why the imagined liquidation of Tradition was 
the precondition for their emergence to domination of European 
commercial society because participating in and esteeming the 
historical Christian tradition was fated to become beneath its 
self-estimation because at some point retaining belief involved 
jeopardising their new hegemony. If the middle class is just as 
much in need of transcending its ownmost modernist relation to 
history just as the working class too must break with their ‘unfree’ 
relation to their condition of domination, this is unlikely because 
the middle class’s ‘signature predicament’ arises from its social 
condition which is to never be coerced into facing what the lower 
classes because of their social conditions are more or less coerced 
into facing i.e. the existential need to break from its accommodations 
to the status quo, so as to rise to a practice and imagining of 
power or sovereignty or agency and be forced to change society in 
the process.
Because of the very early liquidation of its institutions and 
its holistic conception of dasein as a result of its failings and 
poverty and a powerful and insecure Protestant English monarch 
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on its border, Scotland is arriving late to what every other country 
already knows i.e. that to be modern it is a condicione sine qua 
non to not reject the ballast of the past. If the ‘dictatorship of 
scarcity’ prevented the ’45 generation from making their geo-
political relations in their ownmost image, and if their scarcity 
way of ‘being modern’ followed established British lines, a new 
working-class generation’s affluent and reflexive way of ‘being 
modern’ and new way of being working class sees them reaching 
beyond eighteenth-century compromises with English power to 
the original twelfth-century template in order to re-imagine itself. 
As an ethnographer of the working class, my modernity and 
my nationalism are sociologically grounded in an emergent ’79 
working-class generation thanks to the advent of affluence and 
the extension of higher education. In this reading, the wider 
significance of Scottish nationalism is that it is an attempt to 
address the crisis of the European imagination via the appropriation 
of this original European vision of modernity; an attempt to 
recapture a vision that synthesises transcendence and history and 
which retains the analogia entis and, by rejecting supernaturalism, 
disenchanted nature and human society as it discovered the 
purely natural and social or public realm, and recognised and 
maintained the tension between immanence and transcendence 
and the soteriological value of ‘secondary natures.’ This vision of 
every social formation and every secular station in life and every 
standpoint (class, nationality, generation, gender etcetera) occupied 
by the Christian-in-the-world being ‘charged’ with a theonomic 
dialectic was lost sight of firstly by the Renaissance and then the 
Protestant reformation, and thereafter by the secular modernism 
of the nineteenth century era of commerce. The worker-inquirer-
knower-Christian, then, must recover all of this if the twenty-first 
century is to simultaneously retrieve and inaugurate another era 
of Scottish modernity.
1 July 1999 and 18 September 2014 are the empirical events 
that evidence historicity and nationality remain integral to modern 
dasein because these are the days when the Scots go back three 
hundred years of pseudo-modernity to retrieve a twelfth century 
institution (Brown and Tanner 2004) to salvage the adequate 
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medium to express their nationality, historicity and social condition 
by and resume their adequate being-in-the-world. It is clear then 
that some aspects of dasein can not be opted out of or privatised 
despite three hundred years of trying, and the failed modernist 
experiment of the United Kingdom and non-holistic self-
understandings are coming to an end insofar as the Scots decide 
this is no longer imaginable. As a result of the fifteen years that 
have passed since 1 July 1999 the presence of England within 
the Scottish imagination has declined precipitously, and yet at 
the election of May 2010 to the British parliament in London 
when the Scots elected 50 (out of a possible 51) members of 
parliament who were not Conservatives only to have a Conservative 
government imposed upon them, it remains clear that Scotland 
remains within the ‘1979-1997 syndrome.’
As a result of the unprecedented level of ‘brokenness’ of 
Britain, the following year the Scots concluded that the Scottish 
National Party best reflected and represented them, and judged 
the SNP as the most competent defenders and promoters of their 
historicity and nationality or their ‘palette of many colours.’ 
The electoral success of the SNP then is based upon the fact that 
more and more Scots have a particular conception of themselves 
that means being governed by politicians who lack this same 
particular imagining of Scotland feels like an intolerable absence 
of themselves from their own public sphere. ‘The people’ wish to 
be represented by politicians who share the same imagining 
of Scotland that they have, and if this is how the Scots wish to 
connect with their political representatives it is because they want 
their holistically conceived and enacted-via-practice dasein and 
mitsein to be the medium of their imagination and culture and 
politics and intellectual and cultural and spiritual lives, and when 
Lesley Riddoch stated that Scottish independence is a cause to 
which “people are bringing their entire selves” she was adverting 
to this desire for an integral politics.
Because of this integralism and the desire to practice it, the 
current post-devolution period is palpably an interregnum period 
where until independence is achieved we must wander between 
two worlds, one dead and the other about to be born, and in this 
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interregnum it is difficult not to write Heideggerian-like sentences 
such as Scotland “has a calling to renew the question of Being” 
(Fried 2000, p. 41), or that the Scots on 18 September 2014 
fundamentally must choose themselves, and choose to pursue the 
society they want to make at this historic turning of the tide. In 
2007 and 2011 the Scottish electorate judged the SNP as the party 
that was conscious of what was at stake, while ‘scarcity thinking’ 
unionists continued to beat their monochromatic drum of ‘scarcity 
thinking’ and lead the call for a return to ‘bread and butter’ issues. 
Increasingly, the truth for unionist politicians is they have nothing 
interesting to say to the electorate to reverse their electoral 
fortunes and reanimate their parties because unionist politicians 
peddle a dasein deficit insofar as they do not allow themselves or 
the electorate to imagine a holistic or integral conception and 
practice of dasein and mitsein that would allow politicians and 
people to burn with the desire to put an end to the many 
suppressions of holism that literacy and affluence now make it 
possible to finally recognise and bring to an end.
A parliament that intervenes into the imagination as much as 
the economy is what is wanted; a parliament that has an adequate 
conception of dasein and that understands its electorate identify 
with being a proletariat as well as being a people and has no need 
for the ‘scarcity imagination’ that says they must choose between 
independence and the good society. The 2014 Independence 
Referendum, then, is the day the Scots have given themselves to 
put many errors right once and for all, so that if Scotland votes 
‘yes’ on 18 September 2014 it will be because its people have 
stopped imagining the future with only half of themselves and 
have had enough of trying to exist in the modern era upon the 
basis of renouncing their ownmost selves and their ownmost 
tasks.
We await their decision.
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